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Donald J. Trump’s extraordinary rise to the presidency of the United States evoked 
astonishment and wonder but also concern. Was Trump some sort of Russian agent? Had 
Moscow propelled Trump into the White House, and in the process sowed discord in 
society while undermining American democracy? Russia was presented as some sort of 
all-seeing and all-powerful malevolent force. According to this version, Moscow with 
extraordinary foresight had long cultivated Trump, and had enough kompromat 
(compromising material) to render him a faithful tool of Russian interests. The two 
colluded to get Trump elected on 8 November 2016, and that explains why he refused to 
accept the evidence presented by his intelligence agencies that Russia had ‘meddled’ in 
the election, and why he was so complimentary about the Russian president, Vladimir 
Putin. To critics, this version lacks factual basis, and while Russia may have been 
involved in 2016, its ‘active measures’ (aktivnye meropriyatiya) were at most marginal 
and certainly did not determine the outcome. As some of the more extreme versions of 
the Russiagate allegations unravelled, opinions converged on the view that the response 
to the claims of Russian interference may have been more damaging than the meddling 
itself.  
Four powerful narratives collide with explosive effect. First, Trump’s rise to the 
presidency was so extraordinary that people looked for some sort of external force that 
helped him win the most powerful office in the Western hemisphere. Second, US 
domestic politics, social discontents, insurgent social movements, discordant political 
ideologies and institutional and policy paralysis were clearly aligned in such a way as to 
allow this maverick figure to win an election that even he expected to lose. Third, by 
2016 the crisis of the post-cold war international order had precipitated wars in Georgia 
and Ukraine and the remilitarisation of European security signalled the onset of a new 
cold war. Finally, the contradictions and achievements of Russia’s domestic 
transformation gave rise to the Putin phenomenon, a mixture of tough-minded re-
assertion of perceived Russian national interests accompanied by a thorough 
disenchantment with the West. Thus, if anyone was going to be blamed for Trump’s 
ascent, then it would be Russia. 
This has been a difficult book to write. First, there is the fundamental 
methodological problem that we still do not know what really happened. Much of the 
relevant material remains classified, although in the late Trump years much important 
material came into the public domain. Amid the swirling tide of conspiracy theories and 
endless allegations and counter claims, it is hard to maintain balance and judgement. This 
work has drawn on major official documentation, Congressional records, a rich seam of 
first-hand memoirs and reams of secondary analysis, as well as interviews with some 
Russian and American policy analysts and participants. Second, the logic and dynamic of 
Russian actions remain the source of considerable controversy. Some Russian actions 
were misguided, some outright malevolent, and some largely innocent, but in this story 
always interpreted in the worst possible light by those responsible for America’s security. 
Too err on the side of caution is understandable, even commendable, but the projection of 
domestic political polarisation and conflicts into international affairs, especially when 
dealing with a nuclear-armed power, is dangerous to the point of foolhardiness. One of 





induced suspicion, and Moscow was ready to reciprocate. The Russiagate allegations not 
only put an end to hopes of rapprochement but also damaged relations to make them 
worse than for most of the original cold war. Third, and this is the essence of the 
Russiagate tragedy, many people acting out of the best of motives – US security and the 
defence of American democracy – helped provoke the further polarisation of American 
society, the deepening of distrust in the electoral process, the corruption of the media, the 
politicisation of the security services and, above all, the sowing of mistrust between two 
great powers that will poison relations for years to come.    
The problem, then, is how to cover all four issues, without the book becoming 
monstrous in size and confused in presentation. In what follows coverage of the four 
themes will be unequal, with the focus on the first: the core Russiagate charge that Russia 
‘meddled’ in the US presidential election in a variety of ways to shape the outcome, 
accompanied by the fundamental allegation that Trump in some way ‘colluded’ with 
Russia to win the White House. The overall methodology is interpretive analysis 
accompanied by process tracing and detailed analysis. In trying to make sense of it all, 
the question then arises: sense from whose perspective? In the polarised politics of today, 
and in conditions of the intense passions provoked by the new cold war, truth itself has 
become a victim, just as it did in the original cold war from the late 1940s to 1989. In the 
cold war foundational perspectives themselves became the basis of the confrontation, 
with varieties of socialism (mostly in conflict with each other) ranged against defenders 
of liberal capitalist modernity; with an important strand of democratic socialism in 
between, accompanied by various peace movements and the Non-Aligned Movement. 
Such foundational narratives are now mostly a thing of the past, but instead of heralding a 
new era of peace, reconciliation and enlightenment (as so many anticipated at the end of 
the cold war in 1989), the institutional and ideational structures of the cold war were 
perpetuated in the West, while in the East the democratic norms of tolerance, political 
pluralism, transparency and accountability remain far from consolidated. 
It soon became clear that official narratives and accounts were no more truthful, 
and often quite considerably less so, than a range of alternative sources. The traditional 
print media and their associated web sites lined up on one side or another as the 
Russiagate story unfolded, and very few remained objective as the traditional values of 
impartiality and truth-seeking became victim to partisanship. Trump freely denounced 
anything he did not like as ‘fake news’ and his relationship with the fact-based world was 
notoriously tenuous; but his opponents, some of whom called themselves ‘the resistance’, 
often created a no less misleading ‘alternative reality’ that undermined their own 
credibility. Commentary on Russia became a free-fire zone, in which respectable 
journalists and commentators presented distortions and misrepresentations as fact. 
Standard methods of causality, intentionality and rationality appear to have gone out of 
the window. In coverage of Russiagate, old-fashioned mainstream standards of 
‘bourgeois objectivity’ appear to have dissolved. There is little of use in the voluminous 
output of the various think tanks on both sides of the Atlantic, and some is as 
propagandistic as it was during the cold war. This explains why alternative sources of 
information have become so important. The web-based information sphere is certainly 
full of cranky views and conspiracy theories, but some sites offered consistently fine and 






Russiagate is a combination of many things. Ultimately, it throws a profound light 
on the major political dilemmas of our times, ranging from the rise of a new type of 
societal and state-centred populism, the breakdown of the post-cold war international 
order, the erosion of traditional patterns of civility and due process, the consolidation of 
the power of a cross-national security apparatus that became the driver of a whole set of 
political actions, and the legitimate scope for resistance to a properly-elected president 
who threatened the foundations of the system that allowed him to be elected. Russia was 
used as the stick by Trump’s opponents with which to beat him, but thereby only 
exacerbated the domestic and international crises which gave rise to him in the first place. 
With so many plots, sub-plots and red herrings, it is hard to make sense of it all, but if at 
the end the reader understands at least the main issues and facts of the case, then this 
book will have succeeded in its purpose.  
 












THE RUSSIANS ARE COMING 
 
 
It was not supposed to be like this. The world was surprised in 2016 when Donald J. 
Trump became the Republican Party candidate for the American presidency, and amazed 
when he went on to win the presidential election on 8 November. The Democratic Party 
nominee, Hillary Rodham Clinton, was an experienced politician with a long record of 
public service, whereas Trump had never held public office. Polls throughout the 
campaign had shown Clinton with a strong lead, and although the gap narrowed in the 
final days, her victory appeared assured. How, then, did she manage to lose a race that 
was hers to win? The answer had been lurking in the background throughout the 
campaign, but now emerged with full force: Russian interference. This explained the 
inexplicable. A malevolent entity with extraordinary foresight had cultivated Trump and 
gathered compromising material to turn him into a faithful servant of Russian interests. 
As a result, so the story goes, the Russian president Vladimir Putin colluded with Trump 
to get the latter elected as the ‘Manchurian candidate’, a man whose identity had been 
reshaped to serve his masters in the Kremlin.1 It appeared to fulfil Philip Roth’s Plot 
against America, in which an outsider with weak democratic credentials takes the 
presidency with the help of a foreign power.2 For his critics, this explains why Trump 
refused to accept the evidence presented by intelligence agencies that Russia had 
interfered in the election, and why he was so complimentary about Vladimir Putin. 
However, for Trump and his supporters, the Russia accusations were not only absurd but 
also tainted his victory and deprived him of room for manoeuvre in relations with Russia. 
The idea that he was little more than a Russian stooge who collaborated with Moscow for 
political and economic benefit undermined the legitimacy of his victory and paralysed his 
ability to govern. By any standards, this is an extraordinary story, and its various 




Russiagate is one of the most mystifying yet consequential events of our time. It stymied 
Trump’s declared foreign policy ambitions while damaging the quality of American 
democracy. Two issues collided with explosive effect. The first was the crisis in 
American domestic institutions and political processes. American domestic conflicts, 
social discontents, working class job insecurity, stagnant middle-class incomes, insurgent 
social movements, polarised political ideologies and institutional paralysis combined with 
 
1 The image draws on the spy-fiction novel by Richard Condon, The Manchurian Candidate 
(New York, McGraw Hill, 1959), which was twice filmed (1962 and 2004), in which the Kremlin 
places an agent in the White House. For an analysis of the Cold war anxieties explored by the 
book and the 1962 film, see Matthew Frye Jacobson and Gaspar Gonzalez, What Have they Built 
You To Do? The Manchurian Candidate and Cold War America (Minneapolis, University of 
Minnesota Press, 2006). 
2 In Roth’s case, the outsider was Charles Lindbergh, and the outside power in the 1940 election 





business, defence and intelligence groups to allow a maverick figure to win an election 
that even he expected to lose. The country was clearly looking for change, but instead of 
offering a fresh candidate Clinton was the epitome of establishment thinking, who 
effectively stood as the continuity candidate of the Barack Obama two-term presidency 
(2009-2017). These domestic tensions intersected with the crisis of the post-cold war 
international order. By 2016 the conflict in Ukraine was in its third year, accompanied by 
the increased militarisation of European security and the deprecation of Russia. This 
signalled the onset of a new cold war, in which the ideological confrontation and great 
power contestation of the original cold war from the late 1940s to 1989 were resurrected. 
The roots of the second conflict lie in the way that issues remained unresolved at the end 
of the first. In the 25 years between the end of the original cold war in 1989 and the onset 
of the second in 2014 none of the fundamental problems of European security had been 
resolved. The expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Russia’s 
increasing resistance to the enlargement of the Atlantic power system gave way to 
renewed cold war.3  Russia became a challenger state apparently seeking revenge by 
supporting Trump, who had signalled that he would improve relations with Moscow.  
The basic allegation is that in one way or another the Russian state or affiliated 
agencies colluded with Trump’s campaign team to enhance his prospects while reducing 
those of Clinton. Collusion is defined as ‘secret or illegal cooperation, especially between 
countries or organisations’, which suggests that such activity may be either good or bad, 
although the illegal character of the activity means that there is a presumption of 
something nefarious going on. In our case, this is certainly the relevant interpretation. 
The collusion between Trump and the Russian authorities was allegedly prompted by a 
long-term strategy to cultivate him as a Russian ‘asset’, including by supporting his 
schemes, some of which faced perilous finances (it was not for nothing that Trump was 
known as ‘the king of debt’), as well as holding compromising material (kompromat) on 
him. The collusion is alleged to have taken the form of various meetings between 
campaign staffers and the Russian authorities, including with the veteran Russian 
ambassador to the US, Sergei Kislyak. The various contacts between Trump associates 
and the Russian regime are alleged to have been the result of some sort of malfeasance or 
collusion, turning Trump into the ‘Siberian candidate’, a mutation of the earlier cold war 
Manchurian variant. 
To achieve their goal, Russian military intelligence (the GRU) ‘hacked’ into the 
server of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Democratic Campaign 
Congressional Committee (DCCC) and released embarrassing materials to WikiLeaks, 
the web-based investigative site founded by Julian Assange in 2006. The publication of 
44,053 emails and 17,761 attachments from senior DNC officials provoked speculation 
that their release was coordinated with the Trump team. The messages revealed that the 
DNC was not impartial but sought to facilitate the nomination of Clinton and acted to the 
detriment of the independent left-leaning senator from Vermont, Bernie Sanders. The aim 
was to mine political intelligence, but whether it was intended specifically to help Trump 
win the election is more questionable. As we shall see, there is a question whether the 
 
3 Richard Sakwa, Russia against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order (Cambridge, 






DNC was hacked, with WikiLeaks insisting that the material was leaked from an 
identified source. 
The hackers also gained access to the emails of Clinton’s campaign director, John 
Podesta, following a successful spearphishing email sent on 19 March 2016. The Podesta 
emails exposed Clinton’s close relationship with Wall Street bankers, high speaking fees 
for secret speeches and apparent hypocrisy in condemning privilege while enjoying its 
benefits. There was also information about the Clinton Foundation and unflattering 
personal material about Clinton. The genuine revelations spawned a sub-industry of 
conspiracy theories, including the fabricated claim that the emails contained coded 
messages that connected leading Democrats with some restauarants and an alleged 
human trafficking and child sex ring (the Pizzagate conspiracy theory). Overall, 
WikiLeaks published 64,000 Podesta emails, releasing them gradually (unlike the 
massive 22 July DNC release), which kept the email issue in the news all the way 
through to the November election. There was a ceaseless drip of embarrassing 
revelations, above all about the relentless pursuit of funds by Clinton and her team. The 
Podesta emails reinforced the image of Clinton as unprincipled and greedy.  
At the same time, Russia is alleged to have waged a social media campaign to 
support Trump but above all to ‘sow discord’ in American politics and thus to undermine 
American democracy. The Internet Research Agency (IRA) based in St Petersburg 
deployed sock-puppet (trolls) accounts (humans who pretend to be what they are not) and 
their automated versions (bots) to influence public debate by sharing sites and voicing 
divisive opinions. These allegedly shaped voter preferences and depressed turnout among 
some key constituencies, above all people of colour. In what turned out to be a tight 
election, Russian social media interference may have switched the vote in crucial swing 
states, notably Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. A swing of just 77,744 votes 
would have have tipped these states into Clinton’s camp.4 There is much debate over the 
effect of these Russian social media interventions, which were tiny in comparison with 
the total vast output. The IRA did pump out material that was derogatory about Clinton, 
but much of this output had nothing to do with the election (it was clickbait designed to 
increase traffic), and a large proportion came after voting day. However, even small 
pressure could have tilted the scales in certain strategic locations, especially when 
amplified by mass media reporting of the issue.  
During the campaign John Bolton, who was to serve as Trump’s third national 
security adviser between April 2018 and September 2019, called Russian electoral 
interference an ‘act of war’.5  The seriousness of the allegations provoked numerous 
investigations by US security agencies and Congressional committees, complemented 
from May 2017 by a special counsel investigation headed by Robert S. Mueller III. 
Mueller was tasked to investigate ‘any links and/or coordination between the Russian 
government and individuals associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump’. 
During his term as director of the FBI from 2001 to 2013 Mueller shifted the focus of the 
agency’s work from combating US crime to fighting global terror. A graduate of 
Princeton, Mueller was one of the last of the old-school Ivy League Republicans whose 
sense of public duty eschewed personal vanity and entitlement. The contrast could hardly 
 
4 Larry J. Sabato, Kyle Kondik and Geoffrey Skelley (eds), Trumped: The 2016 Election that 
Broke all the Rules (New York, Rowman &Littlefield, 2017), p. 5. 





be greater with Trump, who dismissed the investigation as a ‘witch-hunt’ and brusquely 
rejected the charge of collusion.  
The Mueller Report was completed in March and a redacted version was 
published on 28 April 2019. The Introduction boldly asserted that ‘The Russian 
government interfered in the 2016 election in sweeping and systematic fashion’.6 Those 
who looked to Mueller to provide some startling new evidence that would torpedo the 
Trump presidency were disappointed. The report examined the two known operations by 
Russian agencies, the GRU hacking and the St Petersburg trolling operation, and 
analysed the activities of the Russiagate cast and its major incidents: Trump’s foreign 
policy adviser Carter Page’s relations with Russia, the 9 June 2016 Trump Tower 
meeting between some Russians and Donald Trump Jr, the Paul Manafort case, the 
alleged offences of George Papadopoulos (another of Trump’s short-lasting foreign 
policy advisers), the meetings with Kislyak, and other arcana associated with the saga. 
Mueller’s equivocal formulation – that Russia interfered in a ‘systematic’ manner yet had 
not colluded with Trump; and the various incidents demonstrated not ‘sweeping’ but 
surprisingly insubstantial interference – opened a floodgate of commentary. The outcome 
came as no surprise for those who had long questioned the fundamental premise of the 
investigation, while for others Mueller was the God that failed to destroy the Trump 
presidency. 
The material on the IRA summarised the February 2018 indictment of 13 Russian 
nationals and Yevgeny Prigozhin (‘Putin’s cook’) who bankrolled the operation. The 
report asserted that the IRA’s aim was to ‘sow social discord’, but this was imputed 
rather than proved. The report concluded that ‘these operations constituted “active 
measures”’, a reference to Soviet disinformation activities. The report detailed 
Prigozhin’s publicly known ties to Putin, but the precise relationship between the IRA 
and the Kremlin was not analysed. The report cited the $100,000 that the IRA spent on 
Facebook ads as evidence of its influence on American society yet failed to place this in 
context. It implied that this paltry sum could have a greater effect than the $1.2 billion 
spent by the Clinton campaign, the Democratic Party and associated Political Action 
Committees (PACs), twice as much as the $600 million spent by the Trump campaign. 
The original indictment named a company that did not exist at the time, but this was later 
dropped from Mueller’s report.7  
 The report then detailed the specific GRU cyber-warfare units which hacked the 
Clinton campaign and the DNC and then released the emails through Russian-sponsored 
cut-outs, Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks, as well as WikiLeaks. These were ‘designed and 
timed to interfere with the 2016 US presidential election and undermine the Clinton 
Campaign’. Large parts were redacted, but as with the July 2018 indictment, the report 
suggested detailed knowledge of the inner workings of the GRU, to the point that 
‘evidence was sufficient to support computer-intrusion (and other) charges against GRU 
officers’. The report claims that the GRU hacked into 30 DNC and 29 DCCC computers 
and downloaded data using the ‘X-Tunnel’ software. The GRU gained access to Clinton 
 
6  Robert S. Mueller III, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 
Presidential Election, March 2019, Vol. 1, p. 1, https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf. 







campaign co-chair Podesta’s email account when he clicked on a spearphishing message 
on 19 March and gained access to the DCCC’s account when a staffer clicked on a 
similar email on 6 April 2016. As for the main hack of the DNC servers, the FBI or 
Mueller never conducted forensic examinations of their own. Instead, they relied on 
CrowdStrike, a private contractor hired by the Democrats to examine the servers. The 
material was then published, according to the report, through DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0, 
‘fictitious online personas’ created by the GRU, and later through WikiLeaks. Mueller 
argues that Guccifer 2.0 was the source of the emails and that he was a persona managed 
by Russian operators. 
Surprisingly, Mueller provided no proof of this, and neither did he give specific 
evidence of the transfer of the DNC emails from Guccifer 2.0 to WikiLeaks. Mueller 
admits that the ‘first known contact’ between Guccifer 2.0 and WikiLeaks was on 15 
September 2016, months after the documents were published. Instead, the report 
speculates on the use of ‘intermediaries’ in summer 2016.8 As we shall see, the degree to 
which WikiLeaks coordinated with the Kremlin in the publication of the emails is a 
matter of considerable controversy. Assange strongly rejects the charge that he worked 
for or conspired with Russian agencies and states unequivocally that the Russian 
government was not the source of the emails. This supports the view of those who argue 
that the DNC download took place via a local thumb drive (USB memory stick) and not 
remote exfiltration. Mueller devoted 199 pages to conspiracy (he rejected the term 
‘collusion’ as having no legal weight), but the evidence to support conspiratorial 
behaviour was remarkably thin. The second part of the report was devoted to obstruction, 
detailing eleven instances in which Trump and his team impeded or subverted the 
investigation.  
As the Mueller investigation ground on, the Trump administration tried to govern. 
It managed to push through a massive tax cut, intended to unleash hitherto suppressed 
entrepreneurial energies but its immediate effect was to deepen inequality. Funds to build 
Trump’s vaunted anti-immigrant wall with Mexico were not forthcoming, and in foreign 
policy Trump was unable to fulfil his campaign pledge to improve relations with Russia. 
The promise itself became the object of suspicion and fuelled the Russiagate 
investigations. Senior agent Peter Strzok, the head of the FBI’s counter-espionage section 
and lead Russiagate investigator, argues that ‘many of Trump’s actions, large and small, 
public and secret, were so inexplicably aligned with those of Russia that the coincidence 
– if it was a coincidence – had become impossible to ignore’.9 Trump’s challenge to the 
bipartisan new cold war consensus was considered less a rational policy option than some 
sort of intrigue. The FBI was convinced that Moscow held kompromat on Trump, forcing 
him to kowtow to Moscow.10 Trump then was forced to prove otherwise, encouraging the 
administration to adopt harsh measures including ramping up sanctions, expelling 
diplomats, closing consular offices and pursuing uncompromising policies in Ukraine and 
elsewhere.  
This was exacerbated by Trump’s appointment of hard-line security veterans to 
key positions, the so-called ‘adults in the room’. National security adviser General H. R. 
 
8 Mueller, Report, Vol. 1, p. 47. 
9 Peter Strzok, Compromised: Counterintelligence and the Threat of Donald J. Trump (Boston, 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2020), p. xvii. 





McMaster, chief of staff John Kelly and defence secretary Jim ‘mad dog’ Mattis were 
conventional cold war defenders of American primacy and exceptionalism. Bolton, who 
replaced McMaster in April 2018, was even more a forceful neoconservative 
interventionist, while Rex Tillerson’s replacement as secretary of state in the same 
month, Mike Pompeo, was hardly less militant. As the former head of ExxonMobil, 
Tillerson at least had the advantage of a close relationship with Putin, whom he visited 
regularly and from whom he received the Order of Friendship medal in 2013. Tillerson 
recounts how in 2014 in Sochi Putin told him that ‘I’ve given up on your President 
Obama. He doesn’t do anything he says he’s going to do. I can’t deal with someone who 
does not follow through on his promises. I’ll wait for your next president’.11 Putin also 
felt that the US treated Russia ‘like a banana republic’, and a year earlier warned that 
‘You Americans think you won the cold war. You did not win the cold war. We never 
fought that war. We could have, but we didn’t’, and he reminded Tillerson that Russia 
was a nuclear power ‘As powerful as you’.12 Tillerson told Mattis that the new president 
would have ‘an opening with Putin and could perhaps even develop a constructive 
relationship’.13 Mattis was sceptical, and in the end the Russiagate scandal put paid to 
whatever chance there may have been for that. 
Trump was undoubtedly the most disruptive postwar American president. His 
disdain for the multilateral institutions of the postwar international system and his open 
contempt for many of America’s traditional allies and the country’s alliance system as a 
whole did as much to weaken the country’s status and prestige as any other event in the 
modern era. To the degree that Moscow’s intervention helped get Trump elected, Russia 
was responsible for the deleterious consequences. This explains the intense bipartisan 
pressure to hold Russia to account. Congress was fired up by the charges of Russian 
interference to adopt draconian new sanctions, greatly extending those adopted by 
executive order by Obama. In July 2017 the House of Representatives voted 419-3 and 
on 28 July the US Senate voted 98-2 in support of what is officially called ‘HR 3364 
Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act’ or CAATSA. The measure 
limited the president’s ability to ease or lift sanctions. Given the overwhelming vote in 
Congress, Trump on 2 August 2017 (regretfully) signed the legislation into law. 
Concessions, and even engagement, with Russia were interpreted as proof that Trump 
was in some way beholden to Moscow. Relations with Russia deteriorated to a level 
below anything seen during the original cold war. With few substantive channels of 
communication between the two major nuclear powers and with no rules of engagement, 
the danger of conflict was probably higher than at any point since the Second World War. 
 
Russiagate and new cold war 
 
The suffix ‘gate’ since the Watergate break-in and subsequent cover-up by President 
Richard Nixon in the early 1970s denotes some sort of scandal and is today used to cover 
a multitude of sins. The roots of the Watergate scandal lie in Nixon’s attempt to spy on 
the campaign of his Democratic opponents in 1972, and since then the term has been 
 
11 Bob Woodward, Rage (London and New York, Simon & Schuster, 2020), p. 8. 
12 Woodward, Rage, p. 9. 





cheapened by its profligate use, yet in this case its application is appropriate.14  The 
Russiagate scandal is if anything of greater consequence than the original Watergate 
scandal. In the earlier case, the dogged investigation by two Washington Post reporters, 
Carl Bernstein and Robert Woodward, in the end provoked Nixon’s resignation on 9 
August 1974.15 Their investigation still has the power to enthral and remains a testimony 
to the values of independent journalism of a more innocent era. Truth could still be 
distinguished from falsehood and so-called ‘fake news’ had still not appeared, although 
‘disinformation’ – the presentation of material intended to deceive – was certainly 
present. In Russiagate the main media organisations and commentators lined up on one 
side or the other and accused the other of disinformation. Russiagate is a symptom of the 
polarised political culture of our times and the decline of what were once described as the 
Enlightenment values of impartiality and truth-seeking. This creates ‘neo-journalism’, in 
which the story is tailored to an existing set of beliefs. 
 This was exacerbated by the pressures of post-war international confrontation. 
Michael Glennon advances a sophisticated version of the idea of a ‘deep state’, based not 
on some conspiracy of the left or right to undermine democratic institutions but the 
structural development of the American state after 1945. Drawing on the distinction 
drawn in the late nineteenth century by the British journalist Walter Bagehot between the 
‘dignified’ institutions such as the monarchy and the House of Lords, and the ‘efficient’ 
institutions such as the cabinet and House of Commons that actually do the governing, 
Glennon applies this dual state model to the US. The ‘dignified’ institutions in his view 
are Madisonian: the courts, Congress and the presidency that draw their authority from 
the constitution. However, in foreign and security policy the country is governed by 
‘Trumanite’ entities: the ramified national security structures and associated corporations 
spawned by the cold war that survived and proliferated afterwards. 16  The close ties 
between business, the state and the public sphere are well documented.17 The Trumanite 
bodies endure because of the legitimacy they gain by being embedded in the Madisonian 
matrix; but the effectiveness of constitutional control has withered because of the 
inherent complexity of national security issues as well as the enduring bipartisan 
ideological consensus on America’s ‘leadership’ (reformulated in the Trump era as 
‘greatness’) in world affairs. Obama-era White House staffer Ben Rhodes termed the 
foreign policy establishment ‘the blob’.18 This group, mostly located in Washington and 
its environs, is preoccupied by the apparent decline of American hegemony: ‘It has been 
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distinguished by its unwillingness, or inability, to reconsider or reprioritize national 
interests that were first defined after World War II, and then continued, by and large, on 
auto-pilot after the end of the cold war’.19 Trump challenged what he considered to be the 
ossified and anachronistic ‘Trumanite’ multilateral formats of the national security state 
abroad, notably NATO, which confirmed the concerns of the military-intelligence 
community, who then naturally ramped up the Russiagate allegations. 
 The Democrats argue that Trump conspired with the Russians to win the election, 
but Michael Wolff (the author of one of the earliest exposés of the Trump administration) 
notes that ‘the Trumpers believed that the Obama administration had conspired with the 
intelligence community to make it seem [italics in original] as if Trump and his people 
had conspired with the Russians to fix the election. It was not Trump and the Russians 
who had successfully stolen the election; it was Obama and his cohorts who had tried and 
failed to steal it’.20  According to Andrew McCarthy, a trenchant critic of the Russiagate 
allegations, the ‘real collusion scheme’ was not with Russia. Instead, the Obama 
administration ‘put the awesome powers’ of the US security apparatus in the service of 
getting Clinton elected and, failing that, to set in motion an ‘insurance policy’ in the 
unlikely event that Trump won. This took the form of an investigation that Trump ‘would 
be powerless to shut down’, which would ‘simultaneously monitor and taint him’, and 
that would internalise ‘Clinton campaign-generated opposition research, limning Trump 
and his campaign as complicit in Russian espionage’. The investigation would ‘hunt for a 
crime under the guise of counterintelligence’.21 In short, Trump’s opponents used the 
collusion narrative to defeat him, ‘and if they could not defeat him, to undermine his 
presidency – in hopes of defeating him next time’.22 Gregg Jarrett describes how the FBI 
and Obama’s administration improperly worked to get Clinton elected, and when that 
failed they went on the offensive against Trump to undo the election and to remove him 
as president. He argues that there was never any real evidence of ‘collusion’ between 
Trump and the Russians.23 If these accounts are accurate, then the real deception was 
perpetrated by elements within the Obama administration and intelligence community.24 
While Trump and his supporters became convinced that the deep state was out to 
get him, many liberals, who had previously been sceptical if not outright critical of the 
surveillance state, now believed that the security services were protecting democracy 
from ruin. 25  In the original cold war, particularly on the right, democracies were 
considered to be at a disadvantage against non-democracies because of the proclivity of 
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publics to appease dangerous adversaries.26 Paradoxically, as Russiagate developed it was 
the right-wing public that was less enthusiastic about ‘confronting’ Russia than the 
liberal-progressive internationalists, with the Clintonian Democrats in the lead. Threat 
inflation by interested parties tap into a deep well-spring of ‘militarized patriotism’ left 
over from the cold war to distort public debate.27 In the case of Russiagate, cold war 
legacies clearly predisposed leaders and the public to accept an exaggerated discourse of 
Russian malevolence. 
Democratic Party supporters were particularly inclined to take this view. The 
‘reset’ policy launched by Obama in 2009 ran into the sands because of the West’s 
intervention in Libya in 2011 and Russia’s turn to social conservatism and repression in 
the wake of the demonstrations against electoral fraud in the December 2011 State Duma 
election. The Putin who was elected for a third presidential term in March 2012 was 
alienated from the West and embittered by what he perceived to be the ingratitude of the 
Russian middle classes. The ‘anti-gay propaganda’ law of June 2013 particularly 
alienated Western liberals and prompted Obama to boycott the Sochi Winter Olympics in 
February 2014. The outbreak of open conflict over Ukraine in 2014 represented a further 
sharp deterioration in relations. This is what gave traction to the Russiagate allegations, 
and why during the campaign Clinton tried to link Trump to her pet enemy, Putin, and 
why afterwards this was transformed into an explanation for her defeat. This did not have 
the power to reverse the outcome, ‘but it did have enough influence to draw the nation 
into a prolonged period of hysterical denial of reality … for the Clinton fanatics it was 
self-evident – only some malevolent outside power could account for the triumph of the 
most repugnant monster who ever emerged from our television screens’.28 The Clintonian 
Democrats needed a scapegoat, and Russia proved more than fitting. The Kremlin 
explicitly challenged American hegemony, and in Russiagate this challenge was 
redefined as a threat to American democracy.  
 The relentless Russiagate investigation enraged Trump, but more importantly it 
stymied his declared intention of normalising relations with Russia. As Isikoff and Corn 
note, ‘Russia had become a rallying cry for his [Trump’s] tormentors – the original sin of 
his presidency, a scandal that raised questions about both his legitimacy and the nation’s 
vulnerability to covert information warfare’.29 Trump insisted that the whole business 
was ‘fake news’; whereas his opponents simply could not understand why he refused to 
accept the apparent unanimous findings of the intelligence community that Russia had 
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‘hacked’ the election.30 It was, after all, as the Washington Post put it, ‘the ‘crime of the 
century’.31 Former CIA director Michael Hayden described it as the ‘most successful 
covert operation in the history of intelligence’.32 Since Trump so wilfully appeared to 
ignore the information provided by his intelligence services and the consensus view of 
Russian malevolence shared by members of Congress and the media, then he must have 
something to hide. The default explanation was that Trump was in some way beholden to 
Putin, either because of financial dependency or because the Kremlin held power over 
him: ‘With Trump unable or unwilling to come to terms with Putin’s war on American 
democracy, it fell to government investigators and reporters to piece together the 
complete story’.33 
Russiagate once again demonstrates the power of narrative. American innocence 
and democracy were portrayed as under attack from a uniquely and historically 
malevolent force. Instead of focusing on the social and political discontents exposed by 
the campaign and Trump’s election, attention shifted to the Russian attack on American 
democracy. The outcome was presented as an historical aberration that could be remedied 
not at the ballot box but by some sort of judicial procedure. 34  This prompted the 
impeachment attempt from mid-2019, which served only to reinforce the elements of 
crisis in American democracy. Politics could not be revived by non-political means. It 
was no longer just generals and elites who fostered the confrontation, but the hatred of 
Russia’s alleged misdeeds and misbehaviour became a social project of information 
warfare and ultimately media manipulation. Sceptics were hesitant to speak out, given the 
powerful combination of forces arrayed against them. This Trump-era pathology of 
‘resistance journalism’ relieved commentators of traditional standards of integrity as long 
as their target was sufficiently disliked by mainstream liberal media venues. 35  This 
reckless form of neo-journalism ‘caused US politics to be drowned for three years in little 
other than salacious and fact-free conspiracy theories about Trump and his family 
members and closest associates’, notably that ‘Putin had infiltrated and taken over the US 
government through sexual and financial blackmail leverage over Trump and used it to 
dictate US policy’. 36  Matt Taibbi describes Russiagate as this generation’s ‘WMD’, 
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comparable to the falsehoods over weapons of mass destruction that justified the Iraq 
War in 2003.37 The New York Times published over 3,000 stories on Russiagate, with 
several published a day at the peak, most peddling the same line. In sum, ‘Future media 
historians may hold the Trump-Russia story to be a laboratory-perfect specimen of 
discourse concentration. For nearly two years, it towered over the information landscape 
and devoured the attention of the media and the public’.38  
This is the context for Russiagate. Trump of course dismissed not only the 
collusion narrative but the whole intelligence community view of Russian interference. 
He did this for obvious reasons since the alleged Russian interference not only 
constrained his policy choices but above all derailed his presidency and undermined the 
legitimacy of his election. Alleged Russian interference became bound up with virulently 
partisan considerations in which deception and self-deception operated in equal measure. 
Sanctions and the sharp fall in the oil price from late 2014 weakened Russia, and hence it 
was both a convenient and easy target. It had a long track record of opposing the West, 
something that irked the Democrats even more than the Republicans. Russia not only 
challenged US military hegemony, but also America’s role as the champion of the 
‘democratic peace’. The Russiagate scandal intersected with major challenges in 
domestic and international politics and amplified both. The election of a nonconformist 
outsider challenged the given order. Trump’s style was combative and extreme, and his 
business dealings had long shown disrespect for the rule of law and propriety and a 
propensity to gamble with the money of others. Yet Trump’s election reflected deep-
rooted dissatisfaction in American society to which he gave voice and expression. This 
book is not about the Trump presidency, but it will inevitably have to consider the way 
that his policies and behaviour, as well as that of his opponents, contributed to the crisis. 
In international politics Trump challenged many of the accustomed patterns of behaviour, 
and his ‘America first’ strategy discounted traditional alliances and multilateral 
organisations in favour of a raucous display of American power. Yet Trump in foreign 
policy, as at home, raised important questions about the character of the post-cold war 
international system. These issues came together in the Russiagate scandal. 
 
Deception and war 
 
What if Russian actions during the 2016 election were minimal and defensive, and there 
was no grand plot to ‘sow discord’ and undermine American democracy? What if Trump 
was right (and he was uniquely positioned to know) and there had been no collusion with 
Russia, and that Russian meddling was at most marginal and exerted no influence on the 
outcome? In that case, the endless years of the Russiagate scandal, in which every scrap 
of evidence was portrayed as the ‘smoking gun’ before being discredited, only for 
another issue to be played up for its few hours as the scandal du jour. If this is the case, it 
was not the actual events associated with Russiagate that harmed the country, but the 
ensuing exaggerated response. The portrayal of what may well have been a set of random 
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actions as equivalent to an attack on the country recalls other incidents in American 
history. In February 1898 the USS Maine blew up in Havana harbour, and the vast 
outpouring of patriotic anger attributed the loss to an act of Spanish perfidy, whereas it 
appears that a spark from ship’s furnace blew up the ammunition magazine. The 
explosion set the US on the path of imperial expansion, with the seizure of Cuba and a 
savage war in the Philippines. Equally, the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964 
propelled the US into full-scale war in Vietnam.  
Deception is defined as ‘the deliberate attempt on the part of leaders to mislead 
the public about the thrust of official thinking’.39 By this definition, deception must be 
deliberate. Based on three case studies – Franklin Roosevelt preparing the American 
public for war in 1941 (a case of strategic deception, considered to be in the national 
interest); the disinformation that accompanied America’s full-scale entry into the 
Vietnam War in 1964; and the outright falsehoods that provoked the US and its allies to 
attack Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq in 2003 – John Schuessler argues that deceit 
can in certain circumstances be justified if the goal is something that is in the national 
interest. The deceptive strategies employed by the British to get the US to enter the war 
against Hitler are an example of this.40 All the leaders were ‘economical with the truth’, 
but by the time we get to the Iraq War the US government and its allies peddled outright 
falsehoods. This also applies to the Afghanistan War launched in autumn 2001. In a 
report with disturbing echoes of the Pentagon Papers, documentation on US military 
involvement in Vietnam since 1945 exposed by Daniel Ellsberg in 1971, the American 
public was consistently misled about the scale of military failure in Afghanistan.41 The 
invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was presented as ‘a necessary war, not a war of choice, 
and the intelligence services and politicians provided an exaggerated and uniformly 
menacing view of the potential threat. Anyone who doubted that claim was almost certain 
to be labelled an appeaser or a fool, or even accused of being unpatriotic’. 42  The 
‘marketplace of ideas’ did not function very well in the run-up to this war.43 
Sun Tzu in The Art of War declared that ‘all warfare is based on deception’, but in 
our case this applies not only to the normal disinformation and propaganda campaigns 
waged by hostile states, but a situation in which ‘the art of war’ characterises domestic 
political conflict. In recent years American politics has become intensely polarised and 
parties have come to see each other as the enemy. Strategies of deception and 
misinformation are routinely deployed. In conditions of an emerging new cold war, a 
foreign power was implicated in these struggles, forging new chains of deception; and at 
the same time, domestic political struggls were projected into the international arena. 
John Mearsheimer notes that ‘if lying is pervasive in a democracy, it might alienate the 
public to the point where it loses faith in democratic government and is willing to 
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countenance some form of authoritarian rule’.44 Deception has profoundly deleterious 
foreign policy consequences, but self-deception has harmful domestic effects. Russiagate 
turned Russia from an adversary into an enemy and changed a confrontation into a new 
cold war.45 It also further polarised American domestic politics, with each side in the 
Russiagate conflict mobilising and distorting the evidence to buttress their case, with 
those loudest in condemning disinformation often the most egregious in distorting the 
facts.  
Two major narratives contend. In the first, a ‘soft on Russia’ fifth column had 
emerged, which then merged with the Trump campaign. Michael Flynn was the leading 
exemplar of this tendency. He headed the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) from July 
2012 to August 2014 and argued that the main problem was not Russia but Iran and allied 
terrorist groups. He warned Obama against arming the resistance to Bashar Al-Assad in 
Syria, predicting that it would only empower Islamic extremists. Concern was intensified 
in intelligence circles when Trump repeatedly spoke of the need to improve relations with 
Russia and refused to criticise Putin. This shaped the mainstream Russiagate narrative: 
that Trump in some way actively colluded with the Russian authorities to swing the 
election his way; that the various hacks of Democrat emails and their publication by 
WikiLeaks was coordinated with Moscow to damage the Clinton campaign; and that 
Russian social media activism substantively changed the outcome of the ballot. Entwined 
with all of these is the larger picture that Russia was an aggressive and dangerous foe 
determined to destroy Clinton’s campaign and above all to subvert American democracy. 
These are serious charges, and hence it was the duty of patriotic Americans and their 
allies to defeat these attacks, which bordered on war. Russia’s dupes, including Trump, 
were to be constrained, while exposing Trump’s unsuitability for office and opening 
avenues for impeachment.  
The second narrative is generated by the central paradox of Trump’s leadership. 
He was so manifestly unsuited for high office that ‘defenders of this established order 
were of course compelled to protect it from him’. However, once he unexpectedly won 
the election, Trump became the representative of the established order, and attempts to 
undermine him thereafter verged on the unconstitutional. 46  Trump was the legal 
president, but his legitimacy was questioned. When Flynn joined the Trump campaign in 
2016 and spoke of improved relations with Moscow, the Russia-worried hands in the 
intelligence community went into over-drive. This prompted the alleged entrapment 
campaign against the Trump staffers Carter Page (who had long been involved with 
Russia) and George Papadopoulos (who had never had anything to do with Russia, but 
through contact with the mysterious professor Joseph Mifsud had apparently gained 
access to emails incriminating Clinton held by Russia). Above all, Flynn became a victim 
of the deep state’s attempt to hold the line against Russia, with the added benefit for them 
of weakening Trump’s presidency. In other words, this second narrative regards the 
ensemble of Russiagate allegations as largely manufactured, but they then became self-
sustaining. The acts of alleged deception by security agency officials later themselves 
became the subject of investigation by several Congressional committees and the 
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Department of Justice (DoJ) once Wiliam Barr was confirmed as attorney general in 
February 2019.  
The first narrative carried over into the attempt to impeach Trump following his 
25 July 2019 call with the new Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, which brought 
to the fore a whole new set of contending narratives that soon acquired the ‘Ukrainegate’ 
moniker. Whatever slight chance there may have been for rapprochement with Russia, 
which Trump saw as a potential ally in the looming struggle with China, were dashed. 
Domestically, the clash of Russiagate narratives exacerbated political polarisation and 
damaged the quality of political discourse. Commentators exploited ‘information and 
propaganda advantages to frame issues in misleading ways, cherry-pick supporting 
evidence, suppress damaging revelations, and otherwise skew the public debate in 
advantageous directions’. 47  Russiagate became a symbol of renewed confrontation 
marked by the hysteria characteristic of times when vital interests are threatened. In the 
Joseph McCarthy period in the 1950s there was acute social paranoia and the disciplining 
of alternative views, and elements of this were now reproduced.48 Liberal democracy in 
condition of new cold war was not immune from deception. The result is always the 
same, involving some sort of blowback that undermines the original goal.49 
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On 16 June 2015 Trump ‘magisterially, like some kind of lord from on high’ descended 
the escalator in Trump Tower to announce that he would run for the presidency.50 He 
argued that only someone ‘really rich’ could ‘take the brand of the United States and 
make it great again’. The announcement was accompanied by racist comments about 
Mexican immigrants: ‘When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best.  … 
They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists’51 – prompting NBC to 
fire him from the reality show The Apprentice (and Celebrity Apprentice) that he had 
hosted for 14 seasons. By then Trump’s public image had changed from a ‘skeezy 
hustler’ into ‘a plutocrat with impeccable business instincts and unparalleled wealth’.52 
An extraordinary combination of events in the end propelled Trump to the White House: 
the flaws of the other 16 Republican contenders handed Trump the Republican 
nomination on 21 July 2016; the weakness of his Democratic opponent, Hillary Clinton, 
who conducted a wooden, entitled and uninspired campaign; the blunder of James 
Comey, the director of the FBI, in reopening the Clinton email enquiry on the eve of the 
election; and Russian interference in the form of a social media campaign and theft of 
Democrat campaign files that tarnished their campaign. Trump’s opponents portrayed 
him as little more than a Kremlin stooge, enraging Trump, who hated being beholden to 
anyone, and ensured that the subsequent investigations would poison his presidency.  
 
The greatest political upset in American history 
 
On 8 November 2016 Trump pulled off ‘the greatest political upset in American 
history’.53  Trump won 62.98 million votes, 2.86 million fewer than Clinton’s 65.84 
million. However, this translated into 304 Electoral College votes, compared to Clinton’s 
227, making Trump the fifth US president to win office without a popular majority. 
However, he did win 2,649 counties (mostly rural) compared to Clinton’s 503 (largely 
concentrated in the big coastal cities). The huge majorities won by Clinton in California 
(4.1 million votes more than Trump) and New York (winning by a margin of 1.7 million) 
was too concentrated and only accentuated her flagging support in the American 
heartland. Trump’s achievement was all the greater since Clinton had a billion-dollar 
campaign war chest, the largest in American history. This was the biggest upset since 
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Harry Truman defeated Thomas Dewey in 1948, yet Trump’s ‘victory was decades in the 
making, and the signs of a victory like his were there for years’.54  Michael Cohen, 
Trump’s long-time personal lawyer and general fixer, describes how Trump channelled 
the resentment of people labelled as racist in the Obama years, ‘who were sick of political 
correctness and tolerating illegal immigration and having to pretend that they believed 
things they simply didn’t believe’. 55  KT McFarland, who served as deputy national 
security adviser until May 2017, notes that ‘By the 2016 election, it was clear that 
America was ready for change’.56 However, there was no consensus on the character of 
the necessary changes. 
Since the 1970s the two major parties ‘have increased their ideological 
uniformity’, particularly among Republicans, who increasingly self-identified as 
conservatives.57 Clinton in effect ran as ‘the candidate of Barack Obama’s third term’, 
and anger against the establishment status quo was directed against her. Trump was 
already closing the ratings gap by the time Comey reopened the investigation into her use 
of a private email server on 28 October, just 11 days before the election.58 Trump’s long-
time associate and an original contestant on The Apprentice, Omarosa Manigault 
Newman (or Omarosa as she styles herself), argues that the widespread assumption that 
Clinton would win ‘demotivated her base’ and led to the lower turnout of her 
supporters.59 Above all, Trump’s election was part of the great ‘populist’ uprising against 
established elites, of which the Brexit vote for the UK to leave the European Union was 
the harbinger in June of that year.60 Trump’s election is interpreted as a ‘whitelash’ 
against the liberal order.61 In this context, we should not over-personalise the victory. 
Trump used traditional Republican campaign techniques and applied them particularly 
effectively in the big (post)industrial states, where he won narrowly. With the nomination 
in the bag, some traditional Republican leaders rallied behind him, although they knew 
that Trump was far from being a traditional Republican.62 His success was prepared by 
nearly a decade of Tea Party populist anti-elitist agitation, and a generation of stagnating 
blue collar and middle-class incomes. Even then, income and unemployment rates were a 
weak predictor of voting intentions, and exit polls revealed that those most concerned 
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with economic problems voted disporoportionaly for Clinton, while those most 
concerned about immigration voted for Trump.63  
McFarland defends sophisticated ‘populist’ and ‘nationalist’ positions and argues 
not only that ‘The Washington Establishment was unaware of the growing anger of the 
working and middle classes’, but also that it had ‘failed to pursue an effective national 
security policy for much of the last twenty years’. Bogged down in various ‘forever wars’ 
in the Middle East, in her view ‘the real strategic threats posed by a revanchist Russia and 
an expansionist China’ had been neglected.64 Her approach is analysed by Pippa Norris 
and Ronald Inglehart, who argue that Trump used ‘populist rhetoric to legitimize his style 
of governance, while promoting authoritarian values that threaten the liberal norms 
underpinning American democracy’.65 They define populism as political style focused on 
the first-order question of who should rule, invoking ‘the people’ against corrupt elites; 
while second-order questions of what precisely should be done and policy decisions are 
left vague, endowing the rhetoric with a ‘chameleon-like quality’.66 This certainly applies 
to Trump, but as they point out, his rise was an element in a broader phenomenon, part of 
what they call the ‘cultural backlash’ against the ‘silent revolution’ of post-material and 
socially liberal values of the previous four decades. Together with concerns over 
immigration, this rather than the economic insecurity of the ‘losers’ of globalisation tilted 
older white working class voters towards Trump.67 He also took advantage of the changes 
in the Republican Party, starting with Newt Gingrich’s irreconcilable Congressional 
partisanship following their midterm success in winning both houses in 1994, through to 
Sarah Palin’s denunciation of the ‘Washington establishment’ as John McCain’s running 
mate in 2008 and to the Tea Party insurgency launched the following year. 68 The Trump 
phenomenon represented the culmination of a ‘silent counter-revolution’ against liberal 
social and political liberalism.69 
Trump’s campaign was haphazard and chaotic yet sparked a powerful response 
among alienated constituencies. One of Trump’s associates who would figure largely in 
the Russiagate scandal was Paul Manafort. He had long known Trump, and on 29 March 
2016 he joined the staff and on 19 May became campaign chairman, and on 20 June 
replaced Corey Lewandowski as campaign manager.70 Manafort had been a business 
partner of one of Trump’s close advisers, Roger Stone, in the political consulting firm of 
Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly, established in 1980. Manafort was part of Nixon’s re-
election campaign in 1972 and later worked for presidents Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan 
and George H. W. Bush, and Senator Robert Dole. He also acted as consultant to 
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unsavoury authoritarian leaders, including Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines and 
Angolan war leader Jonas Savimbi. However, his work in Ukraine from 2004 proved his 
downfall. He advised the Russophone Party of Regions on how to improve its image, and 
helped its leader, Viktor Yanukovych, to win the presidency in 2010. They were ‘pro-
Russian’ to the degree that they offered a more ‘multivector’ and politically plural 
alternative to that of the more neo-nationalistic pro-Western groups, but mostly they saw 
politics as a means of enhancing their power and privileges.71 Yanukovych’s greedy 
corruption alienated other oligarchs and ultimately provoked the ‘revolution of dignity’ 
that ousted him in February 2014. As for Manafort, he processed some $75 million 
through dozens of US and foreign banks and corporations.72 With Yanukoych in exile in 
Russia, Manafort’s involvement with the Trump campaign was dogged by scandal and he 
became the subject of an FBI investigation. Following the exposure of secret payments 
from the Party of Regions, on 14 August 2016 Manafort was sacked. Republican 
operative Kellyanne Conway became campaign manager, with the ideologue Steve 
Bannon as chief strategist. 
The Trump campaign at that stage was no more than ‘a few people in a room’, 
and thereafter it worked with the Republican National Committee (RNC), chaired by 
Reince Priebus, to provide organisational muscle.73 In fact, Lewandowski and Bossie 
argue that Manafort was a disaster as manager, and the campaign was only saved after 
Bannon and Conway took over.74 They stress that Trump’s rapturous welcome at rallies 
across the country showed that the electorate was looking for something different: ‘we 
were no longer just a campaign, but a movement’.75 In their view, trump ‘rekindled a 
dream for millions of Americans – and that’s why they elected him president’.76 They 
dismiss the ‘absurd conspiracy about collusion with Russia, which we can both tell you 
firsthand is ridiculous’.77 As for the RNC, learning from Obama, it poured over $175 
million into analytics and big data, and was even able to track individual primary 
voters.78 Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner and Brad Parscale from June 2016 ran the 
digital media and data analytics side of things, while Priebus built ‘the most 
comprehensive voter file that the country had ever seen, and it [the RNC] would fold it 
all into a complex digital operation’. 79  In 2016 Parscale placed 5.9 million ads on 
Facebook based on only 35 root narratives. 80  This technological and informational 
sophistication is important, because it puts any putative Russian interference in the shade. 
Compared to the massive investment in big data by the major campaigns, outside 
interference pales into insignificance. Despite the support of the Republican machine, 
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‘Trump was an insurgent candidate with no clear link to the Republican Party’.81 He 
behaved like a third-party outsider both as candidate and as president. In the end Trump 
won 38 Republican primaries, a record in a contested season. 
Three points stand out amid the vast literature on Trump’s victory. First, as the 
conservative commentator and speechwriter (author of the ‘axis of evil’ concept in 2002) 
David Frum notes, ‘Trump gained the presidency thanks in part to voters disgusted by a 
status quo that was ceasing to work for more and more of them’. 82 The median Trump 
voter was not especially ideologically militant or religious, but what ‘set them apart from 
other Republicans was their economic insecurity and their cultural anxiety’.83 With the 
end of the cold war and the decline of national security concerns, domestic politics had 
been conducted with ‘intensifying ferocity’. 84  In one of the many paradoxes of the 
election, Trump, a three-time married adulterer with hitherto socially liberal views, 
captured four in five white evangelical voters, more than any of the more traditional 
Republicans like Mitt Romney, John McCain or George W. Bush. Reasons given are fear 
over the decline of Christian values, the failure of previous Republican presidents to 
deliver on their promises, and Trump’s ruthless commitment, in the event fulfilled, of 
packing federal courts with conservative judges.85  
The crisis of conservatism was recognised and analysed by commentators such as 
Frum; but there was also a crisis of liberalism, which its partisans refused to 
acknowledge. 86  Peter Thiel, the founder of PayPal and one of Trump’s few early 
supporters at the top of corporate America, argued that  
 
Just as much as it’s about making America great, Trump’s agenda is about making 
America a normal country. A normal country doesn’t have a half-trillion dollar 
trade deficit. A normal country doesn’t fight five simultaneous undeclared wars. 
In a normal country, the government actually does its job. And today it’s 
important to recognise that the government has a job to do.87 
 
Steven Rosefielde argues that Trump’s victory reflected a desire for an elected 
government that was responsive to the concerns of common people. The grievances of 
ordinary middle and working class Americans focused on the domestic and international 
consequences of America becoming a ‘Global Nation’, to which the established order 
appeared to be increasingly deaf. Instead, Trump put himself at the head of a movement 
seeking to build a Jeffersonian populist America, a programme that if successful would 
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transform the position of the middle and working classes. Paradoxically, in Rosefielde’s 
interpretation, it was the new populists who defended pluralism and open societies 
against the cloying and stifling orthodoxies of the postwar globalist consensus.88 
The second point is that Trump offered a rethink of foreign policy priorities. 
Again, this did not come out of nowhere, and Republican interventionism and neo-
conservative foreign policy hawkishness were already encountering increasing resistance 
before Trump’s advocacy of Kissinger-style realism.89 Trump was the only Republican 
candidate who tempered the militant cold war talk. In comparison to Clinton’s foreign 
policy hawkishness, Trump appeared the voice of reason and moderation. As he put it in 
October 2015, ‘If we’re going to have World War III, it’s not going to be over Syria’. In 
contrast to politicians, like Clinton, who were calling for a no-fly zone over Syria, which 
would have meant shooting down Russian jets, Trump commented: ‘I won’t even call 
them hawks. I call them fools’.90 From this perspective, Trump’s call for a transformation 
of American foreign policy was the logical counterpart of his domestic programme. 
Trump argued that US foreign engagements in recent decades had not benefited the mass 
of Americans. Instead of the traditional globalism, he advanced a ‘democratic 
nationalism’ that prioritised the needs of Americans over those abroad.91 As the legal 
scholar and diplomat Rein Müllerson puts it,  
 
Hillary Clinton, epitomising the corrupt politics of the Democrats, lost the 2016 
presidential election not because of some foreign interference but because the rift 
between the political elite and the American people had become all too obvious. 
Externally, she has been a perfect example of those ‘liberal interventionists’ who 
differ too little from the ‘neocons’ who were running the show under the 
Republican presidency of George W. Bush.92  
 
The circle now closed, and ‘being anti-Trump has become synonymous with being anti-
Russian’, with the ‘Washington ruling class’ unable to accept Clinton’s defeat and hence 
‘floated dozens of theories of how the only reason Trump won was because the Russians 
intervened’.93  
 The third point focuses on the flaws of Clinton’s campaign and the weakness of 
her candidacy. Interim DNC chair Donna Brazile considered Clinton such an ‘anaemic’ 
candidate, both politically and at times physically, that she contemplated replacing her 
with her running mate, Senator Tim Kaine of Virginia, with Obama’s vice president Joe 
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Biden as his deputy.94 There had long been various questions about the funding of the 
Clinton Foundation. The Uranium One case, involving both Russian and Kazakh entities, 
combined donations to the Foundation and support for the company.95 A book sponsored 
by the hedge-fund billionaire Robert Mercer and his daughter Rebekah describes the 
case, and other money-making ventures, in exhaustive but not always convincing detail.96 
Clinton’s inappropriate use of a private email account for government business, her 
intimacy with Wall Street, her embrace of the identity politics of race and gender but not 
class, the use of administrative resources against the left-wing candidate Bernie Sanders, 
her status as long-time insider, and the burden of coming over as Obama’s ‘third-term’ 
continuity candidate, all alienated potential voters. Her campaign strategy was also 
flawed, taking some crucial swing states (in particular, Michigan, Pennsylvania and 
Wisconsin) for granted, whereas Trump conducted a barn-storming campaign that 
motivated his base. As a result, Trump was gaining on Clinton even before Comey’s 
bombshell about reopening the FBI investigation into a new batch of Clinton’s emails on 
the eve of the election. Non-college educated voters turned out to vote for Trump in great 
numbers, some ten per cent of whom were former Obama supporters but shifted 
allegiance because of their economic plight, while 60 per cent of military veterans voted 
for Trump.97 
 
Russia and Clinton’s downfall 
 
The election was Clinton’s to lose. As Benjamin Free notes in a famous polemic, ‘Donald 
Trump’s win over Hillary Clinton is considered to be the most controversial win in 
modern United States history’. He asks the fundamental question: ‘Why would over half 
of an entire nation elect a man with no political career over a woman whose entire career 
was political?’. Clinton was ‘the most qualified person to ever run for president’.98 She 
lost the Democratic Party nomination in 2008 to Obama, but then served as his secretary 
of state, in which capacity she advocated military intervention in Libya in 2011, sanctions 
on Iran, and endorsed (although reluctantly) Obama’s ‘reset’ policy with Russia. When 
Libya became yet another failed state, her record as a militant interventionist (she 
supported the war on Iraq in 2003) shadowed her presidential bid. In the congressional 
investigation into the attack on the US diplomatic mission in Benghazi on 11 September 
2012, in which the US ambassador (Christopher Stevens) and three others were killed, 
Clinton accepted formal responsibility, but her defence ‘that she simply didn’t know’ the 
detailed security arrangements, despite repeated requests for security upgrades, ‘outraged 
the public’.99 In the next four years there were eight separate congressional investigations 
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into the attack. Much of this was partisan, but there were some genuine questions to be 
answered. 
Russia became an obsessive theme of Clinton’s campaign. Clinton was a classic 
liberal interventionist, and thus her foreign policy activism crossed the aisle to meet the 
neo-conservative advocates of American primacy. When it came to Russia, the country 
was judged by the degree to which it adapted to Western models of democracy and 
integrated into the Western power system. Clinton had long criticised Putin and was 
dismissive of his policies.100 President George W. Bush had famously been ‘able to get a 
sense of his soul’ when he met Putin in Slovenia in June 2001, but in 2008 the putative 
Democrat candidate Clinton declared that she would have told Bush that Putin did not 
have a soul because he ‘was a KGB [Soviet Committee for State Security] agent’.101 
Obama’s reset stressed the relationship with President Dmitry Medvedev, who had taken 
over from Putin at the end of the latter’s constitutionally-limited two terms in 2008. This 
made sense, but the accompanying denigration of Putin did not, and neither did vice-
president Joe Biden’s warning during his visit to Moscow in March 2011 against Putin 
returning to the presidency. This, together with the Libyan fiasco, destroyed Medvedev’s 
chances for a second term. 
On 24 September 2011 a presidential transition back from Medvedev to Putin was 
declared. The announcement was heavy-handed and insulting, as if the presidency was 
the property of the Kremlin elite, and provoked widespread discontent.102 Following the 
deeply flawed parliamentary election of 4 December, discontent exploded into the largest 
political protests of the Putin era. Clinton added fuel to the fire by calling for a full 
investigation of electoral fraud. She observed:  
 
Russian voters deserve the right to have their voices heard and their votes 
counted, and that means they deserve free, fair, transparent elections and leaders 
who are accountable to them.103  
 
This is a fair comment, but in conditions where the West had engaged repeatedly in 
regime change operations under the guise of human rights and democracy, the alarm bells 
rang in the Kremlin. Clinton was associated with democracy promotion as a mode of 
regime change, hence Putin appeared to believe that she had in some way sponsored, if not 
provoked, the protests. He argued  
 
From the outset the secretary of state said that [the elections] were not honest and 
not fair, but she had not yet even received the material from the observers. She set 
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the tone for some actors in our country and gave them a signal. They heard the 
signal and with the support of the US State Department set to work.  
 
He went on to stress that ‘We are the largest nuclear power, and our partners have certain 
concerns and shake us so that we don’t forget who is the master of this planet, so that we 
remain obedient and feel that they have leverage to influence us within our own 
country’.104  
He warned that those who ‘dance to the tune of a foreign state’ would be held to 
account. His denunciation set the tone for an anti-American campaign that targeted NGOs 
funded by Western agencies. The ‘foreign agents law’ of November 2012, loosely 
modelled on America’s 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), imposed harsh 
conditions on Russian NGOs engaged in loosely defined political activities drawing on 
foreign grants. It also provoked the inappropriate harassment of the newly appointed 
American ambassador, Michael McFaul. One of his first acts in January 2012 was to meet 
with civil society activists as part of his commitment to engage with Russian society, but 
this was interpreted as part of the regime change strategy.105 Clinton thus had a history of 
sharp antagonism to Putin and his government, and this would shape her response to 
alleged Russian meddling in the US election. It also suggested a motive for Russian 
actions, as a way of punishing Clinton. McFaul puts it succinctly: ‘For Putin, the 2016 US 
presidential election was an opportunity for payback. Putin, his intelligence officers, and 
his surrogates went on the offensive against candidate Clinton and against the US 
democratic system more generally’. 106  McFaul argues that Putin is motivated not by 
material or security interests but ideological factors that fail to reckon with the costs of 
various interventions, in Ukraine and Syria as well as the US. However, this view is itself 
part of the new cold war narrative about Russia. It far too readily discounts more structural 
approaches to Russian foreign policymaking, which see the country as facing genuine 
challenges from the expansive and radicalised post-cold war Atlantic power system, which 
was approaching its borders from several directions. 
Clinton also had domestic problems to deal with. On appointment as secretary of 
state in 2009 she established a private email system in her home in Chappaqua, New 
York. The State Department set up a classified email account on a secure government 
server, but for some reason she only used the private server to handle personal and 
classified emails despite explicit State Department instructions not to do so. The 
Benghazi congressional investigation discovered its use, and in summer 2014 the 
investigators demanded access to her emails. After various negotiations, on 5 December 
she handed over 30,490 emails that she considered work-related, but withheld 31,839, 
 
104 Ellen Barry, ‘Rally Defying Putin’s Party Draws Tens of Thousands’, New York Times, 10 
December 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/world/europe/thousands-protest-in-
moscow-russia-in-defiance-of-putin.html. See also ‘Russia PM Vladimir Putin Accuses US over 
Poll Protests’, BBC News, 8 December 2011. 
105  Putin later defended this, arguing ‘I can hardly imagine the Ambassador of the Russian 
Federation to the US actively working with members of the “Occupy Wall Street Movement”’, 
‘Interview to Channel One and Associated Press News Agency’, Kremlin.ru, 4 September 2013, 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/5935. 
106 Michael McFaul, ‘Putin, Putinism, and the Domestic Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy’, 





insisting that they were personal and private. 107 The matter became public on 2 March 
2015 and dogged her campaign.108 Matters were exacerbated by the destruction of the 
emails that she had held back on 25 March, despite Congressional instructions to preserve 
them. The inspector general of the intelligence community referred the matter to the FBI 
in July to investigate whether ‘Clinton had mishandled classified information while using 
her personal email system’.109 
The question was not so much whether she had mishandled classified information 
– she had palpably done so – but ‘What was she thinking when she had done this?’.110 In 
May 2016 the State Department’s inspector general concluded that she had violated the 
Department’s policies and protocols. Despite her denials, on 5 July 2016 Comey 
announced that classified information had in fact been found in 110 emails and 52 chain 
emails, and over 2,000 additional emails had later been classified as confidential. He 
judged Clinton’s behaviour ‘extremely careless’ – the term ‘gross negligence’ was taken 
out because it carried a specific legal meaning.111 One of the Mueller special counsel 
investigators, Andrew Weissmann, describes Clinton’s email use as ‘indefensible 
imperiousness’, and harshly condemns Comey’s behaviour.112 Nevertheless, assuming 
the DoJ’s prerogatives, Comey terminated the case (we will return to this later).113 The 
FBI officials who exonerated Clinton, notably Andrew McCabe (appointed deputy FBI 
director on 29 January 2016) and Strzok, became leading exponents of the Russiagate 
narrative.114 
The Clinton email issue then intersected with the Russia story. On 12 June 
WikiLeaks editor Assange announced in an interview with ITV’s Robert Peston that ‘We 
have upcoming leaks in relation to Hillary Clinton … we have emails pending 
publication’. 115  By then WikiLeaks had published a searchable index of the 30,000 
known Clinton emails, so the assumption was that somehow Assange had got hold of 
copies of the 32,000 deleted emails. However, two days later came the news (in the 
Washington Post, citing two CrowdStrike executives) that DNC computers had been 
hacked by Russians. Instead of calling in the FBI, the DNC hired CrowdStrike, a 
computer security company affiliated with the hawkish Atlantic Council. CrowdStrike 
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announced that malware inserted by Russians had been found on the DNC servers. On 
the same day Ellen Nakashima, who had been briefed by the DNC, 116 was the first to 
report that  
 
Russian government hackers penetrated the computer network of the Democratic 
National Committee and gained access to the entire database of opposition 
research on GOP presidential candidate Donald Trump. … The intruders so 
thoroughly compromised the DNC’s system that they were also able to read all 
email and chat traffic.  
 
Nevertheless, the report argued that ‘the breach was traditional espionage’, and 
categorised it as  
 
an example of Russia’s interest in the US political system and its desire to 
understand the policies, strengths, and weaknesses of a potential future president – 
much as American spies gather similar information on foreign candidates and 
leaders.117  
 
This may well have been the case, but what was new, according to McCabe, was the 
weaponisation of information from the DNC ‘in a way that we’ve never seen before’.118 
CrowdStrike asserted that not one but two groups of hackers, believed to be based 
in Russia, had undertaken the hack. One was dubbed Cozy Bear (APT29), also known as 
The Dukes, affiliated with the foreign intelligence service (SVR).119 The other was Fancy 
Bear (APT28), linked to Russian military intelligence (GRU). The two teams had 
apparently enjoyed a two-year spree in 2014 and 2015 roaming the unclassified email 
systems at the White House, the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, and it 
had taken years to repair the damage. Obama at the time decided not to name Russia as 
the perpetrator, a decision that in the light of Russiagate was later considered a 
mistake.120 In 2016 the two teams not only worked independently but were unaware of 
each other’s existence, and even competed for dominance as they scoured the highways 
and byways of the DNC systems. The SVR team at some point withdrew, and it was the 
GRU team (Fancy Bear) that apparently made public the hacked the DNC emails. 
CrowdStrike’s attribution of Russian government responsibility was not independently 
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verified by the FBI or other federal law enforcement or security agency.121 The DNC’s IT 
director, Yared Tamene Wolde Yohannes, testified to the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), then under the leadership of the Republican, Devin 
Nunes, that the FBI never requested access to the physical servers, while Michael 
Sussmann, the DNC’s outside counsel, told the same committee that the FBI refused a 
DNC offer for full access to its servers.122 This directly contradicts Comey when he told 
the Senate Intelligence Committee in January 2017 that there had been ‘multiple requests 
at different levels’ for access to the DNC servers, and he agreed with the question posed 
by the committee chairman Richard Burr that direct access to the servers and devices 
would have helped the FBI investigation: ‘Our forensics folks would always prefer to get 
access to the original device or server that’s involved, so it’s the best evidence’.123 
Yohannes stated that the DNC gave images of its servers to CrowdStrike, who in turn 
passed them on to the FBI in May and June 2016, and these were then used by Mueller, 
along with grand jury materials (redacted in his report) to demonstrate that Russian 
hackers stole the DNC emails. Quite why no federal agency subjected the DNC servers 
(apparently, there were 140 of them) to forensic analysis remains one of the great 
mysteries of Russiagate. 124  Even stranger, it later emerged that CrowdStrike never 
produced a full final report for the government, because the FBI never asked for one – 
something that Comey was hard put to explain.125 
This was the context in which Clinton’s struggle for the Democratic nomination 
encountered serious competition from Sanders. He won an astonishing 23 primaries and 
put up a spirited fight to the end. American voters were clearly looking for an alternative, 
and even socialism appeared to be back on the agenda.126 On 22 July 2016 WikiLeaks 
published 19,252 DNC emails with 8,000 attachments of communications between key 
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actors, covering the period from January 2015 to May 2016. The DNC material showed 
how top Democratic Party officials ‘were attempting to undermine Sanders’ entire 
campaign in order to secure the party’s nomination even before she [Clinton] began to 
pull ahead of Bernie in the primary votes’. Free notes ‘This issue alone cemented her 
untrustworthiness as president, but it spawned many others to vote for her volatile 
counterpart to prove a point’. The slanted light it shed on the Democrats ‘caused the 
entire party to buckle in on itself and uproar. And it is this buckling that would give the 
Republican Party the fuel it needed to win’.127  
In the days before the Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia, 25-28 
July, the Clinton campaign and its press allies ‘saw Russia as a potentially valuable 
weapon for attacking Trump’.128 Paul Krugman in The New York Times talked of ‘Donald 
Trump, The Siberian Candidate’, and asked ‘If elected, would Donald Trump be 
Vladimir Putin’s man in the White House?’.129 Two days after the WikiLeaks release, on 
24 July Clinton campaign manager Robby Mook went on the major television news 
stations to claim not only that Russia was behind the hack, but also that the Trump 
campaign was in league with Russia, citing various unnamed ‘experts’, who were later 
proved wrong.130 On CNN he stated ‘What’s disturbing to us is that experts are telling us 
Russian state actors broke into the DNC, stole these emails, and other experts are now 
saying that the Russians are releasing these emails for the purpose of actually helping 
Donald Trump’.131 The next day the New York Times noted that ‘the Russian intervention 
narrative fits with Mrs. Clinton efforts to establish the idea that President Vladimir V. 
Putin of Russia wants to see Mr. Trump elected to weaken America and hurt its closest 
NATO allies’. 132  Mook also claimed that ‘Donald Trump changed the Republican 
platform to become what some experts would regard as pro-Russian’, which was also 
false.133 Clinton’s formal nomination as the party’s candidate on 26 July did not put an 
end to the matter, and some Sanders’ supporters felt betrayed by the Democratic Party 
machine and only reluctantly supported Clinton’s campaign. Free details the DNC’s 
apparent malfeasance and suggests that once Trump became the Republican nominee, 
‘Sanders was the only one set up to beat Donald Trump, and that Hillary Clinton didn’t 
stand a chance’. Free is obviously a Sanders supporter, but insists that Clinton’s defeat 
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was not a ‘gender situation’ but reflected the deeper currents in American political life. 
Trump’s invocation of the ‘silent majority’ appealed to real constituencies and concerns, 
‘and this is what the Democratic Party overlooked’.134  
The larger context did not help. His cautious approach to the deployment of 
American power in Syria ‘lowered Obama’s standing within the hawkish Washington 
establishment’. It was infuriated when, despite his red line against the use of chemical 
weapons, he refused to order air strikes against Syria following a chemical attack in 
Ghouta, in the suburbs of Damascus, in the early hours of 21 August 2013. ‘Simmering 
frustration at Obama’s inaction and America’s seeming impotence while Putin acted 
decisively and effectively was like dry kindling waiting for a match’. The spark was the 
publication of the DNC material showing bias against Sanders. Instead of contrition, the 
Democrat establishment went on the offensive: ‘Journalists who backed Clinton quickly 
tried to turn attention from the embarrassing emails to the idea of “a Kremlin conspiracy 
to aid Donald J. Trump”’.135 WikiLeaks was vilified as an instrument of the Kremlin, 
although the connection is at best circumstantial. WikiLeaks was created by Assange as 
an outlet for leaked documents, and it published classified intelligence material and 
diplomatic cables.136 Bradley (later Chelsea) Manning, an intelligence analyst stationed in 
Iraq, downloaded 750,000 classified diplomatic and military files onto a thumb drive and 
handed them over. From November 2010 WikiLeaks published some 250,000 US 
diplomatic cables taken from Clinton’s State Department, which if nothing else turned 
her against the platform. In 2013 Edward Snowden, a contract worker in an outsourced 
facility, exposed the inner workings of the National Security Agency (NSA) and how it 
bulk-collected metadata about the phone calls and emails of millions of Americans – 
what he calls ‘surveillance capitalism’.137 Russia had nothing to do with any of this, yet 
the official American view is that WikiLeaks is a ‘non-state hostile intelligence 
service’.138 Assange defended his position: ‘If it’s true information, we don’t care where 
it comes from. Let people fight with the truth, and when the bodies are cleared there will 
be bullets of truth everywhere’.139 
Assange in 2012 hosted 12 episodes of ‘The World Tomorrow’ on RT (formerly 
Russia Today, the TV channel established in 2005 to advance Russian perspectives 
internationally), airing from the Ecuadorian embassy in London. It was produced 
separately, but RT was the only channel willing to broadcast the show. In the eyes of his 
critics, this turned Assange into little more than a ‘useful idiot’ for Moscow, and later 
justified assertions of collusion between RT and WikiLeaks.140 Assange took refuge in 
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the embassy in 2012 to avoid facing rape charges in Sweden, which he believed were 
politically motivated to ensure his extradition to the US. WikiLeaks was condemned by 
governments because of its exposures, ‘including of the US-UK “special relationship” in 
running a joint foreign policy of deception and violence that serves London and 
Washington’s elite interests’. For example, files released by WikiLeaks in 2016 from the 
Clinton archive show William Burns, the US deputy secretary of state (and later Joseph 
Biden’s director of the CIA), talking with the British foreign secretary, William Hague, 
about a ‘post-Qaddafi’ Libya, three weeks before military operations began. There was 
clear intent to overthrow Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, with the 17 March 2011 UN 
Resolution 1973 on protecting civilians used as cover. 141  Although WikiLeaks is 
routinely accused of working with Russia, no evidence has emerged of any active 
collusion with Russian agents. As for RT, it was designated a ‘foreign agent’ in 
November 2017, leading the network to be banned from press events and its delisting 
from social media. 
Assange certainly distrusted Clinton. He warned in February 2016 that  
 
‘A vote for Hillary Clinton is a vote for endless, stupid war’, and he blamed her 
for the mess in Libya: ‘Hillary’s problem is not just that she’s a war hawk. She’s a 
war hawk with bad judgment who gets an unseemly emotional rush out of killing 
people. She shouldn’t be let near a gun shop, let alone an army. And she certainly 
should not become president of the United States.142 
 
The feeling was mutual, and Clinton supporters claimed that WikiLeaks and Assange 
were little more than Russian stooges. Once WikiLeaks started publishing the DNC 
material, Assange denied that Russia was involved and warned that  
 
the natural instincts of Hillary Clinton and the people round her, that when 
confronted with a serious domestic political scandal, that she tries to blame the 
Russians, blame the Chinese, et cetera, because if she does that when she’s in 
government, that’s a political, managerial style that can lead to conflict.143 
 
Assange repeatedly asserted that Russia had nothing to do with the emails, telling Fox 
News on 3 January 2017 that ‘our source is not the Russian government or any state 
party’. 144  WikiLeaks has not been noticeably soft on Moscow, publishing tens of 
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thousands of documents critical of the Russian government while defending opposition 
activists. In 2017 it published Spy Files Russia, exposing Moscow’s surveillance 
practices. 
As the campaign entered its final stages, on 26 September thousands of Clinton’s 
emails were discovered on a laptop owned by Anthony Weiner, the estranged husband of 
Huma Abedin, Clinton’s close assistant. We have seen that in 2014 Clinton turned over 
the emails on her private server to the FBI but deleted another 30,000 (the possible 
resurrection of which fuelled much speculation), but now thousands of new emails from 
her personal domain were found. The investigation was mismanaged, falling between the 
FBI’s Washington and New York offices, and Comey was only informed about them on 
27 October.145 The next day he sent a letter to Congress (which was promptly leaked) 
announcing that he was re-opening the Clinton investigation. He believed that he either 
had to ‘speak or conceal’.146 In his characteristically sententious manner, Comey felt that 
‘the credibility of the institutions of justice was at stake’. 147  This went against the 
fundamental FBI principle of no public action before an election that could affect its 
outcome. In any case, there were more options than the binary choice he suggested.148  
Having publicly judged the case on 5 July, he felt that he was locked on the path 
that led to the 28 October announcement. This may well have cost Clinton the 
presidency.149 At the time Clinton was 5.9 points ahead of Trump, but a week later her 
lead had shrunk to just 2.9 per cent as the email issue dominated the news. On 6 
November the FBI announced that its investigation was complete, and Clinton was once 
again exonerated. By then it was too late. Pollsters suggest that it was this, rather than the 
dark arts of Russian persuasion, that swung the vote in Michigan, Pennsylvania, 
Wisconsin and Florida, and possibly also North Carolina and Arizona. Comey believes 
that he acted honourably, but his judgment is suspect. His motivation is also open to 
question. He took it for granted that Clinton’s victory was in the bag so acted to get the 
revived email issue out of the way before she assumed office. This spectacular 




It is hard to exaggerate the shock that Trump’s election delivered to the post-war world 
order. With little experience in politics, Trump brought to the conduct of domestic and 
international affairs the brutality and disregard for standard procedures and norms that 
characterised his work as a businessman. As he put it in his The Art of the Deal, ‘You 
can’t be imaginative or entrepreneurial if you’ve got too much structure. I prefer to come 
to work each day and just see what develops’.150 What may have served him well in 
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business (and there are doubts about that) was not an approach conducive to good 
governance. Equally, what had made Trump such a success in The Apprentice was his 
‘impulse to transgress’, but his presidency evoked ‘a painful feeling of dispossession, as 
cherished norms and national institutions are eviscerated’.151  Trump ‘loved conflicts, 
chaos, and confusion; he loved seeing people argue or fight’.152  Omarosa notes that 
Trump had ‘more power than one man should have, and definitely not a man who has the 
soul of an anarchist’.153 His presidency became the greatest show on earth as the society 
of the spectacle waited for the next sensation.154  
With Trump’s inauguration on 20 January 2017 ‘the United States entered the eye 
of the most extraordinary political storm since at least Watergate’.155 Levitsky and Ziblatt 
argue that ‘Democracies may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders – 
presidents or prime ministers who subvert the very process that brought them to 
power’.156 Frum eloquently describes the threat:  
 
The thing to fear from the Trump presidency is not the bold overthrow of the 
Constitution, but the stealthy paralysis of governance; not the open defiance of 
law, but an accumulating subversion of norms; not the deployment of state power 
to intimidate dissidents, but the incitement of private violence to radicalize 
supporters.157 
 
The election of a man who could barely complete a coherent sentence, and even then 
overloaded his syntax with adjectives and adverbs – ‘great’, huge’, ‘horrible’, ‘beautiful’, 
‘bigly’ – was so shocking that it prompted the search for some external cause. There had 
to be a villain commensurate with the gravity of the crisis. Nothing else but Russia, the 
historic cold war enemy, would do. Parts of the American elite went into over-drive: 
‘What could arguably be called the greatest intelligence operation in the history of the 
world had been executed and the result was that the candidate Moscow had supported had 
won’. Putin’s political mission ‘had successfully influenced the American public’s 
mindset so deeply that they were in total denial that it had been done at all’ – the best 
trick of the devil is to convince you he doesn’t exist.158 Trump’s election was an event so 
unlikely, ‘so utterly extreme’ as Joshua Green puts it in his study of Steve Bannon, only 
some sort of Hollywood-like revelation could explain the mystery; but ‘the revelation 
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never arrived. Even now, there’s a sense that some vital piece of the puzzle is missing’.159 
In the end, it was the Russian interference narrative that filled the revelation gap and 
completed the puzzle.  
 In fact, the key to Clinton’s defeat lay much closer to home. ‘By the time she 
launched her 2016 campaign, Bannon was sitting at the nexus of a far-flung group of 
conspirators whose scope and reach Clinton and her campaign didn’t fathom until far too 
late’.160 In 1998 Clinton condemned the machinations of a ‘vast right-wing conspiracy’, 
but when confronted by precisely such a conspiracy, she placed the blame elsewhere, 
exacerbating the ‘paranoid style’ and McCarthyite practices in American politics. To do 
otherwise would have risked tearing at the foundations of the American polity as it had 
developed in the neoliberal years, for which the Clintons were so deeply responsible. 
Similarly, the ‘remain’ campaign in the Brexit vote only realised far too late that they 
were trying to reverse in weeks what had in effect been decades of unchallenged anti-EU 
propaganda. They were ranged against sophisticated US-financed electoral analytics, but 
they too chased after the chimera of ‘Russian meddling’. In both the UK and the US the 
events of 2016 put an end to the long post-war consensus and opened up a new world of 
chaos and conspiracy. In both countries rational policy analysis gave way to the search 
for some deeper purpose. A large part of the electorate did not believe that Clinton would 
deliver on her promises, while Trump proposed a re-affirmation of elements of national 
identity that were perceived to have been denigrated by coastal elites and establishment 
interests. Clinton proposed policies, but Trump offered meaning. 
Trump assumed office in remarkably benign times, although his ‘American 
carnage’ inaugural address (drafted by Bannon) cast matters in a dark light. The 
American economy had recovered from the sub-prime financial crisis of 2008 and 
thereafter registered impressive growth, the stock market was booming, inflation and 
unemployment were low, and although America was still engaged in Afghanistan, its 
longest war ever, and in conflicts in Iraq and Syria, none immediately threatened the US 
itself. The election gave Trump a united party government, with Republican majorities in 
both the House of Representatives (241 to 194) and the Senate (52 to 48).161 Despite the 
fortunate circumstances, Trump’s early period was beset by permanent crisis. The 
Russiagate allegation hung like an incubus over all that he did, and he would later claim 
that his first two years in office were stolen because of the allegations.  
Trump’s rampage through the institutions of American democracy and the 
customs of international affairs was by any standard awesome. In international affairs 
Trump led the putative defection of the US from the liberal international order that it 
created after 1945. Many of the ideas advanced by Trump had been raised in one way or 
another by American leaders before him, including the need for greater ‘burden-sharing’ in 
NATO, but none fundamentally challenged the network of multilateral institutions and 
bilateral relations that are foundational for US foreign policy. A traditional view of 
internationalism defeated Woodrow Wilson’s attempts to create a multilateral world order 
in the wake of the First World War and kept the US out of the League of Nations. After 
1945 a new breed of internationalists understood that American power would be enhanced 
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by embedding it in institutions representing universal values of law and development.162 
After 1989 this system took the form of intensified globalisation, allowing China and some 
other countries to achieve a spectacular rise in prosperity and power. Trump now sought to 
disassociate American great power globalism from economic globalisation through the 
policy of ‘America first’. 
Bannon was the only Trump insider able ‘to offer a coherent vision of Trump’s 
populism – aka Trumpism’.163 At the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) 
in February 2017 Bannon announced the three strands of Trump’s policy: national 
security and sovereignty; economic nationalism; and, for the first time, ‘the 
deconstruction of the administrative state’.164 However, a few months later the two had 
fallen out – in part because of Wolff’s book, which portrayed Bannon as an intriguer of 
the worst sort, promiscuously leaking against Kushner and his daughter Ivanka – whom 
he dubbed ‘Jarvanka’ – and Bannon was cut loose on 19 August 2017. Trump was 
particularly annoyed by Bannon’s claim that he was ‘Trump’s brain’.165 Green’s book 
quotes freely from Bannon and basically credits him for winning the election, which did 
not go down well with the proud and jealous Trump.166 After the initial shock of victory, 
Trump lacked any ‘larger sense of sober reflection’, and ‘he immediately seemed to 
rewrite himself as the inevitable president’. 167  This was rather less than a personal 
relationship with history or even a sense of destiny, but the presumption of a man whose 
narcissism overwhelmed the most responsible office on the planet. As for Russia, it looks 
for allies where it can find them. If that meant taking Trump at his word that it ‘made 
sense’ to ‘get on with Russia’, then of course Moscow would not reject the opportunity. 
Against the background of collusion allegations this proved provocative, verging on the 
seditious.  
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TRUMP AND RUSSIA 
 
 
Trump’s presidency was the greatest deception of all. It was always rather ridiculous but 
also very serious.168 It was unable to deliver much of its domestic agenda, and in foreign 
policy it failed to achieve the rethinking of grand strategy that it promised. The new cold 
war intensified and relations with Russia plummeted to new depths. However, personal 
relations between Trump and Putin remained cordial, which only deepened the suspicions 
of his critics. Russia cast a shadow over his entire presidency. Roger Ailes, the former 
head of Fox News and onetime political mentor to Bannon, warned Trump shortly after 
the election ‘You’ve got to get right on Russia’, warning him of potentially damaging 
material on its way. Wolff comments as follows:  
 
The charge that Trump colluded with the Russians to win the election, which he 
scoffed at, was, in the estimation of some of his friends, a perfect example of his 
inability to connect the dots. Even if he hadn’t personally conspired with the 
Russians to fix the election, his efforts to curry favour with, of all people, 
Vladimir Putin had no doubt left a trail of alarming words and deeds likely to 
have enormous political costs.169 
 
No-one in the Trump White House was prepared to deal with the collusion charge. 
Trump ‘regarded the Russia story as senseless and inexplicable and having no basis in 
reality’.170 Bannon himself dismissed it as ‘just a conspiracy theory’, adding for good 
measure that the Trump team was not up to conspiring about anything.171  
 
Trump goes to Moscow 
 
Craig Unger provides the most detailed analysis of the possible kompromat held by 
Russia on Trump. He tells the story of  
 
one of the greatest intelligence operations in history, an undertaking decades in 
the making, through which Russian Mafia and Russian intelligence operatives 
successfully targeted, compromised, and implanted either a wilfully ignorant or an 
inexplicably unaware Russian asset in the White House as the most powerful man 
on earth.172  
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In a later work unsparingly called American Kompromat he recounts the charge by ex-
KGB colonel Yuri Shvets, who was posted to Washington in the 1980s, that in fact 
Trump had been a KGB asset for 40 years.173 Is this really the case? 
The story begins with Trump’s marriage to a Czechoslovak citizen when the 
country was part of the Soviet bloc. Trump met Ivana Zelníčková at the Montreal 
Olympic Games in August 1976, and they were married on 7 April 1977. Ivana, an only 
child, was a talented athlete, a member of the Czechoslovak ski team at the Sapporo 
Winter Olympics in 1972, and then a top model. The couple visited the bride’s homeland 
in 1978. Not surprisingly, this prompted the interests of the Czechoslovak Ministry of 
State Security, the StB, and a file was opened on her, as well as her father Miloš, an 
electrical engineer. The StB would naturally share information with the KGB, but it is not 
known when a Soviet file was opened on Trump.174 One can assume that between his 
business ventures, politics was discussed at home, and Ivana provided an insight into life 
in the Communist world. This was the grim period of ‘normalisation’ in Czechoslovakia, 
still suffering the effects of the Soviet-bloc invasion of August 1968, which had snuffed 
out the few months of ‘socialism with a human face’. Nevertheless, his marriage helped 
‘normalise’ Trump’s perception of Eastern Europe. His third wife, Melania Knauss 
(Knavs), also comes from the region, from Slovenia. 
Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, and soon after launched a radical 
programme of perestroika (restructuring), glasnost’ (openness) and then 
demokratizatsiya (democratisation), and Trump showed a renewed interest in politics. 
Hitherto Trump had focused on getting politicians to bend to his will, a task entrusted to 
his pugnacious lawyer Roy Cohn, who Trump admits ‘was no Boy Scout’. Cohn spent 
‘more than two-thirds of his adult life under indictment on one charge or another’.175 
Cohn was the hatchet man for Senator Joseph McCarthy in an earlier version of 
Russiagate, leading the hunt against communists in the 1950s. With reform under way in 
the Soviet Union, in March 1986 Trump met the Soviet ambassador to the UN, Yuri 
Dubinin, and his daughter Natalia Dubinina, who was already a member of the Soviet UN 
delegation. This was Yuri’s first visit to New York, so Natalia took him on a tour of the 
city. He was so impressed by Trump Tower on Fifth Avenue at 57th Street that he asked 
to see the owner. The building occupied the site of the former Bonwit Teller luxury 
department store. Construction began in June 1980, and two-and-a-half years later the 58-
storey (although Trump insists it has 68 floors) skyscraper was complete, with a 
spectacular atrium and waterfall, trimmed in bronze and gold, six floors of shopping, 
thousands of square feet of office space and 263 residential apartments (many of them 
bought by wealthy Russians, some with dubious backgrounds). Ignoring diplomatic 
protocol, they took the lift and saw Trump in his pomp on the top floor. A few months 
later Trump and Dubinin were seated together at a lunch hosted by the cosmetics mogul 
Leonard Lauder, and according to Trump, ‘One thing led to another, and now I’m talking 
about building a large luxury hotel, across the street from the Kremlin, in partnership 
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with the Soviet government’.176 Dubinin, who in late 1986 became ambassador to the US, 
appears to have massaged Trump’s ego, which worked wonders. Natalia recalled that ‘He 
[Trump] is an emotional person, somewhat impulsive. He needs recognition. And, of 
course, when he gets it he likes it. My father’s visit worked on him like honey to a 
bee’.177  
In January 1987 Dubinin invited Trump to visit Moscow, adding that Intourist, the 
Soviet tourist agency, ‘had expressed interest in pursuing a joint venture to construct and 
manage a hotel in Moscow’.178 Vitaly Churkin, who between 2006 and his death in 
February 2017 served as Russia’s permanent representative to the UN, helped arrange the 
visit. On 4 July 1987 for the first time Trump flew to Moscow with Ivana and two 
assistants and stayed ‘in the Lenin suite at the National Hotel’ overlooking the entrance to 
Red Square. He inspected some possible sites for a hotel, including several near Red 
Square, and was ‘impressed with the ambition of the Soviet officials to make a deal’.179 
The Soviet Union was opening to foreign business, but instead of a regulated market a 
buccaneering carpet-bagging capitalism soon poured through the widening doors of the 
liberalising economy. Trump was thus good company for the emerging Russian 
oligarchs, many of whom were former apparatchiks or members of the Soviet mafia 
underworld. There was talk ‘about building a large luxury hotel, across the street from 
Kremlin, in partnership with the Soviet government’. 180 Not for the first time in Trump’s 
dealings with Moscow, he returned empty-handed, and none of the grandiose schemes 
were achieved. 
Back in America, Trump declared himself an expert on strategic security, warning 
of the dangers of nuclear proliferation and claiming that he was ‘dealing at a very high 
level’ with people in the Reagan White House. With his typical bombast, he declared that 
he had the expertise to solve the world’s nuclear problems, and that it would ‘take an 
hour-and-a-half to learn everything there is to know about missiles’.181 By now Trump 
had wider horizons than real estate and harboured the modest ambition to save the 
world. 182  His calls for nuclear disarmament were undoubtedly noted in Moscow. 183 
Speaking with Trump on the issue in 1987, the journalist Ron Rosenbaum came to the 
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conclusion that many voters reached later. He describes some of the more outlandish 
theories of the time, such as secretary of defence Caspar Weinberger’s ‘dense pack’ 
notion that incoming Soviet missiles would collide and blow themselves up mid-air if 
MX intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were concentrated in a small area in the 
American Midwest. As he notes, ‘If Congress could listen to Weinberger propose 
spending billions of dollars for this mad-as-hatter scheme without having him medicated, 
I could certainly listen to Trump’s plan to halt nuclear weapons spread, and take it 
seriously’.184 The complacent establishment line had become so out of kilter with the 
lived experience of millions of Americans, crumbling infrastructure and incompetent 
over-reach in foreign policy, that in November 2016 they were ready to give the outsider 
a chance – he could (it seemed at the time) hardly be worse. 
Although Trump’s vision is partial and distorted, he appears to have been 
genuinely worried by the peculiar kind of rationality associated with the official doctrine 
of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Trump’s uncle, Dr John Trump, was a 
professor at MIT working on cancer research and radiation therapy, and this apparently 
got Trump interested in the subject and awareness ‘of just how much danger nukes put 
the world in’. 185  This was no mere passing interest, and later he asked for more 
information from Bernard Lown, the inventor of the defibrillator, who shared the Nobel 
Peace Prize with Yevgeny Chazov, Gorbachev’s personal physician. On Lown’s return 
from meeting Gorbachev, Trump asked him for ‘everything you know about Gorbachev’, 
and claimed that within an hour of meeting Gorbachev he would end the cold war. Lown 
commented ‘The arrogance of the man, and his ignorance about the complexities of one 
of the complicating issues confronting mankind! The idea that he could solve it in one 
hour!’.186  
Having mastered strategic nuclear issues, Trump turned his attention to mundane 
trade and security matters. On 2 September 1987 Trump paid nearly $100,000 for full 
page advertisements in the Boston Globe, the Washington Post and the New York Times, 
running under the headline ‘There’s nothing wrong with America’s foreign defence 
policy that a little backbone can’t cure’, calling on the US to end the expensive 
commitment to defend Japan and the Gulf States. He argued that Japan was dependent on 
the Persian Gulf for its oil supplies, whereas for the US the region was of marginal 
significance: ‘It’s time for us to end our vast deficits by making Japan and others who can 
afford it pay. Our protection is worth hundreds of billions of dollars to these countries 
and their stake in their protection is far greater than ours’. He made the same point in The 
Art of the Deal, published in November 1987, where he argued ‘What’s unfortunate is 
that for decades now they [Japan] have become wealthier in large measure by screwing 
the United States with a self-serving trade policy that our political leaders have never 
been able to fully understand or counteract’. 187  This was an early indication of the 
‘America first’ mercantilist approach to foreign affairs, in which the US post-war alliance 
system appeared to have no value unless it paid for itself and served American 
commercial interests. The hostility that in the 1980s was directed towards Japan was later 
focused on China. Trump’s disruptive nationalism, dismissal of the traditional alliance 
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system and contempt for multilateral institutions are long-standing positions. While they 
may coincide with Russian preferences they were generated long before Trump entered 
the 2016 presidential campaign.188 It is unlikely that in the late 1980s Moscow had some 
sort of kompromat that shaped Trump’s policies, and even Unger admits that we do not 
know when the KGB opened a file on him.189 However, it was already clear that Trump 
had ‘an uncanny knack for channelling the fears and resentments of the age’.190 
The publication of The Art of the Deal transformed Trump from an eccentric 
businessman into a public, if controversial, figure. Trump was impressed by the openness 
sweeping the Soviet Union and the intensifying ambition to put an end to the cold war. In 
the end, the Soviet Union reformed itself out of existence in 1991. By contrast, the West 
consolidated and then enlarged its post-war security institutions (above all NATO) and 
radicalised its ideological and territorial ambitions. There was ‘no place for Russia’, and 
an escalating series of crises ultimately set the stage for the new cold war.191 As for 
Trump, he made his mark as a budding politician. In 1980 he had toyed with the idea of 
standing for the presidency on behalf of the marginal Reform Party. Now, on 2 
September 1987, the New York Times suggested that Trump could enter the 1988 
Republican presidential primaries against George H. W. Bush, the incumbent vice 
president. Trump dismissed the notion, but his presidential ambitions were no secret. 
Trump took a keen interest in Soviet and Russian developments. On 2 December 1988 
Gorbachev delivered his landmark speech to the United Nations, which in effect declared 
the cold war over. Donald and Ivana were due to have dinner with Gorbachev and his 
wife Raisa in New York, but the idea was scotched, and instead Trump shook hands with 
a Gorbachev impersonator outside Trump Tower.192 The following year the Berlin Wall 
came down, and soon after the Soviet bloc fell apart, the Soviet system dissolved, and the 
USSR itself disintegrated. In his interview with Playboy in 1990, Trump was sceptical 
about Gorbachev at a time when he was being lauded in the West:  
 
I predict he will be overthrown, because he has shown extraordinary weakness. 
Suddenly, for the first time ever, there are coal-miner strikes and brush fires 
everywhere – which will ultimately lead to a violent revolution. Yet Gorbachev is 
getting credit for being a wonderful leader – and we should continue giving him 
credit, because he’s destroying the Soviet Union.193 
 
This cynical if realistic approach chimes with later Russian views of Gorbachev. 
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In November 1996 Trump once again visited Moscow for three days, when he 
discussed a Trump Tower residential complex. Following a series of bankruptcies,194 
Trump had to fly on a commercial airline to get there, which according to his girlfriend of 
the time, Marla Maples, he took as a grievous affront. 195 There was also talk of Trump 
renovating the iconic Moskva hotel, and even the giant Rossiya hotel complex, but by 
1998 these plans had been abandoned.196 In autumn 2002 Trump once again visited, 
staying in the Baltschug Hotel, but this time the plan was not to build in Moscow but to 
sell apartments in his North American properties to rich Russian investors.197 By 2005 
Trump had handed responsibility for Moscow projects to the Bayrock development 
company founded by Tevfik Arif, an émigré from Kazakhstan, with the convicted felon 
Felix Sater taking the lead on various plans. Sater was a Russian-born New York real 
estate developer with alleged links to the mafia and who in December 1998 became an 
FBI ‘cooperating witness’ after he was caught in a stock-fraud scheme.198 As usual, none 
of these plans came to fruition.199 In November 2007 Trump attended the Millionaire’s 
Fair in Crocus City, a vast luxury shopping mall and concert hall built by Aras Agalarov 
on the western outskirts of Moscow. The aim was to launch Trump’s branded ‘24K Super 
Premium Vodka’, presented in a bottle braided with 24-carat gold.200 Even in a country 
still impressed by Western bling, the venture was not a success. Trump’s elder son, 
Donald Jr, visited Moscow in 2008 with plans to expand the Trump empire into new 
territories. By then Trump was less a developer than a licenser of his brand, usually for a 
hefty fee. Once again there were ambitious but fruitless discussions of Trump 
reconstructing the Moskva and Rossiya hotels.201 Trump was as much an outsider to 
Russian business circles as he was to its political elite. 
By the early years of the new century, the Trump brand was fading and his 
business model failing.202 In The Art of the Deal Trump described his casinos in Atlantic 
City as cash machines, but by 1990 the Taj Mahal became the first of his six corporate 
(but never personal) bankruptcies.203 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian 
mobsters moved to the US and squeezed out some of the more established mafia 
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groups.204 Not surprisingly, when Trump launched his campaign in 2015 his alleged 
mafia ties were explored.205 By then Trump had reinvented himself as a celebrity and 
even as some sort of cultural icon. This was overseen by Mark Burnett, the British-born 
TV reality show entrepreneur (and veteran of the 1982 Falklands War), who hit on the 
idea of Trump hosting The Apprentice. The first episode was aired in January 2004 and in 
various formats NBC filmed 14 seasons. Burnett’s ‘chief legacy is to have cast a serially 
bankrupt carnival barker in the role of a man who might plausibly become the leader of 
the free world’.206 The TV show acted as a bridge to the White House.207 
Trump’s fame as the host of The Apprentice brought him into contact with the 
Agalarov family. Aras Agalarov was one of the first developers of luxury housing in 
post-Soviet Moscow. His extensive property empire, including the Crocus Group, soon 
turned him into a billionaire. His son Emin was an aspiring Russian pop star and 
businessman, and married to Leila Aliyeva, the daughter of President Ilham Aliyev of 
Azerbaijan. Emin persuaded Trump to figure in one of his pop videos, which ended with 
Trump ‘firing’ him. Trump acquired the rights to the Miss Universe beauty contest in 
October 1996, and Aras’s company now bought the rights to stage the November 2013 
pageant in his Crocus City Hall, a 7,500-seat concert venue built four years earlier. 
Trump visited Moscow again for the competition. This was when the former British spy 
Christopher Steele alleges in his first memo that Trump hired a couple of prostitutes to 
urinate on each other on the same hotel bed in the Ritz Carlton hotel where the Obamas 
had slept during their one and only visit to Moscow on 6-7 July 2009.208 Trump was 
obsessed with meeting Putin, tweeting: ‘Do you think Putin will be going to the Miss 
Universe Pageant in November in Moscow – if so, will he become my new best 
friend?’.209 In the event, Putin did not attend the event, and there was no meeting. Putin 
did not become his ‘new best friend’.  
Nevertheless, the short visit was packed with events. On its eve, on 7 November 
Trump attended Billy Graham’s 95th birthday party, needing the support of the 
evangelical right to make a credible bid for the presidency.210 He landed in Moscow on 
Friday morning 8 November, and headed to the Ritz Carlton, where he stayed in the same 
presidential suite as the Obamas. He had a long lunch that day with Russian 
businesspeople and sponsors of the gala, and that evening attended Aras Agalarov’s 58th 
birthday party at Crocus City. Exhausted, he got back to the hotel at about 1.30am and 
was up early to shoot a music video with Emin. This was his only night in the hotel, and 
while it does not preclude the ‘golden showers’ incident recorded in the Steele dossier, it 
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seems unlikely.211 The 9th was as hectic as the previous day, including a press conference 
in which Trump was asked about his relationship with Putin, which at that point was non-
existent. Trump still hoped that Putin would attend the contest that evening and praised 
the Russian president: 
 
Look, he’s done a very brilliant job in terms of what he represents and who he’s 
representing. If you look at what he’s done with Syria, if you look at so many of 
the different things, he has really eaten our president’s lunch. Let’s not kid 
ourselves. He’s done an amazing job. … He’s put himself at the forefront of the 
world as a leader in a short period of time. 212  
 
The two did not met because Putin was delayed waiting for the Dutch monarch, Willem-
Alexander, who was stuck in traffic. Following the party after the Miss Universe pageant, 
Trump very late at night headed to the airport.213  
The music promoter Rob Goldstone made the arrangements for the Miss Universe 
contest, for which Trump received a fee of $12.2 million from Aras Agalarov. In a later 
interview Goldstone noted that Trump invited Putin to the pageant and scrawled at the 
bottom ‘lots of beautiful women’. Putin’s reaction to the invitation is not known. 
Goldstone says that if the events described by Steele had occurred, he would have heard 
of it. He stresses ‘on the night in question, Trump should have been getting five or six 
hours of much-needed sleep in order to be ready for our video shoot early that morning, 
which would then be followed by an extremely long day’.214 Whether Moscow gathered 
kompromat on Trump during this visit, rendering him ‘the Muscovian candidate’, is the 
crux of the Russiagate allegation. Alex Sapir, a Soviet émigré who arrived in New York 
in 1975, was with Trump in Moscow, and the idea of building a Moscow Trump Tower 
was discussed. By the time Sapir became acquainted with Trump in 2001, he had already 
been working for US intelligence agencies for three years.215 Between 2006 and 2010 
Sapir and his associates in the Bayrock Group built the Trump SoHo hotel and 
condominium complex in Manhattan. The troubled project was the subject of a lawsuit in 
2011, with potential buyers claiming that they had been defrauded by the Trump team 
exaggerating early sales figures by claiming that ‘more than half’ of the units had been 
sold.216 Now a letter of intent was signed with Agalarov’s company, and it looked as if 
Trump’s ambitions in Moscow were finally going to be realised. Soon after the pageant, 
Agalarov’s daughter presented Trump with a black lacquer box, which contained a letter 
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from Putin – whose contents have not been revealed, prompting much speculation.217 
Following the imposition of Ukraine-related sanctions in 2014, Trump’s daughter Ivanka 
visited various potential sites in Moscow with Emin, but in the end decided to kill the 
deal for business reasons.218 In short, despite repeated attempts to do business in Russia, 
the story is one of failure, like the US-Russian relationship as a whole. 
 
Follow the money 
 
In the Watergate scandal the Deep Throat insider source famously advised Woodward 
and Bernstein to ‘follow the money’, and this became the catchphrase of the film All the 
President’s Men. The trail ultimately led to the White House. Trump’s persistent refusal 
to condemn Putin and Russia is explained by the Kremlin’s financial hold over him. 
According to the recent account by Catherine Belton, Russia backed Trump’s commercial 
interests as far back as the 1990s, exploiting his vanity and financial vulnerability long 
before he assumed the presidency, and then exploited these long-term connections when 
he entered the White House.219 The trail is long and tangled, but the main outlines are 
clear. 
 Trump’s business model is convoluted at the best of times, but when it converges 
with what the Financial Times calls the ‘shadowy post-Soviet world where politics and 
personal enrichment merge’, things become even more complex. Trump’s early business 
dealings may have rendered him vulnerable to ‘undue influence now that he is in the 
White House’.220 The case in question here is the building of Trump Tower in Toronto, a 
project that was launched in 2007. This is a 65-storey tower containing 261 luxury hotel 
rooms and condominiums, and its financing was as complex as any of Trump’s 
schemes.221 Still unfinished by the original completion date of 2010, a further $40m was 
required. It was provided by Alex Shnaider, an early partner in the project, who in 2010 
is alleged to have approved a $100m ‘commission’ to fixers representing the Kremlin’s 
interests. The payment was designed to facilitate the sale of the enormous Zaporozhe 
steel mill (Zaporishstal) in Eastern Ukraine and represented 10 per cent of the $850 
million sale price. The deal apparently was financed by Vnesheconombank (VEB), the 
Russian state investment bank, whose chairman at the time was Putin (he had been 
appointed in 2008). With the $100 million facilitation payment made, the steel mill sale 
went ahead, and part of the profit was invested in Trump Toronto. In a subsequent 
dispute between Shnaider and his business partners it was alleged that some of the money 
may have ended up in the pocket of Russian government officials. If that was the case, 
then the steel mill sale would fall foul of Canadian anti-bribery laws.222 
Although Trump proudly proclaimed himself the ‘king of debt’, boasting of 
‘doing things with other people’s money’, Trump was perceived by lenders as a high risk 
because of his serial business bankruptcies and comparatively few successful ventures. 
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The global financial crisis from 2008 hit Trump hard. His casino business in Atlantic City 
had long become defunct, but now Trump Mortgage collapsed and Trump companies 
defaulted on a $334 million debt repayment to Deutsche Bank due on the loan to build 
Trump Tower Chicago, the last of Trump’s personally-directed projects. By now Trump 
had reinvented himself as a TV star in The Apprentice, and his business strategy was to 
license his brand globally.223 Cohen notes that by 2006 ‘the Trump name was basically 
all that the Trump Organization had left to sell’.224 In 2008 Don Jr. informed a real estate 
conference that ‘Russians make up a pretty disproportionate cross-section of a lot of our 
assets. We don’t rely on American banks. We have all the funding we need out of 
Russia’. 225  It is not clear what Trump Jr. had in mind, but the comment has been 
endlessly repeated as proof of Russian influence on Trump.  
Because of a repeated cycle of bankruptcies in which creditors lost their 
investments, ‘virtually all the banks in the United States refused to do business with 
him’.226 Deutsche Bank was the only mainstream financial organisation willing to lend to 
Trump after 1998, but as with all of his partners, the relationship was long and difficult. 
In 2010 Trump was granted a major loan by the private wealth division of Deutsche Bank 
at a time when it was handling a considerable quantity of Russian money. 227  Even 
Deutsche was wary of dealing with Trump because of the way he ‘used incredibly 
inflated valuations of his real estate holdings to justify his company’s loans’.228 The 
details are unclear, and this has given rise to a mass of speculation. Deutsche Bank has a 
long history of working in Russia and is alleged to have helped launder funds for wealthy 
Russians. It now faces charges of helping launder some $20bn in Russian assets through 
what is known as the ‘Global Laundromat’ case.229 The question is why the bank in total 
lent some $2.5bn to Trump at a time when the risk were known, although no evidence has 
emerged that any lending ‘was connected to the Russian government, companies or 
individuals’.230 Two congressional committees in April 2019 subpoenaed the materials, 
including tax returns from 2010, and in August the bank revealed that it had tax returns 
relating to Trump’s family and businesses. This provoked yet another round of 
speculation, including what transactions Trump may have engaged in with Russian or 
other foreign nationals. 
There have been enduring questions over whether Trump is a billionaire, despite 
his boastful claims.231 Trump was forced to change his business model, licensing others 
 
223 Frum, Trumpocracy, p. 61. 
224 Cohen, Disloyal, p. 28. 
225 Burgis, ‘Trump’s Tower of Secrets’, p. 14; Jonathan Chait, ‘Will Trump be Meeting with his 
Counterpart – or his Handler?’, New York Magazine, 9 July 2018, 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/07/trump-putin-russia-collusion.html. 
226 Cohen, Disloyal, p. 47. 
227 Chait, ‘Will Trump be Meeting with his Counterpart’. 
228 Cohen, Disloyal, p. 202. 
229  Luke Harding, ‘Deutsche Bank Faces Action over $20bn Russian Money-Laundering 
Scheme’, Guardian, 17 April 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/apr/17/deutsche-
bank-faces-action-over-20bn-russian-money-laundering-scheme. 
230 David Enrich, ‘Deutsche Bank has a Lot of Detailed Information’, New York Times, 28 August 
2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/28/business/deutsche-bank-trump.html. 
231 Timothy L. O’Brien, TrumpNation: The Art of Being the Donald (New York, Grand Central 





to brand skyscraper developments with the Trump Organisation, which then managed the 
development under contract.232 Real estate developers paid Trump a large fee to use his 
name, but assumed all the risk themselves; that is, apart from people who put a down 
payment on units, who often lost their deposits.233 Financial problems forced Trump to 
work with the Bayrock Group, which had been involved in the plans to build a hotel in 
Moscow in 2005, with Sater working as the intermediary. Bayrock was chaired by Tevfik 
Arif, who introduced Trump to various Russian investors, although in the end the actual 
development took place in Manhattan. Trump worked with Bayrock and Tamir Sapir, an 
émigré from Georgia who made millions in New York real estate, to develop the scandal-
ridden Trump SoHo hotel and condominium complex in lower Manhattan. 
Trump was never too choosy about his clients, noting that when he was selling 
apartments in the original Trump Tower ‘Many wealthy foreigners didn’t have the proper 
social references for these cooperatives [where there were stringent checks], or didn’t 
want to put themselves through the scrutiny of a bunch of prying strangers. Instead, they 
came to us’.234 Unger puts this rather more harshly, noting that Trump Tower was one of 
only two buildings in New York that allowed shell companies to buy condos, thus 
allowing dirty money to be laundered. 235  In 2016 Trump was the first presidential 
candidate to refuse access to his tax records, and the Trump Organisation has had a 
chequered history with the tax authorities. There are suggestions that in the early 1990s 
Trump took an enormous tax loss of $900 million to reduce his tax liability in subsequent 
years, and that he paid no income tax at all in 1978, 1979, 1992 and 1994. Accordingly, 
Trump ‘is a shameless flim-flam man with practically no regard for the truth or the quaint 
notion that wealthy people like him have a civic duty to pay their fair share of taxes’.236 
The purchase by a Russian oligarch, Dmitry Rybolovlev, of Trump’s Palm Beach 
(Florida) mansion called Maison de l’Amitié for $96m in 2008 has provoked much 
discussion. The price was over double the $41 million that Trump paid only four years 
earlier.237 As so often in these cases, on closer examination there is less to the affair than 
suspected. There is nothing to suggest that the transaction was part of a Russian bail-out 
to help Trump.238 Rybolovlev is known as an extravagant spender, having bought the 
world’s most expensive picture, Leonard da Vinci’s ‘Salvator Mundi’, for $127.5 million 
in 2013 (sold at a later auction for $450 million). In 2010 Rybolovlev sold his Russian 
potash and fertiliser business, Uralkali, for $7.5 billion, and by the following year had 
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pulled out of Russia entirely and relocated to Monaco.239 His net worth is estimated at 
$10.5 billion, including some $2.7 billion held in art and real estate. In other words, 
Rybolovlev had no enduring ties with the Russian government, hence his dealings with 
Trump are unlikely to have been part of a covert operation. For Rybolovlev, $95 million 
is no more than small change, and even in 2008 had no known links with the Kremlin. 
The transition to market economies in the post-Soviet states created a peculiar 
type of buccaneering capitalism, entwined with the remnants of the Soviet bureaucratic 
state. Capital and power are closely linked in Western states, but mechanisms have been 
devised to ensure some sort of separation at the functional level, but in many of the post-
Soviet states it is precisely at the functional level that the authorities and business work 
together. The model changed in Russia when Putin came to power in 2000, and the free-
wheeling oligarchic relations of the 1990s gave way to a more ordered system, although 
the functional relationship continued in new forms. The state stymied the development of 
an independent entrepreneurial class, an aspiration identified in particular with Yukos oil 
company head Mikhail Khodorkovsky.240 In the new dispensation business people could 
keep their wealth as long as they aligned themselves with the regime’s goals. A new class 
of ‘state oligarchs’ (‘stoligarchs’) emerged. Given the enormous wealth generated by 
rising energy prices in the 2000s, much of this money coursed through the Western 
financial system. Already in the ‘wild East’ days of the 1990s the newly enriched class 
learnt the value of offshore tax havens and shell companies, where layer upon layer of 
legal entities (typically with similar names) is created to disguise the ultimate beneficiary 
owner.  
The real estate sector is particularly prone to such activity, with a US Treasury 
investigation in 2017 suggesting that a third of top-end property cash purchases were 
suspicious. 241  Russians were eager purchasers of apartments in Trump-branded 
properties, some of which may have been used to launder ill-gotten assets. A Kazakh 
network is alleged to have been at work in Trump SoHo. In this context, it is hardly 
surprising that a group of 63 Russians spent $100 million to buy property at seven 
Trump-branded luxury towers in Florida. For the new rich in the former Soviet Union, 
real estate investment is the primary vehicle to launder money. The problem is ‘especially 
egregious in the United Kingdom, where some have called the UK luxury real-estate 
industry “a money laundering machine”’. This possibly applies to Trump’s purchase in 
2014 of a loss-making golf course in Scotland, renamed Trump Turnberry, although 
Trump is an enthusiastic golfer. Trump’s finances continue to raise questions, provoking 
‘realistic fears about past business partners using their knowledge to unduly influence the 
President and his policies’.242 
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It is hardly surprising that Trump and Russian money intersected. Trump’s failure 
to divest himself of his interests in the many companies that comprise the Trump 
Organisation and his refusal to release his tax returns means that his presidency was torn 
by conflicts of interest. The fundamental question remains: were Trump’s policies in 
general, and specifically vis-à-vis Russia, ‘shaped by the alignment of his interests with 
those who brought him the money that sustained his career’.243 Trump enterprises are not 
known for the rigour of due diligence, and his business conduct is akin to some dubious 
post-Soviet practices. Business and politics converge at the functional level and money is 
applied liberally and directly to achieve political goals. Trump’s business activities and 
Russian money did intersect at various points, but there is no evidence that his views, let 
alone his policies, have been shaped by these interests. Trump is notoriously negligent of 
the concerns of partners and investors, and there is nothing to suggest that Russia is any 
different. Nevertheless, Russiagate made talking with Russian leaders and officials 
suspicious and contacts were reduced to a minimum.  
Discussions for a development in Moscow were revived on the eve of the 2016 
presidential election, with fateful consequences for those involved. The facilitator once 
again was Sater. Ivanka Trump had earlier pulled the plug on Moscow projects, but when 
Trump announced his presidential bid, Sater reappeared – perhaps coincidentally, but the 
timing raises questions. Trump appeared keen to seal a lucrative Moscow contract, as an 
insurance policy if his presidential bid failed. In October 2015 Sater revived the idea with 
Cohen, whom he had known since his teenage years in Brighton Beach, of building a 
luxury hotel, office and residential complex that would be called the Trump Tower 
Moscow. 244 Cohen is dismissive of Sater’s abilities and connections, and stresses that he 
certainly was not ‘some criminal genius conspiring with Russian oligarchs to launder vast 
sums of money through the Trump Organization’.245 Trump signed a letter of intent with 
the little-known Russian developer I.C. Expert that month.246 The project soon stalled, 
with no site found or serious partner chosen, at which point Sater suggested that Cohen 
get help from the Kremlin. There then followed a farcical attempt to find the relevant 
email address, and as we shall see, a speculative email was sent in mid-January 2016 to 
Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s press secretary. A fortnight later Cohen, without consulting 
Trump, for ‘business reasons’ once again abandoned the project (or so it appeared).247 In 
his press conference of 11 January 2017, Trump insisted ‘I have no deals in Russia, I 
have no deal that could happen in Russia because we’ve stayed away, and I have no loans 
with Russia’.248 As we shall see, Mueller discovered that the project continued well into 
2016.249 
 
All things bright and colourful 
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Trump’s four visits to Moscow, his laudatory comments about Putin, and his murky 
finances produced endless speculation about his relationship with the Kremlin. One of the 
more extreme versions is advanced by Jonathan Chait. On the eve of the July 2018 
Helsinki summit with Putin he outlined what he called a ‘plausible theory of mind-
boggling collusion’:  
 
As Trump arranges to meet face-to-face and privately with Vladimir Putin later 
this month, the collusion between the two men metastasizing from a dark 
accusation into an open alliance, it would be dangerous not to consider the 
possibility that the summit is less a negotiation between two heads of state than a 
meeting between a Russian-intelligence asset and his handler.250  
 
He runs through the Russiagate allegations in a classic neo-journalistic manner, shaping 
the evidence to prove an already decided case. Chait’s allegations drew lines between 
dots that in fact may have no necessary connection. The Russiagate controversy moved 
conspiracy theories to the centre of American life, even while that centre was destabilised 
by the allegations. This was a double movement undermining traditional institutions, 
ethical standards and norms of governance. 
For those looking to taint him with the Russian brush, Trump did his cause no 
good. Trump provocatively lauded Putin as a strong and decisive leader, compared to 
Obama’s ‘weakness’. In the presidential debate of 19 October 2016 Clinton called Trump 
Putin’s ‘puppet’, painting him as a Kremlin stooge who would sacrifice American 
interests to Russia if elected. This further polarised American politics. Republican voters 
were more likely to approve of the Russian leader (which rose to 37 per cent during the 
campaign), whereas Democratic voters went the other way, a split that endures to this 
day. Trump’s questioning of traditional US foreign policy commitments, which began 
long before his presidential campaign, and his vexing behaviour intersected with Russia’s 
assertiveness with explosive effect.  
Putin’s comments only stoked the flames. In his annual press conference on 17 
December 2015 he stressed: 
 
We’re never closed to this [working with the US], no matter who the American 
people elect as their president. It’s them who are constantly trying to tell us what 
we should do in our county, who should get elected and who shouldn’t, and what 
procedures to follow. We never meddle in other people’s affairs. They say it’s 
dangerous to do so in America. They say that if foreign observers get closer than 
five metres to a line of voters, they could end up in prison. We aren’t doing even 
that, right? We are open and will work with any president voted in by the 
American people.251 
 
As he was leaving he was asked about Trump: 
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Well, he is a colourful person. Talented, without a doubt. But it’s none of our 
business, it’s up to the voters in the United States. But he is the absolute leader of 
the presidential race. He says he wants to shift to a different mode of relations, a 
deeper level of relations with Russia. How could we not welcome that? Of course 
we welcome it. As for the domestic politics of it, the turns of phrase he uses to 
increase his popularity, I’ll repeat, it’s not our business to evaluate his work.252 
 
The Russian word Putin used for colourful is yarkii, which can be described as bright, 
vivid or talented. Trump of course put the best slant on the comment and asserted that 
Putin called him ‘brilliant’, which is a misreading of the word. In his interview with 
MSNBC’s ‘Morning Joe’ on 18 December Trump said he welcomed Putin’s compliment: 
‘When people call you brilliant, it’s always good, especially when the person heads up 
Russia’. Trump asserted that ‘It is always a great honor to be so nicely complimented by 
a man so highly respected within his own country and beyond’. He went on to argue ‘I 
have always felt that Russia and the United States should be able to work well with each 
other towards defeating terrorism and restoring world peace, not to mention trade and all 
of the other benefits derived from mutual respect’. Asked by Joe Scarborough what he 
thought of the high number of Russian journalists murdered on Putin’s watch, Trump 
responded, ‘He’s running his country, and at least he’s a leader, you know unlike what 
we have in this country’. Pushed further, Trump compared Russia to the United States: 
‘Well I think our country does plenty of killing also, Joe’, he said. ‘So, you know. 
There’s a lot of stupidity going on in the world right now, Joe. A lot of killing going on, a 
lot of stupidity’. He noted Putin’s high standing in the polls, a sign of his high leadership 
qualities: ‘I’ve always felt fine about Putin. I think he’s a strong leader’.253 
Later, at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in June 2016 
the American journalist Fareed Zakaria, who was moderating a panel, asked Putin what 
had prompted him to describe Trump as ‘brilliant, outstanding, talented’. In fact, of the 
epithets, Putin had only used the word ‘talented’, without specifying what talent he had in 
mind. Putin pushed back and accused Zakaria of exaggerating:  
 
I made an off-hand remark about Trump being a colourful person. Are you saying 
he is not colourful? I did not characterise him in any other way. But what I did 
note, and what I certainly welcome, and I see nothing wrong with this – Mr. 
Trump has stated that he is ready for the renewal of a full-fledged relationship 
between Russia and the United States. What is wrong with that? We all welcome 
it. Don’t you? 254 
 
Omarosa warned Trump against pro-Putin rhetoric, and noted that he understood very 
little about the cold war and international affairs: ‘Donald was not a student of history. 
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He wasn’t a student of anything … I just don’t think that he had the attention span to 
even watch a documentary about Russia’, but he ‘fixated on Vladimir Putin as a feared, 
respected and admired leader’. She notes that Trump may have been envious of the 
control Putin allegedly exerts over Russia, but ‘Trump went with his gut, and his gut told 
him, “I like Putin, and I want him to be my friend”. Nothing else mattered’.255 Cohen 
argues that it was Putin’s alleged wealth that was attractive, with Trump portraying Putin 
as ‘the richest man in the world’.256 Bob Woodward suggests that Trump’s apparent 
obeisance was not because Putin had some kompromat on him, but that Trump had an 
affinity for strongmen. He believed that his skills in the art of the deal worked best 
through personal diplomacy, with people who could deliver like North Korea’s leader 
Kim Jong-un and Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: ‘The tougher and meaner 
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RUSSIAGATE AND THE NEW COLD WAR 
 
 
In the most important foreign policy speech of his campaign, delivered at the Mayflower 
Hotel in Washington on 27 April 2016, Trump argued that  
 
I believe an easing of tensions and improved relations with Russia – from a 
position of strength – is possible. … Common sense says this cycle of hostility 
must end. Some say the Russians won’t be reasonable. I intend to find out.  
 
The speech outlined his ‘America first’ strategy, and excoriated Obama’s alleged foreign 
policy failings: overextending military resources which he then under-funded; of failing 
to get allies to pay their fair share for defence; causing allies to doubt their ability to rely 
on the US; causing adversaries no longer to respect the US; and continuing the unclear 
US foreign policy that had predominated since the end of the cold war. America would 
get ‘out of the nation-building business and instead [focus] on creating stability in the 
world’.258 Amid the welter of Trumpian venality and excess, one big idea emerged – the 
need to rethink the strategic priorities of US foreign policy and at the heart of that was 
rapprochement with Russia. Many of the themes had sounded before, but together they 
questioned the foundations of the post-cold war international order. Trump challenged 
some of the most sacred shibboleths of US foreign policy, above all the venerable 
principle of ‘liberal hegemony’. His victory ‘revealed considerable public dissatisfaction 
with the foreign policy of the past three US presidents’.259 His challenge to the grand 
strategy that had long guided American foreign policy was incoherent and ill-informed, 
but the evident and expensive failures of so many US foreign policy initiatives (such as 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq) gave credence to Trump’s ‘America First’ rhetoric. It also 
suited Russia since the expansive Atlantic system was increasingly perceived as a threat. 
This geopolitical coincidence of interests intersected with domestic US political conflicts 
to devastating effect. 
 
International politics and Russiagate 
 
Trump viewed post-communist Russia as just another country, like France and Germany, 
with whom it made sense to ‘get along’. However, for his critics France and Germany are 
not just other countries but close allies at the heart of the Atlantic alliance, whereas 
Russia was perceived as an adversary. 260  When Mitt Romney during the 2012 
presidential election identified Russia ‘without question our No. 1 geopolitical foe’ he 
was reprimanded by Obama, but by the time of the 2016 election the dissenting position 
had become the new orthodoxy. If in 2012 only two per cent of Americans considered 
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Russia their greatest enemy, by 2015 this had risen to 18 per cent and topped the list of 
adversaries, overtaking North Korea, China and Iran. 261  Trump viewed Russia as a 
business opportunity and a potential ally in the life-and-death struggle with China. He 
was one of the few American leaders who had repeatedly visited the country, which itself 
raised suspicion. Trump’s desire to ‘normalise’ perceptions of Russia and to establish 
pragmatic relations encountered resistance, and Russia was used as the stick with which 
to drive Trump back into the new cold war fold. 
But why Russia? The cold war ended in 1989 amid much celebration that a new 
era of peace and reconciliation was at hand. However, no inclusive and universal peace 
order was established. On the one side, the US-led liberal international order expanded 
and became the dominant model for global order. This was accompanied by the 
institutional enlargement of its main organisations, NATO and the European Union. In 
the early years Russia sought to adapt to the expanding ‘historical West’, and indeed to 
become part of it. However, from the very first, Gorbachev in the late Soviet years, 
President Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s and then Putin from 2000 argued that Russia 
deserved a special status in the new order. This was because of Russia’s long history as a 
great power, its role in putting an end to the cold war, its status as one of the two nuclear 
super-powers, its role as the continuer state of the Soviet Union, and its assumption of a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Russia anticipated not just the enlargement 
of an existing system but a transformation that would recognise Russia’s status as a co-
founder of a new security system. The clash between these contending visions of post-
cold war international order – the expansive version pushed by the West and the 
transformative one desired by Moscow – set the scene for the 25 years of the cold peace 
from 1989, and thereafter the new era of confrontation from 2014.262   
The pattern of Russia’s relations with the West since the end of the cold war has 
been a downward spiral, with rare moments of cooperation alternating with intensifying 
conflicts. Neither side wanted conflict but the general trend was negative, culminating in 
the return to open confrontation in 2014.263 Whether this should be called a new cold war 
has been dismissed as both anachronistic and misleading. Anachronistic, because it 
suggests a return to the previous conflict, whereas many of the earlier features – 
relatively stable bipolarity, confrontation between the two ideologies of capitalism and 
revolutionary socialism, and the focus on a divided Europe –are either not present or 
greatly changed. It is misleading because this new confrontation is truly global and 
involves a new set of actors and encompasses a different range of issues.264 Nevertheless, 
elements of a new cold war have undoubtedly been revived, and for this reason it will be 
used as shorthand for the current confrontation. There is intense ideological and 
increasingly militarised conflict, although taking far more diffuse forms than earlier, with 
the main dividing line between democracies and authoritarian systems. There has also 
been intense informational mobilisation, with accusations traded between Moscow and 
Washington and other capitals of electoral interference, regime change operations, 
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hacking, cyber warfare and disinformation campaigns. In short, as George Beebe puts it, 
‘The United States and Russia are fighting an undeclared virtual war’.265 
Why did relations between Russia and the Atlantic system deteriorate to the point 
that we now talk of new cold war? Is Russia solely to blame, or are there larger structural 
forces to blame? Certainly, long-term factors apply, including the way that Russia 
historically has been ‘a screen on which Americans [project] their hopes and fears’.266 
The diplomat and historian George F. Kennan observed that ‘A large segment of the 
American population has the need to cultivate the idea of American innocence and virtue 
– which requires an opposite pole of evil’.267 Russia over the generations has served in 
this capacity, although at crucial moments the two have been on the same side. Russia 
supported American independence, the Union forces in the Civil War, and the two were 
allies in the two great wars of the twentieth century. At the same time, Soviet Russia 
prompted the Red Scare of 1919 and was the antagonist of the cold war after 1945. The 
failure to secure an enduring peace drove the two apart after 1945 and again after 1989. 
In Russiagate the view of Russia as a revisionist power, determined to avenge its alleged 
humiliation and loss of status since the end of the cold war, predominated. Russia was 
aggrieved about what it perceived to have been the bad faith of the Western powers, when 
repeated promises that NATO would not enlarge were not only repudiated but even the fact 
that such commitments were given is denied.  
Russiagate grew out of the way that the cold war ended, and the failure in the 
subsequent 25 years of the cold peace to establish an equitable and stable security order 
in Europe and globally. In the 1990s Yeltsin had been the West’s willing ally, but even he 
found working with the US difficult and humiliating, notably when NATO launched the 
78-day bombing campaign against its traditional ally, Serbia, in 1999 without UN 
authorisation.268  In 1996 the US sent numerous election experts and public relations 
consultants to Moscow to help Yeltsin win re-election (accompanied by a timely $10.2bn 
IMF loan). After a dirty campaign in which Yeltsin’s adversaries were portrayed as an 
existential threat to democracy and even to Russia’s existence as a normal state, and in 
which the spending limits were greatly exceeded, Yeltsin was returned to the Kremlin. 
The US provision of money and advisors contravened Russian laws against foreigners 
working directly in campaigns. Nevertheless, Time magazine wrote gleefully about 
‘Yanks to the Rescue’.269 What the US did in 1996 is sometimes used to justify Russia’s 
intervention in the 2016 US election. 
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Putin pursues a ‘Russia first’ agenda, although in his early years he tried to find a 
formula whereby this could be achieved in partnership with the West. This was the phase 
of the ‘new realism’, which encompassed the Medvedev interregnum of 2008-12 and the 
reset. The realism was new to the extent that Putin sought to defend perceived Russian 
interests and its status as a great power while integrating into the liberal world order. In 
the end, the combination proved impossible. In his infamous speech at the Munich 
Security Conference in February 2007 Putin rudely punctured the West’s belief that the 
‘unipolar world’ would remain unchallenged.270 The reset launched by Obama in 2009, 
when Medvedev was president, represented one of the peaks of cooperation, but it too 
ended in 2011 in renewed confrontation because of conflict over Libya and the Arab 
Spring. By 2012 Putin believed that he had failed to establish what he considered a more 
equitable relationship between Russia and the Atlantic system and to temper what he 
considered to be the ill-advised and catastrophic actions of the Atlantic power system. 
Foreign policy entered a ‘neo-revisionist’ phase in which Russia’s perceived interests and 
status in world affairs were asserted more forcefully, with or without Western approval. 
The aim was not to destroy the existing international system but to revise its hierarchy to 
allow ‘rising powers’ greater scope to pursue their interests.  
Putin’s image in the West turned from reformer to foe, and by 2016 this had 
become the new orthodoxy. Russia challenged American global dominance (hegemony), 
but not in the way usually portrayed. Russian neo-revisionism challenged the practices of 
the Atlantic powers while still committed to the norms of international system as 
reflected in the rules of international society, above all represented by the UN and other 
institutions of global governance. Putin’s critics are right to stress that he represented a 
challenge to the hegemony of the US-led liberal international order; but are wrong to 
argue that he sought to undermine the international system and destroy the order 
represented by the leading capitalist democracies. The goal was more complex: to change 
the balance of power in the system rather than to destroy the system itself.271  
 
Russia and Trump’s election 
 
Putin returned to the Russian presidency in May 2012 aggrieved and suspicious of the 
West. He also had a particular animus against Clinton, whom he perceived as having 
encouraged the protesters in 2011. But does this mean that Putin sought revenge? Russia 
certainly is an aggrieved power and Putin resented perceived and genuine grievances. 
Moscow sought recognition of its status as a great power, and thus cooperation on an equal 
basis in tackling global and regional problems. This does not translate into a model of 
vengeance. Equally, the view that Russia’s domestic problems and contradictions impel it 
to assume an aggressive stance abroad is misleading; the relationship between domestic 
and foreign policy is more complicated. The liberal view is that domestic politics and 
regime type determines foreign policy, whereas realists argue that structural factors shape 
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foreign policy decision-making.272 Putin is an arch-pragmatist, and his actions draw on the 
Russian consensus view of the country’s national interests. Trump’s and Putin’s views of 
international politics did not coincide, yet they were both pragmatists and it was on this 
basis that there was potential for cooperation. Rather than being hell-bent on damaging 
American democracy and working to advance Trump, Russia’s concerns were rather 
different. Some politicians were certainly keen on Trump, seeing him as a necessary 
alternative to Clinton’s militarism and interventionism, but Moscow had seen too many 
American presidents come and go for any great hopes to be vested in any individual.273 
However, some security and other actors in Russia exploited cyber and social media 
technologies to fish in muddy waters. 
At the Helsinki summit on 16 July 2018 Putin admitted that he had hoped that 
Trump would win, because of his expressed view that he sought better relations with 
Russia. The Russian elite feared a Clinton victory because of her known antagonism. In 
the aftermath of the return of Crimea to Russia in March 2014 she likened Putin to Hitler, 
and she sought to ramp up military support for Ukraine. 274  Above all, Moscow 
condemned her aggressive interventionist foreign policy. She promised to provide 
Ukraine with lethal weapons and to impose a no-fly zone in Syria, policies that 
threatened direct confrontation between the two powers. Not surprisingly, from 
Moscow’s perspective Trump appeared the more reasonable potential interlocutor. He 
was the first major presidential candidate since 1945 to question the US commitment to 
European security. As he put it in a major interview in the heat of the campaign, 
‘Congratulations, you will be defending yourself’. Despite their ‘massive wealth’, NATO 
members were not ‘paying their bills’, and unless that changed the alliance would have to 
be rethought.275 
This was undoubtedly music to the ears of the Russian ambassador, Kislyak, who 
ended up taking a rather more prominent part in American political life than he would 
have wished. He assumed the post in 2008 and his sociability soon turned him into a 
Washington insider. McFaul describes Kislyak as ‘old-school, more Soviet than post-
Soviet’.276 Kislyak is a classic Russian intelligent: erudite, well-educated and with a deep 
understanding of international politics. Later, he was bemused and perplexed by the 
enormity of the scandal in which he was engulfed.277 He was a realist in both senses of 
the word: in international affairs, sceptical about the interests driving the promotion of 
democracy and human rights; but a practical realist as well, looking to exploit 
opportunities to advance Russia’s interests, but willing to engage with the US and other 
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countries to pursue common interests. He was thus a quintessential member of the 
contemporary Russian elite, sharing classic Putinite views about the country and its place 
in the world. 
This perspective is sharply at odds with that of Clintonite internationalists. As 
McFaul puts it, ‘The United States emerged from the cold war as the world’s only 
superpower. Yet this super-superpower proved unable, inept, or unwilling to influence 
domestic change in Russia’.278  Like Clinton (and he probably influenced her view), 
McFaul is deeply critical of Putin, which made him a problematic ambassadorial choice. 
He condemned Bush’s attempts to connect with Putin at a personal level, arguing at the 
time of the Slovenian summit in June 2001 that ‘I think there is plenty of good reason not 
to trust President Putin. This is a man who was trained to lie’.279 Later, in Obama’s first 
term, McFaul worked tirelessly to promote the reset in relations, correctly arguing that ‘a 
more benign international environment for the Russian government would create better 
conditions for democratic change internally’.280 But such a reset had to respect Russian 
security and sovereignty concerns accompanied by diplomatic finesse, something that 
was lacking. It certainly did not help when both McFaul and Clinton argued that their 
strategy was to engage with the Russian people over the heads of the Russian 
government. No administration would take kindly to such a potentially disruptive 
strategy, least of all the traumatised Russian leadership. The Soviet system had 
disintegrated barely two decades earlier, and the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 
and the Time of Troubles (Smuta) in the early seventeenth century are part of everyday 
history and cultural reference points.281 
Putin equally made little attempt to hide his dislike of McFaul, considering him 
partly responsible for the deterioration in US-Russian relations.282 McFaul holds to the idea 
of Russia as an ‘autocracy’, and believes ‘A new ideological struggle has emerged between 
Russia and the West, not between communism and capitalism but between democracy and 
autocracy’.283 This is why, with Putin back in the Kremlin, Clinton in June 2012 urged 
Obama to take a harder line, arguing that Putin was ‘deeply resentful of the US and 
suspicious of our actions’, and sought to reclaim lost influence in the neighbourhood. She 
argued that although the project to create a Eurasian Union was called ‘regional 
integration’ it was in fact ‘code for rebuilding a lost empire’.284 In her final memo about 
Russia in January 2013 Clinton noted that the reset had in the end turned into a setback, 
and she urged Obama to set a ‘new course’ by taking a harder line. She argued that the 
relationship between Washington and Moscow would ‘likely get worse before it got 
better’, and Obama had to be ‘realistic’ about the danger that Putin posed to his 
neighbours and the world order’.285 She argued ‘We should hit the pause button on new 
efforts. Don’t appear too eager to work together. Don’t flatter Putin with high-level 
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attention’. Russian intransigence would not prevent the US pursuing its goals in Syria and 
elsewhere: ‘Strength and resolve were the only language Putin would understand’.286 As 
mentioned, she later compared Russian actions in Ukraine to those of Hitler in 1938.287 
These were the basic principles of her campaign in 2016, which McFaul helped draft. He 
summed it up as follows: defend the results of the reset, support Obama’s coercive 
response to ‘Putin’s invasion of Ukraine’, and ‘pledge to do more’; in other words, 
‘Obama plus’ meant an enhanced NATO presence in the Baltic, more military and 
economic support for Ukraine, new sanctions on Russia, the creation of no-fly zones in 
Syria, stronger support for democracy and human rights, and a stronger pushback against 
‘Russian propaganda’ worldwide. 288  This programme was a recipe for intensified 
confrontation, if not war. 
There could be no meeting of minds, and irenic ambitions on all sides were 
frustrated. McFaul frames the events of 2016 in the context of what happened in 2011: 
‘Five years later, Putin seized his moment for revenge when he intervened in the 2016 US 
presidential election to help Trump and hurt Clinton’.289 McFaul’s relentless defence of 
the Russiagate allegations flowed naturally from his model of Russian politics, in which 
‘Putin needs an enemy’ and the domestic legitimacy of the Putin administration is 
questioned. The Russiagate narrative rests on the questionable assumption that Putin took 
revenge on Clinton by making mischief in the 2016 election. 
 
Subverting the West 
 
Election interference is nothing new. According to one study, the US and the USSR 
intervened 117 times in foreign elections during the cold war, with the US using dirty 
tricks and other methods 81 times. It appears that in 2016 ‘the United States was about to 
get a taste of its own medicine’.290 The concept of ‘interference’ became stretched and 
unclear, with generalised assertions of ‘meddling’ and ‘collusion’. Trump did not help his 
case by confusing the character of collusion. In a tweet of 30 July 2018 he reiterated a 
point made by his lawyer Rudy Giuliani the day before: what’s wrong with collusion? In 
his tweet Trump wrote ‘Collusion is not a crime, but that doesn’t matter because there 
was No Collusion’.291 Collusion takes place all the time between countries that are allied, 
but it is Russia’s specific status as a competitor that made contacts problematic, 
prompting charges of interference. Plenty of countries, moreover, seek to influence US 
politics, but the legacy of cold war conflict and renewed hostility made communication 
with Russia suspect. 
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The Communist International (Comintern) was established in March 1919 to 
spread the revolution globally and prompted the Palmer raids in November of that year as 
part of the Red Scare. During the cold war there were plenty of times when Moscow tried 
to influence US politics.292 In 1948 the Soviet Union backed the Progressive Party’s 
Henry Wallace, who had been Roosevelt’s vice president but split with the Democratic 
Party over President Harry Truman’s hawkish cold war stance. In 1964 Soviet and 
Czechoslovak agencies smeared the Republican candidate, Barry Goldwater, as a racist 
and Ku Klux Klan supporter. In 1968 the Soviet Union offered an unprecedented level of 
support for the Democratic candidate, Hubert Humphrey, including financial aid (which 
naturally was refused). In 1976 the KGB adopted ‘active measures’ against Democratic 
Senator Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson, a virulent anti-Soviet hawk.293 In 1983 KGB agents were 
instructed to help defeat Reagan in his bid for re-election. The overall goal was to 
undermine ‘support in the United States and overseas for policies viewed as threatening 
to Moscow, discrediting US intelligence and law enforcement agencies, weakening US 
alliances and US relations with partners, and increasing Soviet power and influence 
across the globe’.294 This is part of the larger pattern of mutual election interference. The 
CIA intervention in the Italian election of 1948 became the template for later actions, 
although after the cold war covert US election interference allegedly became ‘a tool of 
last resort’, whereas Russia apparently gained a taste for it along with new skills.295 
These are now conventionally described as ‘active measures’, but the term has 
been used indiscriminately. It is not the same as disinformation, of the sort which was 
used against Goldwater. Neither is it confined to cyber-enhanced informational warfare 
and cyberattacks, of the sort launched against Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine.296 Active 
measures are now considered central to Russia’s ‘hybrid warfare’, part of a sustained 
strategy undertaken by the Russian security services to undermine the enemy. However, 
the Russian theory of hydrid warfare (gibridnaya voina) differs from the Western 
version, with more emphasis on psychological factors and the use of the media to 
demoralise the protagonist. A recent study argues that excessive Western politicisation of 
the concept represents ‘an unhelpful and alarmist perception of an almost existential 
threat to the Western world’, whereas a ‘calm, pragmatic and detailed understanding of 
Russian actions’ could temper the exaggerated view that Russia was trying ‘to undermine 
the US-led liberal democratic order’.297 The idea of informational battles fought through 
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trolls, hacking teams and other proxies to gain advantage in the ‘fifth domain’ 
(cyberspace) gained notoriety following the publication of a famous article by Valerii 
Gerasimov, the chief of the Russian General Staff, in which he analysed the lesson of the 
Arab spring. He stressed that the ‘very rules of war have changed’, arguing that non-
military means such as the ‘use of political, economic and informational, humanitarian, 
and other non-military measures – applied in coordination with the protest potential of 
the population’, can exceed ‘the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness’.298 The 
article was a response to what was perceived to be new forms of Western ‘hybrid 
warfare’, but it was taken as a statement of a new Russian doctrine.   
In conditions of renewed cold war, the Soviet goals outlined above were revived, 
and that is why terms such as ‘active measures’ and ‘disinformation’ have been applied to 
the Russiagate affair.299 Most Soviet actions were inept and remarkably ineffective.300 
Nevertheless, they provoked a neuralgic (and understandable) fear about foreign 
subversion that once again erupted as allegations of Russian meddling gained traction. 
Putin stands accused of trying to subvert Western democracy. Russian agencies have 
supported rightwing populists and other opponents of the liberal order. Such contacts 
began in the 1990s, but after 2012 intensified as Russia pivoted towards a more radical 
politics of resistance. Links have also been established with left-wing critics of the 
Atlantic consensus. These ties are intended to justify Russian policies and perspectives 
internationally, which is a legitimate goal; but more questionable is the alleged attempt to 
gain leverage over Western politics while undermining the liberal consensus – to ‘sow 
discord’, as the mantra became. The methods include information warfare, funding for 
radical right and pro-Moscow organisations and electoral interventions.301 Stories about 
the latter made the US public and elites receptive not only to claims that Russia 
substantively ‘interfered’ in 2016 but that it also sought to undermine American 
democracy. There is also an intriguing twist to the narrative, with claims that classic cold 
war double-bluff is at play. In keeping with the long tradition of deception, Russia’s 
adversarial campaign ‘although poorly executed [was] designed to be overestimated’.302 
In other words, however cack-handed and minimal Russian meddling in 2016 may have 
been, the goal was to provoke a reaction that would sow the desired discord. 
The extent of Russian support for rightwing groups and electoral interventions has 
been exaggerated. In 2014 a Russian bank did provide a €9 million loan to Marine Le 
Pen’s Front National (now Rassemblement National), but later the loan was recalled and 
the bank closed as part of the Central Bank of Russia’s attempt to clean up the Russian 
financial system. This does not look like a concerted plan to subvert French democracy. 
The same applies to the feared Russian attack on the German parliamentary elections in 
2017, where Moscow was strangely quiet. The far-right Alliance for Germany (AfD) 
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tripled its share of the vote from 4.7 to 12.6 per cent to become the third largest party, but 
this had nothing to do with Russia. Fear of Russian interference played its part in the 
French presidential election in 2017. Two days before the second round on 7 May, 
20,000 campaign emails from the Emmanuel Macron campaign were uploaded to 
Pastebin, a file-sharing site, and then posted on 4chan, an anonymous message board. 
Most of the emails dealt with quotidian matters and none were scandalous. They were 
published by WikiLeaks in July and then publicised on various social media accounts, 
some of them with right-wing or Russian connections. In the end, no evidence emerged to 
prove that Russia was responsible. In sum, the endlessly repeated accusation that Russia 
‘hacked’ the French presidential election in 2017 is questionable.  
Russia was categorised as a cold war-style adversary, and its history of electoral 
interference was projected onto the new situation. Russia has become an adversary, but 
this is far from pre-ordained. 303  Unlike the Communist regime established in 1917, 
Russia does not seek to promote a revolution to destroy Western capitalist democracy. In 
keeping with its neo-revisionist stance, Russia seeks not to undermine the existing 
international system but to make it work in a more equitable manner. This may well be a 
quixotic endeavour, given the enormous discrepancy in power between the US-led 
Atlantic system and Russia. Nevertheless, the Russian attempt to ‘democratise’ 
international politics is supported by China and other countries in the global South, but in 
the short-term Russia faced the enlarging Atlantic system on its own. Russia opposes 
NATO expansion, and is critical of Western interventionism and punitive policies. This 
does not necessarily make Russia an adversary, as Trump seemed to understand, hence 
his attempts to engage. However, the traditional ‘Trumanite’ security state recognised a 
challenge when they saw one and mobilised against Moscow. Lacking an institutional 
political base of his own, Trump drew overwhelmingly from the traditional national 
security establishment to staff his administration. This provoked a striking contradiction 
between his expressed wishes and his actions. 
The ‘West’ as a political concept only took shape during the cold war. It 
represented more than a geographical power system but a set of values that claimed to be 
universal, and these shaped the network of global governance institutions that regulate 
global affairs today.304 The collapse of the Soviet Union and its associated Communist 
bloc in 1989-91 reaffirmed the power and validity of the West’s governance and 
economic institutions, as well as its purported values. Russia after 1991 also claimed to 
be committed to these values as it embarked on the rocky road of democratisation and 
economic transformation. However, the failure to transcend the institutional and political 
logic of the cold war, through the creation of a set of mutually acceptable security 
arrangements and practices that would include Russia as part of an extended ‘greater 
West’ in the end led to alienation, renewed confrontation, and ultimately a new cold 
war. 305  Russia is assumed to be leading a campaign to subvert the West. In this 
endeavour, Trump’s apparent hostility to democratic institutions and his undoubted 
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contempt for enshrined standards of public discourse made him, in the eyes of his critics, 
Putin’s accomplice. 
 
Forward to the past 
 
Trump came to power with very few consistent positions, but one of them was that it 
made sense ‘to get on with Russia’. If Trump had stopped there, then that claim would be 
a controversial yet legitimate policy position. However, he went on to observe that Putin 
was a strong leader, ‘far more than our president (Obama] has been’, at which point 
Trump alienated all but his core supporters.306 Trump’s attempt to normalise relations 
were stymied by claims of electoral collusion, hacking and the use of social media to sow 
discord and undermine American democracy. Trump praised his personal relationship 
with Putin, as he did with the Chinese President Xi Jinping, but his policies towards both 
countries were confrontational. It was Trump who took the lead in destroying the whole 
structure of arms control that had been so painstakingly built up during the cold war, and 
who sought to push Russia out of its traditional European energy market. Trump did not 
ultimately challenge the view of Russia as an adversary alongside China, Iran and North 
Korea. He did entertain the idea that Russia could be peeled away from its alignment with 
China, although he offered no serious incentives for Russia to do so. 
Many of the themes sounded by Trump had been advanced earlier in one form or 
another by American leaders, but none with such intensity or generated by ideas that were 
so fundamentally at odds with the multilateral normative Atlanticism that took shape after 
1945. Trump insisted that allies contribute more to their own defence, a long-term stance of 
US leaders but now couched in terms of a transactional relationship rather than the 
traditional commitment to multilateral cooperation. It is in this light that Trump in 2016 
argued that NATO was ‘obsolete’, and in power he made little effort to hide his distaste for 
the EU. He appeared to make NATO’s Article 5 security guarantee dependent on whether a 
state met the two per cent defence spending target set in Wales in September 2014. This 
represents a shift from collective to transactional defence, where security guarantees apply 
only if the appropriate contribution has been made.  
There is a ‘deep Trump’, and on some important matters he held views that endured 
for decades. Trump’s detestation of free trade, collective defence and multilateral 
institutions were unmoveable. According to one of his senior aides, ‘There’s some things 
where he’s already reached the conclusion and it doesn’t matter what you say. It doesn’t 
matter what arguments you offer. He’s not listening’. 307  Trump was the consummate 
opportunist, having little respect for international institutions or multilateral processes if 
they stood in the way of perceived American interests. International affairs were 
understood by Trump in the same way as domestic matters: a struggle for dominance in 
which there could be no enduring cooperation or alliances. Bob Woodward’s book Fear 
shows a man out of his depth on most major international issues, yet repeatedly asking 
the right questions, such as why the US after nearly two decades was still at war in 
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Afghanistan.308 By 2010 the US had spent an astonishing $444bn on the war, 12 times the 
amount given in non-military aid to Afghanistan.309 Trump’s talk of spending more on 
America’s decayed infrastructure made a lot of sense, although in the end not much was 
delivered. 
Trump pursued a distinctive policy towards Russia. As candidate and then as 
president he insisted on keeping channels of communication open. Trump refused to 
condemn Russia’s alleged malfeasance, despite enormous pressure to do so, not so much 
out of respect for Russia but because it tainted his victory. This stance entailed 
considerable costs, intensifying suspicion of some sort of clandestine links during his 
time as a businessman, of collusion as presidential candidate and then as some sort of 
Russian hostage in the White House. Russiagate reinforced a structural shift in American 
politics, with the Democrat’s globalist agenda making them the party of militarism, while 
the Republicans questioned the cost and effectiveness of foreign engagements. 
Neoconservatives focused on the potential threat from China, whereas cosmopolitan 
liberals were more concerned by Russia’s alleged threat to the liberal international order. 
Democrats aligned with the Trumanite national security establishment against Trump.  
Russia rejected post-cold war US expansive hegemony, which for some has become 
the national liberation struggle of our times accompanied by ‘the need to combat official 
deception’.310  With Trump in the White House, Russia sought to end its diplomatic 
isolation. To that end in March 2017 it sent an ambitious proposal to Washington to 
normalise relations across the board, but the offer was rejected. Russia in July then 
offered a more modest non-interference agreement to regulate behaviour in each other’s 
elections, but it was also rejected by the State Department.311 Instead, relations took a 
sharp turn for the worse, and from July 2017 Congress adopted increasingly severe 
sanctions while providing Ukraine with offensive weapons. Moscow’s calls for talks 
about some sort of agreed cyber-security regime were also rejected. Defenders of the 
‘rules-based order’ threatened regulatory restrictions, financial pressure and restrictions 
on political and media pluralism to counter the Russian threat. 
Trump’s approach to Russia is in line with his hard-nosed pragmatic view of 
international relations. He pressed for engagement but this did not prevent him taking 
numerous measures against Russia, including the sale of lethal arms to Ukraine, ramping 
up funding for the European Reassurance Initiative and reinforcing the US troop presence 
in Europe, trying to stop the construction of the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline across 
the Baltic from Ust-Luga to Germany, imposing harsh sanctions, expelling Russian 
diplomats and closing down Russian diplomatic facilities in the US, and much more. Some 
derived from Trump being forced to act tough to prove that he was not in hock to Putin, but 
most came from his deep-seated beliefs in a competitive commercial world. Hence Nord 
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Stream 2 was viewed an impediment to increased US LNG deliveries to Europe, reinforced 
by the long-term US argument that this rendered Germany dependent on Moscow. 
Russiagate was one of the drivers of Trump’s foreign policy, but The Art of the Deal was 
another. 
Russian actions in 2016 were compared to Japan’s sneak attack on Pearl Harbour in 
December 1941, and in various ways called an act of war. Even relative moderates stressed 
the need to ‘stand up to the Kremlin’ and argued that more forceful measures needed to be 
taken against Russia’s ‘malign activities’ across the world. Joe Biden and his co-author 
lamented that the White House was likely to ignore their recommendations: ‘Too many 
times, President Donald Trump has equivocated on whether Russia interfered in the 2016 
election, even after he received briefings from top intelligence officials on precisely how 
Moscow did it’.312 Trump’s overall strategy was in the Henry Kissinger mode (and early on 
was advised by him), namely to try to recruit Russia to align with the US against what was 
perceived as the greatest long-term threat, China. In practice, the sum of US actions only 
reinforced the Russo-Chinese alignment, and there was zero chance of Russia defecting. 
The two countries considered the US an unreliable partner. Instead of Trump’s more realist 
foreign policy instincts, he presided over an increasingly ideologically charged 
confrontation with both Moscow and Beijing. As Timothy Phillips notes in his study of the 
intelligence service and Russia in the 1920s, the British authorities scared themselves with 
spectres of their own making, provoking a war scare and the rupturing of diplomatic 
relations.313 The new cold war recreated this past. 
 
The 16 July 2018 Helsinki summit 
 
By the time he sat down with Trump for their first summit, Putin had met with US leaders 
some 40 times since taking office, including twice with Trump – at the G20 meeting in 
Hamburg on 7 July and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Da 
Nang, Vietnam, on 10 November 2017. There was also the meeting between the Russian 
foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, and Trump in the Oval Office on 10 May 2017, with 
Kislyak in attendance. Distrusting the media, Trump allowed only Russian news agencies 
in to cover the meeting, which not surprisingly rather alienated Western reporters. Trump 
informed his bewildered visitors that he had just sacked Comey and believed that 
‘pressure because of Russia’ had been taken off, although in that regard (as we shall see) 
he could not have been more mistaken. The goal from the Russian side was to normalise 
relations, above all through the lifting of sanctions and the return of diplomatic 
compounds, and this apparently was also Trump’s intention. In the end his lack of 
diplomatic experience only made matters worse. Trump is charged with revealing a 
crucial counter-terrorism secret about a planned ISIS operation.314 In fact, Trump did not 
 
312 Joseph R. Biden Jr. and Michael Carpenter’, ‘How to Stand up to the Kremlin’, Foreign 
Affairs, 2018, Vol. 97, No. 1, January-February 2018, p. 56. 
313 Timothy Phillips, The Secret Twenties: British Intelligence, the Russians and the Jazz Age 
(Cambridge, Granta Books, 2017). 
314  Greg Miller and Greg Jaffe, ‘Trump Revealed Highly Classified Information to Russian 






reveal Israel as the source of the intelligence or the specific intelligence-gathering method 
but this was done by White House leakers.315 Obama-era officials, the State Department 
and intelligence agencies united to thwart Trump’s attempt to improve relations, which in 
the context was perceived as selling out to Russia.316 As Frum notes, ‘In order to stop him 
from betraying his office and the country, the professionals around him [Trump] have 
also effectively prevented him from fulfilling his office and serving his country, 
supposing he were ever minded to do that’.317 
The auguries were not good when Trump and Putin met in Helsinki. Just three 
days earlier Mueller indicted a dozen Russian intelligence officers for hacking the DNC, 
placing Russiagate at the centre of press attention.318 Comparable to the 4 June 1961 
Kennedy-Khrushchev summit in Vienna, when cold war pressures (and Kennedy’s 
apparent unpreparedness) torpedoed the intention of both leaders to normalise relations, 
this one also had devastating consequences. It inflicted ‘a psychological trauma on the 
US establishment and public opinion more broadly’. Trump, like Gorbachev after his 
summit with Reagan in Reykjavik in 1986, was accused of ‘selling out the country’.319 
Trump tried to keep the issue of Russian electoral interference and global politics 
separate, whereas his opponents ensured that the former shaped the latter. Mueller’s 
indictment acted as ‘a warning to the US president and a calculated affront to the Russian 
president’.320 Bolton advised that the Mueller indictments were ‘better announced before 
the summit, for Putin to contemplate’.321 
  The two-hour talk between Putin and Trump, with only interpreters present,  
covered arms control and prohibiting weapons in space, regional security issues including 
security for Israel, Syria, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in 
Eastern Ukraine, and the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Germany. The Russian side 
called for ‘strategic stability’ consultations to discuss the difficult issues, including how 
to include destabilising new types of weapons into the arms control process. Moscow also 
called for an extension of the New START Treaty by five years after its expiry in 
February 2021.322 However, the positive discussions were scuppered by the disastrous 
press conference. Putin took control, outlining the broad outlines of the discussion and 
the burning issues of the day, while Trump’s statement was anodyne and awkward. Putin 
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It’s quite to clear to everyone that the bilateral relationship is going through a 
complicated stage, and yet those impediments, the current tension, the tense 
atmosphere, essentially have no solid reason behind it. The cold war is a thing of 
the past, the era of acute ideological confrontation of the two countries is a thing 
of the remote past, is a vestige of the past. … Today, both Russia and the United 
States face a whole new set of challenges [above all] a dangerous maladjustment 
of mechanisms for maintaining international security and stability.  
 
When it came to the burning topic of the day, he noted  
 
Once again, President Trump mentioned the issue of the so-called interference of 
Russia with the American elections, and I had to reiterate things I said several 
times, including during our personal contacts, that the Russian state has never 
interfered and is not going to interfere into American internal affairs, including 
the election process.323 
 
Trump stressed the potential for cooperation: ‘We’re getting together and we have a 
chance to do some great things, whether it’s nuclear proliferation in terms of stopping, we 
have to do it – ultimately, that’s probably the most important thing that we can be 
working on’. He noted that ‘Our relationship has never been worse than it is now. 
However, that changed as of about four hours ago. I really believe that’.  
His optimism was misplaced. In response to a question on Russian electoral 
interference, Trump’s response was equivocal. He did not actually deny that interference 
took place, arguing that it was under Obama that there was inaction on the matter, while 
asserting that there was no ‘collusion’, and that he had won fairly, after a ‘brilliant 
campaign’. In response to a question on the Mueller investigation, Trump agreed that ‘the 
probe is a disaster for our country. I think it’s kept us apart, it’s kept us separated. There 
was no collusion at all’. Putin chipped in to argue ‘Isn’t is natural to be sympathetic 
towards a person who is willing to restore the relationship with our country, who wants to 
work with us?’. After some more points he brought up the Bill Browder case (discussed 
below), who he claimed earned over $1.5 billion in Russia but ‘never paid any taxes’ and 
‘they sent huge amount of money, 400 million to the campaign of Hillary Clinton’. The 
final question proved fatal, with a reporter asserting that ‘Every US intelligence agency 
has concluded that Russia did [interfere in the 2016 election]’. The first question was 
‘who do you believe?’; and the second could not be more provocative: ‘would you now, 
with the whole world watching, tell President Putin, would you denounce what happened 
in 2016 and would you warn him to never do it again?’. Rather than some anodyne 
answer, Trump mentioned the DNC’s refusal to let the FBI examine their server, then 
after some confused phraseology he said  
 
I have President Putin: he just said it’s not Russia. I will say this: I don’t see any 
reason why it would be, but I really do want to see the server. … I have great 
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confidence in my intelligence people, but I will tell you that President Putin was 
extremely strong and powerful in his denial today’.324 
 
Trump’s refusal to accept the conclusions of his intelligence agencies provoked a 
firestorm of criticism. He was forced to backtrack the following day, when he asserted 
rather more forcefully that Russia did in fact interfere in the election. Trump never denied 
that some sort of cyber-hacking had taken place, but Trump naturally preferred to stress 
that he had won fairly and because of his own efforts. Even as he acknowledged 
interference, he emphasised that it had not affected the outcome of the election. Trump’s 
strategy of separating the conduct of foreign policy from the election interference issue 
failed catastrophically, as did his attempt to establish a constructive dialogue with Russia. 
His stumbling performance at Helsinki added to the charge sheet against him. Bannon 
described his demeanour at the press conference ‘like a beaten dog’ after Trump had 
endured a two-hour tirade by Putin.325 Trump was not only out of his depth but shown to 
the world to be so, and this represented a national humiliation for America. 
 Trump appeared awkward and ill-prepared when standing next to a man who had 
been president for 18 years and who was famous for his mastery of detail. The normal 
hierarchies were inverted, and instead of the US assuming the lead, as Obama and his 
predecessors would naturally do, it was Russia which looked like the dominant power. 
The perception was reinforced by the body language, which appeared to show the smaller 
man in charge, an observation that enraged Trump’s critics. Further, the Russian offer to 
allow Mueller to question the indicted Russians only inflamed matters. Collaboration 
with Russia on the investigation was viewed as a new type of ‘collusion’ and hence 
summarily rejected. This was even more the case when Putin suggested that Russia 
should be allowed to question Browder, long a Russian bête noire. The request was 
logical, although provocative, but what was certainly irrational was the addition of 
McFaul’s name to the list of suspects Russia sought to question. Whatever one thinks of 
McFaul’s understanding of international politics, no can doubt his sincere attempt to 
improve relations through the early Obama-era reset and as ambassador. 
Bolton notes that ‘Trump believed that acknowledging Russia’s meddling in US 
politics, or in that of many other countries in Europe and elsewhere, would implicitly 
acknowledge that he had colluded with Russia in his 2016 campaign’. 326  American 
domestic politics certainly exacerbated the situation: ‘The post-Helsinki hysteria reveals 
not merely the mindset of the president’s enemies, but the depth of their determination to 
destroy him’. Trump himself sailed on imperturbably, and on 19 July commented: ‘The 
Fake News Media want so badly to see a major confrontation with Russia, even a 
confrontation that could lead to war. They are pushing so recklessly and hate the fact that 
I’ll probably have a good relationship with Putin’.327 Kissinger commented that ‘It was a 
meeting that had to take place. I have advocated it for several years. It has been 
submerged by American domestic issues. It is certainly a missed opportunity’. As for the 
broader context, Kissinger was judicious: ‘I think Trump may be one of those figures in 
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history who appears from time to time to mark the end of an era and to force it to give up 
its old pretences. It doesn’t necessarily mean that he knows this, or that he is considering 
any great alternative. It could just be an accident’. 328  As the master of geopolitics, 
Kissinger encouraged Trump in his ambition to ‘get on’ with Putin, to temper Russia’s 
drive to create an anti-hegemonic alignment with China, India and other like-minded 
countries, tired of what they perceived to be Western double standards, in which 
desirable universal norms were subordinated to the power system in which they were 
embedded. Kissinger encouraged Trump to have closer relations with Russia to contain a 
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HACKING THE ELECTION 
 
 
The core of the Russiagate affair is the claim that two teams from Russian intelligence, 
unbeknown to each other, gained access to the DNC’s computer network from July 2015, 
and maintained it until at least June 2016. They then allegedly transferred the material 
through two ‘cut-outs’ (false personas) Guccifer 2 and DCLeaks to WikiLeaks. The 
initial leak of 19,952 emails clearly benefitted the Republican Party and Trump 
personally, hence the claim that the material was published in coordination with the 
Trump campaign to cause maximum damage to Clinton, a goal that Assange pursued 
because he was being used (knowingly or not) by Moscow to advance its aims. Later 
another 20,000 emails were published.330 However, the forensic evidence for these three 
charges – that Russia was responsible for accessing the emails, that they were published 
in coordination with the Trump campaign, and that the whole operation was conducted at 
Moscow’s behest – is disputed. Instead of a hacking operation, some sort of leak may be 
involved. Equally, the claimed attacks on state election infrastructure turned out to be 
exaggerated. 
 
The Democratic Party emails 
 
The Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR, the former First Department of the KGB) team 
had been identified since 2008 as Advanced Persistent Threat 29 (APT29), also known by 
a range of monikers, the best-known of which is Cozy Bear although The Dukes is also 
commonly used. Fancy Bear (APT28) is identified as a unit within the Main 
(Intelligence) Administration of the General Staff of the Defence Ministry. The body was 
established in its present form in 1953 and until 2010 was known as the Main Intelligence 
Administration, GRU, and the latter name has stuck although GU today would be more 
accurate since the word ‘Intelligence’ has been dropped. In the US, the CIA and Defence 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) have broadly similar functions. The GRU shares foreign 
intelligence concerns with the civilian SVR and the FSB’s counter-intelligence divisions. 
Of them all, it is the GRU that in recent years has gained a reputation for recklessness, 
including the hack of the DNC and the attempted killing of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in 
Salisbury, England, on 4 March 2018 and the attempted assassination of the oppositionist 
Alexei Navalny in Tomsk on 20 August 2020. The GRU team (APT28) was given the 
cryptonym Fancy Bear (although it goes by many other names, depending on who 
discovers it), and appears to have been active since 2007. There are estimated to be about 
a hundred APTs worldwide. These are not actual groups of people but a description of the 
malware kits used by hackers working in cyberspace.331 There is a long list of alleged 
targets hit by the Bear bestiary and their associates, beginning with Estonia in 2007 all 
the way through to the American election, with Fancy Bear apparently attacking the 
German Bundestag in May 2015.332  
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Cozy Bear was present in the DNC computer systems from July 2015 and was 
relatively ‘quiet’; but in early 2016 it was joined by the GRU’s far more aggressive 
Fancy Bear. It appears that they worked independently and were not aware of the others’ 
presence. FBI agent Adrian Hawkins was the first to spot the activity, and on 6 August 
2015 contacted the DNC. However, through a series of miscommunications the 
responsible people were not alerted until much later.333 In March 2016 the email account 
of John Podesta, the Clinton campaign chair, was accessed through a phishing attack by 
Cozy Bear. When the DNC acted, it turned to an outside company, CrowdStrike, to 
investigate. Established in 2011 and based in Sunnyvale, California, CrowdStrike is a 
major military and cyber intelligence contractor to the Pentagon. One of its founders and 
CTO, Dmitry Alperovitch, is a non-resident senior fellow, Cyber Statecraft Initiative, of 
the Atlantic Council, which receives funding from outspoken critics of Russia and 
leading defence contractors. It is dedicated to maintaining ‘liberal hegemony and US 
global leadership’. 334  Employing CrowdStrike for such a sensitive operation clearly 
triggered multiple conflicts of interest. Equally, at no point was the FBI allowed to 
conduct a forensic examination of the DNC servers. The outsourcing of state capacity 
may well be the trend of our days, but the absence of an independent FBI investigation 
inevitably casts doubt on the findings. CrowdStrike is just one element in the vast 
military-intelligence-cyber (MIC) complex, where Google and the other tech giants set 
the pace for innovation and para-statal activity. Corporate diplomacy is substituting for 
public engagement as the MIC complex reshapes society and citizenship.335 
CrowdStrike began its investigation in April 2016, and soon discovered the two 
entities in the system. Cozy Bear had long been rooting about the emails and stealing 
files, whereas Fancy Bear only gained access in April 2016. Surprisingly, there was no 
evidence of collaboration between the two groups. 336  Fancy Bear targeted the vital 
opposition research files held on the 17 Republican hopefuls, and above all the material 
on Trump.337  The Trump opposition research dossier was compiled by DNC staffer 
Alexandra Chalupa, a Ukrainian American who would later figure as part of 
investigations into ‘Ukrainegate’ interference in the election. CrowdStrike asked DNC 
managers to keep quiet about the intrusion, arguing that it needed time to identify the 
Russian hackers and their tools, and only then block their access. It appears (according to 
the Mueller indictment) that the GRU hackers detected that they were being monitored 
and on 31 May, two weeks before the public disclosure of the hack, began to resist 
CrowdStrike. After that, the contest escalated into the virtual equivalent of hand-to-hand 
combat. 338 CrowdStrike decided that the software on every machine had to be changed, 
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and until then secrecy was considered essential. On Friday 10 June employees were asked 
to leave their laptops and vacate the premises, and for the next two days CrowdStrike 
replaced the software and applied new log-in passwords.  In June Alperovich, published 
the report Bears in the Midst, the first public accusation of Russian responsibility for the 
DNC hacking.339 We know from testimony provided by Trump associate Roger Stone 
that CrowdStrike provided three reports to the FBI in redacted and draft form, but 
according to federal prosecutors, the administration never obtained CrowdStrike’s full 
and unedited report, and there is no evidence that Mueller received any additional 
information beyond that provided by CrowdStrike.340 
The DNC is considered a valid intelligence target, and it appears (rather 
worryingly) that such scanning goes on all the time. However, the usual procedure is to 
hoard the information, as may have happened with material gleaned from the RNC. 
Placing the material on the internet during an election campaign is something new.341 
This sustains the charge that Russia ‘hacked’ American democracy by waging a cyber-
enabled information warfare (CEIW) campaign to damage Clinton’s campaign and to 
boost Trump’s. By the time the DNC network had been cleansed, a trove of data had been 
extruded. This material was then made public through a Wordpress blog, beginning from 
15 June under the auspices of a persona by the name of Guccifer 2.0. The original 
Guccifer (Marcel Lazar Lehel) was by then in jail, and by all accounts he was a 
Romanian hacker who accessed high-profile US government accounts, including 
Clinton’s private email system.342 WikiLeaks and DCLeaks (a site established in June 
2016 and considered a cut-out for Fancy Bear) were later also used to make the material 
public. The 15 June document posted by Guccifer 2.0 was tainted with ‘Russian 
fingerprints’, including Cyrillic language metadata and the author’s designation as ‘Feliks 
Edmundovich’, the given name and patronymic of Dzerzhinsky, the founder of the Soviet 
secret police, the Cheka, in December 2017. Forensic analysis indicates that the material 
may have been synthetically adulterated with Russian characteristics (more on this 
below).343  
The DNC material was incendiary. It showed the Democrats’ political machine to 
be ‘petty, vindictive, and determined to anoint Hillary Clinton as the Democratic nominee 
despite grassroots enthusiasm for challenger Bernie Sanders’. 344  The timing here is 
crucial. On 12 June Assange announced that he would be publishing ‘emails related to 
Hillary Clinton’; on 14 June CrowdStrike announced that malware had been found on the 
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DNC server and claimed to have evidence it was inserted by Russians; and on 15 June 
Guccifer 2.0 claimed responsibility for the hack and WikiLeaks’ source; and posted 
documents that appear synthetically tainted with Russian attributes. This is where we 
move into intensely contested terrain. The mainstream version advanced by Mueller 
argues that the various personas, Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks, were simply Russian cut-
outs transmitting the material to WikiLeaks, which in turn coordinated its actions with its 
masters in Moscow. The main alternative argument is that there is no evidence to prove 
that the material got to WikiLeaks in this way, and that it may have been leaked through a 
thumb-drive. As for the view that WikiLeaks coordinated its actions with Moscow, the 
evidence is at most circumstantial and is forcefully denied by Assange. Clintonian 
Democrats certainly argue that this was part of a ‘pre-emptive move to associate Russia 
with anything WikiLeaks might have been about to publish and to “show” that it came 
from a Russian hack’.345 
Again, the timing is crucial. Over 98 per cent of the 44,000 emails published by 
WikiLeaks were sent or received by senior DNC officials between 18 April and 25 May 
2016, and for over half that time CrowdStrike had already installed its software and was 
monitoring the network. On 12 June Assange announced that he had emails related to 
Clinton, and the first public report of the hack was published by Nakashima on 14 June. 
She stated that malware has been found on the DNC, which CrowdStrike affirmed had 
been placed by the Russians. The next day Guccifer 2.0, emerging from nowhere but 
described by Mueller as a GRU creation, confirmed the previous day’s allegations and 
claimed responsibility for hacking the DNC as well as being the source for WikiLeaks. 
He released a 237-page document called Donald Trump Report, dated 19 December 
2015, summarising Chalupa’s opposition research on the Republican candidate with 
sections such as ‘Trump is a Liar’ and ‘Bad Businessman’, followed by a section 
detailing his multiple bankruptcies.346 Guccifer 2.0 also published an Excel spread sheet 
called ‘Big Donors’, listing 21 people who had contributed over $500,000 to the DNC, 
and claimed to have many other documents in his possession.347 Guccifer 2.0 denied that 
he was Russian: ‘I don’t Like Russians and their foreign policy. I hate being attributed to 
Russia’, and insisted that he was from Romania, ‘just like the first Guccifer’. He then 
gave details, saying that he hacked into the DNC system in summer 2015 by exploiting 
an unknown vulnerability in NGP VAN, software provided for the DNC that used a 
Windows system, and then installed Trojans on several PCs. He insisted that he had left 
Russian metadata on in the leaked documents as his personal ‘watermark’. He admitted 
that he had been expelled on 12 June when CrowdStrike rebooted the system.348  
The mainstream line is that Guccifer 2.0 was a Russian front: ‘considering a long 
trail of breadcrumbs pointing back to Russia left by the hacker, as well as other 
circumstantial evidence, it appears more likely that Guccifer 2.0 is nothing but a 
disinformation or deception campaign by Russian state-sponsored hackers to cover up 
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their own hack – and a hasty and sloppy one at that’.349 Sceptical points have been raised, 
including the view that the Russian metadata could easily have been inserted to achieve 
false attribution. 350  The ‘Russian fingerprints’ corroborated the claims made by 
CrowdStrike the day before. Another sign of fakery is that Guccifer 2 operated mostly in 
US time zones and with local settings specific to a device configured for use within the 
US. 351  Guccifer 2.0 released more documents from the DNC on 30 June on the 
WordPress blog, and once again denied Russian links and spoke warmly of Assange. 
Others note that WikiLeaks did not use any of the emails sent to it by Guccifer 2, 
although it published similar emails, implying that whoever created Guccifer 2 knew 
what WikiLeaks had and sent duplicates with Russian fingerprints. This suggests that 
‘Guccifer 2.0 had malicious intent towards WikiLeaks from the outset’.352  
WikiLeaks in the end published the most consequential and embarrassing emails. 
Assange as we have seen first went public on 12 June to announce that his website would 
soon be publishing a raft of emails related to the Clinton campaign, stressing that 
‘WikiLeaks has a very big year ahead’. Assange at the time had been holed up in the 
Ecuadorian embassy in London since 19 June 2012, when he asked for political asylum 
after he had lost his legal fight against extradition to Sweden. On 22 July Assange 
tweeted ‘Are you ready for Hillary?’, and that day WikiLeaks posted the first tranche of 
stolen documents, 19,252 DNC emails and 8,000 attachments covering the period from 
January 2015 to 25 May 2016. The timing of publication was certainly devastating, just 
three days before the Democratic convention in Philadelphia, 25-28 July. The campaign 
plans of the Clinton campaign were disrupted, and the revelation that the DNC was 
biased against Sanders forced DNC chair Debbie Wasserman Schultz to resign. She co-
chaired Clinton’s 2008 campaign against Obama, which raises questions about her ability 
to manage the campaign impartially. The atmosphere at the convention was fractious, 
with Sanders’ supporters embittered and alienated. One email chain showed how DNC 
officials planned a line of attack on Sanders’ religious beliefs, while another sought to 
portray his campaign as a mess. In response – and this is the crucial beginning of the 
Russiagate narrative – all senior Clinton campaign staff agreed that they would ‘get the 
word out that this was a Russian hit job’; while others (some of whom had been briefed 
on the early Steele memos) argued that ‘the Russians were using WikiLeaks as part of a 
plot to elect Trump’.353 The stock reaction of the Clintonites was ‘to keep the Russian 
intervention in the spotlight’, arguing that ‘the Russians were covertly attacking the 
election’.354 
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Trump fanned the flames of the collusion narrative in his 27 July press conference 
in Florida. In response to a reporter’s provocative question if he would call on Putin to 
‘stay out’ of the election, he insisted that he had ‘nothing to do with Putin’ and cast doubt 
on whether Russia had hacked the Democrats. He insisted ‘Nobody knows who it is’, but 
if the Russians were responsible, he had a message for them. He called on ‘Russia, if 
you’re listening, I hope you’re able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing [referring 
to the emails that Clinton had deleted from her server]. I think that you’ll probably be 
rewarded mightily by our press’.355 Trump of course was being ironic, but his comment 
was taken as evidence of collusion, if not treason. In fact, the provenance of the DNC 
material remains contested, as does the issue of coordination between Assange and the 
Russian cut-outs. When asked about this by Sean Hannity on Fox News, Assange insisted 
‘Our source is not the Russian government and it is not a state party’, and he accused the 
Obama administration of trying to delegitimise Trump’s election.356 Assange repeatedly 
insisted that Russia had nothing to do with the emails, but how WikiLeaks got the emails 
remains a mystery – Assange insists that he has to protect his sources, and acted only as 
publisher. They could have come through the route suggested by Mueller, but the flash 
drive version (or uploading on to an encrypted remote server) is also credible. 
Assange added more fuel to the fire when on Twitter on 9 August 2016 he offered 
a $20,000 reward for information about the murder in Washington of Seth Rich. Shortly 
afterwards he suggested that Rich may have been a ‘source’ for the hacked material, thus 
suggesting a motive for the killing. Rich was a 27-year-old DNC staffer shot to death in 
an unsolved murder case in the early hours of 10 July in what appears to have been a 
bungled street burglary. Since 2014 Rich had worked for the DNC as a voter expansion 
director. He was shot several times in the back, but nothing was stolen. When WikiLeaks 
published the DNC emails on 22 July the case went viral. Trump-supporting conspiracy 
theorists argue that Rich leaked the DNC emails, and had then been killed either in 
retaliation (by Clintonians) or to keep him quiet (by the CIA). On the other side, there are 
reports that the whole Rich conspiracy theory originated with the SVR and was amplified 
by the IRA.357 Either way, Russiagate sceptics make much of the Rich case. Fox News in 
May 2017 asserted that Rich had leaked the DNC emails to WikiLeaks. The article 
suggested that Rich downloaded the documents, then uploaded them in a Drop Box 
account for Assange.358 Rich’s family reacted with fury and sued Fox, a suit that was 
dismissed in August 2018. 
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No less incendiary was the activity of Roger Stone, the veteran political 
campaigner associated with the Trump campaign. On 21 August he indicated fore-
knowledge about the WikLeaks releases of John Podesta’s emails, infamously tweeting 
‘Podesta’s time in the barrel will come’.359 Later, Mueller would use this as evidence that 
he had advance information, proving coordination between the Trump campaign and 
publication of the emails. In mid-September DCLeaks started publishing email chains 
from Podesta, including messages to Clinton. Once again, ‘The Clintonites devised a 
strategy for shaping the story. This was not about the documents coming out, they told 
reporters. This was about Russia interfering in US democracy’.360 Nothing spectacular 
was revealed, but for a few crucial months news coverage focused on Democratic Party 
emails. The Clinton team was naturally concerned about internal communications being 
made public, especially if they had been stolen by a country that they considered an 
adversary. Stone was later accused of having coordinated the publication of Podesta 
emails with WikiLeaks to divert attention from the Access Hollywood revelations on 7 
October.  
Guccifer 2.0 published another seven blog posts with DNC materials between 18 
June and 14 July, but after Wikileaks released the DNC emails on 22 July restricted 
himself to generalised blog posts. On 31 July Comey took the momentous decision to 
launch a counter-intelligence investigation into possible links between the Trump 
campaign and the Kremlin. The key issue was ultimately the ‘weaponisation’ of the 
stolen material. It is not unusual for foreign powers to penetrate American computers, 
and the Chinese had accessed the networks of the Obama and McCain campaigns in 
2008. However, in 2016 the material was published by a site (WikiLeaks) that did not 
exist in 2008, and Assange was virulently critical of Clinton, a position that was assumed 
to coincide with that of the Russian leadership. Given the track record of mutual hostility 
between Putin and Clinton, this is a reasonable assumption, and there were certainly 
many politicians in Moscow who preferred Trump over his opponent. A political 
preference, however, is not proof of conspiracy. 
 
The indictment of the 12 
 
Just three days before the first summit between Putin and Trump, on 13 July 2018 the 
DoJ indicted 12 individuals from Russian military intelligence (the GRU) for their 
involvement in hacking the DNC servers and the publication of Clinton campaign 
materials. The 29-page special counsel indictment asserted that the hackers ‘conducted 
large-scale cyber operations to interfere with the 2016 US presidential election’. 361 
Beginning in March 2016 GRU officers of Unit 26165 under the direction of Commander 
Viktor Netyshko spearphished Clinton campaign officials and broke into the DCCC and 
DNC networks that April, installing copies of the X-Tunnel malware and used it to 
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transfer files to GRU-leased servers in Illinois and Arizona, with the intermediary servers 
used to mask the GRU’s presence. They tunnelled into over 30 computers on the DNC 
network, its mail server and shared file server. The stolen log-in credentials from DCCC 
officials were used to access the DNC network. A Unit 26165 hacker by the name of Ivan 
Yermakov is alleged to have stolen 50,000 emails from Clinton’s campaign chairman, 
John Podesta, as early as March 2016. Unit 26165 is considered an elite team of 
computer scientists formed in the cold war as a signals decrypting office for the Soviet 
military, and was recently described on a Russian website as ‘able to decipher any code 
within three minutes and re-encrypt it without breaking away from writing a doctoral 
dissertation on quantum physics’.362 A parallel GRU unit under Alexander Osadchuk, 
Unit 74455, created an information operation using fake online personas to manage the 
release of the documents, including Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks. They also contacted other 
organisations, including WikiLeaks, to which they sent thousands of documents. Private 
direct messages between one of the cut-outs and WikiLeaks noted that the latter would 
have a ‘much higher impact’ on the election. At the same time, in summer 2016 another 
officer under Osadchuk’s direction, Anatoly Kovalev, also hacked into the website of a 
state electoral board and stole voter data for 500,000 US citizens and targeted state 
officials responsible for administering elections.363  
According to the indictment, by May 2016 Netyshko’s team stole thousands of 
emails from DNC employees and exfiltrated these and other documents to servers leased 
by the GRU in the US, paid for with Bitcoin. One of Netyshko’s team used the same 
email account as for the spearphishing operation to register the ‘DCLeaks.com’ website. 
The stolen emails from the DNC and the Clinton campaign received over a million page 
views within a year. DCLeaks also had a Twitter account, which it used to release 
material. Guccifer 2.0 also released numerous documents. With questions raised about 
the credibility of Guccifer 2.0, in June 2016 the hackers allegedly passed over 50,000 
documents to WikiLeaks, with nearly all the documents released in stages by the election. 
According to the indictment, Guccifer 2.0 passed the entire archive of the DNC emails to 
WikiLeaks, and as we have seen on 22 July the website published all 19,252 of them, just 
three days before the DNC convention.364  The emails exposed the DNC’s bias towards 
Clinton to the detriment of her main challenger, Sanders. Wasserman Schulz resigned and 
the convention was bitterly divided. Later, the indictment of Roger Stone (see below) 
suggests that he acted as some sort of go-between. This is why WikiLeaks is considered a 
‘Russian front’.365 
 This is a powerful list of charges based on a wealth of detail. It is not clear how 
the information was gained but the underlying assumption appears to be that the US 
intelligence community knew what the Russian were doing since they were probably 
doing much the same to the Russians. Only the exceptional circumstances of the special 
counsel investigation forced them to reveal what they knew. American (and possibly 
Dutch) intelligence services shared information, thus revealing their ability to monitor 
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Russian security agency computers. A rather more prosaic explanation is provided by 
Scott Ritter, the former UN weapons inspector at the time of the Iraq war, who suggests 
that Mueller compiled his list from a classified organisational chart of a Russian military 
intelligence unit obtained by the NSA.366 The Mueller report largely incorporated the 
Netyshko indictment, but provided some more sourcing, but it was still unclear how the 
investigation came to its conclusions. Much of the material appears to be based not on 
intelligence collection but ‘analytical supposition – ie guesswork’.367  
There is also the fundamental question of intent. The timing of the DNC releases 
does not convincingly suggest that the goal was to help Trump, since he declared his 
candidacy in June 2015, but he was only taken seriously from around June 2016. It would 
have taken enormous prescience for the Russians to have taken Trump’s candidacy 
seriously before anyone else did.368 The director of national intelligence (DNI), Dan 
Coats, argued that ‘the digital infrastructure that serves the country is literally under 
attack’ and that ‘the warning lights are blinking red again’, just as before 9/11. Obama 
was more measured and admitted that the phishing attack was standard and ‘not 
particularly sophisticated’. In and of themselves the charges outlined in the indictment do 
not contravene international law, although are a domestic criminal offence.369 The timing 
of the indictment damaged the prospect of rapprochement with Russia. As Trump 
tweeted on its release, ‘Our relationship with Russia has NEVER been worse thanks to 
many years of US foolishness and stupidity and now, the Rigged Witch Hunt!’. 370 
 
Hack or leak? 
 
Did Russia ‘hack’ the DNC and then pass on the materials to various cut-outs and then 
WikiLeaks? The presence of Russian intelligence is more than likely, but some questions 
remain: was there a direct order to target the DNC, or was this part of a normal scanning 
operation; and if the former, at what level was the order given? Did the Kremlin really set 
out to undermine American democratic institutions, or was it simply trying to 
demonstrate its cyber capabilities to deter hostile American activities? There are plenty 
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more questions. Instead of deploying its cyber action team, the FBI outsourced the 
investigation to a partisan body, CrowdStrike.371  A serious investigation would have 
immediately demanded access to the DNC and associated servers, interviews with all 
DNC staff, Podesta and Nakashima (the author of the first public report of the hack on 14 
June). It would also have entailed a thorough analysis of the metadata of all relevant 
published material. Instead, the US security agencies and Mueller appear to have been 
remarkably incurious, attributing not only the hack but also publication to Russian 
agencies. This assertion has roiled American society since 2016, and while it may be 
correct, the evidentiary basis for such far-reaching claims, with major political 
implications, is remarkably thin. 
As with so much in the Russiagate case, the official narrative is neither coherent 
nor consistent. Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst and State Department official, 
identifies at least 11 ‘contradictions, inconsistencies or oddities’ in the public narrative 
about CrowdStrike and its findings: 1) Two different dates – 20 April (Nakashima) or 6 
May (Ward) – are given about the date that Crowdstrike was hired; 2) There are two 
accounts of who hired CrowdStrike – Nakashima reports that the DNC called Michael 
Sussmann of the law firm Perkins Coie, who in turn contacted CrowdStrike’s CSO and 
President, Shawn Henry, but Alperovich told Nakashima that the DNC called direct; 3) 
CrowdStrike improbably claims to have discovered within 24 hours that the ‘Russians’ 
were responsible for the DNC ‘intrusion’; 4) CrowdStrike’s installation of its proprietary 
anti-hack Falcon software on DNC IT systems on 1 or 6 May would have alerted the 
intruders that they had been detected; 5) CrowdStrike told Nakashima that they were ‘not 
sure how the hackers got in’ and did not ‘have hard evidence’; 6) In a blogpost of 14 June 
(the same day as Nakashima’s Washington Post article) Alperovich wrote that the DNC 
was intruded by two Russian entities using malware identified as Fancy Bear (APT28) 
and Cozy Bear (APT29); 7) but Alperovich reports that there was no evidence that the 
two coordinated their attack or even knew of the presence of the other; 8) There is 
confusion over what actually was obtained, with DNC officials claiming that the hackers 
took the entire database of opposition research on Trump and ‘all email and chat traffic’, 
although they insisted that ‘no financial, donor or personal information appears to have 
been accessed or taken’, while CrowdStrike claims that ‘The hackers stole two files’; 9) 
Alperovich does not make it clear whether Cozy Bear or Fancy Bear took the files; 10) 
When WikiLeaks published the emails on 22 July the files show that the last message 
taken from the DNC was dated 25 May, and the bulk was far more than ‘two files’; and 
11), and far from least, why did CrowdStrike wait five weeks before disconnecting the 
DNC computers from the network and sanitising them.372 
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Not surprisingly, Mueller’s conclusions have been challenged.373  The Veteran 
Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS) group argues that the DNC emails were 
physically downloaded and then transferred (by unknown persons) to WikiLeaks rather 
than being extruded via an electronic download. They argue that if there had been any 
external electronic download, both the sender and the reciver would have been registered 
by the NSA – whose impressive capabilities had been revealed by Snowden. They 
conclude that the DNC emails ‘were leaked by an insider’.374 Their memorandum of 24 
July 2017 argued that ‘We do not think that the June 12, 14 & 15 timing was pure 
coincidence. Rather, it suggests the start of a pre-emptive move to associate Russia with 
anything WikiLeaks might have been ready to publish and to “show” that it came from a 
Russian hack’.375  It asserted that the sheer volume of material could not have been 
obtained via a computer hack. They argue that on 5 July (that is, after CrowdStrike had 
cleansed the DNC) a computer directly connected to the DNC server or DNC Local Area 
Network (LAN) copied 1,976 megabytes of data in 87 seconds onto an external storage 
device. They examined the 35,813 emails posted by Wikileaks, in three batches, 
downloaded according to last modified times on 23, 25 and 26 May 2016. The transfer 
rate of 22.7 megabytes per second was far more than can be achieved through a remote 
download. In other words, ‘an insider copied DNC data onto an external storage device’. 
Later remote internet transfer speed tests, by an investigator called Forensicator, found 
that 11.8 megabytes of data per second was the maximum possible with the technology of 
the time.376 No less important, the investigation revealed that the copying took place on 
the East coast of the US.377 All the files had a last modified time rounded to an even 
second, which is consistent not with a remote hack but with a batch transfer to an external 
storage device, using the standard FAT (File Allocation Table) formatting. 378  VIPS 
concluded ‘This finding alone is enough to raise reasonable doubts, for example, about 
Mueller’s indictment of 12 Russian intelligence officers for hacking the DNC emails 
given to WikiLeaks’. The group, moreover, was dismayed that the NSA did not do a 
forensic analysis of its own, and instead relied on ‘assessments’.379 Any hack over the 
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internet would almost certainly have been discovered by the dragnet coverage by the 
NSA or allied foreign intelligence services.380 
This challenges the ‘Russian hack’ narrative and not surprisingly attracts intense 
criticism.381 The argument is advanced not by some marginal crackpots or conspiracy 
mongers but by people who had served with distinction at the highest levels of the US 
security agencies and business. William Binney worked successfully as the Technical 
Director at the NSA, while Skip Folden for 25 years was IBM Program Manager for 
Information Technology. Their work is analysed and publicised by Ray McGovern, one 
of the co-founders of VIPS in 2003 who worked as a CIA analyst from 1963 to 1990. In 
the 1980s he chaired the National Intelligence Estimates and prepared the Presidential 
Daily Brief for Reagan. They filled the gap left by the FBI’s failure to conduct 
independent forensic analysis of the original ‘Guccifer 2.0’ material. A joint article by 
Binney and McGovern in January 2017 argued that the DNC emails were stolen at the 
DNC headquarters and concluded: 
 
Because NSA can trace exactly where and how any ‘hacked’ emails from the 
Democratic National Committee or other servers were routed through the 
network, it is puzzling why NSA cannot produce hard evidence implicating the 
Russian government and WikiLeaks. Unless we are dealing with a leak from an 
insider, not a hack, as other reporting suggests. From a technical perspective 
alone, we are convinced that this is what happened.382 
 
In later papers they demonstrated that the same copy/leak process took place at two 
different times for different purposes. First, an inside leak to WikiLeaks before Assange 
announced on 12 June 2016 that he had DNC documents and planned to publish them, 
which he did on 22 July; and second, a separate leak on 5 July 2016 ‘to pre-emptively 
taint anything WikiLeaks might later publish by “showing” it came from a “Russian 
hack”’.383 The Guccifer 2.0 files were tampered with to make it look as if WikiLeaks had 
ties to Russia. VIPS looked at five files that Guccifer 2.0 posted on 15 June with Russian 
signatures but then found that the same five files posted by WikiLeaks from the Podesta 
emails did not have the Russian signatures. The bottom line was that ‘No one “hacked” 
the Democratic party’s mail in the summer of 2016. It was leaked locally’. The motive 
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appears to have been ‘to expose the party leadership’s corrupt efforts to sink Bernie 
Sanders’ campaign to win the Democratic nomination’.384  
In other words, as they put it in a memo to Trump, their research challenged the 
Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) of 6 January 2017 and ‘cast serious doubt on 
the underpinnings of the extraordinarily successful campaign to blame the Russian 
government for hacking’. This appears to have been a ‘desperate effort’ to blame the 
Russians for publishing the highly embarrassing DNC emails just before the Democratic 
convention in July 2016. They note how Clinton’s press officer Jennifer Palmieri made 
the rounds at the convention in a golf cart, in her words, ‘to get the press to focus on 
something even we found difficult to process: the prospect that Russia had not only 
hacked and stolen emails from the DNC, but that it had done so to help Donald Trump 
and hurt Hillary Clinton’. The VIPS50 report not surprisingly aroused a storm of 
criticism. In a later correction the authors reaffirmed that the 15 June 2016 Guccifer 2.0 
document ‘was synthetically tainted with “Russian fingerprints”’, but they admit that they 
were mistaken to suggest that ‘such tainting was also found in the “Guccifer 2.0” 
metadata from the copying event on July 5’. There was even criticism from within VIPS 
focusing not so much on the weakness of the claim that Russia was responsible for the 
hack, but for excessive confidence in alternative explanations. The dissenters argued that 
data transfer speeds could have reached those required for a hack, depending on the 
capacity of the network and access method. The data transfer, moreover, could have 
taken place on a server separate from the DNC’s, with data previously derived from the 
DNC.385 In response, the VIPS team argued that the download speeds available in 2016 
were much lower than those effective later, and the data downloaded on 5 July was 
transferred at a speed not available to East Coast ISPs, while being entirely consistent 
with the use of a memory stick. Further study, this time with Duncan Campbell, a British 
journalist specialising in security matters, found that Guccifer 2.0 had separated two sets 
of data, one dated 5 July 2016 (which was known), and the other 1 September (new 
information), and when merged they fitted together perfectly. Guccifer 2.0 then used 
various algorithms to modify ‘range change’ dates, in addition to the suspected insertion 
of Russian ‘fingerprints’. In other words, Guccifer 2.0 was a fabricator and a 
fabrication.386  
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Later, Trump ordered CIA director Mike Pompeo to invite Bill Binney to CIA 
Headquarters to brief him on the VIPS findings.387 In his presentation on 24 October 
2017 Binney gave a typically no-holds-barred explanation of their findings and of how 
Pompeo’s subordinates were being ‘less than candid’. 388  In the face of persistent 
criticism, McGovern issued a rebuttal: 
 
We stand by our main conclusion that the data from the intrusion of July 5, 2016, 
into the Democratic National Committee’s computers, an intrusion blamed on 
“Russian hacking”, was not a hack but rather a download/copy onto an external 
storage device by someone with physical access to the DNC. That principal 
finding relied heavily on the speed with which the copy took place – a speed 
much faster than a hack over the Internet could have achieved at the time – or, it 
seems clear, even now. Challenged on that conclusion – often by those conducting 
experiments within the confines of a laboratory – we have conducted and 
documented additional tests to determine the speeds that can be achieved now, 
more than a year later.389  
 
Former British ambassador to Uzbekistan between August 2002 and October 2004, Craig 
Murray, has much to say on the issue, yet he was never interviewed by the FBI or 
Mueller. Murray states ‘I know who leaked them [the DNC emails]. I’ve met the person 
who leaked them, and they are certainly not Russian and it’s an insider. It’s a leak, not a 
hack: the two are different things’.390  
The VIPS group argued that the Russia hack allegation was reminiscent of the 
evidence-free dogma that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction before the US attacked 
the country. Some who had earlier promoted the Iraq WMD disinformation campaign 
were prominent architects of the new one. The former director of national intelligence, 
James Clapper, before 2003 was responsible for the analysis of satellite imagery, and he 
admitted in his memoir that ‘intelligence officers, including me, were so eager to help 
[spread the Cheney/Bush claim that Iraq had a “rogue WMD program”] that we found 
what wasn’t really there’.391 If they could do it once, so VIPS argued, they could do it 
again. In a memo to Obama, delivered just three days before he left office in January 
2017, VIPS questioned the findings of the IC Assessment, reminding the president of the 
trail of deception that led to the Iraq invasion. The assessment by ‘hand-picked analysts’ 
from the FBI, CIA and NSA seemed to fall into the same ‘agenda-driven’ category. In 
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their view, the NSA was the competent body to determine conclusively what had 
happened. One of the enduring anomalies of the Russian hack narrative is that no federal 
law enforcement or intelligence agency was granted access to the DNC computer servers 
and files, even though a foreign government was accused of perpetrating the crime.  
No less worrying was the point made by VIPS50 about the publication from 7 
March 2017 of a trove of original CIA documents dubbed by WikiLeaks ‘Vault 7’.392 
WikiLeaks stated that it received the material from a current or former CIA contractor, 
and argued that it was comparable in scale and significance to Snowden’s material in 
2013. Vault 7 exposed a vast array of cyber warfare tools developed, in conjunction with 
the NSA, by the CIA’s Engineering Development Group, part of the CIA’s enormous 
Directorate of Digital Information, established by CIA director Brennan in 2015. The 
material revealed astonishing digital tools, including the ability to spy through a TV. The 
third Vault 7 release on 31 March exposed the ‘Marble Framework’ program designed 
for ‘obfuscation’, as well as source code for a ‘deobfuscator’ tool to reverse CIA text 
obfuscation. The obfuscation program could be used to conduct a ‘forensic attribution 
double game’ or false-flag operation, and included test samples in Chinese, Russian, 
Korean, Arabic and Farsi. The documents show that the Marble tool had been used in 
2016.393 The Vault 7 material shows how easy it is to camouflage hacking to ensure false 
attribution and to mask the real source. In response to this revelation, CIA director 
Pompeo called Assange and his associates ‘demons’ and argued: ‘It’s time to call out 
WikiLeaks for what it really is, a non-state hostile intelligence service, often abetted by 
state actors like Russia’.394  
The lack of independent verification is a matter of concern. CrowdStrike’s 
credibility was undermined when forced to retract the contention of December 2016 that 
Fancy Bear had used identical tools (the ‘X-Agent’ malware) and methods to hack into 
the Ukrainian military. Kiev rejected the claim that this led to the loss of 80 per cent of 
Ukraine’s howitzers in the battle with rebel Donbas forces.395 Attribution is notoriously 
difficult and complex software can lay false trails and plant false flags. The use of the 
Cyrillic setting by the user named Feliks Edmundovich is beyond sloppy, and some sort 
of double bluff may have been at work. Software is available that can pin the blame for a 
‘hack’ on another intelligence service.396 The Vault 7 releases revealed the CIA’s ability 
to hack computers and leave the signature of others. The Guccifer 2.0 data had been 
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clearly tampered with and manipulated, suggesting that this persona is a deceptive 
fabrication.  
In sum, three types of evidence suggest that the 2016 email compromises may 
have been an inside job: download speeds, Russian ‘fingerprints’ planted on manipulated 
files, and the numerical codes on the stolen files. If this evidence is correct, a remote hack 
via the internet is unlikely. The January 2016 ICA and the Mueller report made 
questionable and unproven assertions about how the DNC material reached WikiLeaks, 
and potential underlying evidence has been redacted. The ICA, importantly, concluded 
that ‘Disclosures through WikiLeaks did not contain any evident forgeries’. In other 
words, the revelations about the way the Clinton campaign traduced Sanders and in 
general behaved in a high-handed manner were true. Any putative Russian involvement 
did not ‘degrade’ American democracy but exposed how it was being degraded.  
 
Interference in state voting systems and infrastructure 
 
The first sign of Russia’s alleged digital intrusions or ‘reconnoitring’ had been picked up 
by the NSA and FBI in local and state electoral boards’ computerised voter registration 
rolls, lists of voters names and addresses, in summer 2015. Clapper immediately 
informed Obama, preparing the ground for later allegations. 397  The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) preliminary assessment came out on 29 September 2016, a 
few weeks after the hacking of election websites in Illinois and Arizona. The headline 
asserted that Russian hackers had targeted 20 voter registration systems, and successfully 
infiltrated four. Later, a senior DHS official testified to Congress that 21 states had 
potentially been targeted by Russian state cyber actors, but that was not based on specific 
individual activity. A number of states subsequently repudiated the suggestion that they 
had been targeted, and another senior DHS official described ‘the majority of the activity’ 
as ‘simple scanning … a regular activity across the Web. I would not characterize that as 
an attack’.398 The DHS assessment of 28 October 2016 suggested that Russian hackers 
breached systems in Illinois, a county database in Arizona, a Tennessee state website and 
an information technology vendor in Florida, but even this modest list was later 
modified.399 The only substantial evidence adduced to support the claim of Russian ballot 
interference is a leaked NSA document dated 5 May 2017 that accused the GRU of 
impersonating a software company and sending spear-phishing emails loaded with 
malware to over 100 state and local jurisdictions involved with voter registration. 
Even the NSA document was cautious in its assessment of the results of the attack 
and about attributing responsibility to Russian state actors.400  Voter registration data was 
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hacked in only one state, Illinois, and even then it was not clear by whom. Expert studies 
concur that ‘there’s no evidence that the Russians breached any election systems or 
interfered in the actual vote’.401 The DHS compiled an intelligence report suggesting that 
Russian hackers targeted voter-related websites in several states, and then leaked 
sensational accounts that turned out to be false and sometimes risible. Mueller took up 
the issue to suggest that Russian military intelligence was behind election infrastructure 
hacking. Mueller’s 13 July 2018 indictment of 12 GRU officers does not cite any 
violations of US election laws, even though the central charge was that Russia had 
interfered in the 2016 election. The DHS competed with other security agencies to get 
state and local voter registration systems designated ‘critical infrastructure’, which would 
release substantive funds. The Russia threat became part of the inter-agency and federal 
competition for resources. Several states objected to the power grab, but Jeh Johnson, the 
head of the the DHS, on 6 January 2017 – the day of the ICA – went ahead anyway.402 
As for the alleged Russian interference, analysis of the July 2016 hack of the 
Illinois voter registration system showed that the personal information of as many as 
200,000 (for some reason Mueller in July 2018 gave the figure of 500,000) registered 
voters was stolen – although the hackers only copied the information and left it 
unchanged in the database. It appears that the Arizona hack, like the one in Illinois, was 
‘possibly for the purpose of selling personal information’. State voter registration systems 
have long been under attack by criminal groups seeking information to be sold for profit. 
In other words, criminal hacking was conflated with Russian government intervention. 
The Russian hacking version offers no explanation about what the perpetrators sought to 
do with the information, hence the rapid shift in the narrative to Russia ‘sought to 
undermine public confidence in electoral processes and potentially the outcome’. Later it 
was revealed that in 14 of the 21 states on the list there had been no more than routine 
scanning, and only six involved attempts at site penetration. The July 2018 Mueller 
indictment appears to offer more information, but this too disintegrates on examination. 
Paragraph 71 talks about the way that Alexander Kovalev and his co-conspirators 
scanned the relevant electoral websites, and when the FBI was alerted he deleted his 
search history but not of his alleged collaborators, suggesting the absence of a 
conspiracy.403 
On 25 July 2019 the Senate Intelligence Committee released a heavily redacted 
report on supposed interference in the 2016 at state and local level, arguing that the 
Russian government ‘directed extensive activity’ against US election infrastructure, 
beginning in 2014 and continuing into 2017.404 The report ‘found no evidence that vote 
tallies were altered or that voter registry files were deleted or modified’, so reverted to the 
default claim that the Russian government ‘was developing and implementing 
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capabilities to interfere in the 2016 election, including undermining confidence in US 
democratic institutions and voting processes’.405 The report discerned no pattern to the 
scanning activity, but in the end claimed that ‘all 50 states probably’ were targeted. 406  
 In late 2016 the Washington Post ran a story arguing that Russian hackers had 
penetrated the US electricity grid through a utility in Vermont. 407  It appears that a 
computer at Burlington Electric had triggered a malware alert (after discovering a 
Russian IP address on a list released by the DHS and FBI in December 2016). The story 
apparently started with anonymous DHS officials who leaked the information, apparently 
only too ready to advance the Russiagate narrative. Basic checks would have discounted 
the story, but in yet another example of neo-journalism a false account was aired and is 
still circulating (even though the Washington Post retracted the story two days later). The 
DHS is still fighting to increase its stake in cyber-protection, and thus has played up the 
Russian threat to America’s critical infrastructure, including energy, nuclear water, 
aviation and critical manufacturing sectors.408 
The Russian scare, nevertheless, did have salutary effects, and cyber-security 
procedures have been greatly improved. By 2018 it was claimed that ‘voters will be 
casting ballots in what experts say will be the most secure US election since the birth of 
the internet, thanks to steps taken since 2016’. The DHS took the lead in protecting 
voting machines, while state election officials hired technology experts and purchased 
new voting equipment with paper-ballot back-ups that allowed the results to be checked 
in case of problems with electronic systems. These were sensible and probably overdue 
measures, and as the 2018 midterms approached ‘There [was] no evidence that election 
infrastructure, including voter registration systems or voting machines, has been targeted 
by Russia’. Nevertheless ‘Officials are worried that Russia or others could deploy new, 
unpredictable tactics on election day, and are unnerved by how quiet Russian hackers 
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SOCIAL MEDIA MEDDLING 
 
 
A study of the ‘electronic warfare’ waged by Russian trolls and hackers calls this 
‘epistemic violence’ committed by ‘discourse saboteurs’. A tiny investment in copy-cat 
ads allegedly amplified existing divisions and shifted the terms of the debate. Drawing on 
academic study of the kinds of persuasion that can influence voters and under what 
circumstances, Kathleen Hall Jamieson argues that the targeted cyberattacks by hackers 
and trolls in the 2016 election were decisive. She focuses on the 78,000 votes in 
Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin which delivered a majority in the Electoral 
College to Trump. Applying studies of communication effects in the 2000 and 2008 
presidential elections, she argues that in the 2016 election the efforts of Russian hackers, 
trolls and bots were amplified by the media, social media platforms, the candidates, party 
leaders and a polarised public. She concludes that Russia delivered Trump victory: 
without Russian meddling there would have been no Trump presidency. Russian 
‘discourse saboteurs’ persuaded just enough people to either vote a certain way or not to 
vote at all.410 The Russians pulled off an electoral coup by alienating voters from Clinton, 
inadvertently aided and abetted by the American media.411  The anti-Russian popular 
author Timothy Snyder amplifies the argument, asserting that Russia has long been 
practicing successful information and influence operations against the West. 412  This 
chapter will assess the validity of these arguments. 
 
The Internet Research Agency (IRA) and Mueller indictment 
 
The main Russian social media intervention came from the Internet Research Agency 
(IRA), established in July 2013 at 55 Savushkina Street in St Petersburg’s Olgino district. 
It was primarily a commercial operation whose initial focus was on working the Russian 
internet on behalf of clients, for example governors whose popularity was falling by 
adding ‘likes’ to their social media presence. In other words, the agency was originally 
created ‘to mess not with American voters but with Russia’s domestic opposition, among 
other subjects, by increasing traffic to certain regime-friendly outlets’.413 The agency was 
staffed not by intelligence officials but by college students and the like attracted by the 
pay. The IRA first came to public attention when it spread online propaganda in support 
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of the Russophone insurgents in the Donbass in 2014, and by 2016 it apparently had a 
staff of hundreds working in 12-hour shifts churning out online material, first for the 
post-Soviet market and then the American public. The business model was to profit by 
attracting clicks to the relevant page, which is why ads were planted covering every side 
of issues as well as having puppy dog and other human-interest pages.  
The IRA is a privately-owned company run by the entrepreneur Yevgeny 
Prigozhin, whose various catering contracts and high-end restaurant in St Petersburg 
earned him the moniker of ‘Putin’s chef’. Prigozhin is a billionaire with close links to the 
presidential administration, from which it gained some major contracts. In return, 
Prigozhin allegedly fulfilled undercover tasks for the Kremlin. Prigozhin is the financier 
behind the Wagner Group that reportedly sent private military contractors to Ukraine, 
Syria, Libya and sub-Saharan Africa. 414  Three journalists investigating Wagner’s 
activities in the Central African Republic were killed in July 2018.415 Sanctions were 
imposed on Prigozhin in December 2016 and soon afterwards also on his two 
acknowledged companies, Concord Management and Consulting, and Concord 
Catering.416 The purported ‘private’ status of these various organisations allowed the 
regime to disavow responsibility for their activities. Plausible deniability is certainly one 
explanation, but there is no conclusive evidence that the whole operation was conducted 
on behalf of the Kremlin, let alone Putin personally. If there was a decision to interfere in 
US politics, at what level was the decision made? Prigozhin undertakes a range of 
freelance tasks, sometimes on behalf of the Russian state and sometimes to pursue his 
own interests, and when the two diverge the consequences can be catastrophic (as in the 
February 2018 battle near Deir Ezzor in Syria). Although Russia today is considered a 
hyper-centralised state, the ‘vertikal’ of power is challenged by powerful corporate and 
regional actors at the horizontal level. Kremlin oversight over this complex and 
contradictory system can at times be minimal if not altogether absent.417 
 The IRA disseminated internet hoaxes ranging from an alleged explosion in a 
Louisiana chemical plant in September, an Ebola outbreak, and in December 2014 the 
police shooting of an unarmed black woman. None of these events took place, and 
following the source led the reporter Adrian Chen to the IRA in Olgino. In his revealing 
study published in June 2015 he noted how the IRA had ‘industrialized the art of 
trolling’, with the management ‘obsessed by statistics, page views and the number of 
posts’, yet after speaking with the operatives he found that ‘the exact point of their work 
was left unclear to them’. Chen was right to warn that the operation threatened ‘the utility 
of the Internet as a democratic space’. 418  The IRA itself became the target of the 
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hacktivist group Anonymous International, releasing hundreds of its emails. This 
indicated a point stressed by Chen in a later article published following Mueller’s 
indictment of IRA operatives. Chen argued that ‘the whole issue had been blown out of 
proportion’, stressing that rather than being some ‘kind of giant machine, in which 
talking points generated by the Kremlin are “amplified” through a network of bots, fake 
Facebook pages, and sympathetic human influencers’, he highlighted ‘just how inept and 
haphazard these attempts were’.419 
On 16 February 2018 Prigozhin was indicted with others by a federal grand jury 
for interfering in the American election.420 The Mueller indictment accused 13 Russian 
citizens and three Russian organisations, one of which was the IRA, of trying to influence 
the 2016 election using social media. The indictment revealed that two IRA employees 
(Anna Bogacheva and Aleksandra Krylova) spent three weeks in the US in June 2014, 
visiting nine states to gauge the country’s political atmosphere.421 Prigozhin owns the 
IRA through his Concord Management company, and according to the indictment, 
Concord was the IRA’s ‘primary source of funding’, paying over $1.25 million a 
month.422 The small group of ‘professional trolls’ in St Petersburg manipulated social 
media platforms to fan the flames of partisanship and to exacerbate American political 
divisions. The indictment talked of a multi-year campaign of ‘information warfare against 
the United States of America’.423 The IRA initiative ‘Project Lakhta’ from ‘around’ May 
2014 to several months after the presidential election targeted audiences in Russia and 
across the world, and only later the US. Lakhta focused on posting advertisements and 
comments on the internet. The ‘Translator [Perevodchik] Project’ from April 2014 
focused on US social media outlets like YouTube, Facebook, Instagram and Twitter and 
continued until February 2018.424 Some 80 people worked in 12-hour shifts to push out 
messages directed to the US public.425 
The indictment asserted that the IRA ‘had a strategic goal to sow discord in the 
US political system, including the 2016 US presidential election’.426 Social media outlets 
were ‘weaponised’ by creating pages that posed as genuine US political groups such as 
‘Secured Borders’, ‘Blacktivist’ and ‘Army of Jesus’ on Facebook and other social media 
platforms. The IRA operatives faked American identities by using virtual private 
networks (VPNs) and the stolen identities of real American citizens. They posted 
messages about divisive social issues like abortion, gun rights and immigration. They 
also issued misinformation, such as voter fraud by the Democratic Party to suppress 
turnout. 427 The operatives also used false identities to get genuine Americans to organise 
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political rallies, such as a ‘March for Trump’ in June 2016. There were also rallies in 
Florida, New York and Pennsylvania. The IRA apparently focused its activities on 
‘purple’ states (those without a clear alignment with the major parties) such as Colorado, 
Virginia and Florida. 428 In short, Mueller found that the IRA used a network of shell 
companies, with names such as MediaSintez LLC, MixInfo LLC and many others, to 
hide its activities and funding. Investigators found internal documentation that described 
IRA activities as ‘information warfare against the United States of America’, which one 
compared to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941.429 
The Mueller indictment, according to Chen, failed to ‘shed light on the extent to 
which the Kremlin and, specifically, the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, were 
involved in the Agency’s work. Nor does the indictment move us any closer to a 
conclusion regarding whether anyone in the Trump campaign colluded with the Russian 
operation’.430 The relationship between the IRA and the Russian government is unclear, 
and Putin denied any links. He argued that even if the individuals and organisations had 
really meddled in the 2016 election, it was of no interest to him: ‘I’m absolutely 
indifferent to this, because they do not represent the interests of the Russian state’. Only 
if they had violated Russian laws, ‘then we will bring them to justice. If they did not 
violate Russian laws, then there is no reason for indicting them’.431 By contrast, the 
Senate Intelligence Committee report on the issue in October 2019 argued that ‘Russia’s 
targeting of the 2016 US presidential election was part of a broader, sophisticated, and 
ongoing information warfare campaign designed to sow discord in American politics and 
society’.432  The report argued that paid advertisements were just a small part of the 
campaign. Instead, ‘the IRA co-opted unwitting Americans to engage in offline activities 
in furtherance of their objectives’, including the mobilisation of African-Americans 
through social media ‘to sign petitions, share personal information, and teach self-defense 
training courses’.433 
 In a revealing interview with the independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta 
in November 2018, Andrei Mikhailov, who helped Prigozhin create his media empire, 
spilled some of the beans after falling out with him. Mikhailov was recruited by 
Prigozhin in 2012 to oversee a media campaign against one of his competitors. Mikhailov 
asserts that Prigozhin is no stranger to dirty tricks, such as staging a food poisoning 
incident against a rival catering company, as well as defaming news outlets by tricking 
them into publishing ‘fake news’. One such media campaign targeted the poet Dmitry 
Bykov and another Forbes magazine. In 2013 an attack of this sort was launched against 
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the relatively independent RIA Novosti news agency, and in December of that year its 
highly professional and courageous head, Svetlana Mironyuk, was summarily dismissed 
and the agency folded into the new militantly loyal Rossiya Segodnya (Russia Today) 
media conglomerate headed by Dmitry Kisilëv. In Mikhailov’s view, the IRA’s 2016 US 
election social media campaign was Prigozhin’s personal idea: ‘I am convinced that he 
received no orders from anyone and did not ask for any permission. There were never any 
orders from any of the [Kremlin] towers – it all came directly from Prigozhin’. Mikhailov 
argued that Prigozhin had chosen Olgino as the site for the troll factory since it was ‘on 
the way to his dacha’ in the nearby Lakhta district.434 Mikhailov described other nasty 
campaigns launched by Prigozhin, exposing the dark underside of Putinite stability as 
well as the degree of latitude allowed a ‘stoligarch’ like Prigozhin. 
The Mueller accusations appear to have had no effect on the IRA ‘troll factory’. 
On the contrary, the enterprise moved into bigger offices a couple of kilometres across 
town and continued to target US audiences. As always with Russia, the response to 
threats and accusations is to dig in deeper. One of Concord’s new projects is an English-
language web news site called USAReally, covering American affairs for American 
readers. In an interview with the Associated Press its chief editor, Alexander Malkevich 
(an avowed Trump fan), admitted ‘Yes, we are a Russian site. We talk to Americans 
about America. But is that forbidden? … Influence readers? Every media wants to do 
that. … and so what?’.  Some of the Russians indicted by Mueller moved on to other 
jobs, went underground, or shut down their social media presence. One of them, Sergei 
Polozov, announced on the Russian social media site VKontakte (VK) that he was ‘using 
his notoriety for a good cause’, and had persuaded Russian censors to block four 
Ukrainian sites. He vowed to continue fighting those who ‘try to drag Russia through the 
mud’; and thanked ‘those who want to join me in the fight against informational 
enemies’.435 The renewed cold war has now sunk deep social roots and is set to endure 
and intensify as both sides consider themselves under siege. 
 
The IRA in context 
 
The IRA pumped out a stream of social media posts, and its employees even assumed 
various false US personas to encourage people to attend rallies and engage in other 
political activities. Nevertheless, the IRA appears to be more of a commercial than a 
political organisation. The Mueller indictment charged several of its officers with minor 
commercial infractions but left out the political aspects of its activities. The indictment 
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overall confirmed the commercial intent behind IRA’s work. Point 95 of the indictment 
makes this clear:  
 
Defendants and their co-conspirators also used the accounts to receive money 
from real US persons in exchange for posting promotions and advertisements on 
the organization-controlled social media pages. Defendants and their co-
conspirators typically charged certain US merchants and US social media sites 
between 25 and 50 US dollars per post for promotional content on their popular 
false US persona accounts, including Being Patriotic, Defend the 2nd, and 
Blacktivist.  
 
Little of the IRA’s output was concerned with the election, and instead it used sock-
puppets on Facebook and Twitter to attract people pictures of puppies and the like, with 
the aim of selling advertisements and promotions on these sites. This confirms the 
questionable ability of $100,000 spent by the IRA on clickbait pages through Facebook 
ads to move people to vote for Trump. Some 56 per cent of the 3,517 ads ran after the 
election, and 25 per cent were not seen by anyone. Only about 100 of the ads mentioned 
support for Trump or opposition to Clinton, a few dozen mentioned the election and a 
handful the other candidates. Most of the posts were not targeted on a constituency 
smaller than the whole US, and some of the targets were irrelevant in electoral terms, 
such as Maryland and Missouri. In February 2018 Facebook executive Rob Goldman 
tweeted that ‘I have seen all the Russian ads and I can say very definitely that swaying 
the election was not the man goal’ [italics in original].436 Thomas Rid confirms this view, 
arguing that it is unlikely that the trolls convinced many American voters to change their 
minds, with only 8.4 per cent its activity election-related.437 In short, the IRA was a 
politicised commercial clickbait business. 
A very different reality is portrayed by Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti in their 
landmark 10,000-word article in the New York Times in September 2018 describing ‘The 
Plot to Subvert an Election’. They argue that ‘Acting on the personal animus of Mr. 
Putin, public and private instruments of Russian power moved with daring and skill to 
harness the currents of American politics’ and launched a ‘surprise attack’ that they 
characterise as a ‘stealth cyberage Pearl Harbor’. This ‘succeeded in delivering the 
presidency to his admirer, Mr. Trump’. They admit ‘Mr Trump’s frustration with the 
Russian investigation is not surprising. He is right that no public evidence has emerged 
showing that his campaign conspired with Russia in the election interference or accepted 
Russian money’. Despite claiming at the beginning that there was a ‘mountain of 
evidence’, by the end they concede that the charges ‘cannot be proved or disproved’; but 
they spend thousands of words suggesting otherwise.438 
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Shane and Mazzetti stress the scale of the IRA’s work on Facebook, with 2,700 
fake Facebook accounts, 80,000 posts and ‘an eventual audience of 126 million 
Americans on Facebook alone’, which they stress ‘was not far short of the 137 million 
people who would vote in the 2016 presidential elections’. For their data they draw on 
Facebook’s presentation to the Senate Judiciary Committee in November 2017 in which 
Colin Stretch, the company’s general counsel, stated that ‘Our best estimate is that 
approximately 126 million may have been served one of these [IRA-generated] stories as 
some time during the two year period’.439 Stretch’s figure is the number of people who 
could hypothetically have come into contact with an IRA-generated story not in the ten 
weeks of the election campaign but over the full 194 weeks from 2015 to 2017, when 
some 29 million could have received an IRA story in their feed. A number of 
assumptions are built into that figure, including that over the two-year period the 29 
million people may have received at least one story in their Facebook feed and that they 
shared it with others at a specified rate. Facebook did not claim that most of the 80,000 
IRA posts were election related. Stretch testified that IRA content over the two-year 
period represented just four ten-thousandths (.0004) of the total content of Facebook 
newsfeeds. Gareth Porter calculates that this means that each piece of IRA content was 
submerged in 23,000 of non-IRA content.  
Some 44 per cent were displayed before 8 November, and 56 per cent after the 
election. About 25 per cent of the ads were never shown to anyone, because of the 
auction system based on relevance. Less than $3 was spent on 50 per cent of the ads, and 
less than $1,000 was spent on 99 per cent of them. Some 5 per cent of the 3,000 ads 
appeared on Instagram.440 This means that the headline figure that ‘Russian propaganda 
reached 126 million Americans’ is deeply misleading.441 The 80,000 Russia-linked posts 
on Facebook between 2015 and 2017 were just a drop in the ocean of 33 trillion posts 
viewed by Americans in the two-year period before and after the 2016 vote. The same 
applies to the $4,700 Russia spent on Google ads. 442  In any case, Adam Moseri, 
Facebook’s vice president for news, admitted in 2016 that subscribers read only about ten 
per cent of stories that enters their daily News Feed. As an informed critic of the Shane 
and Mazzetti article notes, ‘The Times’ touting of the bogus 126 million out of 137 
million voters, while not reporting the 33 trillion figure, should vie in the annals of 
journalism as one of the most spectacularly misleading uses of statistics of all time’.443 It 
was yet another example of neo-journalism. 
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As for Twitter, the IRA sponsored 3,814 accounts, which supposedly ‘interacted 
with 1.4 million Americans’, as Shane and Mazzetti put it. However, over 90 per cent of 
the tweets had nothing to do with the election, and those that did were a tiny stream in the 
flood of Twitter messaging related to the election. Twitter stated that the IRA-linked 
accounts posted 175,993 tweets during the ten weeks of the election campaign, but only 
8.4 per cent were election-related. Those 15,000 tweets represented just .00008 (eight one 
hundred thousandth) of the estimated 189 million tweets identified as election-related in 
those ten weeks. A study by Darren Linvill and Patrick Warren of the 2.97 million tweets 
on 2,848 Twitter handles issued by the IRA accounts over a two-year period focused on 
various strategies for ‘agenda-building’, with five handle categories: right troll, left troll, 
news feed, hashtag gamer and fearmonger. Elements were interchangable, thus they 
conclude that the IRA engaged in ‘industrialized political warfare’. Their data shows that 
nearly a third had normal commercial content or were not in English; another third were 
straight local newsfeeds from US localities or largely non-political ‘hashtag games’; and 
the final third dealt with right or left populist themes in US politics. There were more 
political IRA tweets in 2017 than in the election year.444 
 There is another category identified by Twitter comprising 50,258 automated 
election-related Twitter accounts connected to Russia, generating a total of 2.1 million 
tweets, about one per cent of election-related tweets in that period. The media made much 
of these figures, but Twitter’s Sean Edgett told the Senate Intelligence Committee in 
November 2017 that the company had used an ‘expansive approach to defining what 
qualifies as a Russian-linked account’. Twitter considered the account to be ‘Russian’ if 
any of the following characteristics were found: it was created in Russia or if the use 
registered the account with a Russian phone user or a Russian email; the user’s display 
name included Cyrillic characters; the user regularly tweets in Russian; or the user has 
logged in from a Russian IP address. This is such a broad definition as to be virtually 
meaningless. Many countries use Cyrillic, and geographical origin is often masked by 
VPN, accompanied by the frequent sale of automated accounts. Thus, as Porter stresses, 
the idea that ‘the Russian government seriously threatened to determine the winner of the 
election does not hold up when the larger social media context is examined more closely 
… the Russian private sector effort accounted for a minuscule proportion of the election-
related output of social media’.445 In the universe of information, the Russian input was 
negligible. 
 
Decisive or not 
 
In an extremely tight race, the election was decided by fewer than 80,000 votes in three 
states, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, where Trump’s winning margin was less 
than one per cent in each. In his book Messing with the Enemy, the former FBI agent 
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Clint Watts is adamant that Russia influenced the outcome.446 This was the view of two 
reports issued in December 2018, which argued that Russian operatives used social media 
to ‘confuse, distract, and ultimately discourage’ black people to vote for Clinton.  Black 
turnout in 2016 declined for the first time in 20 years, falling to 58 per cent from the 
record high of 66.6 per cent in 2012. The Senate Intelligence Committee on 17 December 
2018 reviewed the two reports, one from a group of academics from Oxford University, 
the Computational Propaganda Project, and the other by New Knowledge, an American 
cyber-security firm. Both suggested that the major social media companies – Facebook, 
Google and Twitter – failed to provide the US authorities with exhaustive data. They 
argue that Russian trolls flooded social media with rightwing pro-Trump material, to get 
black voters to boycott the election or to vote for third party candidates. New Knowledge 
claimed to have identified an ‘immersive influence ecosystem’, in which posts on various 
platforms reinforced each other.447 The Oxford team argued that the IRA’s activities 
sought to polarise the US public and interfere in the elections campaigning for African 
American voters to boycott the election or to follow the wrong voting procedures.448  
Two-thirds of eligible black voters cast their ballot in the 2012 election, with the 
overwhelming majority going to Obama and just six per cent for Romney. Without a 
popular black leader to vote for, it is hardly surprising that black turnout in 2016 fell, 
with Trump receiving eight per cent. However, some of the decline is explained by the 
voter suppression procedures put in place following Republican victories at the state and 
local level in the Obama years. The election was ‘the first presidential contest in 50 years 
without the full protections’ of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.449 With 4.6 million ‘likes’, 
the bogus Russian Facebook Blacktivist account highlighted the disproportionate poverty 
rates and the endemic use of police violence against people of colour to divert political 
energy away from established parties.450 A detailed study of the ‘influence operation’ 
targeted on Black Lives Matter discourse found that the IRA participated on both sides of 
the argument, with left- and right-leaning false personas, but the two converged to 
critique the ‘mainstream media’. 451  The Soviet Union had a long record of using 
‘information operations’ to ‘disrupt the information streams and information systems of a 
geopolitical adversary’, with disinformation a specific type of information operation.452 
The IRA used fictitious identities to ‘reflect and shape social divisions’, while 
undermining ‘trust in information intermediaries like “the mainstream media”’. There is a 
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fundamental problem of identifying ‘authenticity’ in social media environments.453 The 
Oxford report argued that ultimately this effort was dwarfed by competing armies of 
‘cyber troops’ mobilised by government or political party actors seeking to manipulate 
public opinion online.454 
In December 2018 it was discovered that New Knowledge had run its own 
disinformation campaign, using fake Russian bots to discredit Republican candidate Roy 
Moore when he was running for the US Senate seat vacated by Jeff Sessions in Alabama 
in 2017. The far-right Moore, who faced sexual misconduct charges, was presented as the 
Russia-preferred candidate in a ‘false flag’ operation and thus discredited, and he lost by 
just 1.5 per cent in a tight race. Russia’s alleged tactics were imitated in what New 
Knowledge claimed was an experiment, dubbed ‘Project Birmingham’, arguing that it 
had almost no effect on the outcome.455 There is an obvious ‘disconnect’ between what 
was described as the enormous power of Russian tweets and botnets in the presidential 
election in 2016, and the claimed lack of impact in the Alabama senatorial race that cost 
$51 million: ‘If it was impossible for a $100,000 New Knowledge operation to affect a 
2017 state election, then how could a comparable – perhaps even less expensive – 
Russian operation possibly impact [affect] a $2.4 billion US presidential election in 
2016?’. As for the 2016 election ‘Rather than ruminating over whether they were duped 
by Russian clickbait, reporters who have actually spoken to black Midwest voters have 
found that political disillusionment led many to stay at home’. This is the key reason 
incumbent elites have been so concerned about the purported threat of Russian meddling: 
‘It deflects attention from their own failures, and the failings of the system that grants 
them status as elites’.456 
The IRA engaged in a covert influence operation, which is morally reprehensible, 
but in terms of the effect on electoral outcomes there are strong grounds to be sceptical. 
The posts did not possess magical properties that acted like a hypodermic syringe to send 
messages directly into the minds of voters. It is unlikely that a small number of Russian 
media posts tilted the election in Trump’s favour, but Jamieson shifts the focus to the 
hacked Democratic campaign emails. She assumes that Russia was responsible and 
argues that their effect was amplified by the US media, particularly around the time of the 
three presidential debates, and thus was able to tip the scales in a tight race.457 As we 
have seen, the first tranche of stolen DNC material was published on 22 July, disrupting 
the Clinton campaign and sharpening divisions between supporters. The slow release of 
the Podesta documents began on 7 October, immediately after the Access Hollywood 
video. The third release of emails on 11 October revealed that a Democrat operative, 
Donna Brazile, while working at CNN, had provided debate questions to Clinton, and 
that senior Catholic democratic campaign officials had disparaged Republicans as 
 
453 Arif et al, ‘Acting the Part’, p. 23.  
454 Howard et al, The IRA, pp. 39-40. 
455 Danielle Ryan, ‘Irony Alert: Firm that Warned Americans of Russian Bots … Was Running an 
Army of Fake Russian Bots’, RT.com, 29 December 2018, https://www.rt.com/op-ed/447630-
russian-bots-new-knowledge/. 
456  Aaron Maté, ‘New Studies Suggest Pundits are Wrong About Russian Social-Media 
Involvement in US Politics’, The Nation, 28 December 2018, 
https://www.thenation.com/article/russiagate-elections-interference/. 





allegedly cherry-picking their faith for political gain. All this allowed Trump to argue that 
the election was ‘rigged’, and repeatedly referred to the WikiLeaks material, no fewer 
than 164 times in the last month of the campaign alone.  
The Russian intervention allegedly pushed undecided voters to vote in a certain 
way, but Jamieson concedes that numerous factors were involved. The WikiLeaks 
revelations, for example, are questionably counted as Russian interference, but the last-
minute Comey intervention was enough to shift enough undecided voters, especially 
‘Hillary defectors’ in the three key swing states. Clinton did not need Russian help to 
alienate voters, notably because of her long career littered with scandals, her ‘basket of 
deplorables’ faux pas (used to describe Trump supporters in a campaign speech on 9 
September), and her perceived sense of entitlement (an impression which she worked 
hard to dispel). Above all, as the book Identity Crisis argues, Trump’s brutal exploitation 
of divisive race, gender, religious, migration and ethnicity issues propelled him to the 
White House. The state of the economy, the Obama presidency and the changing 
demographics of the political parties indicated that the election would be tight, and 
although for long periods this was obscured by Trump’s various gaffes, on election night 
the predictions proved justified.458 Nevertheless, although it is unlikely that the IRA had 
any serious effect on voting patterns, its existence was ‘a major historical novelty’, and 
its impact was achieved by the mainstream press coverage that ‘generated [italic in 
original] the actual effect of a disinformation operation’.459 
 Mark Zuckerberg, the head of Facebook, initially dismissed the idea that fake 
news on his platform could have helped elect Trump as president. The $100,000-worth of 
ads placed with the company by the IRA was a minuscule sum by any standard – the 
National Rifle Association alone spent $30 million to help get Trump elected. Three days 
after the election Zuckerberg argued that it was a ‘pretty crazy idea’ to think fake Russian 
messages influenced the outcome. He asserted that voters ‘make decisions based on their 
lived experience’, but he soon changed his tune. 460  When pressed about how much 
‘inauthentic’ Russian content there was on Facebook, Sheryl Sandberg, Facebook’s chief 
operating officer, argued that ‘any amount is too much’, but she ultimately gave the 0.004 
estimate, a negligible amount on any scale. The larger question is that the business model 
of Facebook, Twitter and YouTube is based on generating engagement, and for this 
‘inflammatory and hateful’ posts are best. Two weeks before the vote, a senior official 
with the Trump campaign admitted that they had ‘three major voter suppression 
operations underway’, aimed at young women, African-Americans and white idealistic 
liberals. Facebook was so useful to the Trump campaign that it spent the bulk of its $94 
million budget on the platform, and Facebook even had staff embedded in the Trump 
campaign (a common practice with major advertisers, and they offered identical support 
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to the Clinton campaign) to advise on how to spend the money most effectively, 
including presumably on how to get voters out – or to stay at home.461 
 
On the internet, nobody knows you’re a dog 
 
As the various Congressional hearings and other investigations gathered pace, 
Zuckerberg was forced not only to recant, but also to increase monitoring. By September 
2018 Facebook, Google and Twitter had announced some 125 initiatives to combat ‘fake 
news’. Despite the minuscule amounts involved, the Russiagate scandal took its toll on 
the mighty Facebook empire. In March 2018 its shares took a battering when reports 
emerged that Cambridge Analytica, an American data analysis firm largely owned by 
Robert Mercer, mined the data of 50 million users to create profiles to target them in 
elections.462 In 2014 and 2015 Facebook allowed an app developed by Alexander Kogan, 
at the time a research associate at Cambridge University, to harvest 87 million profiles of 
users around the world. This was then used by Cambridge Analytica to target voters in 
the 2016 US election. The company overall boasted of having access to 230 million 
Americans’ voter-registration data as well as other personal information. The company 
broke Facebook rules by using data collected for research purposes.463 The case provoked 
regulators to clamp down on the big technology companies to defend citizen privacy 
rights. Facebook in 2018 agreed with the Federal Trade Commission that it would inform 
users when their data was being shared with anyone other than their friends.464  
Trump’s digital campaign was based in San Antonio, Texas, and 12 Cambridge 
Analytica people worked there in 2016.465 The company gleaned the personality profiles 
of 230 million Americans and matched them to the Republican Party’s exhaustive Voter 
Vault data base. The persuaders homed in on the 13 million fence-sitters, who could 
potentially be nudged one way or another, and this was further refined by focusing on 
voters in the crucial swing states of Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. In the end, 
their votes made all the difference and Trump won in these states by tiny margins. As a 
senior Facebook executive, Andrew Bosworth, put it, Trump ‘didn’t get elected because 
of Russia or misinformation or Cambridge Analytica. He got elected because he ran the 
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single best digital ad campaign I’ve ever seen’.466 The Russian interference issue diverted 
attention from tackling the problem of big data and democracy.467 
The veteran pollster, Nate Silver, doubted whether the Russian troll farms, memes 
and Tweets had any effect, arguing ‘If you wrote out a list of the most important factors 
in the 2016 election, I'm not sure that Russian social media memes would be among the 
top 100. The scale was quite small and there’s not much evidence that they were 
effective’. Russia’s 5,000 post-election tweets hardly compared to the 500 million posted 
each day.468 The report admitted that only a small proportion of Russian social media 
activity, 11 per cent, was related to the election, and that far from ‘the scale of the 
operation being unprecedented’ Stretch demonstrated that approximately 1 out of 23,000 
pieces of content had anything to do with the IRA. The expenditure was also minuscule, 
with Facebook spending according to the Oxford report coming in at just $73,711 
between 2015 and 2017. Aaron Maté, one of the most incisive analysts of the Russiagate 
affair, sums up Russian social media activity as follows: ‘It was mostly unrelated to the 
2016 election; microscopic in reach, engagement, and spending; and juvenile or absurd in 
its content’. 469  Parscale, who was appointed Trump’s campaign manager for 2020, 
compared Russia’s impact to ‘three pieces of salt inside a giant salad bowl the size of 
Madison Square Garden and you’re never going to taste it’. The Russians spent less than 
$10,000 over the same period that the Trump campaign spent $100 million.470 
The Trump campaign in total ran 5.9 million Facebook ads and the Clinton 
campaign only 66,000.471 The scale of Russian social media intervention in the 2016 
election was minuscule in comparison with the activities of the candidates and other 
interested parties, yet it has been endowed with supernatural powers to influence 
American voters and to shape public discourse. Why would a relatively minor investment 
by Russia outweigh the enormous funds expended by the Clinton and Trump campaigns? 
Mere contact with a Russian-inspired message in the popular imagination and the minds 
of Russiagate proponents was apparently enough to change people’s convictions. What 
was ‘the black magic, the propaganda alchemy, the special sauce that makes Russian 
copycat ads into weaponized tools of democracy-destruction, while those others are just 
normal discourse?’.472 The great majority of the messages were not directly about the 
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election, and can be categorised as ‘clickbait’ – items designed to attract interest and thus 
enhance viewing figures and attract advertisers. 473  Even the New Knowledge report 
admitted that ‘Merchandise perhaps provided the IRA with a source of revenue’. 474 
Equally, some two-thirds of the relevant items were posted after the election. The 
political items, moreover, were broadly equally split between the Trump and Clinton 
campaigns.  
This explains the emphasis on Russia’s attempts to exacerbate divisions in US 
society, which is an indirect admission that the ads and posts were mostly abstract and 
not always partisan. This takes us on to the other fundamental question: is the American 
polity so fragile and divided that a few Facebooks ads and tweets could alter the balance. 
This does not deny the other big question: should Russian agencies have been tweeting 
and Facebooking during the election at all? This understandably fed the Russiagate 
narrative, which Boyd-Barrett ultimately argues itself functioned as a disinformation or 
distraction campaign. While meddling of any kind is to be deplored, the substantive 
charge about Russian interference is weak, and pales into relative insignificance in the 
context of the hidden persuasion environment during election campaigns, reinforced by 
social media campaigns. According to Boyd-Barrett, many factors weaken the integrity 
of the American democratic process, and Russia in 2016 was but a minor one. The 
problem with the whole Russiagate narrative, in his view, ‘was its narrow understanding 
of “election meddling” … Examining only Russia, without reference to other sources [of 
non-transparent interference in elections] was deceptive’.475 The whole Russiagate affair 
in his view can only be understood in the context of the great power rivalry for the 
domination of Eurasia, which is another way of saying that the larger international 
context explains the extraordinary power of the Russiagate narrative. 
 Russiagate was used to discipline the upstart social media companies. Despite 
attempts to scapegoat Facebook, ‘What drove the election decision was not Russian trolls 
or fake news on social media but a pas de deux of the mainstream centre-left media and 
conservative upstarts like Fox and Breitbart’. 476  This is the argument of Harvard’s 
Berkman Klein Centre for Internet & Society, which in a comprehensive analysis of the 
media from 2015 and through the election argues that political cultural changes since the 
1970s interacted with the development of social media and new forms of political 
communication to marginalise the traditional centre right media and politicians while 
radicalising ‘the right wing ecosystem’, notably Fox News, rendering the public 
vulnerable to foreign and domestic propaganda efforts. 477  The mainstream media 
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unwittingly followed the agenda of the right-wing media and Trump with their focus on 
immigration, jobs and trade. The fact that Russian trolls favoured Trump was no big 
news, since ‘The internet is a welter of dubious information and fake claims by people 
pretending to be somebody they aren’t. On the internet, nobody knows you’re a dog’. But 
as the book notes,  
 
Critically, if the biggest win for Russian information operations is to disorient 
American political communications, then overstating the impact of those efforts 
actually helps consolidate their success. … It is important not to confuse the high 
degree to which Russian operations are observable with the extent to which they 
actually make a difference to politically active beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours 
on America.478  
 
Jack Matlock, the penultimate US ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1987 to 1991 
wisely noted that ‘It had never occurred to me that our admittedly dysfunctional political 
system is so weak, undeveloped, or diseased that inept Internet trolls could damage it. It 
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CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION AND CROSSFIRE HURRICANE 
 
 
In a tangled story, the George Papadopoulos affair is more knotted than most. He had the 
ill-fortune to fall down a rabbit hole in which nothing was as it appeared, and he became 
the victim of multiple intrigues. Who is Professor Mifsud, and what part did he play in 
Russiagate? Many questions are also raised by the notorious 9 June 2016 Trump Tower 
meeting between members of Trump’s team and a Russian lawyer. In both cases, nothing 
is as it seems, and it is not clear who was deceiving whom. In the end, on 31 July 2016 
the FBI opened the Crossfire Hurricane counter-intelligence investigation into the Trump 
campaign’s alleged Russia ties that dominated the Trump presidency and embroiled 
America in a cycle of claims and counterclaims. 
 
The British link 
 
The first suggested allegation of collusion between Trump and Russia came not from the 
US security agencies but Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). 
In late 2015 GCHQ forwarded ‘leads’ to Washington, informing CIA director Brennan 
that it was tracking communications between Trump associates and Russia. Brennan 
headed the CIA from March 2013 to January 2017 and had earlier been ‘one of the 
leading architects of the war on terror’ and managed the ‘kill list’ of people deemed 
eligible for lethal ‘signature strikes’.480 He had a chequered history as director. In one 
controversial incident, in 2014 he admitted that the agency spied on Senate staffers 
investigating CIA use of torture.481 As in Russiagate, this was a case of ‘political spying 
under the guise of legitimate national security monitoring’. 482  Brennan went on to 
become a leading advocate of Russiagate claims. It appears that he created a secret 
interagency ‘Trump Task Force’ in early 2016 to investigate Trump’s links with the 
Kremlin, and vigorously promoted the narrative that Russia interfered in the 2016 
election.483 Brennan fed British leads into the mix, since ‘US and UK intelligence sources 
acknowledge that GCHQ played an early, prominent role in kickstarting the FBI’s 
Trump-Russia investigation’.484 The content of these communications has never been 
revealed, but they were allegedly ‘extensive’. As Boyd-Barrett notes, ‘British 
involvement in the 2016 US presidential election would not only have constituted illegal 
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support to the Clinton campaign but would likely have far exceeded in magnitude and 
subterfuge the efforts attributed to Russia in behalf of Trump’.485 The information set the 
hare running, with fateful consequences for American democracy and society. 
In summer 2016 the head of GCHQ, Robert Hannigan, secretly travelled to 
Washington to brief Brennan on British findings about a ‘stream of illicit 
communications’ between Trump campaign officials and Russians, although the nature of 
these contacts remains secret.486 Brennan admitted later that this is what prompted an FBI 
probe, and in August he referred the matter to the inter-agency task force to 
investigate.487 The group included the FBI, the Treasury Department, the DoJ, the CIA, 
the Office of the DNI, headed since August 2010 by James Clapper, and the NSA. In late 
August and early September Brennan briefed the ‘Gang of Eight’, the top-ranking 
Democratic and Republican leaders in the House and Senate, when he told them 
individually that the agency had evidence that Russia was trying to help Trump win the 
presidency.488 On 17 August Trump and two of his leading campaigners, Michael Flynn 
and New Jersey governor Chris Christie, were also briefed by three top FBI officials at 
their New York offices by Joe Pientka, Kevin Clinesmith and Peter Strzok, all of whom 
would take the lead in investigating and promoting Russiagate. They had been 
investigating Trump as a witness in his own case rather than as a possible president, as 
became evident when a redacted note of the meeting finally appeared in August 2020.489 
As for the gang of eight briefings, there are no notes, but later most participants vocally 
condemned Russian activities. For example, Senator Diane Feinstein, the ranking 
Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, and Adam Schiff, vice-chair of the 
HPSCI, on 22 September warned ‘that Russian intelligence agencies are making serious 
and concerted effort to influence the US election’.490 Schiff would lead the Russiagate 
campaign as well as the impeachment efforts in 2019. Above all, in August the CIA 
reportedly told Obama that Putin not only ordered an election interference campaign but 
did so specifically ‘to help elect … Donald Trump’. The information was so sensitive that 
it was delivered by special courier and Brennan kept it out of the Presidential Daily Brief 
on intelligence matters.491 
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A British intelligence tip-off lit the fuse, but Hannigan’s behaviour is puzzling. 
According to the protocols of Five Eyes (the intelligence-sharing agreement between the 
US, UK, Australia, New Zealand and Canada), Hannigan should have contacted the NSA 
director Mike Rogers, the US counterpart to GCHQ. Rogers was a known Russiagate 
sceptic, unlike Brennan who, in the words of one critical commentator, ‘peddled the 
conspiracy theories of his like-minded European counterparts’.492 Rogers was an Obama 
outsider with poor relations with both Brennan and Clapper, and he later criticised their 
behaviour. Rogers discovered that at least since November 2015 Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) applications had been used inappropriately. Congress enacted 
FISA in 1978 to regulate domestic surveillance for national-security investigations, 
creating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to grant individual warrants 
in domestic intelligence operations. In October 2016 Clapper tried, unsuccessfully, to get 
Rogers fired.493 The NSA was the most sceptical – it turned out correctly – about the 
Russian collusion narrative. Clapper, on the other hand, had already distinguished himself 
in 2003, at the head of the Department of Defence’s National Imagery and Mapping 
Agency, in his dogged insistence that WMD had been found in Iraq, asserting that they 
existed but had ‘unquestionably’ been moved into Syria. 494  In March 2013 Clapper 
testified under oath to the Senate Intelligence Committee that the NSA did not engage in 
the bulk collection of the communications of US citizens, a statement that he later 
admitted was false when Snowden’s files revealed that the NSA had been doing just 
that.495 In his memoirs Clapper asserts that Putin’s interference in the 2016 election was 
‘staggering’ and decisively tilted the result in Trump’s favour.496 
 
Papadopoulos gets caught 
 
In early March 2016 the 28-year-old Papadopoulos was taken on by the Trump campaign 
as a foreign affairs adviser.497 He was interviewed for the post by Sam Clovis, the Trump 
campaign’s national co-chair and chief policy advisor, who declared that improved 
Russian-US relations were a top priority for the Trump team. 498 Papadopoulos was one 
of five advisors on foreign affairs (another was Carter Page), although he had modest 
credentials for such a role.499 While working as a researcher at the Hudson Institute he 
called for an Israeli-Cyprus-Greece energy alliance to exploit Eastern Mediterranean 
resources. He also recommended good relations with Egypt, despite the return of 
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authoritarian governance, and a turn away from Turkey, even though it was a NATO 
member.500  
From the first Papadopoulos was one of the targets of the Mueller investigation, 
with his case handled by the indefatigable Jeannie Rhee. Papadopoulos advanced several 
theories about the ultimate source of his travails. When appointed to the Trump team he 
was working at the London Centre for International Law Practice (LCILP); although he 
observes there was not much law going on there.501 On joining the campaign, Naga 
Khalid Idris, the founder of LCILP, was at first hostile to the idea of Papadopoulos 
working for Trump. According to Papadopoulos, he later reversed his position and 
insisted that Papadopoulos go to a conference at the Link Campus in Rome, an institution 
that is reputed to be the venue for non-classified CIA events and ‘a training ground for 
spies’.502 Arriving in Rome on 12 March, Papadopoulos met professor Joseph Mifsud, a 
former Maltese diplomat and director of the London Academy of Diplomacy (LAD) who 
also had ties with LCILP. Idris introduced Mifsud as a man with vital connections, and 
this is indeed the case. From personal experience I can confirm that Papadopoulos’s 
characterisation is accurate: ‘Mifsud spins himself as a worldly insider, a guy with an I-
have-connections-everywhere arrogance’, offset by ‘flashing warmth’.503  
Mifsud has been accused at various times of working for the Russian, British or 
American intelligence services, and he certainly was a cosmopolitan denizen of a 
transnational world of politics, diplomacy and intelligence. His friend Stephan Roh 
claims that Mifsud was linked to British and American intelligence. 504  The DoJ’s 
inspector general Michael Horowitz conducted two major reviews into Russiagate (see 
below), and footnotes to the second one declassified in April 2020 state that the FBI 
could find no record of Mifsud as a confidential human source (CHS) and neither could 
the requested searches from other US security agencies.505 However, there are attested 
links with British intelligence, in particular through Claire Smith of the Joint Intelligence 
Committee and Britain’s Security Vetting panel, with whom he had worked at the Link 
University in Rome.506 Soon after the story became public Mifsud disappeared. A Times 
profile suggested that he was a Potemkin village comprised of honorary professorships, 
loss-making ‘diplomatic academies’, and the name-dropping of prominent political 
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figures with whom he claimed to have worked.507 In fact, Mifsud is a complex individual 
driven by an abiding concern for a united and peaceful Europe from Lisbon to 
Vladivostok, and thus sought to overcome the new cold war.  
That evening Mifsud turned the conversation to Russia, although Papadopoulos 
had no expertise or even interest in the country. Papadopoulos would soon learn that 
while he may not have been interested in Russia, others certainly were, and he became a 
pawn in a web of intrigue intended to tar the Trump campaign with the brush of 
collusion. Mifsud promised to facilitate a meeting between Trump and Putin, and on 14 
March Papadopoulos sent a triumphant email to Clovis about his networking success.508 
Back in London Mifsud emailed Papadopoulos to set up a meeting with ‘somebody very 
important’. Strangely, Idris already knew the identity of the ‘important’ person – none 
other than Putin’s ‘niece’. On 24 March they had lunch at the Grange Holborn Hotel, 
where he was introduced to an ‘attractive, fashionably dressed young woman with dirty 
blonde hair’ by the name of Olga Vinogradova (earlier reports name her as Olga 
Polonskaya). She barely spoke English, and Papadopoulos noticed ‘a big, burly, bald guy 
in a leather jacket and jeans keeping a casual gaze on Olga’. The occasion was ‘another 
opportunity for Mifsud to spin dreams of deal-making with Russia’.509 In the following 
weeks Papadopoulos exchanged emails with Vinogradova about a possible summit, 
although by now her English had become fluent. Even Papadopoulos suspected that she 
was not all that she made herself out to be, doubts reinforced by the fact that Putin has no 
niece by this or any other name. 
On 31 March Papadopoulos attended the first meeting of Trump’s foreign policy 
team at the Trump International Hotel (the Old Post Office) in Washington. He told 
Trump that he had met people in Europe ‘who are eager to set up a meeting for you with 
Russia’. Trump asked Sessions for his opinion and he responded: ‘It’s a good idea. We 
should look into this’.510 Papadopoulos then worked to set up a top-level summit, despite 
a prescient warning from Page (who had not attended the 31 March meeting) to ‘Be very 
careful about talking about Russia’.511 Perhaps Page had an intimation of his own fate 
when he was identified by Steele as the intermediary between the campaign and Russian 
officials keen to see Trump in the White House. On 18 April Mifsud introduced 
Papadopoulos by email to Ivan Timofeev, programme director at the Russian 
International Affairs Council (RIAC). On 25 April Timofeev told Papadopoulos in an 
email that he had discussed the plan for a meeting with Igor Ivanov, RIAC’s president 
and Russia’s foreign minister between 1998 and 2004, but they agreed that protocols 
needed to be observed. While Trump had an open invitation by Putin to meet when he 
was ready, they would make no moves until a more senior figure went through the 
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appropriate channels.512 Timofeev acted with professionalism and integrity, unlike many 
others for whom Russia was the foil against which a conspiracy was woven.513 
On 26 April Papadopoulos enjoyed a breakfast meeting with Mifsud at the Andaz 
Hotel near Liverpool Street station. Mifsud had recently returned from a meeting of the 
Valdai International Discussion Club, and apparently made the epochal statement that is 
at the core of the Russiagate investigation. He is alleged to have told Papadopoulos that 
he had met top officials in Moscow and that they had obtained ‘dirt’ on Clinton: the 
Russians ‘had emails of Clinton. They have thousands of emails’.514 It was never clear 
what emails were in question – Clinton’s deleted emails, or less likely those (not yet) 
taken from the DNC and Clinton staffers. The Mueller report describes the Valdai Club 
as ‘close to Russia’s foreign policy establishment’, which is true; but it is unlikely that at 
an event of this kind anyone would have offered ‘dirt’ on Clinton.515 In an interview with 
Jake Tapper on CNN on 7 September 2018, Papadopoulos argued that Mifsud simply 
stated that he had access to emails, but did not ask whether he [Papadopoulos] or the 
Trump campaign wanted them. Mifsud has since disappeared, but before doing so he 
denied ever making such a statement.516 The Mueller investigators are scathing about 
Papadopoulos’s reliability as a witness and accuse him of repeatedly lying (above all 
about the timing of his meetings with Mifsud), and although he was their first successful 
prosecution they were frustrated: ‘Papadopoulos represented a promising door that just 
couldn’t be nudged open’.517 
Papadopoulos first came to public attention through an interview with the London 
Times on 4 May, in which he castigated the British prime minister, David Cameron, for 
calling Trump’s policies ‘divisive, stupid and wrong’ and allegedly called on him to 
apologise, otherwise the ‘special relationship’ would be damaged.518 At this point matters 
become even more intriguing. On 3 May Papadopoulos met his friend Christian Cantor, 
the chief of the political department at the Israeli embassy in London, who introduced 
him to his girlfriend, Erika Thompson. She happened to work as a senior adviser to 
Alexander Downer, Australia’s High Commissioner to the UK between 2014 and 2018. 
Downer had been Australia’s longest-serving foreign minister (1996-2007) and in that 
capacity was responsible for the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) and 
cooperated closely with the Five Eyes group. After leaving politics in 2008 he joined 
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Hakluyt & Co., a secretive private intelligence agency run by former MI6 operatives. He 
resigned from the agency when he was appointed High Commissioner, but apparently 
continued to attend agency functions. Like Steele’s Orbis Business Intelligence, these 
companies do business that formal state agencies prefer to outsource to ensure what the 
CIA calls ‘plausible deniability’. 
Downer professed interest in the work that Papadopoulos was doing on 
Mediterranean oil and gas reserves, and on that basis Cantor arranged for the three to 
meet in the Kensington Wine Rooms on 10 May (there is now a plaque to mark the 
occasion). Papadopoulos later wrote: ‘In the space of less than an hour, a promising, 
well-intentioned adventure will turn into a long-running nightmare that will destroy my 
career, my finances, and strain relations with the people I care about the most’. 519 
According to Papadopoulos, Downer was ‘oozing aggression’, condemning his 
comments about Cameron, his policy recommendations about Cyprus energy policy and 
Turkey, and admitted that he was a ‘big fan’ of Hillary Clinton. Then Downer claimed 
that Papadopoulos told him that ‘the Russians have a surprise or some damaging material 
related to Hillary Clinton’. Papadopoulos claims that ‘I have no memory of this. None, 
Zero. Nada’.520 Other versions have it that Papadopoulos told Downer that the Russians 
had hacked Clinton’s computers and would use the information against her. According to 
Downer, Papadopoulos claimed that Mifsud had told him that Russia had acquired 
‘thousands’ of emails hacked from the personal server used by Clinton when she was 
secretary of state, the publication of which would damage her presidential campaign. 
Papadopoulos insists that he never said anything of the sort and made no mention of 
hacking in the short meeting. He did mention that he had met Mifsud on a business trip to 
Rome, who asserted that he had ‘dirt’ on Clinton; but there was no mention of hacking in 
his conversation with Downer and Thompson. Papadopoulos insists that he was being 
circumspect since he suspected that the conversation was being recorded on Downer’s 
mobile phone, a suspicion that he later relayed to the FBI. Downer reported the 
conversation to the Australian foreign ministry, which after a two-month delay forwarded 
the information to Washington.  
The brief encounter between Papadopoulos and Downer ostensibly served as the 
basis for the FBI on 31 July 2016 to launch the counter-intelligence investigation into 
Russia’s interference in the US election and the FISA warrants against Carter Page. 
Information about Papadopoulos relayed by the Australian and British authorities ‘so 
alarmed American officials to provoke the FBI to open a counterintelligence 
investigation into the Trump campaign months before the presidential election’.521 The 
point is crucial, because it allows federal prosecutors and Mueller to argue that it was not 
the Steele dossier, now largely discredited, that was the initial source of the Russia 
investigation but the Papadopoulos information. However, the Papadopoulos information 
is no more substantial than the Steele dossier, and in some ways more troubling. Downer 
did not initially think much of what Papadopoulos allegedly told him at their meeting on 
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10 May, but it was only when the DNC emails were published by WikiLeaks on 22 July 
that he went to the US embassy in London and reported the two-month-old conversation 
to Elizabeth Dibble, the chargé d’affaires (the ambassador, Matthew Barzun, was on 
holiday at the time). State Department official Dibble immediately reported the 
information to the FBI, and the Russiagate machine was set in motion. It is not clear why 
Downer waited so long, especially since the theft of the DNC emails had become public 
knowledge by 15 June, yet he waited another five weeks. 
The matter did not end there. On 15 July Papadopoulos was contacted by Sergei 
Millian (real name Siarhei Kukuts), a native of Belarus who at the time was the 38-year-
old head of the obscure New York-based Russian-American Chamber of Commerce. 
Millian has been identified as both Source D and E in the Steele dossier, although 
logically he cannot be both, as well as being the source of the pee tape story.522  Millian 
claimed a close relationship with Trump, although the two were barely acquainted. 
Above all, Millian appears to have been the source of Steele’s fundamental claim that 
there ‘was a well-developed conspiracy of cooperation between [Trump] and the Russian 
leadership’ involving Manafort and Page.523 Meeting a few days later at the Andaz Hotel 
in New York, Millian steered the conversation towards Russia, but by now Papadopoulos 
was cautious, especially since the Trump campaign had made it clear that it was 
‘lukewarm about connecting with Russia’.524 Millian may well have been some sort of 
‘state intelligence asset’, but it is not clear on whose side he was on.525 According to 
Strzok, he was definitely not ‘directed by the FBI’. 526 
On 2 September 2016 Papadopoulos was contacted by Stefan Halper, born an 
American but who had long been domiciled in the UK. Halper worked as an adviser to 
Nixon and Reagan and was the former son-in-law of Ray Cline, one of the CIA’s lead 
analysts during the Cuban Missile crisis in October 1962. Halper now worked as a 
Cambridge University professor and by all accounts was still associated with American 
security agencies as well as being active in the Cambridge Security Initiative run by Sir 
Richard Dearlove, the head of MI6 from 1999 to 2004.527 Apparently, Halper was known 
to MI6 as ‘The Walrus’, because of his portly gait. After a dinner hosted by the Initiative 
in February 2014 attended by Flynn, then head of the DIA, concerns were raised (and 
reported to American intelligence) about his contact at the event with Svetlana Lokhova, 
a Russian-born specialist in Soviet intelligence and espionage at Cambridge University. 
The false allegation was circulated that Flynn had an affair with Lokhova on the orders of 
Russian intelligence. Not surprisingly, Lokhova later sued. At an event hosted by 
Dearlove on 11 July 2016 Halper had his first contact with Carter Page, just three days 
after the latter’s return from Moscow. 528  The conference was organised by Stephen 
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Schrage, a former State Department official who was then Halper’s PhD student.529 He 
notes that in the last session on 12 July Dearlove ‘went far off the script’ and lambasted 
Trump as a national security threat in front of the Trump advisor, and that after a 
discussion with Dearlove Halper suddenly became very interested in Page.530 Lokhova 
claims that Halper (whom she dubs ‘The Spider’) from September 2015 was at the centre 
of a dark web of intrigue against Trump and one of the main instigators of the Russiagate 
conspiracy. Flynn was one of the first targets, and Papadopoulos another. 531 Amidst 
allegations that there was a Russian conspiracy in Cambridge, Halper and Dearlove quit 
the seminar that hosted Flynn because of ‘unacceptable Russian influences’.532 Like the 
Cambridge spy ring of the 1930s, it may take decades before the full story is revealed. 
By now Papadopoulos was short of funds, so he accepted Halper’s invitation to 
return to the UK to discuss a research paper on Mediterranean oil, with an honorarium of 
$3,000. The much put-upon Papadopoulos believes that he was the subject of an FBI 
sting operation to extract information from Trump campaign officials. In September an 
investigator working for the US intelligence community going by the name of Azra Turk 
(the pseudonym can hardly be bettered, especially when dealing with a Turkophobe like 
Papadopoulos) posed as a Halper’s research assistant and met him for a drink on 
Papadopoulos’ arrival in London on 15 September. In his account, she was ‘a vision right 
out of central casting for a spy flick. She’s a sexy bottle blonde in her thirties, and she 
isn’t shy about showing her curves – as if anyone could miss them’. Within five minutes 
she directly asked him ‘are we working for Russia?’.533 He saw Turk three times: in the 
bar, over dinner, and then once with Halper. Papadopoulos felt that something was amiss, 
and thus refused her blandishments. He suspected that she tried to ‘seduce’ him to ‘make 
me slip up and say something that they knew I had no info on’.534 At their meeting, 
Halper pressed Papadopoulos on Trump campaign links with Russia, asking leading 
questions such as ‘It’s great that Russia is helping you and the campaign, right, 
George?’.535 Hardly subtle, but possibly effective. Papadopoulos believes that Halper 
contacted him as part of the already-started FBI Russia-Trump investigation. Halper also 
arranged a meeting, using a similar pretext, with Page, and grilled him on alleged Trump-
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Russia links. The investigation led by Horowitz later examined the role of informants in 
Russiagate.  
By then Papadopoulos’s political career was over. He was dismissed from the 
Trump team in early October 2016 following the adverse criticism generated by an 
interview he gave to the Russian news agency Interfax in which he called for an end to 
sanctions, which in his view had only turned Russia towards China. He assumed the 
Kissinger line that ‘It is not in the interests of the West to align China and Russia in a 
geopolitical alliance that can have unpredictable consequences for US interests’.536 By 
now Papadopoulos was angry and identified the source of his woes: 
 
The deep state is the movement of anti-Trump operatives in America’s three 
branches of government who have been working against Donald Trump, his 
campaign, and his administration to strip it of authority. These operatives are 
government employees loyal to Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. They are 
hellbent on playing politics and using the tools of the state – politically driven 
investigations, rubber-stamped FISA warrants, leaked memos and legal 
documents – as well as planted stories in the press and social media to wage war 
on Trump, his team, and the Republican Party. 537 
 
Papadopoulos’ travails were not over. In October he once again met up with Millian, who 
Papadopoulos suspects was wearing a bugging device while asking provocative 
questions. 538 On 24 January 2017 the Wall Street Journal reported that Millian was the 
source behind the Steele dossier, including the compromising Moscow hotel sex tape.  
On 27 January the FBI finally appeared in person, pounding on the door of his 
mother’s home in Chicago. Papadopoulos was questioned by agents who like Turk, 
Halper and others asked ‘Now, let’s talk about Russian interference. Who in the 
campaign knew about interference?’. As in the previous encounters, Papadopoulos claims 
that he had no idea what they were talking about. 539 They repeatedly asked about the 
precise timeline of meetings with Mifsud, Downer, Millian, Turk and Halper, and without 
his computer or calendar to hand, discrepancies in dates were enough for the FBI to claim 
that he deceived them. According to Strzok, Papdopoulos lied about the timeline, extent 
and character of relations with Mifsud and the other Russians associated with him.540 In a 
second interview a few weeks later Papdopoulos declared that he was willing to 
cooperate, but soon after he deactivated a Facebook account that Strzok claims ‘he had 
used to communicate directly with the Russians’.541 Mueller later indicted him for lying – 
in particular over when he met Mifsud, which Papadopolous stated took place a fortnight 
earlier than in reality. As Papadopoulos notes, there is ‘a difference between having a 
faulty memory and actively lying’, but not ‘when you are dealing with the FBI’.542 The 
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story does not end there. In March 2017 Papadopoulos was contacted by the US-Israeli 
dual citizen Charles Tawil with alleged links to US intelligence and invited to Israel and 
given $10,000 for research on energy issues. Papadopoulos was suspicious about the 
money and deposited it with his lawyer in Greece before returning to the US, whereupon 
he was arrested as his flight from Munich landed in Dulles (Washington DC) on 27 July. 
Papadopoulos feared that the FBI planned to catch him with $10,000 in undeclared cash, 
and when he appeared before House committees he asked whether the money consisted 
of marked bills originating with the FBI. 
Papadopoulos was arraigned on 28 July, and charged with lying to the FBI about 
the timing of certain events (the meeting with Mifsud), an issue of no consequence in 
itself but which, according to Mueller, ‘hindered investigators’ ability to effectively 
question Mifsud’ when he was interviewed in the lobby of a Washington hotel on 10 
February 2017.543 In the interview and a follow-up email from Mifsud sent a few hours 
later he denied any advance knowledge of Russian hacking, and the FBI did not press the 
issue. Mifsud insisted that his contacts with Papadopoulos were entirely innocuous and 
academic in character, dealing mostly with geopolitical issues and how a new cold war 
could be averted.544 The next day Mifsud left the US and disappeared. The Mueller 
indictment nevertheless asserted that Papadopoulos had obtained advance information 
about the alleged Russian hacking of the DNC and Clinton campaign computers. 
Papadopoulos was the first of the Trump team to plead guilty in Mueller’s investigation, 
confessing to making a ‘material false statement’ to the FBI about his contacts in the 27 
January FBI interview. Prosecutors argued that Papadopoulos had caused irreparable 
damage to the investigation after allegedly repeatedly lying, causing the FBI to fail to 
interview a key witness. He reached a plea deal with Mueller on 5 October 2017 and after 
a year of cooperation, on 7 September 2018, Papadopoulos confessed to a crime that he 
insists he did not commit. 545  He was sentenced to 14 days in jail, 200 hours of 
community service, and a $9,000 fine, but was pardoned by Trump in December 2020. 
Papadopoulos played only a small and brief part in the Trump campaign, yet the case is 
pivotal to the Russiagate allegations.546 
 
A theory of conspiracy 
 
In an interview with Martha MacCallum of Fox News on 19 September 2018, 
Papadopoulos argued that the meddling was not so much by the Russians as by the 
Australian and British authorities. 547  He accused the FBI and British intelligence of 
persecuting him as part of a plan to derail the Trump campaign and presidency. 
Papadopoulos believes that he was the victim of an entrapment campaign, since all three 
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– Cantor, Downer and Thompson – had made clear their anti-Trump views, and 
Downer’s request to met him was particularly suspicious. Papadopoulos believes that 
‘these people  were looking for a way to find evidence of collusion by planting a false 
flag story – that the Russians had dirt on Clinton – and then tracking the campaign to see 
who pursued the phony story’.548 Papadopoulos considered that he was ‘the lynchpin of 
their conspiracy case’.549 He certainly came under pressure from the FBI, realising that 
‘I’m facing five years in prison for lies I don’t remember making, and twenty years for 
obstruction because I followed my lawyer’s advice and deleted my Facebook account’.550 
Papadopoulos had not told campaign members about Mifsud’s claim, no ‘matter how 
much Robert Mueller and his team of FBI agents and prosecutors wished I had’.551 In his 
view, ‘The Mueller Investigation needs convictions, not just for public relations purposes 
but as a scare tactic for future suspects and people of interest’.552 He was right at least in 
that respect, since the Mueller team made no secret of their ambition of getting 
Papadopoulos to ‘flip’ and testify against others. 
Downer played a critical role in launching what was to become the FBI’s 
Crossfire Hurricane investigation.553 However, when McCabe was asked by the HPSCI 
why the FISA warrant in October 2016 was requested only for Carter Page and not for 
the man on which the Trump investigation was predicated, he answered ‘Papadopoulos’s 
comment didn’t particularly indicate that he was the person that had had – that was 
interacting with the Russians’.554 In other words, even the FBI did not think that he had 
serious contact with Russians. Papadopoulos appeared to be the trump card in Mueller’s 
prosecution of the collusion case, but in fact it demonstrates the opposite. Mueller’s 
sentencing memo claimed that Papadopoulos ‘did not provide “substantial assistance”’ 
during his interviews in August and September 2017, but Papadopoulos insisted that ‘I 
did my best … and offered what I knew’. This is hardly surprising, since Papadopoulos 
had not achieved much during his brief tenure as a campaign adviser, with the Trump 
campaign rebuffing his attempts to set up meetings with Russian officials. Papadopoulos 
insists that ‘I never met with a single Russian official in my life’. Papadopoulos was 
blamed by Mueller for having impeded the FBI’s investigation into Mifsud, although 
Papadopoulos had voluntarily provided information about his contact with the professor – 
in other words, Papadopoulos refused to accept that he had lied about Mifsud, only 
conceding that he had made misleading statements about being a member of the Trump 
campaign when he first met Mifsud.555  
As for contacts with Russia, in response to a misleading article in the Washington 
Post on 15 August 2017, which tried to prove ‘Russian meddling’, Timofeev issued a 
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detailed rebuttal. He admitted that Papadopoulos contacted RIAC in spring 2016 in the 
form of unofficial emails suggesting a possible visit to Russia by Trump. Following 
normal protocols RIAC requested an official ‘enquiry’ (the technical term for such a 
visit) to test the seriousness of the initiative. No response was received, and that was the 
end of the matter.556 RIAC was doing what it was set up to do – to foster dialogue and 
analysis. The attempt to turn this into some sort of conspiracy demonstrates the pervasive 
lack of knowledge about Russian institutions and the insubstantiality of many Russiagate 
allegations. 
Papadopoulos certainly believes that he was the subject of an extended 
entrapment scheme, beginning in March 2016 when he announced that he was joining the 
Trump team to his colleagues at the LCILP. He calls it a ‘strange operation’ since there 
appeared to be no law going on, and suspects that it was an intelligence front.557 The 
initial response to Papadopoulos joining the Trump campaign was hostile, but soon after 
he was invited by the director to a three-day conference at the Link campus in Rome, 
where he was introduced to Mifsud, and the byzantine story develops from there. Out of 
the blue he was contacted by the Cambridge academic Stefan Halper, an old CIA hand, 
and questioned about Russia. A mysterious Belarusian-American Sergei Millian offers 
him a secret $30,000 per month PR job but only if he continues working for Trump. The 
Israeli-American businessman Charles Tawil buys him lunch in Illinois, and they go 
clubbing together in Mykonos, and then Tawil flies Papadopoulos to Israel where he 
gives him $10,000 in cash, money that the suspicious Papadopoulos leaves with a lawyer 
in Thessaloniki. Flying back to the US in July 2017, he is surrounded by a squad of FBI 
agents when changing planes, and as they go through his bags it dawns on him that they 
are looking for the money. In a dishevelled state, he is hauled before a judge and warned 
that he faces 25 years in prison on charges of obstruction and lying to the FBI. 
Papadopoulos was ‘caught up in the biggest scandal to rock American politics since 
Watergate’ in his view because ‘the deep state of former Obama and Clinton-loving 
lawmen’ aimed to kill three birds with one stone: to protect the US-Turkish power 
relationship; to ‘cripple the Trump campaign and administration to prevent any warming 
of relations between the United States and Russia’; and to send a message to the Trump 
team, thus ‘sowing chaos and distrust inside and outside of the administration’.558 The 
purpose of the whole exercise was to stop Trump, and it is ‘a story of abuse of power and 
prosecutorial overreach’.559 
The murky details of the Papadopoulos affair may one day be exposed, but for 
now we have to make sense of what we have. One of the main interpretations is that 
Brennan’s CIA was the main driver working with Clapper’s DNI while using the hapless 
Comey and colluding with foreign intelligence services.560 The motive was high-minded 
– to prevent the election of someone they believed represented a danger to the republic 
and its allies. If this version is correct, then Russia was collateral damage. Rather than 
demonstrating ‘a Russian operation that was more aggressive and widespread than 
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previously known’, 561  the Papadopoulos case reveals how Russia was mobilised by 
contending domestic groups. Already in late July 2018 Nunes, the HPSCI chair, 
expressed confidence ‘that once the American people see these 20 pages [the classified 
part of the FISA application to bug Carter Page] … they will be shocked by what’s in that 
FISA application’.562 To get to the bottom of the matter, on 17 September 2018 Trump 
called for the immediate declassification of all Russiagate documents. However, those 
called upon to do the declassifying were precisely those whose activities would be 
revealed. Pressure from the DoJ and the intelligence community, home and abroad, 
forced Trump on 21 September to retract his order. Trump revealed that ‘key allies’ had 
asked for the documents not to be released. In a tweet, Papadopoulos asserted that these 
‘allies’ were the Australian and British governments. The Wall Street Journal on 24 
September 2018 admitted as much when it wrote ‘As for the allies, sometimes US 
democratic accountability has to take precedence over the potential embarrassment of 
British intelligence’. This implies that three of the Five Eyes states may have been part of 
a potentially criminal intelligence operation to sabotage the campaign of an American 
presidential candidate. They believed they were acting for the public good, but deception 
always demands its own price.  
 
Crossfire Hurricane  
 
Shortly after dropping the investigation into Clinton’s emails, on 31 July 2016 Comey 
started an investigation into the Trump campaign’s links with Russia, codenamed 
Crossfire Hurricane. It was an investigation in its own right as well as a portmanteau for 
four related sub-investigations into Carter Page, Paul Manafort, George Papadopoulos 
and, above all, Michael Flynn. The matter was opened as a counter-intelligence 
investigation, but it was also potentially a criminal investigation.563 Above all, it appears 
that Trump himself was the object of the investigation, and not just his campaign or later 
his administration. The decision ranks as one of the most important in American 
intelligence history. Seldom if ever has the FBI investigated a presidential campaign 
while the battle was in full flood, but the stakes could not have been higher: ‘whether a 
major political campaign had conspired with a foreign enemy to throw the outcome of a 
presidential election’.564  
Although the probe was kept secret, the charge of political bias inevitably 
arises.565 When the document opening the enquiry was finally published in May 2020, 
suspicions were reinforced by the flimsy predicate for the case and the unprofessional 
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construction of the FBI Electronic Communication (EC) itself.566 Instead of complete 
‘from’ and ‘to’ lines in the EC, only the ‘from’ line was filled: from the FBI’s 
counterintelligence division with Strzok listed as the contact. The EC was also drafted by 
Strzok, and then approved by Strzok, an absurdity that violated normal FBI procedures. 
The names in the ‘cc’ line were redacted, but Strzok’s was listed at the end (for some 
reason he sent the message to himself), with more senior people listed first if normal 
protocols were observed. These people are likely to have been FBI director Comey, his 
deputy McCabe and counterintelligence assistant director Bill Priestap. 567 The intensity 
of concern over Russia as the new cold war intensified fed back into American domestic 
politics to create an atmosphere where unsubstantiated intelligence leads were magnified 
by domestic political polarisation. 
An investigation was launched by an incumbent administration into the legal 
opposition, and it did so with the aid of obscure and rarely used statutes. Crossfire 
Hurricane was opened as a FARA investigation, which involves a criminal violation of 
the 1938 law requiring registration with the US government for work or services on 
behalf of a foreign country. The law had been amended in 1966 to tighten disclosure 
requirements about lobbying on behalf of foreign governments. Before Russiagate FARA 
suits had been extremely rare, with only seven criminal prosecutions and three 
convictions in the half century from 1965 to 2015. Aware of civil liberties issues, the DoJ 
encouraged ‘people doing work for covered foreign powers or entities to comply with the 
law, not to indict them for failure to do so’.568 The EC does not explain why the FBI 
believed that individuals associated with the Trump presidential campaign had been 
engaged by a foreign government to work on its behalf. As we shall see, Flynn (who 
became Trump’s short-lived national security adviser) had been hired by the Turkish 
government, and a separate counterintelligence case was opened against him on 9 
August. However, this was not mentioned in this EC. Instead, it quoted verbatim from the 
email received on 29 July from the US embassy in London about the information 
provided two days earlier by Downer, in which he reported on his conversation in the 
London bar with Papadopoulos. Downer ‘suggested the Trump team had received some 
kind of suggestion from Russia that it could assist this process with the anonymous 
release of information that would be damaging to Mrs Clinton (and President Obama)’. 
This was all rather nebulous, but Strzok jumped to the conclusion that Papadopoulos and 
possibly others had been engaged by Russia to act as foreign agents on its behalf. Downer 
himself was cautious, warning in his report that it was ‘unclear whether he or the 
Russians were referring to material acquired publicly of [sic] through other means’. It 
was also ‘unclear’ how the Trump campaign had reacted to the Russian offer, and 
irrespective of the Trump team’s reaction the Russians would probably do whatever they 
planned to do with the information ‘with or without Mr Trump’s cooperation’.  
In his conclusion Strzok does not mention Papadopoulos and instead writes that 
Crossfire Hurricane was opened to examine whether ‘individual(s) associated with the 
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Trump campaign are witting of and/or coordinating activities with the Government of 
Russia’. This was all very vague and based on a prejudice that Russia may have been up 
to something and that the Trump campaign may have been complicit. As a former FBI 
assistant director of intelligence notes, ‘No reasonable FBI counterintelligence squad 
supervisor in the field would have approved and opened that Strzok EC. They know the 
rules too well’. He goes on to argue 
 
Instead, the nation was left with an investigation of a presidential campaign that 
had no legitimate predication; that spawned a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act intercept of a US citizen that had no legitimate predication; that resulted in a 
confrontation with a new administration’s national security adviser that had no 
legitimate predication; and, finally, that led to an expansive special counsel 
investigation that had no legitimate predication. No pattern-recognition software 
needed here.569 
 
The fundamental question remains: why did the FBI open the investigation? Was this an 
investigation in search of a crime? We now know that the Papadopoulos information 
from Downer was crucial, and according to Strzok ‘provided the sole basis. Period’. He 
insists that when the investigation was opened Steele ‘was completely unknown to 
me’.570 There is no formal mention in the EC of the Steele dossier, but we know that the 
first memo was already available to the FBI (although not necessarily to the investigators 
dealing with the case). The security services were inclined to believe that the Trump 
campaign would be susceptible to Russian influence, and that was because of the revival 
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THE STEELE DOSSIER  
 
 
Hillary Clinton’s defeat at the hands of someone with no political or military experience 
aggravated an already deeply polarised American public. Some sort of external factor 
was sought to explain Trump’s election, an endeavour aggravated because of Trump’s 
obdurate insistence, at the rhetorical level at least, that it made sense to have good 
relations with Russia. Clinton herself labelled Russian purported actions as 
‘unprecedented’.571 She argues ‘We can’t understand what happened in 2016 without 
confronting the audacious information warfare waged from the Kremlin’. She also noted 
Comey’s intervention, the hostile media and the ‘deep currents of anger and resentment 
flowing through our culture’.572 She quotes, evidently with approbation, that Trump’s 
presidency ‘was not legitimate because of the mounting evidence of Russian interference 
in the election’.573 At the heart of this was the Steele dossier. 
 
The Steele dossier 
 
The dossier prepared by the former British intelligence agent Christopher Steele is one of 
the foundation stones of the Russian collusion narrative.574 Steele joined MI6 in 1986 and 
was posted to Moscow in 1990 before being expelled in 1993. He returned to London, 
and following various postings headed the Russia desk from 2006. In that capacity he 
was former FSB agent Alexander Litvinenko’s handler in London and was then in charge 
of the MI6 investigation into his poisoning in November of that year. Steele retired in 
2009, apparently believing that further promotion within the service would be blocked.575 
Then, with another former MI6 officer Chris Burrows, he established the investigative 
research firm Orbis Business Intelligence. Following Russia’s successful bid to host the 
2018 FIFA World Cup (and England’s miserable failure, winning only one other 
country’s support), the British, who had hitherto supported the head of FIFA, Sepp 
Blatter, now demanded his head.576 Steele took the lead in investigating alleged FIFA 
corruption. The US was also miffed at having lost out to Qatar in its bid to host the 2022 
event. It was during joint work on this sports corruption scandal that Steele forged close 
links with the FBI.577 In February 2016, when he was in contact with the deputy attorney 
general (the No. 4 man at the DoJ), Bruce Ohr, Steele emailed a private client a Russian 
Leadership Report making the provocative claim that ‘Russian leader Vladimir Putin 
 
571 Hillary Rodham Clinton, What Happened (London, Simon & Schuster, 2017), p. 356. 
572 Clinton, What Happened, p. xii. 
573 Clinton, What Happened, p. 3. 
574 Taken as authoritative by Luke Harding, Collusion: How Russia Helped Trump Win the White 
House (London, Guardian Faber Publishing, 2017). 
575 Miller, The Apprentice, p. 78. 
576 Reported on BBC News, 29 May 2015. 





might be losing his grip on power’. This flew in the face of the evidence and drew on the 
same sort of dubious sources that he would use later.578 
The private intelligence dossier compiled by Steele consists of 17 separate memos 
comprising 35 pages in total, with the first dated 20 June and the last published on 13 
December 2016. Technically, it is not a dossier at all, but a compendium of individual 
intelligence memos. Claimed sources included people inside Russia as well as ‘field 
operatives’ outside the country.579  The version published online by BuzzFeed on 10 
January 2017 is mostly in chronological order, and takes the form of photocopied pages, 
including sections highlighted in yellow, reflecting the fact that this was a personal 
copy.580 Various agencies and people had some but not all copies, and therefore ‘the 
dissemination of Steele’s information was a confusing mess’.581 The tone is that of an 
official intelligence report, with surnames in capital letters, and each memo containing a 
Summary followed by Detail. The informants are given as letters of the alphabet, and 
often described as a ‘source close to the Kremlin’; in other words, unidentified Russian 
originators. As the journalist Luke Harding, who has written a book on the subject, 
admits: ‘normally an intelligence officer would debrief sources directly, but since Steele 
could no longer visit Russia, this had to be done by others, or in third countries’.582 Or, 
we might add, not at all. 
The Steele material is inflammatory and propounds ‘a conspiracy of vast 
proportions’.583  The first memo begins with the startling assertion that the ‘Russian 
regime has been cultivating, supporting and assisting Trump for at least five years’, and 
that Trump accepted ‘a regular flow of intelligence from the Kremlin’. The aim ‘endorsed 
by Putin, has been to encourage splits and divisions in western alliance’. In words that 
have been repeated ad nauseam, the goal was ‘to sow discord and disunity both within 
the US itself, but more especially within the Transatlantic alliance which was viewed as 
inimical to Russian interests’. Trump was allegedly offered ‘various sweetener real estate 
deals’, although he declined them, but ‘his inner circle have accepted a regular flow of 
intelligence from the Kremlin, including on his Democratic and other political rivals’. 
The FSB had allegedly ‘compromised Trump sufficiently to be able to blackmail him’, 
including through ‘perverted sexual acts’. These were detailed as ‘hiring the presidential 
suite of the Ritz Carlton Hotel, where he knew President and Mrs Obama (whom he 
hated) had stayed on one of their official visits to Moscow, and defiling the bed where 
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they had slept by employing a number of prostitutes to perform a “golden showers” 
(urination) show in front of him’. The Russian intelligence services had also allegedly 
collated a dossier of compromising material on Clinton, controlled personally by the 
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov.584 
The memos continue in this vein. The second report warned that ‘Russia has an 
extensive programme of state-sponsored offensive cyber operations’, with the FSB often 
using ‘coercion and blackmail to recruit most capable cyber operatives in Russia’.585 The 
third report was the most explicit in alleging collusion, noting ‘Further evidence of 
extensive conspiracy between Trump’s campaign team and Kremlin, sanctioned at 
highest levels and involving Russian diplomatic staff based in the US’. The ‘well-
developed conspiracy of co-operation’ was allegedly managed on the Trump side by the 
Republican candidate’s campaign manager Paul Manafort, using foreign policy adviser 
Carter Page and others as intermediaries’. A Trump associate allegedly admitted that the 
‘Kremlin [was] behind recent appearance of DNC e-mails on WikiLeaks, as means of 
maintaining plausible deniability’. The collaboration had been conducted ‘with the full 
knowledge and support of Trump and senior members of his campaign team’. In return 
Trump allegedly ‘agreed to sideline Russian intervention in Ukraine as a campaign 
issue’, as well as diverting attention away from ‘Trump’s business dealings in China’. 
The issue was repeated several times, although the alleged Chinese connection was never 
pursued by the media or investigators.586  
Other allegations will be examined later, but a few points already stand out. First, 
the text is at the root of everything that followed, and its language was used to press the 
master-charges of collusion and hacking. Second, there is no definite evidence for the 
charges, which cite ‘high-ranking’ Russian officials as the source, with no opportunity for 
cross-checking. Nigel West (the pen name of former MP Rupert Allason), an espionage 
expert, already in January 2017 noted that ‘there is … a strong possibility that all Steele’s 
material has been fabricated’. He identified some major errors. Eleven people are cited in 
the dossier as unnamed sources, with seven assigned an alphabetic code, but one source 
(‘E’) was treated as an expert in three entirely different fields, beginning as a middle 
manager at the Ritz Carlton in Moscow, then described as an expert on cyber warfare, 
and later as an expert on money-laundering. In addition, a non-existent Russian consulate 
in Miami was mentioned.587 Third, despite allegedly having sources in the Kremlin, it 
was only after WikiLeaks published the DNC that Steele first mentioned them. In other 
words, in this case and others material was drawn from press reports and social media 
chatter rather than from highly placed sources, Fourth, the credulity with which the 
material was received by leading officials, politicians and journalists is disturbing. The 
unverified material was eagerly used to reinforce prejudices and to serve political 
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purposes, a deception whose shamelessness in an earlier age would have discredited the 
perpetrators.588 Fifth, the provenance of the reports and the uses to which they were put is 
crucial. In essence, beginning life as opposition analysis on various potential presidential 
candidates, from June 2016 the research was commissioned by Fusion GPS and was paid 
for by the Clinton campaign (which must by any standard cast doubt on its impartiality), 
especially when it was used by the FBI in its Trump investigations.  
The written account by deputy assistant secretary of state Kathleen Kavalec of her 
meeting with Steele on 11 October 2016 describes how he admitted that his research was 
political and faced an election-day deadline. Her account reveals an attempt to ‘frame’ 
the future president by tarring him with the brush of collusion with Russia.589 Kavalec 
was sceptical from the start, noting that there is no Russian consulate in Miami. Even less 
credibly, Steele told Kavalec that two of his insider Kremlin sources were Vladislav 
Surkov and Vyacheslav Trubnikov. Surkov was known as the Kremlin’s ‘grey cardinal’ 
and had been deputy head of the presidential administration responsible for domestic 
politics up to December 2011, but mistakenly staked on a second term for Medvedev and 
by 2016 had been relegated to an advisory position on the Donbass and other regional 
conflicts. Trubnikov was SVR director from 1996 to 2000 and thereafter held several 
senior diplomatic posts. It is unlikely that either would have access to the Kremlin’s 
secrets; and if they did, they would not have told Steele’s informants. This is where we 
enter the world of double-bluff: were they feeding information ‘to have the West believe 
what the Kremlin wants the West to believe’?590 Even more cunningly, perhaps they were 
feeding garbled nonsense to Steele to provoke a counter-intelligence investigation that 
would incapacitate the Trump presidency and set the Democrats on a wild goose chase. If 
the latter, the operation was a brilliant success. 
Steele was fired as a paid FBI informant when it was revealed that he had been 
double-dipping with the Democrats and leaking confidential anti-Trump information to 
the media. Steele nevertheless prepared a final memorandum dated 13 December which 
made the extraordinary claim that Trump’s lawyer Michael Cohen (accompanied by three 
unnamed colleagues) held a secret meeting in Prague in August (or September) 2016 with 
Kremlin operatives. They allegedly met with Oleg Solodukhim, an associate of the 
Kremlin’s then chief of staff, Sergei Ivanov, to discuss how deniable cash payments were 
to be made to hackers working in Europe under the Kremlin’s direction against the 
Clinton campaign and to pay for covering up the campaign and suppressing information 
about Moscow’s secret connections with the Trump team. In Prague Cohen agreed to 
various plans to protect the operation and discussed what was to be done if Clinton won 
the election. Solodukhim apparently admitted that payments to the hackers had been 
made by both the Trump team and the Kremlin. Cohen contemptuously dismisses the 
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account but notes how it elevated him from relative obscurity into an international object 
of vilification ‘because of the horseshit report of some washed-up former MI-6 
intelligence operative in England who I knew for a fact didn’t have his facts straight’.591 
Cohen also notes that if his denial was accepted, ‘then the entire logic of the Russia-
Trump conspiracy theory fell apart. The Russia connection had to be true because it had 
to be true, circular thinking that in its way provided the perfect counter-point to the idol 
worship of Trump’.592 
 
Forging the dossier 
 
Although the Steele dossier played a central part in the Russiagate narrative, its assertions 
have never been independently verified and some of its points have been repudiated. It 
has undated and misdated reports and other mistakes. For example, it spells Alfa Bank (a 
major Russian financial institution) as Alpha Bank, variously ascribes the pee tape to 
Source D and then Source E, states that Trump made a ‘recent trip’ to Moscow when he 
made no such trip. It talked of the exchange of anti-Clinton intelligence and money at the 
Russian consulate in Miami, although (as Kavalec noted) no such consulate exists. The 
material is not predictive (as it would be if the sources were genuine) and instead is 
reactive; incorporating events as they unfolded (such as the WikiLeaks emails and Carter 
Page’s visit to Moscow) into the designated narrative of Trump-Russia collusion. The 
style is rambling and imprecise, in the manner of someone trying to impersonate someone 
writing a professional intelligence document. When Steele was sued for libel in a British 
court and answered questions under oath, he admitted that his memos contained 
‘unverified’ items of ‘raw intelligence’ that he had reported because they ‘warranted 
further investigation’, and not because they were true.593 Steele was concerned that there 
may have been a national security threat, not that there was one.594 
The genealogy of the dossier is as convoluted as its contents. In September 2015 
the Washington Free Beacon Foundation, a conservative website funded by the hedge-
fund billionaire Paul Singer, a ‘never Trump’ Republican, hired Fusion GPS, an analytics 
firm headed by Glenn Simpson, to investigate Trump.595 The aim was to support the 
candidacy of Marco Rubio and to stop the outsider from winning the Republican 
nomination. When this failed, the investigation was taken up by others. The HPSCI 
chaired by Nunes later took the lead in investigating the origins of the dossier. Their 
landmark report of February 2018 revealed that in April 2016 the law firm Perkins Coie 
hired Fusion GPS on behalf of the Clinton campaign and the DNC to examine alleged 
collusion between Trump and Russia. Fusion GPS in turn contracted Steele’s firm Orbis 
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to undertake the work. The DNC paid more than $1 million for the dossier.596  The 
commission was managed by Marc Elias, a Democrat lawyer working for both the DNC 
and the Clinton campaign, with the funds going through his law firm, Perkins Coie. The 
payments to Fusion GPS were stated as legal fees to the law firm, and it is alleged that 
only later did senior officials in the Clinton campaign became aware of the 
arrangement.597 However, it could be that ‘the Clinton machine knew that what is was 
doing was controversial. That’s why it did backflips to disguise the operation from 
Congress and the public, and in its Federal Election Commission (FEC) reports’.598 As 
for Simpson, he appeared to take pride in selling himself and the work of his company as 
‘journalism for rent’, an obvious oxymoron since the very act of selling information 
corrupts the process.599 This did not prevent the dossier becoming a ‘media obsession’ 
and allowed Fusion GPS go on to tap into the lucrative funds available for the shadowy 
‘Integrity Initiative’, a cold war style self-defined counter-disinformation exercise. As 
Barry Meier aptly argues, ‘Today, private spying has boomed into a renegade, billion-
dollar industry, one that is increasingly invading our privacy, profiting from deception 
and manipulating the news’.600 
Steele was hired by Fusion GPS in May 2016, and from the first the FBI received 
and reviewed his reports.601 In June 2016 Steele contacted Michael Gaeta, with whom he 
had worked on the FIFA corruption case and who was now an assistant legal attaché at 
the US embassy in Rome. Victoria Nuland, the State Department’s head of European and 
Eurasian Affairs, approved the FBI’s request to meet Steele.602 A later declassified State 
Department 126-page document revealed that Steele had in fact been in contact with 
Nuland since 2014, through the auspices of the State Department official Jonathan Winer. 
He convinced her of the authenticity of Steele’s material on Russia, although the reports 
delivered between May and November 2014 are the same disorganised tissue of fact and 
invention as his later dossier. For example, on 21 August Steele reported that an 
increasingly isolated Putin, influenced by the defeatist mood in the Kremlin and advisors 
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unhappy with his Ukraine policy, the imposition of Western sanctions and the subsequent 
turn to China, was ready to capitulate under US and NATO pressure. Soon after Steele 
told Nuland that within a year the Russian regime could be ‘on its knees’. The reports had 
not been requested by the State Department but were sent by Steele ‘unilaterally’, and to 
her credit, Nuland asked Winer about Steele’s sources. In stark contrast, the material 
from Winer, an expert on the Middle East and North Africa, was substantive, well-
organised and informed.603 
On 5 July FBI agent Gaeta met with Steele in his London offices.604 There Gaeta 
read the first of the memos that would become the dossier, and shocked by what he read 
he is reported to have told Steele ‘I have to report this to headquarters’. 605 In his HPSCI 
testimony FBI deputy director McCabe confirms that Gaeta received the material, but 
argues that he could find no-one at the FBI interested in pursuing the matter until the file 
arrived at FBI headquarters in September.606 However, the 2019 Horowitz report suggests 
that the delay was caused by the sensitive nature of the material in an election year, with 
the FBI agents already aware of Steele’s connection (via Simpson and Perkins Coie) to 
the Clinton campaign. This is why advice was sought on 13 July from a senior FBI agent 
in New York, who was already investigating Page (the case was later transferred to the 
Washington office).607 Bruce Ohr also passed on information received from Steele and 
Fusion GPS to senior FBI officials McCabe, senior FBI lawyer Lisa Page and Strzok in 
July.608 However, although officials were aware of the Steele material, as we have seen, it 
was the information from Downer that formally triggered the Russia probe. 
Steele became a paid FBI confidential human source (CHS) from at least February 
2016, and possibly from 2013. 609  According to a footnote to the Horowitz review 
declassified in April 2020, he received $95,000 in payment for his services in 2016.610 
However, his contract was terminated in October because he revealed his relationship to a 
reporter from Mother Jones.611 Strzok notes that Steele was ‘closed’ not because his 
information was bad, but because ‘he was a control problem’.612 Steele began supplying 
his reports to the FBI on 5 July, the same day that Comey dismissed the Clinton email 
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server case.613 Steele repeatedly urged the press to publish his incendiary information, but 
most outlets were cautious. Michael Isikoff on 23 September was the first to publicise the 
work after meeting with Steele. 614  He now argues that Steele’s sensational Russia 
collusion charges lack evidence and are ‘likely false’. Nevertheless, Steele’s report was 
used by the FBI to justify four FISA warrants on Page. Mother Jones magazine’s David 
Corn wrote the second major story on 31 October. 615 Corn also met with Steele, who 
admitted that he was desperate to stop the Trump campaign and to intensify the FBI 
investigation.616  Steele was dismissed the following day, with the FBI concluding that 
‘Steele seemed more interested in getting the story out rather than quietly working with 
them on the investigation’.617 
Nine separate US media organisations refused to publish any of the dossier’s 
claims in the latter part of 2016, despite determined efforts by Fusion GPS to make it 
public. In his book on the subject, Glenn Simpson tells us how keen he was to have 
Steele’s material in the public domain, even though the FBI was sceptical about some of 
the assertions. The final memo took a circuitous route, including via the Republican 
Senator John McCain, the chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, before getting 
to the FBI.618 It is not known whether McCain provided a copy to CIA director Brennan, 
but the CIA head attached a two-page summary when he delivered the ICA on Russian 
collusion to outgoing president Obama on 5 January 2017. David Kramer, a long-time 
McCain associate, in March 2019 admitted that he contacted at least 14 journalists about 
the Steele dossier. Kramer travelled to London and met with Steele on 28 November, 
when they discussed all the memos, but was only given a physical copy of the dossier 
(then consisting of 16 memos) by Simpson on 29 November on his return to 
Washington.619 In addition to press briefings, he gave a copy to the then-senior director 
for Russian affairs at the NSC, Celeste Wallander and in early December briefed her and 
Nuland. On 29 December he allowed a Buzzfeed reporter, Ken Bensinger, to photograph 
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the dossier at the McCain Institute, hence the published version had his highlights marked 
in yellow. 
This was the version published on 10 January 2017, after it was mentioned by the 
FBI and journalists started asking about Trump’s ties to Russia. McCain on 18 October 
2017 famously denied providing a copy of the dossier to BuzzFeed, insisting that he had 
given it only to the director of the FBI, but we now know that it was provided by his 
associate.620 An email from FBI officer Peter Strzok to FBI attorney Lisa Page dated 10 
January confirms that the FBI knew that the version published by BuzzFeed was 
‘identical’ to the version given to the FBI by McCain.621 
 
The Steele storm 
 
James Baker, the FBI’s general counsel between 2014 and 2017, met with Sussman, the 
lawyer from Perkins Coie who handled the DNC account, some weeks before the 2016 
election. The meeting discussed Russian interference, including hacking and supposed 
ties to Trump. As a report of the meeting notes, it suggests ‘FBI investigatory 
malpractice’. The mere fact that the FBI’s general counsel was meeting with a top lawyer 
working for the Clinton campaign shortly before the election ‘is proof that the bureau 
strayed beyond obvious guardrails’: 
 
It’s alarming enough that the FBI felt free to open a counterintelligence 
investigation into an active presidential campaign. That it also felt free to gather 
information for that probe from the opposing campaign is mind-boggling. Team 
Clinton had the most powerful position on earth to gain from Mr. Trump’s 
downfall. No conflict there, right? 622 
 
The HPSCI memo of February 2018 revealed that ‘senior DoJ and FBI officials’ by this 
time knew that the Clinton campaign was behind the Steele Dossier, and the Baker-
Sussmann meeting ‘raises the likelihood that those “senior officials” extended into Mr. 
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Comey’s inner circle and that quite a few people understood the bureau was moving 
against a campaign based on the rival campaign’s opposition research’. 
FBI documents released in August 2018 confirm that the FBI stopped formal 
contact with Steele a week before the election. In December 2018 the House Oversight 
Committee released the 235-page transcript of Comey’s questioning before the House 
Judiciary Committee and Oversight Committee on 11 August 2018. Comey’s memory 
appeared to be failing, since his responses contained 166 ‘don’t knows’, 71 ‘I don’t 
remember’, and eight ‘I don’t recall’. Nevertheless, Comey admitted that the FBI did not 
verify the dossier, even though it was used to spy on a senior politician in the Trump 
camp (Page). Work on checking the dossier, Comey admitted, was still not complete by 
the time he left office in May 2017. He once again asserted that it was not the dossier but 
the Papadopoulos case that kick-started the investigation.623 This does not let the FBI off 
the hook, since the Papadopoulos affair is hardly more substantive than the Steele 
dossier. 
This is typical of the way in which the Russiagate allegations shift shape and 
mutate into unrelated charges to reinforce the central allegation. In the Mueller 
investigation secondary issues gain prominence in proportion to the weakness of the 
central charge. This was the case with the accusations against Cohen, which replaced 
Russian collusion for a time as the reason to investigate Trump. We will deal with his 
prosecution later, but here note that he continued to deny ever having visited Prague, 
something that was once again asserted by his lawyer, Lanny Davis, in August 2018. 
Davis insisted that all the charges in the dossier were false, and Cohen certainly did not 
travel to Prague to discuss ‘cash payments’ to hackers of the Clinton campaign. Cohen 
repeatedly offered his passport as proof that he did not travel to the city. This did not stop 
at least ‘two sources’ claiming that Mueller had evidence that Cohen travelled through 
Germany to the Czech Republic.624 A further sub-plot about the genesis of the Steele 
dossier involves Cody Shearer, who provided opposition research for the Clintons, who 
apparently passed on information about the ‘golden showers’ incident to Winer.625 Winer 
in turn passed the story on to Steele.626  
The DoJ’s inpector general Michael Horowitz and several Congressional 
committees investigated whether the FBI properly handled the Trump-Russia collusion 
allegations. In particular, the FBI failed to complete due diligence procedures to ensure 
that Steele’s alleged expertise could be trusted. The FBI was still verifying the Steele 
dossier when it was submitted as evidence for the FISA warrant. Comey himself testified 
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in June 2017 that the dossier was considered ‘unverified and salacious’. 627 
Notwithstanding these doubts, the dossier was deployed to investigate the campaign of 
the nominated Republican candidate, even though the document was developed as 
opposition research paid for by the Democrats.  
In his first report on the issue in June 2018, Horowitz exposed a pattern of anti-
Trump bias in communications between FBI officials as they pursued the Russia 
enquiry.628 The report focused on the handling of the FBI’s investigation (called Midyear 
Exam) into Clinton’s emails, but noted that the same FBI team which investigated the 
Clinton emails deployed at least one informant among Trump advisors, and obtained 
FISA wiretap warrants on Carter Page, issued national security letters to obtain records, 
and unmasked the identities of surveilled campaign officials. The report revealed that 
‘FBI officials displayed not merely an appearance of bias against Donald Trump, but 
animus bordering on hatred’.629 This stricture has been applied to the team leading the 
FBI investigation of Trump. Strzok’s virulent anti-trump texts to Lisa Page (with whom 
he was having a relationship) later became evidence of anti-Trump collusion.630 Strzok 
investigated Clinton’s use of a private email server and then took the lead in the Trump-
Russia probe.631  
Horowitz revealed the inflammatory text messages on FBI-issued devices 
between Strzok and Page. 632  On 3 March 2016 Page noted that ‘God Trump is a 
loathsome human’, to which Strzok responded ‘God Hillary should win’. On the opening 
of Crossfire Hurricane, Strzok on 31 July texted Page to say ‘And damn this feels 
momentous. Because this matters’, and clearly to him it mattered more than the Midyear 
investigation.633 Discussing Trump’s presidential bid on 8 August, Strzok infamously 
stated ‘we’ll stop it’, although later argued that the reference was to the American people 
at large. A week later on 15 August Strzok texted Page to say: ‘I want to believe the path 
you threw out for consideration in [McCabe’s] office, that there’s no way he [Trump] 
gets elected, but I’m afraid that we can’t take that risk. It’s like an insurance policy in the 
unlikely event you die before you’re 40’. 634  Strzok argues that this was ‘a risk 
assessment like any other’, evaluating the potential harm of a hypothetical event.635  Page 
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a few weeks earlier had made no secret of her prejudices: ‘I do always hate the 
Russians’.636 She stressed ‘there is ‘very little I find redeeming’ about Russia, although 
she generously conceded a ‘couple of good writers and artists I guess’. Strzok was less 
broad-minded: ‘F*cking, conniving cheating savages’.637 Russiagate combined their two 
pet hates, Trump and Russia.638  
Horowitz criticised Strzok for his slow reaction to the discovery in September 
2016 of thousands of Clinton’s emails on Weiner’s laptop. Strzok prioritised the Trump-
Russia investigation over the email investigation.639 The day after Mueller was appointed, 
on 18 May 2017 Strzok texted Page about whether he should join the special counsel 
team, arguing that ‘For me, and this case, I personally have a sense of unfinished 
business. I unleashed it with MYE [Midyear]. Now I need to fix and finish it’. Later in 
the same exchange he talked about working on an ‘investigation leading to 
impeachment’. Strzok denied that this meant he contributed to Clinton’s defeat by 
investigating her emails and would now fix it by destroying Trump.640 Horowitz argued 
that Strzok’s messages ‘potentially indicated or created the appearance that investigative 
decisions were impacted [affected] by bias or improper considerations’.641 The culture of 
leaking by DoJ and FBI officials about ongoing investigations was criticised. When his 
email exchanges with Page were revealed Mueller promptly removed Strzok from the 
Russiagate enquiry in late July 2017.  
A declassified footnote to the Horowitz review reveals that Steele stressed that his 
‘source network did not involve sources from his time as a former government employee 
and was developed entirely in the period after he retired from governmental service’.642 
Other footnotes states that ‘sensitive source reporting’ from June 2017 indicated that a 
person affiliated with an unnamed Russian oligarch was aware of Steele’s investigation 
possibly as early as July 2016.643 This gave rise, as we shall see, to speculation that this 
conduit may have fed Kremlin disinformation to Steele. Ohr records, moreover, that in a 
meeting in December 2016 Simpson told him that Steele’s primary source was not in 
Moscow but a former Russian intelligence officer living in the US.644  In other words, the 
information came not from the ground in Russia but a continent away in America. 
Horowitz’s report reveals that when interviewed by the FBI, one of Steele’s sources 
disavowed all the information in the dossier and claimed that it misrepresented several 
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things he had said. Not surprisingly, with sources such as these the dossier is as reliable 
as Steele’s prediction in early 2016 that Putin was about to fall. Above all, if Steele (and 
by implication the CIA) really did have access to information from highly placed moles 
in the Kremlin, this would be an extraordinary coup, not to be lightly wasted on a 
‘salacious and unverified’ document. To expose their existence in such an off-hand 
manner would run against the fundamental tradecraft of spying and would have 
precipitated a ferocious investigation in the Kremlin, but there was no hint of that. 
On 12 July 2018 Strzok testified to the House Judiciary and Oversight committees 
that he was not biased against a president that he still described as ‘horrible’ and 
‘disgusting’.645 Strzok, bizarrely, described the hearing as a win for Putin.646 Strzok was 
dismissed from the FBI on 13 August 2018 because of his anti-Trump texts. The 
information passed on to the FBI from Steele and other sources adopted an 
undifferentiated view of Russia, in which every passing oligarch (in fact, every 
mentioned Russian) was ‘close to Putin’, and every shady character (and we have already 
met a few) was engaged in some nefarious business on behalf of the Kremlin. McCabe’s 
extreme view of Russia – that ‘the Russian government itself’ was ‘the ultimate Russian 
criminal organization’ 647  – is rooted in a distinctively parochial American type of 
Russophobia. Fired by what they believed was the righteousness of their cause, namely to 
stop what they believed was a ‘crime in progress’ and the ascent to the presidency of the 
Kremlin-supported Trump, Russiagaters accepted threads of unsubstantiated allegations 
and disinformation, joining dots that were in no way connected, to ensnare the presidency 
and the country in ‘a web of deception’.648  
On 28 August 2018 Justice Department lawyer Bruce Ohr testified to a 
Congressional committee about his part in the FBI launching the Trump investigation. It 
had earlier been revealed that his wife, Nellie, worked for Fusion GPS, the research firm 
that sponsored the Clinton-funded Steele dossier. It was then discovered that Ohr, the 
third most senior official in the Justice Department, also had various interactions with the 
head of Fusion GPS, Simpson and Steele, and he passed information about these talks to 
the FBI. In other words, multiple sources were informing the FBI about the dossier. It had 
earlier been known that notes taken by Ohr of a meeting with Steele in September 2016 
stated that the dossier’s author ‘was desperate that Donald Trump not get elected and was 
passionate about him not being president’. Now the 28 August meeting revealed that ‘he 
verbally warned the FBI that its source had a credibility problem, alerting the bureau to 
Mr. Steele’s leanings and motives’. He also told the FBI that Nellie was working for 
Fusion and the dossier project. This information was given to the FBI before the first 
FISA application for a warrant against Carter Page in October 2016. This was not 
mentioned in the FISA application, and they instead asserted that Steele was a ‘reliable’ 
source. Neither did the application mention that the spouse of a senior Justice Department 
official was working on the dossier and thus benefitting financially from a document that 
the FBI was using in an investigation. The FBI thus failed to flag the potential conflict of 
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interest and the provenance of Steele’s dossier.649  By then at least five sources had 
informed the FBI about the political origins of Steele’s work. Congressional 
investigations later tried ‘to determine whether that omission was part of a larger, 
intentional campaign to mislead the FISA court and Congress in order to keep the Russia 
investigation going despite a lack of evidence supporting the collusion theory’.650 
 
Debunking Steele  
 
More questions should have been asked about how a former British spy who was banned 
from travelling to Russia was able to access highly placed sources in the Kremlin and 
Russian intelligence over unsecured email and telephone lines to gain information that 
well resourced intelligence agencies were unable to do: 
 
After all, a foreign citizen [Steele] produces a catalogue of unverifiable, 
scandalous accusations against a US presidential candidate, attributed to unnamed 
Russian officials. Paying for this ‘opposition research’ is the candidate of the 
party in power. Her confederates, including elected Democrats, conspire to use the 
FBI’s possession of this document to get US media outlets to report allegations 
from sources who won’t identify themselves, who offer no support for their 
claims, passed along by an operator whose political motives are manifest.651 
 
At no point does Steele foretell events but instead casts them in a collusive light in 
hindsight, such as the publication of the DNC emails by WikiLeaks. ‘Steele’s project was 
not intelligence-gathering. It was the crafting of a campaign narrative about a traitorous 
Trump-Russia espionage conspiracy, into which new developments were melded as they 
occurred’, and this is why Steele fed the information to the media at the same time as 
passing it to the FBI and DoJ. 652  Too many actors were ready to lend credence to 
unverified assertions because they reinforced existing beliefs or suited instrumental 
purposes.653 The conspiracy theory about Trump as a Russian asset, or as someone so 
hopelessly comprised by some sort of kompromat held against him, was always 
implausible but it seized the imagination of a large part of the American elite and by mere 
dint of repetition was taken as fact. For the intelligence services and the media this was 
‘an epic disaster’.654  
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It did not go unchallenged. In May 2017, Alfa Bank owners Mikhail Fridman, 
Peter Aven and German Khan, filed a defamation lawsuit against BuzzFeed for 
publishing the Trump–Russia dossier that alleged financial ties and collusion between 
Putin, Trump, and the three bank owners. Alfa Bank was established by Fridman in the 
late Soviet years, and with his associate Aven, a former Russian minister for foreign 
economic relations, it became one of Russia’s most successful financial institutions and 
its largest commercial bank with a presence in several Western countries. In October 
2017 Aven, Fridman, and Khan also filed a libel suit against Fusion GPS and its 
founder Simpson, for circulating the dossier among journalists and allowing it to be 
published.  Following a meeting between the Kremlin, Aven and Fridman in May 2018, 
the Kremlin released a statement asserting that they did not represent the interests of 
Putin or the Russian government.  In April 2018 Aven, Fridman, and Khan filed a libel 
suit against Steele in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, but the suit was 
dismissed in August 2018. In a sealed deposition of 2 August 2018 in response to the 
defamation suit, Steele admitted that the law firm Perkins Coie wanted to be in a position 
to contest the results of the election, on the grounds that Trump had conspired with 
Moscow. His American lawyers filed his answers in December in the libel lawsuit in 
Washington, and it was at that point that his comments became public. In a previous 
filing in a separate case in April-May 2017 Steele stated that his task was to find links 
between Trump associates and Moscow. In the new libel suit Fusion GPS, typically, 
sought to depict the three bankers as corrupt Putin cronies. The three lost the libel suit in 
the US on the grounds that the dossier served the public interest by examining possible 
Russian influence in the 2016 election. 
In a parallel libel suit in London the three insisted that they were not ‘creatures of 
the Kremlin’, and Steele’s claim that in the 1990s they delivered ‘large amounts of illicit 
cash’ to Putin when he was deputy mayor of St Petersburg was demonstrably false.655 On 
8 July 2020 the High Court of England and Wales ruled that Steele had used ‘hearsay, 
some of it opinion, and much of it based on unverifiable information from unidentified 
sources’.656 The court ruled that Steele violated the 1998 Data Protection Act by failing to 
check the accuracy of information in his dossier, and ordered Orbis Business Intelligence 
to pay damages to two Alfa Bank principals for making comments about them that were 
not only a fabrication but also unlawful.657 The summing up by High Court judge Sir 
Mark Warby applies to much of the commentary on Russiagate: ‘To treat hearsay reports 
as established fact … is an unsatisfactory approach’. He found that the dossier’s 
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allegations about the bank’s executives were ‘inaccurate or misleading’, and reasonable 
steps to verify the claims had not been undertaken. He noted that Steele frequently 
offered ‘very different versions’ of key events, which were ‘mutually inconsistent in a 
number of respects’.658 The fines plus court costs threatened to bankrupt Orbis. 
In the second defamation suit in London, Russian tech entrepreneur Alexei 
Gubarev, owner of XBT Holdings that provided computer servers, challenged Steele’s 
assertion in the final memo that his Webzilla service provider was used by the Russian 
security services to hack the Clinton campaign.659 Gubarev strongly denied the charge, 
and separately in Florida sued BuzzFeed.660 In his July 2018 deposition in the BuzzFeed 
defamation case, Steele admitted that while writing the dossier he relied upon a ‘random’ 
not fact-checked article posted to CNN’s old iReports website, among other sources.661 
He also admitted being separately paid by the FBI for his research, and that he leaked 
information about his investigation to Mother Jones and had off-the-record meetings with 
the New York Times, the Washington Post, Yahoo! News, the New Yorker and CNN in 
September and October 2016, which led to the FBI terminating his contract.662 In a 
written statement to the High Court in July 2020, Steele insisted that he had never wanted 
the dossier to be made public, and would have done ‘whatever I could do to prevent 
‘BuzzFeed from publishing the document, previously arguing that his report had been 
commissioned to provide Clinton with a legal basis to challenge the 2016 election.663 The 
in camera court proceedings in London, in which Gubarev sued Steele, from 20-24 July 
2020 also revealed the far more prominent role played by David Kramer, McCain’s 
associate, than had previously been known. We saw earlier that it was Kramer who 
provided the dossier to BuzzFeed, but court records now revealed that he acted as a key 
conduit between journalists and Steele, offering to ‘feed’ stories about Trump associates, 
and in particular Flynn, to Washington Post columnist David Ignatius.664 In late 2020 
Gubarev lost the case, with the judge ruling that even if the material about him and his 
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company in the dossier was defamatory, he had failed to prove financial damages as a 
result of the disclosure.665 
In August 2020 DNI John Ratcliffe revealed a declassified footnote of the January 
2017 ICA. It noted that Steele had only ‘limited corroboration’ and that he used 
‘identified and unidentified sub-sources’ that offered ‘highly politically sensitive 
information from the summer to the fall of 2016 on Russian influence efforts aimed at the 
presidential election’. As part of Trump’s order to declassify documents related to the 
Trump-Russia investigation, on 8 October the FBI disclosed the 94-page spreadsheet that 
it had used to try to corroborate Steele’s explosive assertions and came to the same 
conclusion as the earlier ICA footnote: there was at best ‘limited corroboration’.666 This 
was confirmed by FBI supervisory analyst Brian Auten, who oversaw work on the 
spreadsheet. He admitted under oath to staff investigators of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in October 2020 (declassified months later) that ‘the actual allegations and 
actions described in those reports could not be corroborated’. Auten and the Crossfire 
Hurricane team knew that the dossier was junk yet failed to inform the FISA court and 
used the material in all four warrant applications to spy on Carter Page. Former acting 
FBI head McCabe, who approved and signed the final application, testified that without 
the dossier the warrants would not have been issued.667 
The Senate Judiciary Committee continued its release of Russiagate materials. On 
17 July 2020 it declassified the FBI’s interviews over three days in January 2017 with the 
primary source of the Steele dossier.668 The 57 pages of notes reveal in vivid terms what 
the FBI knew about the dossier, yet it continued to use it in presentations to the FISA 
court. This had already been revealed by the Horowitz report in December 2019, but the 
interview transcripts provide a shocking view into how the dossier was compiled.669 It 
now became clear that Steele had based his dossier on a single main source, someone 
who had earlier provided Steele with business intelligence. The source was 
‘uncomfortable’ when in March 2016 Steele asked him to investigate the Trump 
campaign, and in particular Paul Manafort and later Donald Trump. He warned Steele 
that his friends and contacts were ‘too far removed’ from these matters, yet he felt 
obliged to provide him with material. Later Steele asked him to investigate five people 
associated with the Trump campaign but he only remembered three names – Manafort, 
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Page and Cohen.  He drew not so much on a network but on his ‘social circle’, and since 
Steele warned him that it was a security risk to take notes, he forgot what information 
came from whom. At one point he even reported information from an anonymous 
‘Russian male’ who ‘never identified himself’ (later alleged to be Sergei Millian, 
although he denies providing any information). 670  Regarding Trump’s alleged 
‘unorthodox sexual behaviour’ in Moscow, the main subsource simple reported the ‘well 
known story’ about Trump’s involvement in ‘water sports’ at the Ritz Carlton. The 
source warned Steele that his information was ‘rumour and speculation’ and was unable 
to corroborate his reporting.671  
Although the report redacted the name and other identifying information, two 
days later the primary subsource was exposed on the internet and his name was then 
published by RT.672 The source was revealed to be Igor Danchenko, who was tasked by 
Steele in March 2016 to start digging up dirt on Manafort, a brief that in June was 
broadened to include Trump, Page, Cohen, Flynn and some others whose names he could 
not remember. Danchenko worked as a senior research analyst at the Brookings 
Institution from 2005 to 2010 and then, among other things, as a freelancer for Steele’s 
Orbis company. Danchenko was born in Ukraine and is a Russian-trained lawyer who 
subsequently took degrees at the University of Louisville and Georgetown University. 
Together with another researcher at Brookings, Clifford Gaddy, he obtained Putin’s 
doctoral (kandidatskaya) dissertation and found evidence of plagiarism.673 Greg Jarrett, 
whom we have quoted earlier, noted that he had come across Danchenko’s name several 
times before, but in media comments stressed ‘I could never piece it together. Because 
frankly … it is so wild and stupid that Steele’s source was not from Russia but – it’s a 
guy in Washington DC working for the liberal Brookings Institution’. He went on to state 
‘Now, it sort of makes sense because the president of Brookings at the time was Strobe 
Talbott: [a] long-time Hillary Clinton ally who was hoping to fuel the collusion narrative 
and had his own contacts with Christopher Steele’. He notes that Talbott’s brother-in-law 
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was the ‘Clinton sycophant’ Cody Shearer.674 Early in the collusion investigation Talbott 
asked Steele to send him a copy of the dossier as it was being compiled to share with 
Obama administration officials and Brookings staff, according to Steele’s testimony in 
the British lawsuit.675  
In his book Witch Hunt, Jarret describes how Shearer compiled a second dossier 
with some of the same allegations and which became public in September 2016, some of 
which was used in Steele’s dossier. Jarret now highlighted the awful symmetry of the 
case: ‘So, I mean, the machinations of this – and it’s all Hillary Clinton. Her campaign is 
paying for the dossier. And, it turns out some of her allies are feeding the dossier 
information, all fabricated’. Equally disturbing, the main source turned out not even to be 
a Russian but a Ukrainian. The FBI knew all of this when they interviewed Danchenko in 
January 2017 yet allowed the Steele version to run rampant for three years. Reports note 
that Danchenko was shocked that his speculations and random materials, gleaned from 
acquaintances and chance encounters to earn his fee from Steele, became the foundation 
for years of accusations and recriminations.676 However, an official letter from attorney 
general Barr to Senator Lindsey Graham in September 2020 revealed that the FBI had 
investigated Danchenko in 2009-11 over the claim by a Brookings colleague that in 2008 
Danchenko had offered classified information for sale, met a known Russian intelligence 
agent, and had meetings at the Russian embassy.677 This is why the Steele dossier was 
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Stories of Russian hacking circulated in Washington for some time. Franklin Foer was 
one of the first to make the case for a trump-Putin conspiracy in Slate on 4 July 2016, 
seeking to explain the contradiction between Trump’s supposed embrace of Putin and his 
goal of making America great again. Trump was either drawn to authoritarian strongmen, 
or he was reliant on dirty money coming from Russia. According to Foer, there may well 
have been collusion between Trump and Putin to hack the DNC and release the material 
to cause maximum damage to the Democrats; or Putin did indeed hold kompromat on 
Trump.678 The article was a classic mix of fact and supposition, all neatly folded into a 
neo-journalistic story to confirm an existing narrative. On 6 January 2017 the Intelligence 
Community Assessment (ICA) asserted that Russia had ‘hacked’ the presidential 
election. Along with the Steele dossier, the ICA is one of the cornerstones of the 




As late as July 2016 DNI Clapper refused publicly to state who was responsible for the 
alleged hack or to assign motivation. The FBI at this point believed that the cyber-attack 
sought to disrupt the American political system rather than specifically help Trump. CIA 
director Brennan could not run the risk of being seen to interfere directly in US domestic 
politics but encouraged the FBI to start a counter-intelligence operation (the absence of 
evidence meant that there was no basis for a criminal investigation).679 Comey launched 
operation Crossfire Hurricane on 31 July, and shortly afterwards Brennan and Comey 
briefed Congress. Although the investigation remained secret, the Trump-Russia 
collusion narrative entered the public domain.  
The Obama administration was uncertain about whether to go public, with 
Brennan allegedly calling for restraint to protect CIA informants. The CIA apparently 
had information from two separate sources in the Kremlin that Putin had personally 
authorised a covert operation to destabilise the American presidential election.680 On 4 
August Brennan told Alexander Bortnikov, the head of the FSB, ‘You’re meddling in our 
election. We know it. We have it cold’, a charge that Bortnikov flatly denied.681 Brennan 
later told the HPSCI that he warned Bortnikov that the US was aware of Russian 
operations, and that it would damage relations between the two countries.682 The Obama 
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administration as a whole was ‘concerned that any statement it made about Russia’s 
actions might be cast as trying to help Clinton and hurt Trump’.683 Trump was sceptical, 
for which he was roundly admonished. Trump was accused by Mike Morell, the deputy 
head of the CIA from 2010 to 2013 and twice acting director, of being ‘an unwitting 
agent of the Russian Federation’. He warned that Trump was ‘not only unqualified for the 
job, but he may well pose a threat to our national security’.684  
It was at this point that Steele made his memos known, turning them into an open 
secret in Washington. Brennan contacted Senate minority leader Harry Reid and told him 
that Russia was trying to help Trump win the election, and that ‘Trump advisers might be 
colluding with Russia’.685 It was assumed that this would soon be made public, and two 
days later Reid’s letter to Comey was published in the New York Times on 29 August. 
Reid announced that he had learned of ‘evidence of a direct connection between the 
Russian government and Donald Trump’s presidential campaign’, which had ‘employed 
a number of individuals with significant and disturbing ties to Russia and the Kremlin’. 
In short, Reid asserted that ‘The evidence of a direct connection between the Russian 
government and Donald Trump’s presidential campaign continues to mount’, repeating 
the Clinton’s team’s supposition that the Russians were helping Trump while referring to 
at least one of Steele’s claims. Reid’s letter was the first formal airing of the collusion 
narrative. In their book, Isikoff and Corn note that Reid believed that Brennan had an 
‘ulterior motive’ with the briefing, but ‘concluded the CIA chief believed the public 
needed to know about the Russia operation, including the information about the possible 
links to the Trump campaign’.686 
The following day the ranking Democratic members of four House committees 
issued a public letter to Comey requesting ‘that the FBI assess whether connections 
between Trump campaign officials and Russian interests’ may have contributed to the 
DNC hack so as ‘to interfere with the US presidential election’.687 Soon after, Fusion 
GPS briefed its media allies about the dossier, including a meeting with some leading 
journalists at the Tabard Inn in Washington on 22 September.688 As Hettena notes, ‘It’s a 
safe bet that the Clinton campaign was in some way behind these efforts’.689 Steele 
briefed the media about his findings, but they declined to use this ‘unverified 
information, with its unclear provenance’.690 
In an interview with Bloomberg on 1 September 2016 at the Eastern Economic 
Forum, in response to a question about the hack of the Democratic Party, Putin insisted: 
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I know nothing. There are a lot of hackers today, you know, and they perform 
their work in such a filigreed and delicate manner and they can show their ‘tracks’ 
anywhere and anytime. It may not even be a track; they can cover their activity so 
that it looks like hackers operating from other territories, from other countries. It 
is hard to check this activity, maybe not even possible. Anyway, we do not do that 
at the national level. Besides, does it really matter who hacked Mrs. Clinton’s 
election campaign team database? Does it? What really matters is the content 
shown to the community. This is what the discussion should be held about. There 
is no need to distract the attention of the community from the essence of the 
subject substituting it with secondary questions dealing with the search of those 
who did it. I would like to repeat: I know absolutely nothing about it, and Russia 
has never done anything like this at the State level.691 
 
Putin even went so far as to suggest that that the hackers had provided a public service.692 
Obama was having none of it, and at the Hangzhou G20 summit on 4-5 September he 
met Putin on the sidelines for over an hour. In addition to discussing Syria and Ukraine 
Obama delivered a warning about Russia’s cyber intrusions: ‘We know what you’re 
doing; if you don’t cut it out, we will impose onerous and unprecedented penalties’.693 
Obama was pressured by some leading Democrats to go further and publicly denounce 
Russian interference, but he was sensibly circumspect. He came under enormous pressure 
from the Democratic establishment, such as Diane Feinstein, the ranking Democrat on the 
Senate Intelligence Committee, to denounce Russia. 
Putin sought to shift attention from the provenance of the leaked emails to their 
content, while the Clinton camp naturally concentrated on the source to objuscate the 
content. The DNC emails exposed the bias of the Democrat leadership against Sanders, 
while Podesta’s emails showed that he hoped that the media would advance Trump (who 
was considered unwinnable) and thus allow Clinton to pillory him and boost her own 
position. The views of Sanders were surprisingly popular in this campaign, and he gave 
Clinton a good run for her money and may well have been a more credible candidate 
against Trump. A socialist as president of the US would have represented as big a shock 
to the American polity as Trump, but the election of the latter demonstrates that the 
system was ripe for change. As for the treatment of Jill Stein, the Green Party candidate 
in the 2012 and 2016 elections, the Democratic establishment came close to suggesting 
that an independent run was somehow illegitimate. Third party independent candidates 
have historically, like Ross Perot in 1992, siphoned enough votes to force unexpected 
outcomes. In 2016 three per cent of the vote was cast for libertarian candidate Gary 
Johnson and one per cent (1.4 million votes) for Stein. The total of some five million 
people who voted for third party candidates could have made a significant difference in 
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swing states, although it is unclear how many of the second preference votes would have 
gone to Clinton.  
This phase of the Russiagate scandal culminated on 23 September, when Michael 
Isikoff of Yahoo News reported on the Steele dossier’s allegations regarding Carter Page. 
He was a minor character in the Trump campaign yet figures largely in the Russiagate 
affair. As noted, according to the Steele dossier, Page met with Rosneft head Sechin and 
discussed a possible deal. Hettena notes that officials were ‘seeking to determine’ if Page 
had private communications about the possible lifting of economic sanctions if Trump 
became president.694 This brought the collusion narrative into the open. On 30 October 
Reid once again publicly wrote to Comey ‘In my communications with you and other top 
officials in the national security community, it has become clear that you possess 
explosive information about close ties between Donald Trump, his top advisors, and the 
Russian government’.695 Mueller found no such ‘explosive information’ and none has yet 
come to light. 
 A team of computer scientists at this time combed the Domain Name System 
(DNS), a global network that acts as the phonebook for the Internet, for potential 
anomalous patterns involving Russian contacts with American entities. Every DNS query 
(look-up) is logged, leaving records. Examining Trump’s domain, the scientists found 
frequent and repeated DNS lookups from servers owned by Alfa Bank. Between May and 
September 2016 Alfa looked up the Trump Organisation’s domain over 2,000 times. 
Only one other organisation contacted the Trump Organisation with a comparable 
frequency, Spectrum Health of Grand Rapids, Michigan. Spectrum Health is linked to the 
DeVos family, and Betsy DeVos was appointed secretary of education in Trump’s first 
cabinet. Her brother, Erik Prince, is a Trump associate who was investigated by Mueller, 
in particular his meeting following the election with a Russian official in the Seychelles, 
where they apparently discussed establishing a back channel between Trump and Putin, a 
meeting that Prince insists was ‘incidental’ (see below). The scientists decided that the 
Trump server was being used as a covert channel for communication and was proof of an 
illicit link between Russia and the Trump campaign. The subject was aired in the press, 
notably following Reid’s 30 October letter to Comey charging that the FBI was 
withholding information. Franklin Foer added a new wrinkle to the story in late October 
2016, when he suggested that the Trump server may well have been communicating with 
Russia.696 However, the mainstream was more more cautious, and rightly so.697 Most 
likely an automated marketing email system (spam) triggered the repeated 
communications. The story was kept alive not only by Congressional interventions, but 
also by activists, notably Daniel Jones at the head of the Democracy Integrity Project, 
working closely with Glenn Simpson at Fusion GPS.698 Ostensibly established to keep 
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elections free from foreign interference, the Democracy Integrity Project exploited new 
cold war fears to generate funds. In the same spirit, Cambridge Analytica now stood 
accused of transferring its illicitly gained information to help Russia target American 
voters – one of the more far-fetched claims.699 
In September Obama commented that in allegedly supporting Trump, Putin had 
‘backed the wrong horse’, and thus there seemed little point to do much in response.700 
Obama has been much criticised for his alleged weak reaction to Russian malfeasance. 
David Shimer examines two possible reasons: the probability that Clinton would be 
elected; and the fear that a defeated Trump would claim that he had been cheated. He 
goes on to claim that the White House under-estimated the scale of Russia’s intervention 
and therefore failed to launch a covert cyber-attack or some other kinetic response.701 As 
a reviewer notes, ‘The Obama team worried less about what Putin had done than what he 
could do, and, as a result, they missed the fact that Russia’s interference represented the 
greatest degree of Kremlin risk-taking aimed at the United States since the Cuban missile 
crisis’.702 In the event, history proved Obama right – to a point. 
Clinton continued to push the Russian interference theme. In the first of the three 
presidential debates, this one at Hofstra University on Long Island on 26 September, she 
was asked by NBC anchor Lester Holt what could be done to thwart the Russian assault. 
Clinton responded: ‘There is no doubt now that Russia has used cyberattacks against all 
kinds of organizations in our country. And I am deeply concerned about this. I know 
Donald’s very praiseworthy [sic] of Vladimir Putin, but Putin is playing a really tough, 
long game here’. She condemned Trump’s (ironic) invitation to hack her deleted emails: 
‘I was so shocked when Donald publicly invited Putin to hack into Americans. That is 
just unacceptable’.703 Trump was dismissive: ‘She is saying Russia, Russia, Russia. But I 
don’t – maybe it was. I mean, it could be Russia, but it could also be China, it could also 
be lots of other people. It could also be somebody sitting on their bed who weighs four 
hundred pounds, OK?’704  
The Trump team considered the whole Russia business something invented by 
opponents that was failing to register with the public. He ‘believed the idea that they were 
colluding with the Russians ludicrous’.705 To counter this view, Clapper and DHS head 
Jeh Johnson were keen to go public about Russia’s alleged interference, while the FBI’s 
Comey was more cautious since he knew that a counter-intelligence investigation was 
under way. Finally, a joint statement on 7 October 2016 officially accused Russia of 
interfering in the election:  
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The US intelligence community (USIC) is confident the Russian government 
directed the recent compromise of emails from US persons and institutions, 
including from US political organisations. The recent disclosures of alleged 
hacked emails on sites like DCLeaks.com and WikiLeaks and by the Guccifer 2.0 
online persona are consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-
directed efforts. These thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the US 
election process. Such activity is not new to Moscow – the Russians have used 
similar tactics and techniques across Europe and Eurasia, for example, to 
influence public opinion there. We believe, based on the scope and sensitivity of 
these efforts, that only Russia’s senior-most officials could have authorised these 
activities.706  
 
The document made the bold claim that Russia’s leadership had directly ordered the 
attack, although Clapper and Johnson were careful not to attribute any election site hack 
to the Russians. The sensational revelation was expected to dominate the news cycle. 
Instead, an hour after the announcement, the Washington Post released a conversation 
caught on a hot-mike in 2005 between Trump and Billy Bush, then host of an NBC show 
called Access Hollywood. Trump ‘bragged in vulgar terms about kissing, groping and 
trying to have sex with women’, and talked of how he could get away with groping 
women: ‘When you’re a star, they let you do it’, Trump said. ‘You can do anything. Grab 
them by the pussy’. 707 The Russia story was eclipsed. 
The eventful day was not yet over. Conspiracy theories were further stimulated by 
WikiLeaks dumping some two thousand emails just an hour after the Access Hollywood 
tape aired, taken from Podesta’s personal Gmail account. Part of a declared trove of some 
50,000 emails, this tranche revealed Clinton’s paid speeches to Wall Street executives, 
including Goldman Sachs. She noted the difference between ‘a public and a private 
position’, implying that they need not take her reforming rhetoric too seriously. The 
emails also exposed collusion between the Clinton campaign and DNC campaign chair 
Donna Brazile about the questions and topics to be raised in the presidential debates and 
campaign meetings. Once again, the Clinton team focused on the provenance of the 
emails rather than their damaging content, arguing that ‘This is a Russia-orchestrated 
October Surprise, and our campaign is being attacked by Putin’.708 This was also the view 
of the FBI, regarding it as extremely unlikely that the release was not timed to limit the 
damage of the Access Hollywood audiotape.709  
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The second presidential debate was held at Washington University in St Louis, 
Missouri, on 10 October, and the dramatic events of three days earlier dominated. In 
addition, on 8 October Bill Pruitt, a producer on the early Apprentice seasons, tweeted 
that there were far worse recordings of Trump than the Access Hollywood material, 
implying that outtakes of the show exposed Trump using the N-word.710 For the debate, 
Bannon devised the bizarre plan of inviting four women – Juanita Broaddrick, Kathleen 
Willey, Paula Jones and Kathy Shelton – three of whom had earlier accused Bill Clinton 
of sexual misconduct or assault, and Shelton had been traduced by Hillary during the trial 
of her rapist, for whom she was acting as attorney. When Clinton was asked about the 
hypocrisy revealed by the Podesta emails, she deflected the charge to suggest that 
Russian intelligence provided the material to WikiLeaks and was now shaping the 
discussion in a presidential debate: ‘We have never in the history of our country been in a 
situation where an adversary, a foreign power, is working so hard to influence the 
outcome of the election. And believe me, they’re not doing it to get me elected. They’re 
doing it to try to influence the election for Donald Trump’. Trump questioned why ‘they 
always blame Russia’, and answered his own question: ‘And the reason they blame 
Russia because they think they’re trying to tarnish me with Russia’. He went on to assert: 
‘I don’t deal there. I have no businesses there’.711 Trump’s various business projects in 
Moscow had repeatedly failed to get off the ground, but it was later revealed that he 
continued to pursue the Trump Tower Moscow project until well into 2016. 
In the third presidential debate, held on 19 October in Las Vegas, Clinton declared 
‘We have 17, 17 intelligence agencies, civilian and military, who have all concluded that 
these espionage attacks, these cyberattacks, come from the highest levels of the Kremlin, 
and they are designed to influence our election. I find that deeply disturbing’.712 The 7 
October statement had been issued in the name of only two agencies (DHS and ODNI) 
and it was misleading to suggest that all 17 agencies carried out their separate 
investigations, and all had come to the same conclusion. It relied on the circular logic of 
assumed Russian behavioural norms to explain the country’s actions, all without concrete 
evidence of any specific Kremlin policy to support Trump. Nevertheless, on 31 October 
the Obama administration used the ‘red phone’ to issue a warning to the Kremlin, 
including a hint that cyber activities were covered by the ‘law for armed conflict’ (in 
other words, the laws of war), and stressed that meddling in the election ‘would represent 
serious interference in the fundamentals of US society’.713 Overall, Obama was reticent 
about making a public fuss, fearing that it could be construed as interfering in the 
election. Ben Rhodes describes the internal debate about how to respond, and while 
claiming more could have been done publicly, the scope for action was limited.714 The 
‘Russia problem’, clearly, was one that it was anticipated would be dealt with once 
Clinton was elected. 
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This was not to be, and within 24 hours of her defeat Mook, Clinton’s campaign 
manager, and Podesta assembled her communications team at campaign headquarters in 
Brooklyn to outline the strategy that would be pursued for the next few years – that 
Russia was responsible for the defeat and for an egregious attack on American 
democracy. This story was amplified by the media and the ‘intelligence assessments’ of 
the security agencies.715 The strategy shifted attention from the mistakes of the Clinton 
campaign and her inadequacies as a potential leader and avoided analysing the way that 
the Sanders Democrats had been marginalised. It also helped manage dissent and set the 
terms of debate, which in the end enforced conformity through restrictions on social 
media. New cold war hostility escalated informational warfare.716 
 
Carter Page and the FISA warrants 
 
On 21 March 2016 Page, along with Papadopoulos, was part of the eclectic group invited 
to become Trump’s foreign policy advisers. There were good reasons to be suspicious 
about Page. He was a consultant and businessman specialising in energy matters and 
Central Asian affairs who had lived and worked in Russia between 2003 and 2007 as 
deputy manager of Merrill Lynch’s Moscow’s office, and then established an energy 
investment company in New York. Page twice failed to gain a PhD degree from SOAS, 
University of London, with the examiners scathing about his work, until he finally passed 
in 2011 at the third attempt with an unknown examiner.717 In 2013 an SVR agent, Viktor 
Podobny, posing as an attaché at the UN, contacted him in New York and gave him some 
energy-related documents and held out the prospect of profitable deals in Moscow. The 
FBI had been tracking the agent but believed that Page had no idea that he was not 
dealing with a bona fide commercial prospect. According to an FBI transcript of a 
conversation between Podobny and another Russian intelligence officer, the former stated 
‘I promised him a lot … How else to work with foreigners? You promise a favour for a 
favour’.718 In the FBI’s intercept, Podobny was recorded as calling Page an ‘idiot’ who 
‘wants to earn lots of money’ and did not consider him worth recruiting. 719 By 2015 the 
Podobny group was broken up and the FBI dropped the Page investigation.  
In his capacity as a Trump adviser, Page was invited to speak at the New 
Economic School in Moscow, where Obama had delivered a lecture during his visit in 
2009. The institution is private and defends its independence, although it naturally has 
links with senior government ministers. In 2016 the liberal deputy prime minister Arkady 
Dvorkovich was chair of its board. On 7 July Page delivered what is universally agreed to 
 
715  Jonathan Allen and Amie Parnes, Shattered: Inside Hillary Clinton’s Doomed Campaign 
(New York, Broadway Books, 2017). 
716 For more detail, see Kevin Gosztola, ‘It’s Time to Reckon with Clinton Democrats who 
Pushed Russiagate’, Medium.com, 26 March 2019, https://medium.com/@kevin_33184/its-time-
to-reckon-with-clinton-democrats-who-pushed-russiagate-9ecb67cb60ae. 
717  Personal discussion with Professor Greg Andrusz and Dr Peter Duncan, the two original 
examiners. See also Luke Harding and Stephanie Kirchgaessner, ‘Ex-Trump Adviser Carter Page 
Accused Academics who Twice Failed his PhD of Bias’, The Guardian, 22 December 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/22/trump-carter-page-phd-thesis-trump. 
718 Shane and Mazzetti, ‘The Plot to Subvert an Election’ 





have been a boring speech. He reprised his long-standing view that Washington’s policy 
should focus on the mutual interests between Russia and the US rather than on values 
such as democracy. According to the Steele dossier dated 19 July, Page met earlier that 
month with Igor Sechin, the head of Rosneft, Russia’s top oil company. According to 
Steele, Sechin was so keen to have sanctions lifted that he offered Page the opportunity to 
broker the sale of 19 per cent of Rosneft stock. 720 This would have been worth billions, 
and it is simply not credible to believe that Moscow would be willing to pay such vast 
sums for such dubious benefits or use such a political lightweight as the intermediary. In 
the same visit, Steele alleges that Page met with a senior figure in the presidential 
administration, Igor Diveykin, who told him that the Kremlin possessed not only a file of 
kompromat on Clinton but also on Trump, ‘which the latter should bear in mind in his 
dealings with them’. 
 In March 2016 Page was interviewed by the FBI, and later in the year a FISA 
warrant was taken out against him.721 Page was removed from any involvement in the 
Trump campaign on 24 September, so the point of the FISA surveillance is not clear. 
Strzok admits that the Steele dossier ‘ended debate as to whether we had probable cause 
for a FISA application’.722 The first 90-day FISA warrant against Page was issued on 21 
October, followed by three more on 12 January, 7 April and 29 June 2017. The warrants 
covered not only Page but also anyone with whom he was in contact under the so-called 
two-hop surveillance procedure – that is, anyone Page talked to, and anyone they in turn 
talked to.723 The repeated warrants have become the centrepiece of investigations into 
Russiagate malfeasance and FBI over-reach. Comey was intent on renewing the FISA 
applications to use Page surveillance as a window into the Trump camp, although by then 
Page was an outsider. To do so he relied excessively on the uncorroborated Steele 
dossier, a matter later investigated by the DoJ’s inpector general Michael Horowitz.724 
Four major issues stand out. First, the FISA court was not adequately informed 
that the information justifying the requests came from a dossier created by Fusion GPS, 
which was funded by the Clinton campaign. In the requests Steele is referred to as 
‘Source#1’. There is a page-long footnote about Steele’s background, but it is ambiguous 
about the credibility of Steele’s material. Even after the dubious source of the information 
became known, Comey signed off two more FISA warrants and even included 
information from the final, 13 December, memorandum. In other words, the FBI 
continued to use information from Steele even after his credentials and integrity had been 
questioned. As Judicial Watch president Tom Fitton notes, ‘The anti-Trump Russia 
“investigation” had Christopher Steele at its centre and his misconduct was no 
impediment to using information from his Russia intelligence collaborators to spy on the 
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Trump team. The corruption and abuse is astonishing’.725 Later, the FBI argued that the 
dossier was secondary in its investigation (and thus in the FISA warrants), by asserting 
that in fact it was the Papadopoulos material that prompted the investigation into alleged 
Russian election interference and the Trump campaign’s knowledge of Russian actions. 
That may be the case, but there no doubt that the FBI relied in large part on the dossier to 
obtain the surveillance warrants against Page.   
Second, the December 2019 Horowitz report found that an FBI lawyer doctored a 
CIA email to portray Page falsely to the FISA court as a Kremlin agent when he was 
really a CIA informant. On 17 August 2016 the CIA sent a note to the FBI stating that 
Page (described as ‘Individual #1’) had been approved as an ‘operational contact’ for the 
CIA from 2008 to 2013, and that he had provided information about his earlier contacts 
with Russian intelligence officers.726 Why, then, did the FBI application for the first FISA 
warrant not include information about Page’s work with the CIA? Even more pertinently, 
why did the FBI seek repeated warrants on the basis that Page was a secret Russian agent 
when they knew that he had worked as a CIA informant against Russia? Part of the 
answer emerged during the criminal investigation into the actions of Kevin Clinesmith, 
the FBI assistant general counsel working on Crossfire Hurricane, which emerged at the 
time when the fourth FISA warrant was being sought. An unidentified FBI supervisory 
special agent (SSA) wanted to know whether Page had ever been a ‘source’ and insisted 
on receiving a copy of the 17 August 2016 CIA message. Clinesmith forwarded it but 
doctored the text to add the words ‘and not a source’.727 Clinesmith was dismissed from 
the FBI in late 2019. 728 He later pleaded guilty to the felony of falsifying evidence to 
support the FISA warrant against Page. Before sentencing in December 2020 he agreed to 
a plea deal whereby he cooperated with the Durham investigation into Russiagate, which 
we shall discuss later. Later, in an extremely unusual move, the FISA court 
retrospectively retracted two of the four warrants, and barred any of the agents involved 
in the original warrants from submitting future applications.729 
Third, it was only in late October 2017 that the public and Congress first learned 
that the law firm Perkins Coie, on behalf of the DNC and Clinton’s campaign, hired the 
research form Fusion GPS, who in turn hired Steele, to investigate Trump’s Russia 
connections. This was confirmed in the four-page Nunes memo of 18 January, released 
by the Republican-controlled HPSCI on 2 February 2018. It revealed that Strzok opened 
the investigation into Trump-Russia collusion based on ‘information’ about 
Papadopoulos and not on the Steele dossier. Steele, the memo noted, was dropped as an 
FBI source because of contacts with the media. The memo went on to assert that the 
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dossier ‘formed an essential part’ of the case for the first FISA warrant, but none of the 
warrants disclosed the source of funding, and that Steele was dropped by the FBI because 
he ‘lied’ about his media and other disclosures, although he remained in contact with 
Bruce Ohr. The devastating conclusion of the Nunes memo is that the FBI and DoJ knew 
that the Steele dossier was unverified and paid for by Clinton and the Democrats, and 
compiled by someone who despised Trump, yet it was used to spy on a Trump 
associate.730 Nunes claimed that the FBI failed to alert the court to Steele’s anti-Trump 
agenda. As noted, a footnote in the first FISA warrant outlines Steele’s ties to the DNC 
and problematic political motivations but obscured more than it revealed. A Democratic-
led minority memo of 29 January 2018, prepared by ranking member Adam Schiff, 
sought to refute the charges. It insisted that the Steele dossier had nothing to do with 
opening Crossfire Hurricane, and that the justification for monitoring Page was ‘multi-
pronged’. It stressed information that was independent of the dossier, including ‘Page’s 
past relationships with Russian spies’, and noted that Page was interviewed by the FBI in 
March 2016 ‘about his contact with Russian intelligence, the very month Donald Trump 
named him a foreign-policy adviser’.731 The Schiff memo failed to mention that Page had 
been reporting to the CIA about his contacts with Russian intelligence, and instead the 
FBI used these contacts as the basis of the allegation that Trump was colluding with the 
Russians. The December 2019 Horowitz report confirms the Nunes version and noted 17 
mistakes, omissions, and acts of misconduct in applying for the original FISA warrant 
against Page in October 2017 (more on this below). 
Fourth, the pertinent question is the degree to which the FBI tried to corroborate 
the charges, and above all to verify the Steele dossier’s provenance and contents.732 This 
itself became the subject of partisan struggles. Congressional Democrats insisted that the 
agencies submit any such documents to them before publicising them, fearing that 
possible collusion with intelligence and law enforcement agencies would be revealed. As 
Trump’s lawyer John Dowd argued, ‘The entire enquiry appears to be the product of a 
conspiracy by the DNC, Fusion GPS – which sponsored the Steele dossier – and senior 
FBI intelligence officials to undermine the Trump presidency’. 733  Others stress the 
‘complicity of our allies, particularly Britain’, to explain why Trump ‘has refrained from 
unsealing and publicizing most memoranda, files, and court documents pertaining to the 
Trump-Russia investigation’s origins’.734 The bottom line is that the warrant applications 
obscured the Clinton campaign provenance of the Steele dossier and its credibility 
problems, and were ‘unabashed about using counterintelligence authorities to conduct a 
criminal investigation in the absence of a predicate crime’.735 
 
The Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) 
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On 29 November 2016 a letter from eight Democrats on the Senate Intelligence 
Committee asked Obama to declassify documents about ‘Russian active measures’, the 
evidence that underlay the 7 October statement. Obama did not declassify the material 
but instead asked Clapper to respond. 736 On 6 December Obama ordered Brennan to 
prepare a detailed ICA on Russian interference, to be delivered within a month. The 
timescale was very tight for such a complex investigation but ensured that it would be 
delivered while Obama was still president. Clapper took a leading role, supported by the 
CIA and NSA, and only ‘a small number of people within the three agencies would 
compile the study or even know about it’.737 
On 6 January 2017 the intelligence community published the 25-page document 
(with 10 blank pages) Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections, 
issued in the name of 17 intelligence agencies.738 It described itself as ‘a declassified 
version of a highly classified assessment’, and devoted the first two pages to the 
‘tradecraft’ involved in producing such a document. The analytic assessment covered the 
‘motivation and scope of Moscow’s intentions regarding US elections and Moscow’s use 
of cyber tools and media campaigns to influence US public opinion’.739 The document 
was prepared by DNI Clapper with the CIA and the NSA, but surprisingly, not the State 
Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), the body which had objected 
(it later turned out correctly) to aspects of the October 2002 Estimate on Iraq. Similarly, it 
was surprising that the DIA did not take the lead since it had the greatest expertise on 
Russia. Contrary to Clinton’s repeated assertions, the report was not prepared by ‘all 17 
intelligence agencies’. In fact, Clapper confessed on 8 May 2017 in testimony to the 
Senate that the authors were some two dozen ‘hand-picked seasoned experts from each of 
the [three] contributing agencies’ [the CIA, FBI and NSA]. 740  The outcome was 
determined by the choice of analysts.741  
Clapper’s views are clear. On 28 May 2017 in an NBC interview Clapper argued 
that Russians ‘are almost genetically driven to co-opt, penetrate, gain favour, whatever, 
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which is a typical Russian technique’.742 During a visit to Australia on 7 June Clapper 
criticised Trump for thinking that there could ever be substantive cooperation between 
Russia and the US. He condemned what he claimed to have been Russia’s attempt to 
interfere with the US presidential election. The objective, in his view, was ‘to sow doubt, 
discontent, and discord about our political system. They achieved, I am sure, beyond their 
wildest expectations’. He insisted that ‘The Russians are not our friends; they (Putin 
specifically) are avowedly opposed to our democracy and values, and see us as the cause 
of all their frustrations’. He claimed that ‘It is in their genes to be opposed, diametrically 
opposed to the United States and to Western democracies’, and assumedly to work for 
their downfall.743  
The paucity of hard evidence in the ICA is striking, and this is perhaps why the 
NSA endorsed the report with only ‘moderate’ confidence, compared to the FBI’s and 
CIA’s ‘high confidence’.744 The document argued that Putin ‘sought to use disclosures to 
discredit the image of the United States and cast it as hypocritical’ and asserted  
 
Russian efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential election represent the most 
recent expression of Moscow’s longstanding desire to undermine the US-led 
liberal democratic order, but these activities demonstrated a significant escalation 
in directness, level of activity, and scope of effort compared to previous 
operations.  
 
Crucially, the report went on state that  
 
We assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 
2016 aimed at the US presidential election. Russia’s goals were to undermine 
public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm 
her electability and potential presidency. We further assess Putin and the Russian 
Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump. We have 
high confidence in these judgments. 
 
Putin was held personally responsible, since he was angry that the US had used the 
Panama Papers and the Olympic doping scandal against him. The circularity of the 
argument is striking: the activity accorded with what the US intelligence community 
believed to be Russian motivations, and therefore the Russians must have been 
responsible, and the order must have come from the top. The report argued that  
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Moscow’s influence campaign followed a Russian messaging strategy that blends 
covert intelligence operations – such as cyber activity – with overt efforts by 
Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and 
paid social media users or ‘trolls’.745 
 
Moscow used fake social media personas (‘trolls’) and automated accounts (‘bots’) to 
influence the election. The report concluded that ‘Moscow will apply lessons learned 
from its Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the US presidential election to influence future 
efforts worldwide, including against US allies and their election processes’.746 
 The report noted that Russian intelligence had gained access to DNC networks in 
July 2015 and ‘maintained that access until at least June 2016’, while the GRU ‘probably 
began cyber operations aimed at the US election by March 2016’. 747  With ‘high 
confidence’ the ICA argued that the GRU ‘used the Guccifer 2.0 persona, DCLeaks.com, 
and WikiLeaks to release US victim data obtained in cyber operations publicly and in 
exclusives to media outlets’. 748  A large part of the report was devoted to ‘Russian 
propaganda efforts’ through ‘Russia’s state-run propaganda machine’, targeting global 
audiences through RT and Sputnik and a network of quasi-government trolls. From 
March 2016 they allegedly ‘began openly supporting President-elect Trump’s 
candidacy’. 749  The report noted that ‘The likely financier of the so-called Internet 
Research Agency of professional trolls located in Saint Petersburg is a close Putin ally 
with ties to Russian intelligence’.750 The election operation was described as the ‘new 
normal’ in Russian influence efforts, and that Russia ‘has sought to influence elections 
across Europe’.751  
Seven of the ICA’s 22 pages were taken up by Annex A, describing how 
‘Kremlin’s TV Seeks to Influence Politics, Fuel Discontent in US’. The annex was 
originally published in 2012 and described RT as a ‘Kremlin-financed channel operating 
within the United States’ and condemned its coverage of ‘US election’ fraud and the 
Occupy Wall Street movement. RT was not the only Western media channel to suggest 
that the American political system was ‘corrupt’ and dominated by corporations, or that 
America was a ‘surveillance state’ afflicted by police brutality.752 Annex B was devoted 
to the methodology of ‘estimative language’, noting that a ‘high confidence’ assessment 
is based on ‘high quality information from multiple sources’, although it ‘does not imply 
that the assessment is a fact or a certainty’.753 
 On 9 June 2020 DNI John Ratcliffe declassified the two-page so-called Annex A 
of the ICA (not to be confused with the other addendum on Russian media interference), 
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revealing that the FBI was wary about the Steele dossier.754 The FBI had been keen for 
everything, vetted and unvetted, to be included but the CIA disagreed, as did Michael 
Rogers of the NSA. The secret Annex was a compromise, with none of the ICA’s 
analytical conclusions to be drawn from the dossier or even refer to it, and the Annex 
would note the ‘limited corroboration’. The Annex begins by noting: ‘An FBI source, 
using both identified and unidentified subsources, volunteered highly politically sensitive 
information from the summer to the fall of 2016 on Russian influence efforts aimed at the 
US presidential election. We have only limited corroboration of the source reporting in 
this case and did not use it to reach the analytic conclusions of the CIA/FBI/NSA 
assessment’. The Annex noted the leaking of the material into the public domain: ‘The 
source’s reporting appears to have been acquired by multiple Western press organizations 
starting in October’. Referring to Steele, the Annex states  
 
The most politically sensitive claims by the FBI source alleged a close 
relationship between the President-elect and the Kremlin. The source claimed that 
the President-elect and his top campaign advisers knowingly worked with Russian 
officials to bolster his chances of beating Secretary Clinton; were fully 
knowledgeable of Russia’s direction of leaked Democratic emails; and were 
offered financial compensation from Moscow.  
 
Another point notes that ‘The FBI source claimed that the Kremlin had cultivated the 
President-elect for at least five years; had fed him and his team intelligence about 
Secretary Clinton and other opponents for years, and agreed to use WikiLeaks in return 
for policy concessions by the President-elect – assuming he won the election – on NATO 
and Ukraine’. The FBI was right to have been wary, and given the extravagant nature of 
the dossier’s claims, it is hardly surprising that it was relegated to a secret Annex.  
 
The long shadow 
 
A further matter of concern is the ‘oversized impact that private spies were suddenly 
having on politics, business and our personal lives’.755 Private agencies and political 
entrepreneurs, with unclear funding routes, were able to shape the political agenda with 
the connivance of those whose job it was precisely to protect against such interference in 
the relationship between the citizen and the state. Private spying has become big 
business, and Steele was at home in this twilight world whose currency is information. 
Unfortunately, much of it is counterfeit. In withering criticism, the journalist Masha 
Gessen (who is no friend of Putin) demonstrated with forensic skill that the headline 
conclusion that Putin ordered an ‘influence campaign’ to help Trump win the presidency 
was not supported by the evidence. She notes what strikes any reader: although the report 
is only 25 pages long, there is not much to read, after the various blank pages and 
extraneous materials are subtracted; and neither did it present anything new. The three 
‘key judgments’ were that: 1) ‘We assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an 
influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election’; 2) ‘Moscow’s 
influence campaign followed a Russian messaging strategy that blends covert intelligence 
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operations – such as cyber activity – with overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, 
state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or “trolls”’; 
and 3) ‘We assess Moscow will apply lessons learned from its Putin-ordered campaign 
aimed at the US presidential election to future influence efforts worldwide, including 
against US allies and their elections processes’.756 
 The first charge was based on the view that Moscow sought to discredit Clinton 
since Putin disliked her, accompanied by the broader goal of undermining ‘the US-led 
liberal democratic order’. This explains why after June 2016 Putin avoided praising 
Trump, since the Kremlin apparently feared that this would be counter-productive and 
undermine Trump’s pledge to work with Russia, especially over Ukraine and Syria. Thus, 
perversely, the absence of support for Trump is taken as proof of Russian collusion in his 
election. Equally, as Gessen notes, Putin earlier had not been exactly effusive in his 
praise of Trump, having mentioned him only twice before: after his press conference in 
December 2015 when he described Trump as ‘colourful’, and then in the follow-up 
conversation with Zakaria at SPIEF in June the following year. This exchange can hardly 
be used to demonstrate Russian ‘meddling’ in the US election, as the ICA suggested. The 
various other arguments purporting to show that Putin had a preference were even 
weaker, including the view that Putin hoped to create with Trump an international anti-
ISIS coalition (which in fact already existed, although not in the form proposed by Putin 
in his UN General Assembly speech on 28 September 2015); and that Putin liked to work 
with political leaders ‘whose business interests made them more disposed to deal with 
Russia’, such as former Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi or former German 
chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. In fact, Schroeder only moved into business (becoming 
chair of the shareholder’s committee of the Nord Stream 1 consortium) after he left the 
German chancellor’s office in November 2005. The report also suggested that Russian 
officials stopped criticising the US election system after Trump’s election, and cancelled 
the #DemocracyRIP campaign, planned to lament Clinton’s victory. In other words, 
Moscow had anticipated a Clinton victory, and was as surprised by the outcome as 
everyone else. As Gessen notes, ‘The logic of these arguments is as sound as saying 
“You were so happy to see it rain yesterday that you must have caused the rain 
yourself”’. The conclusion is devastating: ‘That is the entirety of the evidence the report 
offers to support its estimation of Putin’s motives for allegedly working to elect Trump: 
conjecture based on other politicians in other periods, on other continents – and also on 
misreported or mistranslated public statements’.757 
The rest of the ICA dealt with technical aspects of alleged Russian interference, 
including the hack of the DNC and its scanning of local electoral boards, although not of 
vote counting procedures, and the extensive and rather bizarre section dealing with 
Russia’s ‘state-run propaganda machine’, covering RT and Sputnik. Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky, the long-time head of the populist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 
(LDPR), was also considered part of the campaign. While aligned with the Kremlin on 
most major policy issues, the LDPR can hardly be considered representative of the Putin 
leadership. Zhirinovsky toasted Trump’s victory, but there is no evidence that the 
Kremlin celebrated. The ICA claimed that the Russian media ‘hailed President-elect 
Trump’s victory as a vindication of Putin’s advocacy of global populist movements – the 
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theme of Putin’s annual conference for Western academics in October 2016’. Having 
participated in that session, I can attest that the statement is fundamentally misleading. 
The theme of the annual Valdai Conference was ‘The Future Begins Today: Outlines of 
the World Tomorrow’ and examined challenges to global order. The debate was broad-
ranging and diverse, focusing on changes in the international system and the implications 
of global shifts in power.758 It certainly was not an endorsement of any state-directed 
populist subversion of liberal democracy. 
The reception of the ICA is as important as its contents. The media 
overwhelmingly accepted the various assessments as proof that Putin had intervened in 
the election, whereas the report failed to demonstrate that this was the case. It was even 
less convincing when it came to demonstrating that the social media campaign had any 
discernible effect. Instead, it was endlessly trumpeted that it would be hard to counter the 
assessment of 17 intelligence agencies, when as we have seen only three were involved, 
and then only select individuals drafted the report. Nevertheless, the report has been 
accepted as the canonical statement that the November 2016 election was distorted, 
reinforcing the view of those who argue that Trump’s election was illegitimate. Gessen 
concludes that  
 
the intelligence report does nothing to clarify the abnormalities of Trump’s 
campaign and election. Instead, it risks perpetuating the fallacy that Trump is 
some sort of foreign agent rather than a home-grown demagogue, while doing 
further damage to our faith in the electoral system. It also suggests that US 
intelligence agencies’ Russia expertise is weak and throws into question their 
ability to process and present information. 759  
 
The ICA was rejected by the HPSCI in March 2018, arguing that any influence exercised 
by Russia did not specifically favour Trump.760 The methodological point is taken up by 
Matlock. Although billed as an ‘intelligence community assessment’, in his view ‘A 
report of the intelligence community in my day would include the input of all the relevant 
intelligence agencies and reveal whether all agreed with the conclusions. Individual 
agencies did not hesitate to “take a footnote” or explain their position if they disagreed 
with a particular assessment. A report would not claim to be that of the “intelligence 
community” if any relevant agency was omitted’. Referring to Clapper’s selection of 
analysts, he noted that ‘if you can hand-pick the analysts, you can hand-pick the 
conclusions’, the same procedure that was applied in 2003 to report falsely that Saddam 
Hussein had stocks of WMD. Above all, he questions why the specialist expertise of the 
DIA, the DNI’s National Intelligence Council or that of the State Department’s INR was 
not used, and instead the FBI was drawn in. Worse, he was even informed by a senior 
official that the INR ‘did, in fact, have a different opinion but was not allowed to express 
it’. The ICA notes that the WikiLeaks DNC emails ‘did not contain any evident 
forgeries’, so ‘what was disclosed was the truth. Russians were accused of ‘degrading our 
democracy’ by ‘revealing that the DNC was trying to fix the nomination of a particular 
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candidate rather than allowing the primaries and state caucuses to run their course. I had 
always thought that transparency is consistent with democratic values’. He concludes that 
‘Prominent American journalists and politicians seized upon this shabby, politically 
motivated, report as proof of “Russian interference” in the US election without even the 




On 5 January, the day before the report was released, Obama was briefed by Clapper and 
the heads of the CIA, FBI and NSA on its contents, with Joe Biden and other senior 
officials in attendance. Although the Clapper team insisted that Russian interference was 
extensive, Obama clearly still had doubts. These were reinforced by a succession of VIPS 
memos questioning the hack theory, with another one published on 17 January 
demanding proof that Russia was responsible for the DNC intrusion.762 In his final press 
conference on 18 January Obama stated: ‘The conclusions of the intelligence community 
with respect to the Russian hacking were not conclusive as to whether WikiLeaks was 
witting or not in being the conduit through which we heard about the DNC emails that 
were leaked’.763 In other words, he accepted that there was reasonable doubt about how 
the material got to WikiLeaks. As for Trump, he sought to take advantage of the 
situation, and during the 2016 campaign repeatedly referred to WikiLeaks. From the 
FBI’s perspective, it was ‘problematic that a presidential candidate would use material 
stolen from a hostile foreign adversary for his own political gain’.764 
On 6 January the intelligence heads came to Trump Tower to see Trump. DNI 
head Clapper, CIA director Brennan, FBI director Comey and NSA Director Mike 
Rogers met to discuss the main talking points, and Clapper was designated to take the 
lead, in full awareness that the report would challenge the legitimacy of Trump’s win. 
Comey volunteered to stay behind and present the Steele dossier. As for the CIA, 
Brennan was haunted by the failures of his organisation in the Iraq War, accepting the 
account of a source code-named Curveball that Iraq had WMD. In the words of the CIA 
director at the time, George Tenet in his presentation to President Bush, it was a ‘slam 
dunk’.765 Although such extravagant language was avoided on this occasion, Clapper 
argued that Russia had a long-standing desire ‘to undermine the US-led liberal 
democratic order’, that Putin had ‘ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the 
US presidential election’ and ‘to undermine public faith in the US democratic process’, 
and had ‘developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump’. When it appeared that 
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Clinton would win, ‘the Russian influence campaign began to focus more on 
undermining her future presidency’.766  
Trump responded with his disturbing mix of shrewdness and belligerence. Trump 
evinced scepticism about the lack of sources for such a bold assessment, and it was clear 
to Clapper that ‘Trump was obsessed with anything that might challenge the legitimacy 
of his election victory’.767 Three days later Trump argued that the same people now 
warning against Russia were the same as those who had asserted that Saddam Hussein 
had WMD, and later that day told Fox News: ‘They have no idea if it’s Russia or China 
or somebody sitting in a bed some place’, and he tweeted ‘Unless you catch “hackers” in 
the act, it is very hard to determine who was doing the hacking. Why wasn’t this brought 
up before the election?.768 This was the start of a pattern in which Trump disparaged the 
‘intelligence community’ and condemned the Russia investigation as a ‘witch-hunt’. The 
intelligence community fought back. Already on 5 January Clapper told the Senate 
Armed Services Committee that ‘There’s a difference between scepticism and 
disparagement. Public trust and confidence in the intelligence community is crucial’.769 
Trump’s questioning of what could legitimately be considered dubious intelligence 
community information was condemned as undermining confidence in the intelligence 
community. This tautological noose around Trump affected not only his domestic agenda 
but above all his ability to conduct an independent Russia foreign policy. This 
exasperating logic culminated at the July 2018 Helsinki summit, when Trump was 
excoriated for failing to endorse intelligence assessments and the Mueller indictments (an 
indictment of course is not the same as a conviction).  
After the others had left Comey provided Trump with a two-page summary of the 
Steele dossier. 770 Comey gives a vivid account of the meeting, telling Trump that ‘the 
Russians allegedly had tapes involving him and prostitutes at the presidential suite at the 
Ritz Carlton in Moscow from about 2013’. Trump interjected ‘there were no prostitutes; 
there were never prostitutes’ and argued that he was ‘the type of guy who didn’t need to 
“go there”’. In any case, Trump ‘said he always assumed that hotel rooms he stayed in 
when he travels are wired in some way’.771 Comey stated that ‘We are not investigating 
you, sir’. ‘That seemed to quiet him’.772 Trump later stated that he felt that he had been 
‘shaken down’ by Comey. 773  The briefing gave the dossier a legitimacy that was 
unwarranted. It licensed CNN to reveal its existence on 8 January, which in turn 
provoked Buzzfeed to publish the report two days later.774 Clapper appears personally to 
have leaked Comey’s meeting with Trump to CNN.775  
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The day after publication, in his 11 January 2017 press conference Trump asked 
‘Does anybody really believe that story? I’m also very much of a germaphobe, by the 
way. Believe me’, and he excoriated CNN for having reported on the Steele dossier.776 
The episode intensified the war between Trump and the intelligence community. 777 
Trump was livid, and the day after the Steele dossier was published, he issued the 
intemperate tweet: ‘Intelligence agencies should never have allowed this fake news to 
“leak” into the public. One last shot at me. Are we living in Nazi Germany?’.778 In turn, 
the intelligence community was incensed by the comparison with the Nazis. Soon after 
the Senate Intelligence Committee, headed by Republican Richard Burr of North 
Carolina and Democratic vice chair Mark Warner of Virginia, announced the launch of a 
wide-ranging investigation into the alleged Russian attack on the American election, and 
the HPSCI soon followed suit. In the wake of the Church Committee’s inquiry into CIA 
abuses, standing intelligence committees had been set up in both the Senate and the 
House in 1976 to hold the intelligence services to account, but Russiagate proved a 
severe test. 
Woodward makes his view clear: ‘I was surprised, not at the allegations, which 
might be true, but that the intelligence chiefs, particularly the FBI director, would present 
any of this to Trump’.779 Clapper in his book Facts and Fears describes the ICA as ‘a 
landmark product – among the most important ever produced by US intelligence’, yet, 
Woodward notes, ‘almost as an afterthought, Comey had introduced the dossier as if to 
say, by the way, here is this scurrilous, unverified, unsupported footnote with some of the 
ugliest allegations against you. They wanted the formal assessment to be believed by the 
president-elect. Why pollute it with the dossier summary?’ Woodward argues that the 
Steele dossier is ‘a garbage document. It should never have been presented as part of an 
intelligence briefing’. 780  Wolff puts the point well: ‘The implicit conclusion: a 
compromised Trump had conspired with the Russians to steal the election and to install 
him in the White House as Putin’s dupe’. Wolff nicely lays out the options: ‘If this was 
true, then the nation stood at one of the most extraordinary moments in the history of 
democracy, international relations, and journalism’.781 Commentators took this as the 
unvarnished truth and sustained the Russiagate story for several years. But Wolff goes 
on: ‘If it was not true – and it was hard to fathom a middle ground – then it would seem 
to support the Trump view (and the Bannon view) that the media, in also quite a dramatic 
development in the history of democracy, was so blinded by an abhorrence and revulsion, 
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both ideological and personal, for the democratically elected leader that it would pursue 
any avenue to take him down’.782  
 







FLYNN AND THE RUSSIAN CONCUSSION 
 
 
Obama was condemned for not having been more assertive in ‘calling out’ Russia’s 
alleged interference. He made up for this in one of his last acts as president when on 29 
December 2016 he sanctioned the GRU and the FSB, four senior officers in the GRU, 
and three companies that provided technical support for the GRU’s cyber operations. In 
addition, the State Department expelled 35 Russian diplomats and closed two Russian-
owned compounds, one in Maryland and the other in New York, which had allegedly 
been used for espionage. By then it was allegedly too late: ‘A president beholden to 
Russia had been installed in the Oval Office: the most successful foreign espionage 
attempt against the United States in the nation’s history’. 783  The gulf between the 
enormity of this claim and the weakness of the evidence is the core of the Russiagate 
problem. Omarosa notes how the Trump presidency became defined by what insiders 




Michael Flynn was the controversial three-star general who as director of the DIA viewed 
Russia as a natural ally in what he considered a ‘world war’ against radical Islam, and to 
that end visited GRU headquarters in Moscow in June 2013.785 In 2010 he co-authored a 
scathing analysis of US intelligence failings in Afghanistan, which hardly enamoured him 
to the other security agencies.786 As head of the DIA from July 2012 he provided a 
critical assessment of the Syrian National Army’s fight against Al Qaeda and other 
jihadists, even though the CIA at the time was funding and training Syrian rebels. He was 
dismissed by Obama in August 2014 for alleged management failures, and possibly for 
his refusal to downplay the threat from anti-Damascus forces, earning him the enmity of 
Brennan and Clapper. 787 After retiring from the military Flynn established a consulting 
agency advising foreign governments, a venture that would later cause him major 
headaches. In 2015 Flynn warned Trump that although Russia had updated its strategic 
forces and ‘outsmarted us’, ‘You can’t just have one view of Russia’.788 In his book The 
Field of Fight, co-authored with the neoconservative hawk Michael Ledeen, Flynn called 
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for the war against radical Islam to be ramped up, and for greater confrontation with 
Iran.789 Flynn argued that Russia could be a potential ally against an ‘enemy alliance’ 
comprising such countries as Iran, Venezuela and North Korea.  
In an interview with the Washington Post’s security analyst Dana Priest, he 
bragged about being the only US officer allowed into the headquarters of the GRU.790 
Flynn was criticised for his paid visit to Moscow in December 2015 to celebrate RT’s 
tenth anniversary. At the dinner he was placed next to Putin, although given the formal 
nature of the occasion they hardly spoke.791 In an interview there he called for improved 
Russo-US relations to defeat ISIS (so-called Islamic State, Daesh). Above all, despite 
those like Democratic senator Al Franken of Minnesota, who suggested that Flynn posed 
a ‘danger to the republic’, Flynn alerted his former employer, the DIA, about his visit, 
and later debriefed intelligence officials on what he had learned during his trip. In short, 
‘Rather than a diplomatic embarrassment bordering on treason, Flynn’s conduct at the RT 
event provided some modest benefit to the US intelligence community’.792 Nevertheless, 
Obama’s doubts about Flynn’s judgment were confirmed when at the Republican 
National Convention on 18 July 2016 he led shouts of ‘lock her up’ against Clinton. A 
month later, on 16 August, the FBI started a counter-intelligence probe against him called 
Crossfire Razor.793 After the election Obama warned Trump against employing Flynn, 
but the advice was ignored and on 18 November Flynn was designated national security 
advisor. There were always doubts about Flynn’s suitability for the post, with Kissinger 
predicting that ‘He’ll be gone within a year’.794 In fact, he lasted a mere 24 days in office.  
Flynn and others in the Trump transition team swiftly became engaged in frantic 
diplomatic activity. Between election day and the inauguration Kushner met with over a 
hundred people from more than twenty countries. On 1 December Flynn and Kushner 
met the Russian ambassador Kislyak in Trump Tower where they discussed how to 
improve relations and the situation in Syria. Kushner advanced the surprising idea of 
establishing a private communication channel between the Trump team and the Kremlin, 
including possibly using encryption equipment in the Russian embassy, an idea rejected 
by Kislyak – not the action of a man engaged in collusion.795 On 13 December Kushner 
met Sergei Gorkov, a top executive at VEB (Vnesheconombank), to gauge how Putin 
 
789 Michael T. Flynn and Michael Ledeen, The Field of Fight: How we can Win the Global War 
against Radical Islam and its Allies (New York, St Martin’s Griffin, 2017). 
790 Nance, The Plot to Hack America, p. 55. 
791 This comes from Putin: ‘Putin’s Dinner with Michael Flynn – “I Didn’t Even Really Talk to 
Him”’, Reuters, 4 June 2017, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-russia-usa-putin/putins-dinner-
with-michael-flynn-i-didnt-even-really-talk-to-him-idUKKBN18V0XX. 
792 John Solomon, ‘Exculpatory Russia Evidence about Mike Flynn that US Intel Kept Secret’, 
The Hill, 2 January 2019, https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/423558-exculpatory-russia-
evidence-about-mike-flynn-that-us-intel-kept-secret. 
793  Eli Lake, ‘The Railroading of Michael Flynn’, Commentary, June 2020, 
https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/eli-lake/michael-flynn-gets-railroaded-by-the-
fbi/. 
794 Bolton, Room Where it Happened, p. 7. 





viewed the new administration and how to work together.796 Then, in late December 
Flynn held a series of conversations with Kislyak, which in the end precipitated his 
downfall.  
In his press conference on 16 December Obama lamented that the election had 
been ‘dominated by a bunch of leaks’, insisting that ‘The Russians can’t change us or 
significantly weaken us’. He revealed his condescending view: ‘They are a smaller 
country. They are a weaker country. Their economy doesn’t produce anything that 
anybody wants to buy, except oil and gas and arms’.797 On 28 December he signed 
Executive Order 13757 imposing exceptionally tough measures, to take effect the next 
day. It is not clear why Obama waited until just three weeks before the inauguration, with 
KT McFarland, Flynn’s deputy, suspecting a trap to discredit the incoming 
administration.798 On 28 December Kislyak contacted Flynn about bilateral relations and 
the planned measures. Although Flynn is often represented as a maverick, in fact he 
coordinated his response with the White House in waiting. On 29 December Flynn called 
senior Trump transition officials and after a 20-minute discussion with McFarland the 
transition team at Mar-a-Lago ‘hoped Russia would not ratchet up the aggression in 
responding to Obama’s move’.799 Flynn then asked Kislyak for Russia not to retaliate, to 
which Putin agreed on 30 December. On 31 December Kislyak told Flynn that his request 
had shaped the response. Foreign minister Lavrov initially warned that Russia would 
respond reciprocally,800 but later commented positively: Flynn ‘urged us not to take the 
path of escalation and confrontation. Was that so bad? Was it against the interests of the 
American people or the American government that a potential member of the 
administration urged us not to harm the American diplomatic mission in the Russian 
Federation, not to take away property or expel diplomats?’.801 
One of the first acts of the new DNI, John Ratcliffe, on 29 May 2020 was to 
declassify and release the record of the eight calls between Kislyak and Flynn between 22 
December 2016 and 19 January 2017, five of which were initiated by Kislyak and three 
by Flynn (two of which were return calls requested by Kislyak). 802 The early calls dealt 
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with an Egyptian UN Security Council resolution condemning Israeli settlements. In its 
final days, the Obama administration allowed the resolution condemning Israeli 
settlement-building in the West Bank to be placed on the UN Security Council’s agenda, 
and then decided not to veto it. Obama had a testy relationship with the Israeli prime 
minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, but the timing of the contentious resolution, whether by 
chance or design (like the punitive measures against Russia), embarrassed the incoming 
administration. The Trump team sought to get Security Council members to delay or 
abstain, and Flynn specifically asked the Russians not to support the motion (he made 
similar calls to the other UNSC members). However, in the 23 December call Kislyak 
told Flynn that Russia would not vote against the resolution. 803  In response, Trump 
tweeted that the UN was ‘just a club for people to get together, talk’, and threatened that 
‘things will be different after January 20’.804 Flynn’s call to Kislyak on this issue and 
others was recorded by the NSA. 
The crucial 29 December Flynn return call to Kislyak began with this topic. 
Kislyak reiterated that Russia would not support the US position but stressed that 
Moscow was very interested in working with the new team on the peace process in Syria. 
The Kremlin sought a conversation on 21 January to congratulate Trump and discuss 
issues. The topic that would prove to be Flynn’s downfall only came fourth, with Flynn 
telling Kislyak  
 
Do not allow this administration to box us in right now! … depending on what 
actions the Obama Administration takes over this current issue of the cyber stuff 
… they’re gonna dismiss some number of Russians out of the country, I 
understand all that … I know you have to have some sort of action, but to only 
make it reciprocal; don’t go any further than you have to because I don’t want us 
to get into something that have to escalate to tit-for-tat … I really do not want us 
to get into the situation where we everybody goes back and forth and everybody 
had to be a tough guy here. We don’t need that right now. We need cool heads to 
prevail. And we need to be very steady about what we are going to do because we 
have absolutely a common threat in the Middle East. 
 
After some more discussion, Flynn repeats the request to reciprocate modestly, since if 
another 60 US personnel were expelled ‘you will shut down the embassy’. The most 
important thing was to ‘keep this at even-kill level’ to allow ‘a better conversation where 
we are going to go regarding our relationship’, above all to work together against 
common enemies, above all in the Middle East. The call ends with Flynn stressing 
‘Remember Ambassador, you are not talking to a diplomat; you are talking to a soldier. I 
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am a very practical guy. It’s all about solutions’. The transcript shows that Obama’s 
sanctions were discussed, but only to the extent that they were an obstacle to rethinking 
the Russo-US relationship and the ability to cooperate against common enemies. 
Kislyak certainly considered Obama’s measures a deliberate attempt to poison 
relations with the incoming administration. In his view, the allegations against Russia 
were sour grapes by the losers of the presidential election. In his 31 December call to 
Flynn, Kislyak says ‘And I just wanted to tell you that we found that these [Obama’s] 
actions [were] targeted not only against Russia, but also against the president-elect … and 
with all our rights to respond we have decided not to act now because, its because people 
are dissatisfied with the lost … elections and, and its very deplorable’. Flynn responded 
‘we are not going to agree on everything, you know that, but, but I think that we have a 
lot of things in common. A lot. And we have to figure out how, how to achieve those 
things  … and be smart about it and keep the temperature down globally, as well as not 
just here in the United States and also over in Russia’. The final voicemail from Kislyak 
on 19 January enquired about scheduling the previously mentioned phone call between 
Trump and Putin after the inauguration on 21 January. Flynn did not return the call, 
which meant that Putin was not the first to congratulate Trump on his inauguration. By 
then Flynn was engulfed in his own struggle for survival, but on 28 January Trump told 
Comey ‘that he has serious reservations about Mike Flynn’s judgment’. He was furious 
about the missed call with Putin and blamed Flynn.805 However, a fortnight later, on 14 
February, he defended Flynn, stressing to Comey that his call with the Russians ‘was not 
wrong in any way’, but ‘the leaks were terrible’806  
The Flynn probe launched in August had come up empty, and by 4 January the 
relevant case agent, Joe Pientka, prepared to close the Crossfire Razor file on the grounds 
that there was ‘no derogatory evidence’. The Closing Communication was drafted, but at 
the last minute Strzok sent a text saying ‘Hey, if you haven’t closed [the Flynn case], 
don’t do so yet’. He explained that the ‘seventh floor involved’, referring to Comey and 
McCabe. The reason for the change was the phone calls with Kislyak.807 On the eve of 
the presentation of the ICA, at an Oval Office meeting on 5 January Obama was briefed 
by intelligence leaders. In a follow-on meeting, attended inter alia by Comey, acting 
attorney general Sally Yates, vice president Joe Biden and national security advisor 
Susan Rice, Obama asked how much privileged information gathered by the NSC about 
Russia should be shared with the incoming Trump administration, and in particular 
Flynn. He insisted, curiously, that the FBI should do everything ‘by the book’, as if that 
would not be normal procedure in this case. A declassified email from Rice to herself 
dated 20 January notes that Comey affirmed that he was proceeding ‘by the book’, but he 
noted that Flynn was speaking frequently with Kislyak. Obama then asked directly 
whether ‘the NSC should not pass sensitive information related to Russia to Flynn’. 
Comey answered ‘potentially’ but added that he so far had no indication that Flynn had 
passed classified information to Kislyak, but he noted that ‘the level of communication is 
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unusual’.808  In June 2020 the DoJ made Strzok’s notes on the meeting available to 
Flynn’s new attorney, Sidney Powell, who had made her name years earlier in 
questioning the work of the Enron investigators.809 There is some confusion over the date 
and precise attendance, and although Strzok is not listed as a participant he must have 
been there to take notes.810 The notes imply a top level attempt to keep the Flynn case 
going, with Obama directing that ‘the right people’ investigate the case, even though up 
to then no wrongdoing had been discovered. 811  The controversial character of the 
discussion at the meeting has been used to justify Trump’s claims that the outgoing 
administration was out to get him.812 
This was the meeting when Yates learnt about the calls. In the next fortnight she 
became increasingly concerned about the efforts to keep the Trump team in the dark 
about the Flynn probe, finding Comey’s explanation of the investigation ‘confusing and 
inconsistent’.813 Yates believed that the White House should have been informed. At that 
meeting Comey raised the idea that Flynn may have violated the Logan Act of 30 January 
1799, which forbids negotiation by unauthorised persons with foreign powers with whom 
the US is in conflict. In over 200 years no-one had ever been successfully prosecuted 
under this statute, and no one had even been charged with its violation since the Civil 
War. The Strzok notes reveal that Biden, who had earlier claimed no knowledge of the 
Flynn probe, endorsed the idea that Flynn had somehow violated the Act. Yates was 
sceptical, but deputy attorney general Rod Rosenstein’s ‘scope memo’ of 2 August 2017 
on the Mueller investigation authorised him to investigate whether Flynn had ‘committed 
a crime or crimes by engaging in conversations with Russian government officials during 
the period of the Trump transition’.814 As the incoming national security adviser, it would 
have been surprising if he had not. Instead, the FBI leadership investigated Flynn’s 
conversation with Kislyak as some sort of criminal offence. 
Pientka’s memo moving to close the investigation, given to Flynn’s counsel only 
in April 2020, revealed that one of the predicates to open the probe was the tip-off from a 
confidential human source (possibly Halper) about Flynn’s contact with a person with 
links to the Russian state. The person in question is redacted but is most likely to be 
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Svetlana Lokhova, who met Flynn and travelled in a car with him after a Cambridge 
University seminar in 2016. Far from Lokhova acting as some sort of honey trap on 
behalf of the Kremlin, the whole story smacks of a fabrication. This did not stop the FBI 
trawling the intelligence files to find something against Flynn, but after drawing a blank 
the case was about to be closed. It was revived when David Ignatius, a reporter with ‘long 
ties to the intelligence community’,815 published his column in the Washington Post on 
12 January about the Kislyak calls and the sanctions issue.816 The whole issue exploded 
into the public domain and set the wheels in motion that would crush Flynn. When 
Priebus, the incoming White House chief of staff and other officials questioned Flynn 
about the 12 January article, he insisted that he had not discussed sanctions. He repeated 
that claim to vice president Michael Pence and to press secretary Sean Spicer, and they in 
turn repeated this in press interviews.817 When on 15 January Pence appeared on CBS’s 
Face the Nation he was asked about Ignatius’s column, and Pence averred that Trump 
had won ‘fair and square’ and when asked about the Flynn calls declared ‘I can confirm, 
having spoken to him about it’, that Flynn’s calls ‘had nothing whatsoever to do with 
those sanctions’.818 When it emerged that in fact sanctions (or more accurately, Obama’s 
punitive measures) had been part of the conversations, Pence was furious.819 At issue is 
the question of what precisely is meant by ‘discussing’ sanctions with Kislyak; does a 
request not to retaliate represent discussion? A genuine discussion would have entailed 
exploring how to get the painful sanctions lifted, and this was not discussed. 
Telephone conversations of foreign officials are routinely recorded, but US law 
stipulates that security agencies have to ‘minimise’ (that is, keep secret) the names of any 
Americans caught up in such tapping. This was a legitimate transition call with the 
Russian ambassador, but in this case the material was made available to Yates. She told 
the White House that Flynn’s conversation with Kislyak had been recorded as part of the 
‘incidental collection’ of authorised wiretaps, but the outgoing administration ‘unmasked’ 
Flynn’s identity – which is illegal.820 On 26 January Yates told White House counsel 
Donald McGahn that intercepts showed that Flynn had not been truthful about his 
discussions with Kislyak, and she feared that Flynn could consequently become a target 
for Kremlin blackmail. This does not make sense, since even if he misrepresented the true 
character of his conversation to Pence about his conversations with Kislyak, this was 
hardly a blackmailing matter.821 If the Kremlin did want to blackmail Flynn they would 
have had no leverage, since Flynn had coordinated the Kislyak strategy with the Trump 
transition team.  
Flynn repeatedly denied discussing sanctions, but the version of the recordings 
that made their way to the Washington Post in a further leak published on 9 February 
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provided classified information revealing that the issue was at least implied. 822  The 
Obama punitive measures had been discussed, but not the broader issue of Ukraine-
linked sanctions. Nevertheless, Flynn’s position became untenable. McFarland believes 
that ‘Flynn was targeted from the beginning by some highly placed intelligence 
community and Justice Department officials, as a way to get to Trump’.823 Ultimately, the 
leaks created a media furore that reignited the Trump-Russia investigation and destroyed 
Flynn.824 
This is the background to Flynn’s fateful interview with the FBI on 24 January. 
The meeting was set up by McCabe, who called Flynn that day on other matters and 
casually suggested a talk with the agents.825 McCabe told Flynn that he did not need a 
lawyer, and the FBI agents Brandon Van Grack and Peter Strzok did not warn him that he 
would be speaking under caution, allegedly because they wanted Flynn to be at ease.826 
Strzok and Pientka agreed not to show Flynn the transcript of the Kislyak call, inform 
him that he was the subject of a criminal or counter-intelligence investigation, or warn 
him that it was a crime to lie to the FBI. Bill Priestap, the FBI’s counter-intelligence 
head, was uncomfortable about not warning Flynn or informing the White House that 
Flynn was being interviewed, and he was not clear about the goal. 827  The chaotic 
character of the White House at the time allowed this to happen. Flynn believed the 
interview was purely informational, but as an intelligence professional he was cautious 
and stressed that he could not recall precisely what was said or whether he asked Kislyak 
for Russia not to retaliate. The FBI’s official record of the conversation (known as a 302 
report) confirms that Flynn was non-committal, and that he did not directly deny talking 
about sanctions with Kislyak and instead stated that he could not remember, was not sure 
and even conceded that it was possible.828 The agents did not believe that Flynn sought to 
lie or cover anything up, but as Strzok put it, ‘Flynn hadn’t behaved as if he were lying. 
But what he had said wasn’t true’.829 It appeared that the recommendation once again 
would be to close the case. However, documents disclosed by the DoJ in May 2020 
revealed that the draft 302 was prepared by Pientka, but it was then heavily edited by 
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Strzok, who believed that Flynn had ‘repeatedly and inexplicably lied’.830 It was then 
revised further by FBI lawyer Lisa Page, who had not even attended the interview, and 
this version was never given to the court but instead a summary of the interview, a very 
unusual procedure.831  
The agents did not believe that Flynn had knowingly lied to them, but the 
discrepancy between the transcript of his phone conversation and the interview 
apparently opened him up to blackmail (kompromat) by the Kremlin, and hence the case 
was kept open. The classified transcript of the conversation with Kislyak released in May 
2020 showed that Flynn’s behaviour was appropriate for an incoming national security 
advisor. The DoJ later argued that this was entirely consistent with US national 
interests.832 Pence also later reversed his position and on 11 May 2020 declared that he no 
longer believed that Flynn had lied to him and would welcome Flynn back to the White 
House.833 Ultimately, as Glenn Greenwald argues, ‘There was no valid reason for the FBI 
to have interrogated Flynn about his conversations with Kislyak in the first place. There 
is nothing remotely untoward or unusual – let alone criminal – about an incoming senior 
national security figure, three weeks away from taking over, reaching out to a counterpart 
in a foreign government to try to tamp down tensions’.834 As a later report notes, ‘If the 
goal was a legal trap, it worked’. The FBI agents had seen ‘unmasked’ transcripts of 
Flynn’s calls with Kislyak but did not warn him that this was the case. Flynn was relaxed, 
especially since the counter-intelligence probe into the Trump-Russia connection was 
secret, and he had done nothing wrong.835 Nevertheless, the leaked transcripts allegedly 
showing discrepancies in his account made Flynn’s position untenable. The official 
reason given for Flynn’s resignation on 13 February was that he had lied to Pence, but 
Flynn continues to argue that he had been misrepresented. Nevertheless, his career as an 
administration official was over. 
This was the beginning of intensifying difficulties for Flynn. He was investigated 
for failing to file income from Turkey or to report overseas contacts, and his failure to 
register as a lobbyist before joining the Trump administration. In August 2016 Flynn 
accepted a contract with the Dutch firm Inovo BV to work on a project to investigate and 
defame Fetullah Gulen, an influential exiled Turkish cleric resident in Pennsylvania who 
had turned from ally to bitter enemy of Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Flynn 
was threatened with criminal prosecution on the grounds that he had violated FARA. 
Flynn faced mounting legal fees, as did his son, also called Michael, who was also being 
investigated. On 1 December 2017 Flynn pleaded guilty to a single charge of lying to the 
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FBI about the two conversations with Kislyak and promised to cooperate with the Russia 
investigation. As part of the plea deal, Mueller recommended no jail time. Pleading guilty 
to lying offered a lifeline out of what was becoming an escalating series of charges. 
Flynn was under siege but so was the Trump administration. On 14 February the 
New York Times ran a story stating ‘Phone records and intercepted calls show that 
members of Donald J. Trump’s presidential campaign and other Trump associates had 
repeated contacts with senior Russian intelligence officials in the year before the 
elections, according to four current and former American officials’. In fact, there was no 
basis to the story. On 8 June Comey testified under oath to the Senate intelligence 
committee that the NYT story ‘In the main, it was not true’.836 McCabe was more robust 
in his refutation, telling Priebus ‘It’s total bullshit … it’s not true, and we want you to 
know to know that. It’s grossly overstated’.837 Nevertheless, the issue was turned to look 
as if the White House was trying to suppress the story. Communications ‘between the 
Russian government and an incoming administration is a routine part of transition 
business’. 838  However, in the Trump era nothing was routine as the Trump-Russia 
collusion charges rendered everything abnormal and destructive. 
Flynn was replaced by H. R. McMaster who, interestingly in light of the deception 
examined in this book, in 1997 published Dereliction of Duty, an indictment of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and national leadership for the lies that led to the debacle in Vietnam. He 
concluded that more troops, more bombing and a land invasion of North Vietnam could 
have won the war.839 McMaster was one of the ‘adults in the room’ who blocked some of 
Trump’s worst instincts, but also blunted his attempts to end America’s ‘forever’ wars. 
As for Flynn, a precedent was set for disrupting the peaceful transition of presidential 
power. The ‘resistance’ to Trump stressed the importance of institutions and due process, 
yet in this case the new president’s national security adviser was embroiled in a ‘spurious 
investigation’ and his career and reputation ruined, while the perpetrators went 
unpunished.840 
 
The Comey gyration  
 
Comey is an old-style American public servant, with a strong sense of civic duty and 
commitment to American democratic institutions. This at least is how he presents himself 
in his memoirs. As deputy attorney general in 2004 he was prepared to resign in protest 
against the use of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ (aka torture) by the Bush 
administration. 841  He movingly describes the moment when Obama appointed him 
director of the FBI in summer 2013, recognising that an informal talk would no longer be 
possible once appointed: ‘for over forty years [since the days of J. Edgar Hoover, who 
ran the FBI for 48 years from 1924 to 1972], the leaders of our government had 
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understood that a president and an FBI director must be at arm’s length’.842 This is not 
the way that Trump understood matters. Comey describes the gruesome tête-à-tête dinner 
on 27 January 2017 in which Trump tried to impose a patronage relationship by asking 
whether he wanted to keep his job – although on more than one occasion Trump had 
confirmed that he wanted Comey to stay in post. Comey assured Trump that he could 
count on him to be ‘reliable’. This was not enough, and Trump then expostulated: ‘I need 
loyalty. I expect loyalty’.843  Comey promised ‘honesty’, which Trump interpreted as 
‘honest loyalty’.844 On escaping, Comey wrote up detailed notes on the conversation, 
which became his practice after all meetings with Trump.845 Lewandowski and Bossie 
stress that Trump values loyalty above all else in employees.846 Omarosa notes, ‘His 
[Trump’s] moblike loyalty requirements are exacting, imperishable, and sometimes 
unethical (as in James Comey’s case’). 847  
Trump soon became impatient with Comey, especially when the latter repeatedly 
refused to confirm publicly that he was not under investigation. Trump nevertheless may 
well owe the presidency to him. Comey made two decisive public statements about 
Clinton’s emails: the 5 July 2016 announcement that on his own initiative he was 
dropping the email probe; and on 28 October that he was restarting it. Although the 5 
July announcement condemned Clinton’s conduct as ‘extremely careless’, his decision to 
drop the case pre-empted that of the DoJ.848 Such matters are usually the prerogative of 
prosecutors attached to the DoJ and not the FBI (a department of the DoJ). However, DoJ 
head, attorney general Loretta Lynch, had been compromised by a chance encounter with 
Bill Clinton on the tarmac at Phoenix airport in Arizona on 27 June. Comey now took it 
upon himself to speak on behalf of the whole investigation, believing that it was matter of 
ensuring that the ‘reservoir of trust’ in the independence of the FBI had to be 
maintained.849 He used Russia to explain his odd behaviour, suggesting that classified 
information prompted him to act in this way. It is alleged that at some point in 2016 the 
FBI received unverified Russian intelligence about purported emails from Lynch to a 
member of the Clinton team in which she promised to go easy on Clinton. Although this 
information was almost certainly false, Comey allowed it to shape his action, fearing that 
should such exchanges become public the FBI would be discredited.850 The tortuous logic 
is typical of Comey, whose ‘loyalty was to his own conception of the truth’ rather than to 
the law and institutions.851 A later DoJ investigation found Comey’s behaviour to be 
‘extraordinary and insubordinate’, and his justifications unpersuasive.852 
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His revival of the email enquiry on 28 October is also closely bound up with 
Russia. Comey reopened the investigation ‘to maintain the credibility of his original 
intervention’, which was presented as part of a normal criminal enquiry and not a 
counter-intelligence operation. But, ‘Let’s get to the bottom line. A handful of US 
intelligence officials, with Mr. Comey out front, meddled in the presidential race, 
potentially altering its outcome. They did so on grounds that they were somehow 
protecting America from Russia. This was their rationale for getting around the obvious 
and important inhibitions against such meddling’. 853  In other words, the substantive 
Russian influence on the contest was not what it did, but the response of others to what 
they imagined Russia may have done. Moreover, Comey’s justification for his actions is 
illogical. He feared that false information could leak, and thus discredit Obama’s DoJ by 
suggesting collusion between Clinton and Obama; but if the material did enter the public 
domain, they would still have to deal with the accusation, now compounded by Comey’s 
action. There is therefore only one inescapable conclusion: Comey was ‘trying to give the 
Obama administration a hand in clearing up the email problem of its anointed successor. 
Mr Comey himself has admitted that he might not have taken his second fateful 
intervention if he was not certain Mrs Clinton was going to win anyway’. Throughout, 
ostensible concerns about Russian intelligence activities were opportunistically entwined 
with anti-Trump motives. 854  The Clinton campaign has a justified grievance that 
reopening the email investigation just days before the election had a devastating effect on 
her campaign. However, by the same token, the Trump camp also has a legitimate claim 
that the collusion narrative undermined his support. 
 This leads us back to Comey’s fateful decision to start the Crossfire Hurricane 
counter-intelligence investigation on 31 July 2016. On the day that Comey dropped the 
probe into Clinton’s emails, 5 July, Steele met FBI agent Gaeta and thereafter peddled his 
material to various other official contacts.855  Bruce Ohr testified to Congress on 28 
August 2018 that he met with Steele on 30 July and received information about his 
dossier, which he immediately took to the FBI’s then deputy director McCabe and Lisa 
Page, counsel to McCabe, and the investigation was started the following day. In August 
he briefed Strzok and the DoJ’s deputy assistant attorney Bruce Schwartz, lawyer Zainab 
Ahmad and Criminal Fraud section head Andrew Weissmann. With a reputation as an 
aggressive white-collar prosecutor, Weissmann in June 2017 took on a managerial role in 
the Mueller investigation. He had been deputy and later director of the Enron task force, 
investigating the affairs of the Texas energy company in the early 2000s. In that capacity 
he doggedly investigated the failings of the illustrious accounting firm Arthur Andersen, 
leading to its closure with the worldwide loss of 85,000 jobs. Some years later his 
convictions would be unanimously reversed by the Supreme Court.856 Ohr made no bones 
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about the fact that the material came from the Clinton camp, and told the others that 
Steele was ‘desperate that Donald Trump not get elected’, and that his wife Nellie Ohr, a 
former CIA analyst and expert on Russia, had been working for Fusion GPS since 
October 2015. Ohr sounded these warning before the FBI filed its first application for a 
surveillance warrant against Carter Page in October.  
This is important, because the ‘FBI and Justice Department have gone to 
extraordinary lengths to muddy these details’. Schiff, the HPSCI’s top Democrat, 
incorrectly stated in January 2017 that the FBI probe team only received Steele’s 
reporting in mid-September. This dating is designed to support the claim that the dossier 
played no part in the unprecedented decision to investigate a presidential campaign. The 
Papadopoulos material kick-started the probe, but it stretches credulity to believe that a 
stray conversation by a low-level campaign aide reported two months later by a foreign 
official could have sparked such a high-level response. The Ohr testimony also suggests 
that the FBI misled the FISA court in its warrant application. The FBI not only failed to 
inform the court that it knew that the dossier came from a rival campaign, but it also 
averred that Steele was ‘reliable’ and that his material was ‘credible’. 857  The FBI 
effectively endorsed the ‘uncorroborated narrative that Donald Trump and Russia were 
trying to hijack the presidential election’. Between July and October 2016 Clinton 
officials made over half a dozen attempts to get suspect evidence into the hands of FBI 
counter-intelligence officials. It was a ‘classic case of information saturation’; to inject 
political opposition research (known as ‘oppo’) into the FBI machinery. The FBI’s 
counter-intelligence apparatus was ‘weoponized with political opposition research from 
one campaign against its rival’.858 This was reason enough to dismiss Comey. 
Comey’s memoirs are remarkably unreflective about the Russiagate affair. 
Instead, he repeats three key points: that Russia ‘sought to undermine confidence in the 
American democratic enterprise’; ‘the Russians wanted to hurt Hillary Clinton’; and 
‘Putin wanted to help Donald Trump win’.859 He notes that the FBI learned in late July 
2016 that Papadopoulos had earlier discussed obtaining damaging emails from the 
Russian government, and this is what prompted the FBI to open the investigation, 
although it was only made public in March 2017. 860  He thus discounts the Steele dossier, 
which he only mentions in the context of him making its contents known to Trump on 6 
January 2017. On that day, as Comey puts it, ‘We were sneaking in to tell him [Trump] 
what Russia had done to try to help elect him’.861 Comey asserts that he was delegated by 
the other agencies to make the presentation, but Brennan suggests that Comey 
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unilaterally decided to do this.862 He briefed Trump on the existence of the Steele dossier, 
but failed to mention that it had been sponsored by the Clinton campaign and the 
Democratic Party. He also focused on the most ‘salacious and unverified’ parts of the 
dossier and avoided talking about the most controversial aspects suggesting that the 
Trump team was colluding with the Russians. McFarland provides a vivid eyewitness 
account of the dramatic events of these weeks and argues that the meeting was ‘a 
blackmail attempt. Comey had information on Trump. It all turned out to be lies. Comey 
knew it was a lie’.863 
By hiding its origins, Comey prevented Trump from defending himself 
adequately.864 Comey told the president-elect that the FBI was not currently investigating 
him, although the broader question of possible collusion with Russia had been under 
investigation since the previous July. Comey describes the droll affair at a reception on 
22 January for law enforcement agencies in the White House. Comey sought to blend in 
with the curtains to avoid being noticed, but Trump called him to the front and tried to 
hug him while whispering in his ear ‘I’m really looking forward to working with you’. 
This looked to TV viewers like an embrace: ‘The whole world “saw” Donald Trump kiss 
the man who some believed got him elected’. 865 The next meeting on 27 January was the 
one-on-one dinner. His next encounter with Trump was on 8 February, just after the 
notorious Bill O’Reilly interview on Fox News when Trump had been pressed whether 
he ‘respected’ Putin. ‘I do respect him’, Trump said. ‘but I respect a lot of people. That 
doesn’t mean that I’m going to get along with him’. ‘But he’s a killer’, O’Reilly said. 
‘Putin’s a killer’. Trump sensibly answered ‘There are a lot of killers. We’ve got a lot of 
killers’ … ‘What do you think? Our country’s so innocent?’.866 Trump asked what he was 
supposed to do: ‘Say I don’t respect the leader of a major country I’m trying to get along 
with?. 867 The required response would have been ritual condemnation of Putin and his 
regime, something that Trump refused to do, reinforcing the suspicion that Moscow 
exercised some power over him.868  
Their meeting on 14 February was devoted to the Flynn affair. The president 
insisted that Flynn ‘is a good guy’, and there was nothing wrong in talking with the 
Russians, but he had misled the vice president. He then said: ‘I hope you can see your 
way clear to letting this go. … He is a good guy. I hope you can let this go’.869 Comey 
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certainly wasn’t going to let the matter drop, and the rift between the two men widened. 
On 20 March Comey dropped the bombshell to Nunes’ HPSCI that the FBI was not only 
investigating Russian meddling in the election, but also ‘the nature of any links between 
individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian government and 
whether there was any coordination between the campaign and Russia’s efforts’.870 On 30 
March Trump called Comey at the FBI to ask him to ‘lift the cloud of this Russia 
business’, which made it difficult for him to do his job as president. He complained about 
the congressional hearing about Russia the previous week, in which Comey confirmed 
the FBI investigation into possible coordination between Trump and Russia. Comey once 
again stressed that ‘we weren’t investigating him’, and Trump repeatedly asked Comey to 
make that public.871 Trump was incensed by Comey’s refusal to state publicly what he 
repeatedly told Trump in private – that he personally was not being investigated.  
Trump came to regret not firing Comey at the beginning of his administration, and 
he felt that by holding the Steele dossier over him at the 6 January meeting, Comey was 
‘pulling a [J. Edgar] Hoover’ to keep him in line (Hoover was famous for the pressure he 
exerted on politicians).872 Bannon warned Trump against doing so: ‘The day you fire 
him, he’s the greatest martyr in American history. … They are going to name a special … 
counsel. You can fire Comey. You can’t fire the FBI’.873 Bannon argued ‘This Russian 
story is a third-tier story, but you fire Comey and it’ll be the biggest story in the 
world’.874 Trump on 11 April again asked Comey to make public that he was not under 
investigation, but Comey was non-committal. Meantime, on 2 March 2017 attorney 
general Jeff Sessions recused himself from Russian matters. At his confirmation hearing 
on 11 January Sessions asserted that ‘I did not have communications with the 
Russians’.875 The Washington Post publicised that in fact Sessions had on two occasions 
met with Kislyak, at Trump’s Mayflower speech and then at the Republican National 
Convention in Cleveland, Ohio, from 18-21 July 2016.876 These were cursory meetings 
(confirmed by the Mueller report), but Sessions felt that he was compromised and stood 
aside. Russian matters were now handled by Rod Rosenstein, who was confirmed as 
deputy attorney general on 26 April. 
The end came in a typically Trumpian unceremonious manner. On 8 May Trump 
requested that Rosenstein write a note describing Comey’s performance as FBI director. 
Early on 9 May Rosenstein delivered the three-page memorandum ‘Restoring Public 
Confidence in the FBI’ describing Comey’s failings, in particular his pronouncements 
concerning Clinton’s emails the previous July. He outlined the arguments in favour of 
sacking the erratic head of the FBI.877 Later that day Trump crudely announced Comey’s 
dismissal in a tweet while the latter was in Los Angeles. This was only the second time in 
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the FBI’s eight-decade history that a director was fired before his ten-year tenure was 
over. Trump gave contradictory reasons for the sacking. At first he justified firsing 
Comey because of his ‘awful and unacceptable’ behaviour in 2016 (meaning the Clinton 
emails), although Trump had said nothing about this earlier. 878  In his subsequent 
dismissal letter to Comey, Trump condemned him for mishandling the Clinton email 
affair, and claimed that Comey had ‘lost the confidence and respect of the FBI rank and 
file’. However, he added ‘While I greatly appreciate you informing me, on three separate 
occasions, that I am not under investigation, I nonetheless concur with the judgment of 
the Department of Justice that you are not able to effectively lead the bureau’. 879 In other 
words, he blamed Rosenstein, even though the memo had been drafted at Trump’s 
request. Nevertheless, Rosenstein understood that Trump wanted to get rid of Comey, not 
the Russia investigation.880  
Bannon believed that Comey had become a threat as the FBI was looking for 
Jared Kushner’s tax records. 881  Trump’s team at first tried to shift the blame onto 
Rosenstein, with Kellyanne Conway, Trump’s spokesperson, arguing that ‘This has 
nothing to do with Russia’. However, at the meeting with Lavrov and Kislyak in the 
White House on 10 May Trump told them: ‘I just fired the head of the FBI. He was crazy, 
a real nut job. I faced great pressure because of Russia. That’s taken off’. 882  In an 
interview on 11 May on NBC, Lester Holt suggested that Trump had accepted the DoJ’s 
recommendation, but Trump would have none of it: ‘But regardless of recommendation, I 
was going to fire Comey. In fact, when I decided to just do it, I said to myself, you know, 
this Russia thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up story, it’s an excuse by the 
Democrats for having lost an election that they should have won’.883 Comey fought back, 
releasing personal notes of his nine conversations with Trump (which itself could be 
considered an illegal leak of FBI documents). He let it be known that in the Oval Office 
meeting with Trump on 14 February about Flynn the president had asked him to ‘let this 
go’.884 As Trump stressed, Comey had assured ‘on three separate occasions’ that he was 
not under investigation but did not explain why he refused to make this public.885 
McCabe argues that Comey’s firing ‘gave new urgency to the FBI’s investigation 
of Russian interference in the 2016 elections – that interference was a fact, not a 
supposition – and into possible collusion by the Russians with the Trump campaign’.886 
This is odd because the top DoJ official overseeing the FBI’s Russia investigation in 
early 2017, Dana J. Boente, was briefed as many as six times on its status and was told 
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that there was no evidence of Trump campaign collusion.887 Despite this, Comey ramped 
up the threat in his testimony to the HPSCI on 20 March, when he stated that the whole 
Trump campaign was being investigated for possible links with the Kremlin. McCabe 
now took this to a wholly new level. He was a lifelong Republican who took over as FBI 
acting director following Comey’s dismissal. He enjoyed a successful career fighting 
organised crime and had strong views on Russia, considering it ‘a place where no 
distinction between crime and government exists’.888 His dislike was only matched by the 
certainty of his belief that Russian interference in US elections posed ‘existential dangers 
to our life as a democratic nation’ and the intensity of his detestation for the president. 
When Trump called the ICA a ‘hoax’, the FBI went into overdrive to investigate 
‘whether that man or his campaign solicited or cooperated with Russia’s activities’.889 
McCabe believed that ‘Russia is an existential threat to the United States’.890 He feared 
that the Russian mafia and political interference, combined with Trump’s disregard for 
democratic norms and civic virtues, represented a genuine threat to the American way of 
life. McCabe was later caught in the crosshairs of Horowitz’s review of the release of 
information to the press about the FBI’s investigation of the Clinton Foundation. 891 
McCabe initially denied having authorised this, but a few days later conceded that he had 
in fact done so. This later provided a pretext for Sessions to dismiss McCabe on 16 
March 2018, two days before his planned retirement, threatening his pension. 
On 13 May McCabe announced that the FBI had opened a formal criminal 
investigation into Trump.892 At the same time, he sought to institutionalise the Russia 
investigation in the form of a special counsel investigation.893 McCabe was not the only 
one looking for a scapegoat for America’s domestic political crisis. Testifying before the 
HPSCI, Brennan on 23 May 2017 asserted that he was ‘aware of information and 
intelligence that revealed contacts and interactions between Russian officials and US 
persons involved in the Trump campaign’.894 He insisted, moreover, that he knew from 
past experience that ‘the Russians try to suborn individuals, and they try to get them to 
act on their behalf either wittingly or unwittingly’. The ‘witting or unwitting’ phrase is 
straight out of the classic cold war playbook. In 1956 the chair of the House Un-
American Activities Committee (HUAC), Francis E. Walter, declared that ‘people who 
are not actually Communist Party members are witting or unwitting servants of the 
Communist cause’. 895  There is some justification for the view of Senate Judiciary 
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Committee chair, Lindsey Graham, ‘that Crossfire Hurricane was one of the most 
incompetent and corrupt investigations in the history of the FBI and DoJ’. 896 It was also 
one of the most politicised. 
Lisa Page, counsel to McCabe, later testified that there had been ‘indecision in the 
Bureau as to whether there was sufficient predication [evidence] to open [the 
investigation]’. However, within hours of Comey’s dismissal Strzok texted her: ‘We need 
to open the case we’ve been waiting on now while Andy [McCabe] is acting 
[director]’.897 They were keen to get McCabe’s approval before someone perhaps less 
sympathetic to the idea was appointed permanent director. In the event, the New York 
Times on 11 January 2019 revealed that the FBI had earlier opened the counter-
intelligence investigation into Trump, and that this morphed into the Mueller enquiry.898 
McCabe authorised both counter-intelligence and criminal enquiries into Trump to give 
the cases solid footing.899 A CNN article immediately after Comey’s firing reported that 
Rosenstein and senior FBI officials ‘viewed Trump as a leader who needed to be reined 
in, according to two sources describing the sentiment at the time’.900 In a 13 May meeting 
with McCabe, Rosenstein even suggested wearing a bugging device to the Oval Office to 
entrap the president and mentioned invoking the 25th Amendment, which prescribes the 
action to be taken if the president is unable to fulfil his duties. 901 Rosenstein assumed 
that the Democrats would approve of the dismissal of Comey, the man who had done so 
much to undermine Clinton’s campaign, but Comey was now useful to them as Trump’s 
scourge.  
On 16 May Trump met Mueller to discuss the FBI directorship, although Mueller 
made clear that he was not a candidate. Then, on 17 May Rosenstein appointed Mueller 
special counsel to investigate ‘any links and/or coordination between the Russian 
government and individuals associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump’.902 
Rosenstein had been considering this move for days, and understood that the rules had 
changed since earlier broad investigations – Watergate in the early 1970s, Reagan’s Iran-
Contra in the 1980s and Clinton’s Whitewater and Monica Lewinsky in the 1990s – and 
now investigations were more tightly controlled by the attorney general. With Sessions 
recused, it meant Mueller would report to him. Rosenstein maintained personal control 
over the whole Mueller enquiry, in large part to ensure that the FBI’s over-heated 
suspicions that the US government had been taken over by the Russians was contained.903 
Rosenstein was shocked to discover that on his own initiative McCabe had made Trump a 
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subject of an FBI investigation.904 Rosenstein was trapped between Trump and the FBI 
and closely managed the process, hence it would not be inappropriate to call the whole 
business the ‘Rosenstein investigation’.905 When Sessions broke the news to Trump that a 
special counsel had been appointed, Trump was stunned: ‘Oh my God. This is terrible. 
This is the end of my presidency … it takes years and years and I won’t be able to do 
anything’.906  
 
Michael Flynn on trial 
 
One of the first victims of the Mueller investigation, not surprisingly, was Flynn, and the 
case demonstrates the dangers of coercive plea bargaining. Flynn is not a rich man, and 
he also apparently feared bankruptcy because of the Mueller probe. Flynn’s son Michael 
worked in his father’s consulting company and his ties to foreign clients also exposed 
him to possible criminal charges.907 In December 2017 Flynn pleaded guilty to the single 
charge of lying to the FBI about his contacts with Kislyak and agreed to cooperate with 
Mueller. He and his son were threatened with an unrelated FARA charge concerning 
lobbying work for Turkey. By the time of his sentencing in December 2018 the Mueller 
team had interviewed Flynn 19 times and he had provided them with documents and 
communications about ‘interactions between individuals in the presidential transition 
team and Russia’.908 There was no evidence of collusion with Russia, so he was charged 
with lying, ‘And it’s not even clear he did that. The FBI officials who first interviewed 
Mr. Flynn [on 24 January 2017] didn’t think he lied about his interactions with Russian 
ambassador Kislyak. More likely, Mr Flynn copped a plea to save his son from worse 
treatment at Mr Mueller’s hands’.909 As a CNN report in February 2017 put it, ‘The FBI 
interviewers believed Flynn was cooperative and provided truthful answers. Although 
Flynn didn’t remember all of what he talked about, they don’t believe he was 
intentionally misleading them’. 910  Comey told HPSCI on 2 March that his agents 
‘concluded that Mr. Flynn hadn’t lied but had forgotten what had been discussed’.911 In 
new information, Flynn admitted failing to disclose a $530,000 lobbying contract with 
Turkey that he was fulfilling while advising Trump in 2016, and that he was being 
directed by Turkish government officials. Mueller advised that Flynn should not receive a 
jail sentence after pleading guilty to lying to the FBI.912  
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The Flynn sentencing document outlined the ‘serious’ nature of Flynn’s crimes, 
and raised the question whether the Flynn-Kislyak conversation violated the Logan Act. 
As mentioned, this is the statute adopted in 1799 that criminalises negotiations by 
unauthorised persons with foreign governments that are in dispute with the US. Only two 
people have ever been charged under this act, the last in 1852, and neither was convicted. 
Presidential transition teams routinely establish contact with their foreign counterparts, 
yet the moribund Logan Act was revived to send FBI agents to interview Flynn, who 
allegedly gave a false account of his discussions with Kislyak. At what was meant to be 
his sentencing on 18 December 2018, Judge Emmet Sullivan of the US District Court in 
Washington launched an astonishing broadside: ‘This is a very serious offence. … You 
were an unregistered agent of a foreign country [Turkey] while serving as the national 
security advisor to the president’. Referring to the secret payments from an agent of the 
Turkish government, he came close to calling Flynn’s behaviour treasonous: ‘Arguably, 
you sold your country out’. 913  It appears that Flynn ended his work for Turkey in 
November 2016, before taking up his official duties. Sentencing was postponed to allow 
Flynn to complete his collaboration with Mueller. 
On 29 January 2020 Flynn petitioned the court to revoke his guilty plea, and on 
the eve of the scheduled 27 February 2020 sentencing hearing Flynn’s new lawyer, 
Sidney Powell, and filed for the case to be dismissed. The new legal team argued that the 
case against him was based on government misconduct, including withholding 
exonerative evidence, falsification of the 24 January 2017 interview, and political 
targeting against him as part of the plot to oust Trump. They called on Barr to probe FBI 
and DoJ abuses, which he did on 14 February when he appointed US Attorney for the 
Eastern District of Missouri Jeffrey Jensen to investigate the government’s handling of 
the case. The remit covered such issues as whether the wiretap of his conversations was 
illicit and why he was ‘unmasked’. On 7 May 2020 the DoJ on Jensen’s recommendation 
filed a motion seeking to dismiss the prosecution of Flynn on the grounds that newly-
found documents revealed improper conduct by the FBI. Flynn had been cleared by FBI 
agents, and there appeared to have been no lawful reason to have interviewed Flynn. Barr 
stated the issue bluntly: ‘They kept it [the case] open for the express purpose of trying to 
catch, to lay a perjury trap for General Flynn’.914 Above all, ‘there was no valid reason 
for the FBI to have interrogated Flynn in the first place’, since it was entirely appropriate, 
and certainly not criminal, for an incoming national security adviser to communicate with 
an ambassador to reduce tensions.915 
Nevertheless, Judge Sullivan opposed the recomendation and the case was sent 
into legal limbo amid attacks on the integrity of Barr himself.916 Trump weighed in and 
on 7 May in the Oval Office warned that the officials involved in the Russia investigation 
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and the Flynn case were guilty of ‘treason’ and would ‘pay a big price’. The New York 
Times was right to warn that ‘It is a small step from using the Justice Department to 
protect your friends to using it to go after your political enemies’, but by insisting on 
Flynn’s guilt and Barr’s flaws, the paper added to the country’s polarisation.917 A three-
person appeals court on 24 June ordered Sullivan immediately to dismiss Flynn’s prior 
conviction for lying to the FBI.918 Later the DoJ revealed a summary of its 17 September 
interview with William Barnett, the FBI’s case agent on the Flynn investigation and later 
part of the Mueller enquiry, conducted as part of the Jensen review. The summary makes 
clear that Barnett believed that Flynn neither conspired nor colluded with Russia during 
the 2016 campaign, and above all believed that the Crossfire Hurricane investigation was 
‘opaque’, with ‘little detail concerning specific evidence of criminal events’. The 
predication to open the Crossfire Razor investigation into Flynn in his view was ‘not 
great’, and he considered the theory that there was something untoward in the changed 
wording of the Ukraine resolution at the RNC in July from the provision of ‘lethal 
assistance’ to ‘appropriate assistance’ was ‘groping’. He believed the Flynn probe was an 
‘exercise in futility’ and in December 2016 called for the case to be dropped. By 4 
January, as we have seen, he was ready to close the case file, but this was blocked by 
Strzok. Barnett believes that this explains he was excluded from the fateful 24 January 
interview with Flynn. He notes that by May Crossfire Hurricane was winding down for 
lack of evidence but was revived by Mueller’s appointment. In his view, the whole 
business was ‘upside down’, with investigators frantically looking for evidence of a 
crime. There was a ‘get Trump’ attitude by some in the special counsel office, with 
incidents involving Trump interpreted ‘in the most negative manner’. For example, 
concerning Crossfire Razor he told Mueller attorney Jeannie Rhee that ‘there was no 
evidence of a crime’, but in his view ‘Rhee was obsessed with Flynn and Russia and she 
had an agenda’. There appeared to be a competition between investigators to be the first 
to find ‘something criminal there’. Investigators believed that interviewees were hiding 
information even when in Barnett’s view they had no information. This explains the 
repeated and ultimately pointless but demeaning interviews of McFarland, which she 
describes in painful detail. In frustration, Barnett sought a transfer from the case.919 
On 25 November 2020 Trump announced by tweet that he had granted Flynn a 
‘full pardon’, provoking the now predictable partisan responses. Trump’s allies 
welcomed the decision, but House speaker Nancy Pelosi called it an ‘act of grave 
corruption and a brazen abuse of power’.920 The Flynn charges always looked flimsy and 
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politically motivated, but rather than exoneration by the courts he was pardoned. The 
larger issue is well expressed by McFarland: ‘The tragic irony not just for Flynn, but for 
the president and the country, is that the entire Russia investigation, the national hysteria, 
the collusion claims, and the obstruction of justice accusations all seemed to hinge on a 















There may have been no fire, but there was a lot of smoke. Even before Mueller 
published his report in March 2019, the investigation had resulted in over 30 indictments, 
six guilty pleas and two sentences. Although the Trump administration pressed for the 
enquiry to conclude before the November 2018 midterm elections, in fact it continued 
well after. What is striking about the mass of its activity is how tangential it was to the 
main charge – collusion between Trump and the Kremlin, as outlined in the Steele 
dossier and asserted by the Papadopoulos informants. Instead, collateral investigations 
resulted in trials and convictions, above all that of Trump’s long-term lawyer and general 
fixer, Michael Cohen, who oversaw attempts to build Trump Tower Moscow. In the end, 
Trump’s impeachment in late 2019 was provoked not by Russiagate but by 
‘Ukrainegate’, his call with the new president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, on 25 
July 2019 and associated cold war and electoral matters. First, though, the investigation 
was gifted the extraordinary Trump Tower meeting, in which the Trump team appeared 
eager to solicit damaging information from a foreign power in the middle of an election 
campaign. 
 
The 9 June 2016 Trump Tower meeting 
 
The June 2016 Trump Tower meeting between Trump officials and a Russian lawyer 
came to light only after Mueller had been appointed, yet it became the cornerstone of 
collusion allegations. The story begins in May 2016 when the Russian lawyer Natalya 
Veselnitskaya met in Moscow with an old client, Aras Agalarov, and she told him about 
her work on the Magnitsky case. On 24 November 2008 the tax accountant Sergei 
Magnitsky was arrested and held in appalling conditions in pre-trial detention, and on 16 
November 2009, aged only 37, he died in jail from pancreatitis aggravated by medical 
neglect. Magnitsky had worked for a decade for Bill Browder’s Hermitage Capital 
Management, a joint venture registered in Guernsey with banking giant HSBC, which 
became the largest foreign-owned investment fund in Russia. Browder portrayed himself 
as an activist investor, who by pushing for improved governance increased the 
profitability of companies, and thus the value of his stake. Browder’s company had long 
been accused of illegally exploiting various tax minimisation schemes, hence his offices 
in Moscow were raided by tax investigators on 2 June 2007. Soon after, a $230 million 
tax rebate was granted to some of his former companies in suspicious circumstances. 
According to Browder, Magnitsky exposed the subsequent abuse of office and wholesale 
fraud and corruption within the Russian investigative and executive establishment, 
although his account has been challenged. 922  After an indefatigable campaign by 
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Browder, the US Congress in December 2012 adopted the Magnitsky Act, against 
Obama’s best instincts.923 The Act sanctioned those allegedly involved in Magnitsky’s 
death, although the factual basis may have been entirely false. 924  Not surprisingly, 
Moscow sought to lift the Magnitsky sanctions. 
Veselnitskaya, a former prosecutor in the Moscow region and at the time head of 
a substantive law firm with some 30 employees, took up the case. The Mueller 
investigator Weissmann calls her a ‘Russian operative’, but the degree to which she was 
on a state-directed mission is unclear, although she was undoubtedly pursuing goals that 
aligned with those of the Kremlin – above all, to get the Magnitsky sanctions lifted.925 
The Human Rights Accountability Global Initiative Foundation (HRAGI) was created to 
pursue this goal, instructing the US law firm Baker Hostetler, which in turn hired Fusion 
GPS – the very body that had hired Steele. Agalarov suggested that she meet with Don Jr, 
with whom he had worked during the 2013 Miss Universe competition.926 Rob Goldstone 
had long been the main conduit between the Agalarovs and the Trumps, so it was natural 
to ask him to arrange the meeting. Emin Agalarov called Goldstone, and in turn 
Goldstone on 3 June emailed the young Donald:  
 
Emin just called and asked me to contact you with something very interesting. 
The Crown prosecutor of Russia met with [Emin’s] father Aras this morning and 
in their meeting offered to provide the Trump campaign with some official 
documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with 
Russia and would be very useful to your father.  
This is obviously very high level and sensitive information but is part of 
Russia and its government’s support for Trump – helped along by Aras and Emin. 
What do you think is the best way to handle this information and would you be 
able to speak to Emin about it directly?927  
 
Trump’s response was famously enthusiastic: ‘If it’s what you say it is, I love it’. After 
several more email chains, the meeting took place on 9 June in Trump Tower. The 
repercussions resonate to this day. It was Goldstone and not the Russian government who 
offered ‘dirt’ on Clinton to entice Don Jr into the meeting, and no dirt was produced. 
However, the readiness to accept damaging information from foreigners was obviously 
inappropriate and evidence of ‘collusion’ between the Trump camp and Russia. Bannon 
considered the meeting ‘treasonous’ and ‘unpatriotic’.928 However, this view is shaped by 
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his loathing for Don Jr., whom he referred to as Fredo, the gullible and weak son of mafia 
boss Vito Corleone in The Godfather.929 Bannon was not the only one who had little 
respect for Don Jr; ‘his father  held him in extremely low esteem’.930 For the Mueller 
investigators, ‘There it was: The Russians made an offer. The campaign accepted’.931 
The stage was set for the fateful meeting. Don Jr. was joined by Trump’s 
campaign manager Paul Manafort and his son-in-law Jared Kushner.932 Goldstone was 
present at the younger Trump’s request. Four people attended from the Russian side: 
Veselnitskaya; her interpreter, Irakly Kaveladze, who held various positions in 
Agalarov’s Crocus Group; Rinat Akhmetshin, a Washington lobbyist who had once 
served in Russian military intelligence and was now working for the Katsyv family in the 
Prevezon tax rebate case, but who appears to have turned up by accident (hence his 
sporty informal attire);933 and Anatoly Samochornov, a New York state resident and a 
translator also working on the Prevezon and anti-Magnitsky Act cases. Veselnitskaya had 
defended Pyotr Katsyv, the former transport minister of the Moscow region (the territory 
surrounding Moscow city), who was also a wealthy and aggressive business entrepreneur. 
At the time of the Trump Tower meeting Veselnitskyaya represented Katsyv’s son, 
Denis, whose Cyprus-based company Prevezon Holdings had been charged by the US 
attorney for the Southern District of New York (SDNY), Preet Bharara, of laundering the 
proceeds of the $230 million Russian tax fraud allegedly exposed by Magnitsky. Part of 
the money had been funnelled into the purchase of New York real estate.  
Trump Jr. came to the meeting expecting to hear secrets about Clinton, and that is 
why he asked Kushner and Manafort to attend. Kushner turned up late and tried to leave 
early.934 Veselnitskaya began by talking about Democratic abuses, but she soon turned to 
the Magnitsky Act and Russian countersanctions (the ban on Americans adopting 
Russian children). Veselnitskaya talked about the money that Browder had made for the 
Ziff brothers (who had invested with Browder in Russia) that could have made its way to 
the DNC. Trump Jr. asked if she had any proof that the Clinton campaign or the DNC 
had received funds that could be traced back to Russia, and she answered negatively. At 
this point Don Jr. texted Manafort to say that the meeting was a ‘waste of time’ and asked 
a subordinate to call him to provide an excuse to leave.935 The meeting lasted no more 
than 20 minutes. There had been no discussion of the election and no cooperation. 
 The Trump Tower meeting is at the heart of the Russian collusion allegation. 
Goldstone was called to provide testimony to a special counsel grand jury, to both Senate 
and House committees, and nine hours of questioning to the Mueller investigation. His 
original email requesting the meeting has triggered a veritable avalanche of speculation, 
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including a book (not surprisingly) by Goldstone himself.936 Despite what the 3 June 
email said, there were no ‘official documents’ from ‘the Crown Prosecutor of Russia’, 
and nothing to ‘incriminate Hillary’, and it was not clear to what ‘her dealings with 
Russia’ referred. Trump, against all the odds, had just won the Republican primaries 
(although he was still to receive the official nomination), and thus a meeting with his 
team would be a premium event. Goldstone argues that he deployed exaggerated 
language to entice the junior Trump. He used the term ‘crown prosecutor’ which, since 
Russia is a republic, is nonsense, although a term familiar to Goldstone with his British 
background. Goldstone now argues that he was not entirely wrong in suggesting that the 
Russians wanted to help Trump, having witnessed the enthusiasm with which top Russian 
leaders sought to meet him during 2013 visit: ‘Emin had spoken to me about how this 
woman was well protected, about money from Russians to the Democrats and that could 
mean Hillary Clinton, so surely that would have been useful to Trump’.937 Goldstone 
admits that he ‘puffed up’ the language in his email, ‘But I never thought in a million 
years that an email I wrote in about three minutes to Don Jr. would be examined by the 
world many times over. I just needed to get him to respond’.938  
The matter is made murkier by the fact that Veselnitskaya had dinner with 
Simpson the night before as well as after the Trump Tower meeting. She was a client of 
Fusion GPS, but Simpson plausibly denies discussing the Trump meeting on either 
occasion.939  The relationship goes back to September 2013 when the US Attorney’s 
office in SDNY filed money-laundering charges against Prevezon Holdings, whose sole 
share-holder was the businessman Denis Katsyv. Browder initiated the case in December 
2012 when he filed material alleging that Katsyv and Prevezon had been involved in 
laundering the illicit tax rebate associated with Browder companies. The defence against 
the charges, and against the Magnitsky Act as a whole, was led by Veselnitskaya, who 
had been the Katsyv family lawyer for a decade. She began to investigate Browder, and 
in spring 2014 Katsyv’s defence team hired Simpson and Fusion GPS to find out more 
about his activities.940 This was the beginning of a monumental feud between Simpson 
and Browder. They prepared a 600-page report, with some astonishing information about 
Browder’s businesses. Links were suggested between Hermitage Capital’s purchase of 
Gazprom shares and the New York investment firm Ziff Brothers, a long-standing 
Democratic donor for whom Browder had earlier made stock trades in Russia. 
Information about the Ziff brothers appeared in Russian requests sent to the DoJ from the 
Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO), headed by Yuri Chaika. 
 Although short, the meeting has generated a voluminous literature. The White 
House account of the meeting changed several times and involved ‘deep layers of 
deception’.941 The Trump team tried to obfuscate and deflect from the basic fact that it 
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had been willing to accept assistance from a non-friendly foreign power during an 
election campaign. Trump later admitted that the meeting was indeed to ‘seek political 
dirt’, adding that this is ‘totally legal’, and this may be true. Trump later argued that he 
would listen if a foreign power had ‘dirt’ on an election rival – that was simply the way 
that politics, in his view, worked. This was at odds with the view of the new FBI director, 
Christopher Wray, who argued that the bureau would expect to be informed about any 
contact by a foreign power during an election.942 Don Jr. may have violated federal 
statutes forbidding any foreign person to ‘make a contribution or a donation of money or 
other thing of value, or expressly or implicitly promise to make a contribution or a 
donation, in connection with any Federal, State or local election; and for anyone to 
knowingly solicit, accept, or receive from a foreign national any contribution or donation 
prohibited [by this law]’.943 Despite the comprehensive language the law is vague, since 
it would make a foreigner writing a speech or providing information ‘a thing of value’. It 
would be hard to put a value on Veselnitskaya’s purported dirt. 944  The information 
provided by British intelligence and the Steele dossier was intended to affect the election, 
and thus would presumably fall foul of this statute. Equally, if Manafort, Don Jr. and Co. 
had met with Canadian agents in Trump Tower, no one would have batted an eyelid, or if 
Clinton had won, the meeting would have been irrelevant. However, the meeting became 
significant when Trump’s victory became wrapped up in malfeasance allegations. When 
the meeting became public in July 2017 it encapsulated ‘both the case against collusion 
with the Russians and the case for it. It was a case, or the lack of one, not of masterminds 
and subterfuge, but of senseless and benighted people so guileless and unconcerned that 
they enthusiastically colluded in plain sight’.945 
Several complex stories intersect, and everyone appears to be deceiving everyone 
else. Veselnitskaya herself remains a controversial figure. It has been suggested that she 
indeed came to Trump Tower with material on Clinton that she anticipated would interest 
the Republican campaign, and that she had discussed the points to be raised with Chaika, 
covering Browder and the Ziff brothers.946  Goldstone recalls that these names were 
indeed mentioned, with Veselnitskaya bringing a memo that stated that Ziff Brothers 
Investment, a US-based firm, had made illegal share purchases in a Russian company 
(Gazprom) and evaded large sums in Russian taxes. Two of the three brothers were 
donors to Democratic campaigns, including Clinton’s. Veselnitskaya also claimed that 
the Democrats benefitted from ‘stolen money’, material that the Republicans could have 
used against them. In April 2018, Veselnitskaya on NBC News declared that although 
she was privately employed, ‘I am a lawyer and I am an informant … Since 2013, I have 
been actively communicating with the office of the Russian prosecutor-general’. 947 
Goldstone, it appears, had been inadvertently correct in mentioning the involvement of 
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the prosecutor-general (whom he called the Crown prosecutor). The meeting was also 
referenced by Putin at the Helsinki summit with Trump, when he talked about ‘business 
associates of Mr Browder’ who ‘sent a huge amount of money’ to Clinton. 
When Browder was forced to provide a deposition in the Prevezon case on 15 
April 2015 he was evasive and lacked a grasp of basic details about the Katsyv case and 
the Magnitsky affair in general.948  A film by Andrei Nekrasov, The Magnitsky Act: 
Behind the Scenes provides a devastating examination of the inadequacies of the version 
advanced by Browder. The film portrays Browder as an entirely unconvincing witness.949 
A recent study, aptly titled Grand Deception, argues ‘Rather than seeking justice for 
Sergei [Magnitsky], Browder gives the impression that he is cynically exploiting Sergei’s 
death and his family’s tragedy to vindicate himself and to inflict as much damage as he 
can on Russia and its legitimate leadership’. 950  The American Congress essentially 
adopted the Magnitsky Act in December 2012 on Browder’s questionable version of 
events. The whole renewed cold war cycle of sanctions and countersanctions began with 
an act of deception.  
 
Michael Cohen and Trump Tower Moscow 
 
Cohen joined the Trump Organisation in 2006 as an all-round fixer and dealmaker, 
preparing property deals and silencing potentially hostile media stories. 951 Cohen 
progressed to become executive vice president of the Trump Organization and acted as 
Trump’s personal lawyer. At the heart of the Trump empire, he was uniquely placed to 
observe what was going on. In summer 2016 Cohen declared that ‘he would take a bullet’ 
for the president.952 However, following the search of his premises by federal agents on 9 
April 2018 and subsequent arrest he ‘put my family and country first’. Trump initially 
defended Cohen, arguing that the measures against Cohen were part of the ‘witch hunt’ 
and declared that ‘I have your back’, an implicit promise that as long as Cohen stayed 
loyal, Trump would stay loyal to him.953 Trump condemned the investigation as ‘an 
attack on our country’, but thereafter relations broke down.954 Cohen now believed that 
the president was ‘unsuitable to hold the office’, citing his refusal while standing next to 
Putin in Helsinki in July 2018 to accept the conclusion of US intelligence agencies that 
Russia had disrupted the election. 955  
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Threatened by a long prison sentence amid fears that his wife, Laura, would also 
be indicted, Cohen was induced to cooperate with the prosecutors – in other words, he 
‘flipped’. He makes some devastating comments about the American justice system, 
noting ‘that if federal prosecutors want to get you, they will’.956 Investigators looked into 
the limited liability company (LLC) he set up to manage cash flows for his work for 
Trump, and reached a plea deal with prosecutors. In the SDNY on 21 August 2018 Cohen 
pleaded guilty to eight felony charges, six of which involved bank fraud, tax fraud and 
campaign finance violations, and two implicated Trump in buying the silence of women 
with whom he had allegedly had affairs, and he later pleaded guilty of lying to Congress. 
Cohen is one of only two people to receive a substantial prison sentence (36 months) as 
result of the Mueller investigation. The SDNY continued to investigate the activities of 
the Trump Foundation, Trump University and the Trump Organisation as well as Giuliani 
and his two associates, the Soviet-born businessmen Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman, until 
the abrupt sacking of Geoffrey Berman, the US attorney for the district, on 20 June 
2020.957 
The heart of the Cohen matter was cash payments in October 2016, just weeks 
before the ballot, to two women who claimed to have been paid hush money to keep quiet 
about their affairs with the future president. The payments were categorised as ‘illegal 
campaign contributions’ since the story would have embarrassed Trump in a tough 
election campaign. Stephanie Clifford, a pornography film actress who worked under the 
name of ‘Stormy Daniels’, was paid $130,000 to keep quiet about her affair with Trump. 
Karen McDougal, a former Playboy ‘Playmate’, was paid $150,000 in September 2016 
by the National Enquirer scandal sheet for a story about her time with Trump, but then 
by arrangement with Cohen ‘at the direction’ of Trump did not publish.958 This was a 
‘catch and kill’ operation to silence McDougal, with the ‘deception … designed to hide 
the true nature of Trump’s character’.959 Cohen claimed that Trump then repaid him the 
$130,000. Under oath, Cohen testified that Trump had directed him to commit a crime 
and encouraged him to file false invoices so that Trump could reimburse him. Trump 
insisted that the money did not come out of campaign finances but out of his own pocket. 
In a representative Tweet of 10 December 2018 he insisted that the Democrats wrongly 
called ‘a simple private transaction … a campaign contribution’. Once Trump was 
elected, the LLC was used to manage donations from companies seeking access to 
Trump, and its funds were used to pay for luxury items and the dues of private clubs. 
This was not the declared purpose of the LLC, which was real estate consultancy.960 
Cohen’s lawyer, Lanny Davis, indicated that Cohen was ready to tell Mueller everything 
he knew ‘about a conspiracy to corrupt American democracy by the Russians, and the 
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failure to report that knowledge to the FBI’, adding that ‘If those payments were a crime 
for Michael Cohen, then why wouldn’t they be a crime for Donald Trump’.961  
Other matters were also investigated, including a $20m loan on a taxi business run 
by Cohen and his family. In an interview with CNN Davis claimed that Trump knew in 
advance of the June 2016 Trump Tower meeting. By December 2018 federal prosecutors 
declared that Cohen acted at the direction of Trump when he committed the two election-
related crimes in 2016. On 12 December Cohen was sentenced to three years in jail for 
the crimes he had committed in Trump’s employ. He also received a two-month jail term 
for lying to Congress when he stated that Trump Organisation efforts to build a tower in 
Moscow were terminated in January 2016, when in fact they continued to June. The 
charges focused on the hush-money payments to cover up the extra-marital affairs. Cohen 
insisted that Trump knew that he was doing wrong: ‘He directed me to make the 
payments. He directed me to become involved in these matters’. He argued that he did as 
instructed out of ‘blind loyalty’ to Trump: I gave loyalty to someone who, truthfully, does 
not deserve loyalty’. Giuliani downplayed the charges, even though they were federal 
felonies: ‘Nobody got killed, nobody got hurt … This was not a big crime’.962 In the end 
Mueller found nothing criminally of substance to connect the Trump Organisation’s 
dodgy business practices and Moscow. The Wall Street Journal observed ‘goodbye to 
Russia. You served your purpose. Vladimir Putin’s effect on the 2016 election, we can 
now admit, was trivial – his real influence has come almost entirely through the 
willingness of US combatants to exploit Russia in pursuit of their own power ambitions 
and vendettas’.963 
However, the story did not end there. Cohen was now cooperating with Mueller 
and in November 2018 headlines announced that Cohen admitted to lying over Trump’s 
Moscow plans. The envisaged 100-storey Trump Tower would have been the tallest 
building in Europe, with Trump’s name emblazoned in red at the top. In September 2015 
Trump approved Cohen’s plan to contact the Russian government about the project, and 
in December Cohen began working with Felix Sater on the proposal. Cohen earlier 
claimed that such contacts ended in early 2016, before the crucial Iowa caucus vote that 
would set Trump on the road to the White House. In a letter to Congress on 28 August 
2017 Cohen wrote that ‘The proposal was under consideration at the Trump Organization 
from September 2015 until the end of January 2016. By the end of January 2016, I 
determined that the proposal was not feasible for a variety of business reasons and should 
not be pursued further’, and insisted that he did not brief Trump or his family further on 
the project.964 In September 2017, in testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, 
Cohen stated that in January 2016 it was decided that the Moscow project ‘was not 
feasible for a variety of business reasons and should not be pursued’. This allowed Trump 
to claim during the campaign that he did not have any business ties with Russia.  
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It was now revealed that the project continued until at least 14 June 2016, and 
there were even plans for Trump to travel to Moscow to discuss the proposal. Cohen 
admitted speaking to Kremlin officials in 2016 about securing Russian support for the 
project, even though earlier Trump had denied having any contact with them during his 
run for office. In his August 2017 submission Cohen admitted sending an email to 
Peskov, Putin’s press secretary, about the project, but at the time said that he received no 
reply. Now Cohen admitted to Mueller that he did receive a reply from Peskov’s office, 
and that in a phone call with Peskov on 20 January he asked for help ‘in moving the 
project forward’. Peskov later confirmed that his office had received two emails from 
Cohen in January 2016 requesting a meeting with Sergei Ivanov, then Putin’s chief of 
staff, or with Peskov himself, to help establish the necessary business contacts. 965 Peskov 
stated that ‘We called them back and asked what the Presidential Administration has to 
do with that and whether they are aware who they contacted’. Peskov showed the two 
emails, signed by Cohen, to reporters, and noted that in the 20-minute conversation ‘We 
told them that the Presidential Administration doesn’t build houses, and if they want to 
invest in Russia then we will be happy to see them at the St Petersburg Economic Forum 
(SPIEF)’.966 Cohen agreed to attend SPIEF, but on 14 June, two days before the event, he 
abruptly cancelled. As a result of the 9 June Trump Tower Veselnitskaya meeting, he had 
been shunning an increasingly desperate Sater.967 Why Sater was so keen on pushing the 
Moscow project is itself a mystery. The cold call email to Peskov’s team was clearly an 
act of desperation, described by Cohen himself as a Keystone Kop move.968 Rather than 
showing high level collusion, it revealed the amateurishness of Trump’s associates. They 
lacked the high-powered real estate contacts required to build such an ambitious tower in 
Moscow.  
The impression that they were out of their depth is reinforced by Cohen and 
Sater’s suggestion that Putin would be offered a $50 million penthouse in the envisaged 
tower in the Moscow City business complex, and the rest of the units would be sold for 
$250 million each to the Russian elite.969 By any standards, this was ludicrous – the 
‘Wild East’ 1990s had long gone and Putin had no need for an apartment of this sort. In 
any case, such a development would have required the approval of Moscow’s energetic 
mayor Sergei Sobyanin, and collaboration with a top-notch development company. 
Instead, Trump’s team worked with a second-tier company called I. C. Expert Investment 
with no experience of working in downtown Moscow, but with whom they signed a letter 
of intent in 2015.970 There was little follow-up, but efforts to get the project off the 
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ground apparently continued until June 2016, even though Mueller found emails showing 
that Cohen briefed Trump extensively even later. Emails with Sater moreover talked of a 
possible visit by Trump to Moscow once he had secured the nomination.971 Peskov, as 
noted, suggested that Trump could be invited to SPIEF, where he would meet Putin and 
Medvedev.972 Trump was clearly keen on the project, but ‘the campaign was far too 
chaotic and incompetent to actually conspire with the Russian government’. For Trump, 
‘politics was an opportunity to make money’, and he was willing to bend US foreign 
policy to that end.973 
Trump and his legal team submitted written answers in November 2018 and only 
then was Cohen’s admission revealed. If the answers conflicted with Cohen’s revised 
version of events, then the president would be open to charges of perjury. Trump 
apparently encouraged Cohen to travel to Moscow during the campaign to meet Putin and 
lock down the deal. ‘Make it happen’, is what Trump, according to BuzzFeed on 17 
January 2019, told Cohen in one of at least 10 meetings with him on the subject, and then 
characteristically denied having spoken to him at all on the topic.974 The assumption, 
presumably, was that Trump expected to lose the election and sought to leverage his 
status as candidate while the going was good for a lucrative deal later.975 The report 
alleged that Trump had personally directed Cohen to lie to Congress about the plans to 
build the tower. If true, Trump was now open to an obstruction of justice charge (the first 
article of the impeachment charge against Nixon), and something that Mueller appeared 
to have been angling for since the beginning. In the event, Mueller took the rare step to 
disavow the report as ‘not accurate’. It was just one of over 50 Russiagate news stories 
that after a brief media feeding frenzy had to be retracted or seriously corrected.976 
As for Cohen, he served a year of his three-year sentence on federal charges of tax 
evasion, making false statements, lying to Congress and making illegal payments to 
women to silence allegations of past affairs with the president (which he denied). He was 
released in May 2020 because of fears of Covid-19 spreading in prisons. However, after 
tweeting about his forthcoming unflattering book about Trump, Disloyal, he was back in 
jail in July, although later once again allowed home. The book likens Trump to a Mafia 
boss and revealed all kinds of ‘sins and crimes’ in which Cohen got involved on behalf of 
his boss. This includes a discussion of Trump’s rationale for approving the $130,000 
payment to Stormy Daniels, fearing that exposure of the relationship would not play well 
with his supporters, although ‘I bet they’d think it’s cool that I slept with a porn star’. As 
for Trump’s admiration of Putin, Cohen puts this down simply to Trump’s love of 
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money, believing that Putin was ‘the richest man in the world by a multiple’. The book 
describes how bereft Cohen felt after his relationship with the president soured, since for 
years he had been ‘Trump’s first call every morning and his last call every night’. He 
knew Trump better than anyone, and he now described him as a con artist, a predator, a 
racist, a bully and a liar.977  
 
Paul Manafort and Ukrainegate 
 
In January 2016 the Obama White House convened a meeting of top Ukrainian 
corruption prosecutors and investigators, mostly from the National Anti-Corruption 
Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), with leading US security officials to discuss anti-corruption 
efforts. By all accounts, discussion quickly turned to two other politically sensitive 
investigations: vice president Joe Biden’s family involvement in Ukrainian business 
matters; and the participation of Paul Manafort’s lobbying firm in Trump’s campaign. On 
the former, Biden’s son, Hunter, from April 2014 (two months after the regime change in 
Kiev) was on the board of the Burisma Holdings energy company owned by Mikola 
Zlochevsky, who under Viktor Yanukovych had been the minister for ecology and 
natural resources and who was under investigation in Ukraine and the UK for tax 
evasion, fraud and corruption allegedly committed while he was minister. The latter issue 
soon focused on reviving an investigation into payments to US persons by the ‘Russian-
backed’ Party of Regions. The 2014 FBI investigation focused on Manafort, whose 
company had long worked with Trump through his partner Roger Stone. The case was 
closed without prosecutions at the time, but it was not forgotten. Its revival is one of the 
earliest documented efforts to establish a Trump-Russia collusion narrative.978 
Manafort was hired by the Ukrainian Party of Regions in 2004 and helped 
Yanukovych win the presidency in 2010. Between 2010 and 2015 Manafort worked for 
what the Western media invariably calls the ‘pro-Kremlin’ Yanukovych, although 
relations between Russia and Ukraine in this period were at best uneasy and Putin is 
known to have loathed his Ukrainian counterpart. Luke Harding notes that Manafort was 
such an enthusiast for US interests ‘that the joke inside the Party of Regions was that he 
actually worked for the CIA’.979 Typically, when Yanukovych in 2012 jailed his long-
term rival, Yulia Tymoshenko, Manafort produced a 187-page report justifying her 
detention. Paradoxically, Manafort worked to turn Ukraine away from a pro-Moscow 
orientation by signing the Association Agreement with the EU. It is ironic that the main 
figure convicted in the Russiagate investigation into Russian collusion was in fact doing 
the opposite. By November 2013 he had convinced Yanukovych to sign the document, 
which would have marked the beginning of Ukraine’s economic (and probably political) 
turn away from Russia. Manafort apparently also got the EU to agree to sign, even 
though Tymoshenko remained incarcerated – earlier the EU position had been that there 
could be no deal while she remained in jail. In the event, at the last minute, on 21 
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November, Yanukovych decided to postpone signing, sparking protests that turned into 
an uprising, and ended in Yanukovych’s flight from Kiev early on 22 February 2014. 
Manafort’s former employee, Rick Gates, in his first trial in August 2018 claimed that 
Manafort received $42 million for his pro-EU lobbying from Sergei Lyovochkin, 
Yanukovych’s chief of staff (although the latter denies this). Manafort’s pro-EU work 
meant that he continued to play a role in Ukrainian politics even after the ‘coup’ against 
Yanukovych.  
There are even suggestions (from cryptic exchanges between Manafort’s 
daughters) that it was Manafort’s idea to send militants to the Maidan on 29 November 
2013 to provoke a reaction, which would force Yanukovych back to an EU-centred 
orientation. There is speculation that Lyovochkin deliberately used excessive force 
against the relatively small number of demonstrators that night to ‘outrage the world’. 
The violence had the desired effect, and on 1 December up to half a million protestors 
came out on to the square. Arsen Avakov, Ukraine’s interior minister since 2014, is also 
of the view that the wanton and pointless violence of the riot police was a deliberate 
provocation, but events spiralled out of control. According to Gates, after Yanukovych’s 
ouster Manafort allegedly helped broker the deal on 25 March 2014 between Vitaly 
Klitschko and the oligarch Petro Poroshenko, whereby the former would stand for mayor 
of Kiev, and the latter for the presidency. The deal was sealed in Vienna where the 
oligarch Dmytro Firtash was in exile fighting an extradition request to the US. Lvyochkin 
was also there, and later we discover Manafort as well. Manafort remained a frequent 
visitor to Kiev, and he returned to participate in the regional elections of October 2015, 
where he supported Lvyochkin’s new opposition party.980 Just months later, he joined 
Trump’s campaign. In sum, far from being ‘pro-Russian’, Manafort was playing a far 
more complex – and lucrative – game. 
A secret ‘black ledger’ showing payments from the Party of Regions to Manafort 
had been known to the Ukrainian authorities since 2014, but on 29 May 2016 NABU 
announced its existence, just days after Manafort’s appointment as Trump’s campaign 
chair. Department of Justice documents, moreover, indicate once again the involvement 
of Bruce Ohr, his wife Nellie (who worked for Fusion GPS), and Steele. Nellie Ohr later 
admitted to Congress that she transferred Russian material on Trump from Fusion to the 
DoJ through her husband during the election. It was Nellie Ohr who on 30 May 2016 
alerted her husband and other DoJ officials to the existence of the black ledger, which led 
to Manafort’s downfall and subsequent prosecution.981 Later, FBI documents, revealed by 
the conservative watchdog Judicial Watch, demonstrated just how central the opposition 
research firm Fusion GPS was in driving forward the Russiagate narrative. Nellie Ohr 
compiled reams of research purporting to show connections between Trump, his 
associates and Russia. There are hundreds of emails between Bruce Ohr, Nellie Ohr and 
DoJ officials, with Bruce Ohr also acting as a conduit between Steele and the FBI after 
the former was cut off after speaking to the media.982  
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Fusion GPS throughout 2016 worked to encourage stories about the alleged 
corruption of Trump and his associates. One of these in late July discussed Manafort’s 
activities in Ukraine.983 In August 2016 the Ukrainian MP Serhiy Leshchenko published 
part of the ledger showing that Manafort received $12.7 million in undisclosed cash 
payments for his work in Ukraine between 2007 and 2012 on behalf of the Party of 
Regions and Yanukovych. Leshchenko was an associate of the Ukrainian oligarch Viktor 
Pinchuk, who donated millions to the Clinton Foundation. Leshchenko himself made no 
bones about his partisanship, telling the Financial Times that Trump was ‘a pro-Russian 
candidate who can break the geopolitical balance in the world’, hence most Ukrainian 
politicians were ‘on Hillary Clinton’s side’. This is what spurred Leshchenko and ‘Kiev’s 
wider political leadership to do something they would never have attempted before: 
intervene, however indirectly, in a US election’.984 There were also investigations into 
various offshore accounts that helped fund Manafort’s lavish life style, as well as an $18 
million deal to sell a cable TV station to a partnership put together by Manafort and the 
‘Russian oligarch’ Oleg Deripaska, who the Western media invariably, although 
misleadingly, call ‘a close of ally of President Vladimir V. Putin’.985 Deripaska first hired 
Manafort in 2006 to help resolve his visa problems with the US authorities, but the 
relationship later soured. Deripaska in 2014 launched a legal case in the Cayman Islands 
against Manafort for the recovery of $18.9 million he had invested in a cable-
telecommunications deal and which had subsequently disappeared.986 In September 2016 
the FBI asked Deripaska to prove that Manafort was helping Trump collude with Russia, 
a notion that Deripaska dismissed as ludicrous. Steele and Bruce Ohr between December 
2015 and February 2016 discussed securing evidence against Manafort.987 Manafort’s 
alleged Russia links ignited Russiagate concerns, even though the bulk of Manafort’s 
work in Ukraine was directed against Russian strategic interests, above all by advancing 
Ukraine’s closer association with the EU. 
A Ukrainian court in December 2018 concluded that NABU’s use of the ledger 
was an illegal attempt to influence the US election. A NABU official is recorded as 
stating that the ledger had been released to help Clinton’s campaign.988 The judgment 
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documents about Manafort.989 Leschenko admitted revealing the secret ledger payments 
to Manafort, and conceded that he had been motivated by hostility to Trump. Later, there 
were allegations that the ledger had in part been forged or tampered with. Manafort 
insisted that its publication ‘was a politically motivated false attack on me. My role as a 
paid consultant was public. There was nothing off the books, but the way that this was 
presented tried to make it look shady’. He was particularly upset that his work in Ukraine 
was presented as ‘pro-Russian’, when in fact ‘all my efforts were focussed on helping 
Ukraine move into Europe and the West’.990 As for Leshchenko, in evidence to Congress 
it was later discovered that he was also a ‘source’ of Russian dirt on Trump that was fed 
to Clinton’s opposition research firm Fusion GPS. Back in Ukraine, an investigation was 
opened into his purchase of a luxury apartment in mid-2016. Overall, this is another case 
of deceptive politics: ‘a Ukrainian parliamentarian fed dirt to Clinton’s team and leaked 
to the media information that harmed the Republican candidate’s campaign? That seems 
like more collusion than was uncovered by special counsel Robert Mueller’s 
investigation’.991 
It is hardly surprising that the Ukrainian authorities favoured Clinton. She 
promised to supply offensive weapons to Kiev, a policy rejected by Obama fearing that it 
would exacerbate the new cold war. Trump’s alleged pro-Russian sentiments prompted 
fears of a ‘sell-out’, above all by forcing Kiev to fulfil its commitments under the terms 
of the Minsk-2 agreement of February 2015. In March 2016 Trump stated that he did not 
want to ‘go to World War 3 over Ukraine’, 992  which seems an eminently sensible 
position. Nevertheless, his moderate stance on Ukraine ‘boosted an inconvenient 
storyline for the campaign: that Trump was too cosy with Putin’.993 The Democrats were 
certainly very cosy with the neo-nationalist regime that seized power in February 2014. 
Biden famously boasted at a meeting of the Council for Foreign Relations on 23 January 
2018 that he had forced the Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko to fire Ukraine’s chief 
prosecutor, Viktor Shokin, by threatening to withhold a $1 billion US loan. Shokin was 
conducting the Burisma investigation, and when he was sacked in March 2016 the probe 
transferred to NABU, and was promptly shut down – although it would be revived to 
haunt Biden’s 2020 presidential bid and became part of the debates surrounding the 
impeachment attempt against Trump. 994  At issue is whether Biden sought Shokin’s 
removal to protect his son Hunter from investigation for his work with Burisma, or 
whether Joe Biden’s voice was just one of many calling for Shokin’s dismissal because of 
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his failure to tackle corruption. Amid the welter of competing claims one thing is clear: 
the Burisma investigation was active at the time of Shokin’s dismissal but became less so 
afterwards.  
The Ukrainian embassy in Washington later admitted that DNC contractor 
Chalupa solicited dirt on Manafort, and even tried to enlist the Ukrainian president to 
help in the endeavour. Chalupa had earlier worked in the Clinton White House, and now 
worked as consultant for the DNC and prepared ‘opposition research’ on Trump. 
Chalupa’s firm, Chalupa & Associates, was paid $72,000 by the DNC for its work in the 
2016 election. She hoped to get information from the Ukrainian government about 
Manafort’s dealings in the country and force the issue on to the Congressional agenda. 
The Ukrainian ambassador to the US, Valeriy Chaly, reported that the embassy 
considered her request to get Congress involved in investigating Manafort and rejected it 
‘as we were convinced that this is a strictly US domestic matter’. Chaly’s written 
response nevertheless confirmed earlier stories that an American working for the DNC 
had tried to enlist Ukraine’s help in the 2016 election. It appears that a senior embassy 
official, Andrii Telizhenko (who was later accused by the Democrats of being an agent of 
Russian disinformation), was instructed by the embassy to meet with Chalupa in March 
2016 and to gather whatever dirt Ukraine had in its government records about Trump and 
Manafort. According to Telizhenko, Chalupa made no bones about what she was after: 
‘She said the DNC wanted to collect evidence that Trump, his organization and Manafort 
were Russian assets, working to hurt the US and working with Putin against the US 
interests’. Her ambition did not stop there: ‘She indicated if we could find the evidence 
they would introduce it in Congress in September and try to build a case that Trump 
should be removed from the ballot, from the election’.995 If this report is accurate, then 
this is incendiary material, exposing an attempt to enlist a foreign power in the attempt to 
remove an American presidential candidate from contesting an election. Telizhenko 
refused to take part in something that he considered illegal and unethical, but Chalupa 
kept up the work, attending an international symposium in April 2016 where she met 68 
Ukrainian investigative journalists to talk about Manafort, and in May the existence of 
the ‘black ledger’ was announced.  Although the DNC has tried to portray Chalupa’s 
works as that of a free-lancer, emails indicate that the DNC was fully informed of her 
activities.996 
Chaly was at the Republican National Convention in Cleveland in July 2016 and 
met with members of Trump’s foreign policy team. Despite his lobbying, an amendment 
to the Republican Party platform that promised to provide Ukraine with lethal weapons 
was watered down to keep it in conformity with what at the time was official US 
policy.997 Sanctions remained, but the only item that was rejected was the attempt to 
provide offensive weapons, a move that was also rejected by the Democratic Party 
platform adopted at this time. 998  Trump was sensitive to the issue, and on 25 July 
tweeted:  ‘Ukrainian efforts to sabotage Trump campaign – “quietly working to sabotage 
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Trump campaign”’.999 Trump was right, and the hostility of Ukrainians was evident in an 
op-ed written by Chaly in The Hill in August in which he condemned Trump’s stance on 
Russia, arguing that it represented ‘appeasement of an aggressor and supported the 
violation of a sovereign country’s territorial integrity and another’s breach of 
international law’.1000 The Ukrainians publicly questioned Trump’s fitness for office and 
released materials that incriminated his campaign manager Manafort, forcing his 
resignation. This was a genuine case of meddling. Following Trump’s victory the 
Ukrainian authorities sought to make amends for their earlier support for Clinton until 
they were once again caught up in the impeachment scandal. 
Before that, Manafort became one of the most high-profile victims of Russiagate. 
Manafort stood trial in Alexandria, Virginia, from July 2018 on charges of bank fraud 
and tax evasion and putatively in Washington in September on charges of making false 
statements about his foreign lobbying work and money laundering. Manafort had been 
part of Trump’s campaign for only five months in 2016, working as campaign chair 
between June and August, but most of the charges predated this. His house in Virginia 
was raided by the FBI early in the morning of 27 July 2017, gathering much 
incriminating material. His Virginia trial ended on 21 August and Manafort was 
convicted of eight federal felonies associated with financial crimes: five counts of tax 
fraud, two counts of bank fraud, and one count of failure to report a foreign bank account; 
but a there was a hung jury on the other ten charges. Manafort was accused of amassing 
$65m in foreign bank accounts between 2010 and 2014, while spending over $15m on 
luxury purchases. These offences had nothing to do with Trump, and even less with 
Russia, and were only prosecuted because they came into the crosshairs of the Mueller 
investigation. Manafort pleaded guilty to further charges to avoid the second trial in 
Washington, on FARA, money laundering, lying, tax conspiracy and witness tampering 
violations.1001 
By the time of the trial Gates had been ‘flipped’ by the Mueller team, having cut a 
deal and now cooperated with the investigators in exchange for a reduced sentence.1002 
Gates confessed to stealing money for and from Manafort, and confessed to a litany of 
offences, including falsified tax returns to setting up shell companies and misleading 
banks to gain loans, but claimed that he acted on Manafort’s behalf. Gates along with 
Manafort was accused of working as ‘unregistered agents of the government of Ukraine’ 
and two Ukrainian political parties, that they had raised millions of dollars for Ukrainian 
entities, and laundered these funds through scores of ‘corporations, partnerships and bank 
accounts’, and drew on them without paying the required US taxes.1003 Gates pleaded 
guilty in February 2018 to aiding Manafort in tax evasion, misleading accountants and 
deliberately misclassifying payments as loans.1004 
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In a related case, on 20 February 2018 Alex van der Zwaan, a lawyer based in 
London who since 2012 had worked with Manafort on Ukrainian matters, pleaded guilty 
to lying to Mueller about his contacts with Gates and Manafort’s associate Konstantin 
Kilimnik, and the part he had played in disseminating a report about Tymoshenko’s 
trial.1005 He was sentenced 30 days in prison and fined $20,000, but was pardoned by 
Trump in December 2020. There are many other incidents associated with Manafort. As 
we shall see, he was accused of passing on polling data to Kilimnik, who is alleged to 
have ties to Russian intelligence, who in turn passed on the information to two Ukrainian 
oligarchs (the initial story in the New York Times mistakenly named Deripaska).1006 
Deripaska also figured in the rather strange story of the Belarusian model Anastasia 
Vashukevich (aka Nastya Rybka), who in early 2018 claimed to have 16 hours of 
recordings made in August 2016 shedding light on the Trump campaign’s ties with 
Russia.1007 In the tapes, Deripaska is allegedly heard discussing the election with other 
people, possibly Americans, leading to suggestions that Deripaska was the link between 
the Russian government and Manafort in the Kremlin’s attempts to influence the election. 
In 2018 Deripaska won a court case against Vashukevich for having violated his privacy 
by publishing pictures of them together. The arrest and sentencing of the gun rights 
activist Maria Butina, and her 15 months in an American jail before returning to Russia in 
October 2019, demonstrate the same new cold war presumptions and prejudices as 
Russiagate itself.1008 These stories, and there are many more, are part of the penumbra of 
Russiagate, intimating a web of conspiracy but dissolve on closer examination.  
On 26 November 2018 Manafort’s plea deal was rescinded by Mueller, on the 
grounds that he had repeatedly lied to the FBI despite agreeing to cooperate. According 
to Mueller, Manafort lied about five major issues after agreeing to cooperate with the 
prosecutors, including his ‘contact with administration officials’. 1009  The alleged lies 
constituted a new offence, and in March 2019 a Virginia court sentenced him to 47 
months in jail, with 9 months to be taken off for time already served, but a Washington 
court gave him three-and-a-half years in addition to the other sentence.1010 Manafort had 
been in jail since June 2018, largely in solitary confinement, when he was charged with 
witness tampering and had his bail revoked. It was at this time that it was alleged that 
Manafort had gone to see Assange in the Ecuadorian embassy in London in 2013, 2015 
and March 2016, a few months before WikiLeaks published the Democrat emails. 
Assange denied that the two had met, and there was no record of his name in the visitors’ 
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log.1011 Craig Murray insisted that ‘there were no exceptions’ to the rule that visitors had 
to sign in, and he went further:  
 
I can also assure you that Luke Harding, the Guardian, Washington Post and New 
York Times have been publishing a stream of deliberate lies, in collusion with the 
security services. I am not a fan of Donald Trump. But to see the partisans of the 
defeated candidate (and a particularly obnoxious defeated candidate) manipulate 
the security services and the media to create an entirely false public perception, in 
order to attempt to overturn the result of the US Presidential election, is the most 
astonishing thing I have witnessed in my lifetime. 1012 
 
Greenwald commented on the allegation that Manafort had visited, and thus colluded, 
with Assange, with bitter humour: ‘It is certainly possible that Paul Manafort, Roger 
Stone, and even Donald Trump himself “secretly” visited Julian Assange in the embassy. 
It’s possible that Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un joined them’. 1013  Possible, but 
unlikely.1014  
 
Campaign financing and the November 2018 midterms 
 
The American public showed a healthy scepticism about the more exaggerated claims. A 
Gallup poll in August 2018 found that only one per cent considered Russia the top 
problem for the US. The majority of Americans believed that it was important to continue 
efforts to improve relations between the two countries (58%), rather than taking strong 
diplomatic and economic steps (35%). In other words, the Trumpian line that it made 
sense to ‘get on’ with Russia was more popular than the Democrat line of piling on 
pressure.1015 The idea that a handful of GRU officers and hackers plus a bunch of people 
sitting in St Petersburg who spent about $100,000 on social media ads swayed the 
election result in 2016 was insulting and humiliating. The deregulation of campaign 
finances meant that Russian spending was a drop in the ocean. Expenditure on elections 
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ballooned after the 2010 Citizens United case, which opened the floodgates on corporate 
and individual spending through so-called Super PACS (public action committees), 
allowing special interest lobbyists to spend millions on shaping voter preferences and 
getting the support of elected officials. 1016  The decision allowed people like casino 
magnate Sheldon Adelson to spend his millions on elections, which in turn provoked the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal. Outside groups spent a record $6.8 billion in the 2016 
presidential and congressional elections, some $300 million more than in 2012. Obama 
was right to argue that the Supreme Court decision ‘strikes at democracy itself’.1017  
The midterm elections on 6 November 2018, with 35 Senate seats (26 Democratic 
and nine Republican) and all 435 House seats being contested, proved a testing ground 
for allegations of Russian interference. The midterms were widely seen as a referendum 
on Trump and his leadership. Trump once again proved himself a formidable campaigner, 
and although the Republicans lost control of the House, they consolidated their majority 
in the Senate. The Republicans won three seats to increase their majority to 53-47, but the 
Democrats won back control of the House of Representatives (235-199) by gaining 40 
seats. The Republicans lost fewer seats (40) than the Democrats had in the 1994 and 2010 
midterms (54 and 63, respectively). The structural imbalances of the US electoral system 
were once again evident: the Democrats won 11 million more votes than the Republicans, 
yet proportionately the latter still came out ahead. The outcome was far from the 
anticipated drubbing, and it now looked possible for Trump to win a second term in 2020. 
His State of the Union ‘unity’ address on 5 February 2019 became his stump speech for 
the forthcoming campaign. 
Although Russia had no particular dog in the midterms, it was once again accused 
of seeking to destabilise and subvert American democracy and to undermine trust in its 
institutions. In fact, the problem lay closer to home. Some $5.2 billion was spent on the 
election, a significant proportion of which came from America’s leading ‘oligarchs’. The 
three wealthiest families in the US – the Waltons of Walmart, the Mars chocolate family, 
and the Koch brothers – enjoy a combined fortune of $350 billion, joined by the tech 
billionaires such as Amazon’s Jeff Bezos, the owner of the Washington Post. The top 
three wealthiest billionaires – Jeff Bezos, Bill Gates and Warren Buffet – now enjoy as 
much wealth as the bottom half of the US population combined. Adelson broke spending 
records on the election, donating $100 million to the campaign.1018 Not surprisingly, 
issues of social justice and inequality forced the Russiagate allegations near the bottom of 
voter concerns. The persistent problem of voting impediments once again came to the 
fore, with long queues, short voting hours, and various challenges to voter eligibility. The 
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Economist Intelligence Unit assessed the US to be a ‘flawed’ rather than a ‘full’ 
democracy.1019 
Democrats understood that other issues, notably health care and immigration, 
were more effective in challenging the Republicans than the Russia question. A Pew 
Research Centre poll at the time found that only five per cent of those who disapproved 
of Trump cited ‘collusion with Russia’ as the main reason.1020 The Mueller probe had lost 
potency and was regarded as biased. A CNN exit poll found that 54 per cent of 
respondents considered the Russia investigation ‘politically motivated’, and a 46 per cent 
plurality disapproved of the way that Mueller conducted it.1021 This also meant that a new 
wave of sanctions was unlikely, given that there was no evidence of Russian ‘meddling’ 
– Russiagate pressure appeared to be easing. Nevertheless, the collusion and interference 
charges remained the backbone of the attack against Trump, and with the Democrats back 
in control of the House, the charge was renewed. 
Despite repeated warnings that Russia would attempt to ‘meddle’ in the midterms, 
there was no evidence of such activity. Shortly before the election, following a tip-off 
from the FBI, Facebook removed some 100 accounts allegedly linked to the IRA troll 
farm, but that was about it.1022 The US Cyber Command, the military’s cyber warfare 
division, launched a cyber-campaign against Russian operatives to ‘curb misinformation’ 
ahead of the 6 November vote.1023 The IRA was taken off-line for the duration of the poll. 
Reflecting the military’s dominance of the West Wing, in 2017 the Trump administration 
raised the status of the US Cyber Command by placing it under the Department of 
Defence, and in August of the following year it eased Obama-era rules governing the use 
of cyber weapons.1024 In the event, Russiagate was not salient, and Russia as a topic was 
well down the list of concerns. One study of the pre-election period found that only 0.1 
per cent of ads aired in congressional races mentioned Russia. It was as if the whole vast 
furore over Russian interference had evaporated. The Russiagate affair had ‘not gone as 
advertised’.1025 However, Bolton was right to note during an interview with the Ekho 
Moskvy radio station during his visit to Moscow on 22 October 2018 that Russian 
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meddling in the US election in 2016 did not affect outcome but it did ‘sow enormous 
mistrust of Russia’. He went on to warn that ‘You shouldn’t meddle in our elections 
because you are not advancing Russian interest’, and he called meddling ‘a major 
obstacle’ to achieving agreement where the two countries had shared interests.1026 By this 
time the Trump administration had come to view Chinese influence as rather more of a 
threat. Bolton notes that ‘Viewed without partisan blinders, China could bring 
considerably greater resources to bear on this effort [election meddling] than Russia’.1027 
This did not prevent Trump reportedly pleading with Xi to ensure that he would win in 
2020 by increasing purchases of soybeans and wheat. 1028 
 The Democrat take-over of the House gave it greater subpoena power. In the 
gleeful words of the New Yorker ‘the period of serious investigation of Donald Trump is 
about to begin’. The results certainly made it harder for Trump to terminate the special 
counsel’s work. Half a dozen House committees enjoyed the power to investigate Trump, 
including Intelligence, Oversight, Judiciary and others, which issued subpoenas and 
compelled testimony.1029 The winners of the midterms were the Trumpist Republicans 
and radical Democrats, each offering voters ‘an emotionally charged image of an enemy 
instead of a constructive image of the future’, while the moderate Democrats and 
Republicans lost.1030 The House could now block Trump’s legislative agenda, such as his 
wall with Mexico, and exert greater pressure for him to reveal his tax returns and private 
banking records, investigate possible conflicts of interest in his various businesses, and to 
reinvigorate the flagging investigation into his alleged collusion with Russia in 2016. 
Schiff took over as chair of the HPSCI and made the Russia issue his top priority. 
His work enjoyed the support of the intelligence community, especially over the issue of 
whether Trump had tried to obstruct the FBI investigation into the president’s dealing 
with Moscow when he fired Comey.1031 Schiff examined whether Russia had financial 
leverage over the president through investments in Trump’s business empire and whether 
Russians were laundering money though the Trump Organisation. Other questions 
included Trump’s financial relationship with Deutsche Bank, social media interference, 
the Republican Party’s search for Clinton’s emails and who Trump Jr. telephoned in 
between his calls setting up the meeting with Veselnitskaya.1032 Schiff tried to recall 
Bannon and Cohen ‘to get answers that the GOP majority wouldn’t or couldn’t extract’. 
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The Committee acted as ‘Mueller’s congressional backstop’ and then its continuation.1033 
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The first special prosecutor in US history was dismissed by President Ulysses S. Grant in 
1875, but when President Richard Nixon fired Watergate special prosecutor Archibald 
Cox on 20 October 1973 (the ‘Saturday Night Massacre’) the public backlash was so 
intense that he was forced to appoint a replacement, who ultimately forced Nixon’s 
resignation on 9 August 1974. President Bill Clinton was harried for over eight years 
(1994 to 2002) by the independent counsel investigation led by Kenneth Starr in the 
Whitewater investigation, and in December 1998 the House voted to impeach him over 
his affair with the White House intern Monica Lewinsky. In 1999 special counsel 
regulations were revised to stop such an open-ended investigation, and thereafter probes 
were firmly subordinated to the DoJ. Trump no doubt looked to the Grant precedent, but 
times had changed, as demonstrated by the Watergate investigation. Mueller was director 
of the FBI for 12 years from 2001 to 2013 and became famous for his taciturn probity. 
Mueller now investigated a case in which domestic partisanship intersected with foreign 
policy and security concerns. McFarland notes that ‘Trump was pummelled in the press 
every hour of every day for more than two years, with cable news pundits speculating on 
how the Mueller probe was going to find Trump guilty of some of the worst crimes in 
American history’, while former Obama intelligence chiefs implied ‘that they had inside 
information, suggested Trump was a Russian agent and would be charged with 
treason’.1034 In the event, the Mueller team found no smoking gun, but the investigation 
generated process crimes of obstruction of justice.  
 
The special counsel gets to work 
 
Trump developed an understandable loathing for attorney general Sessions. On election 
night Trump praised him as ‘a great man’, but when Sessions in March 2017 recused 
himself from the Russia investigation, he rapidly fell from grace. Trump has a point in 
believing that ‘The previous administration, its own candidate defeated, was not just 
disregarding the democratic custom of smoothing the way for the winner of the election; 
rather, in the White House view, Obama’s people had plotted with the intelligence 
community to put land mines in the new administration’s way’. Susan Rice had a 
spreadsheet listing all the contacts between Trump officials and Russians.1035 Perfectly 
legal conversations were ‘unmasked’, turning Russiagate into ‘spygate’, or as the scholar 
Stephen F. Cohen put it, ‘intelgate’.1036  
Snowden revealed that since November 2010 the NSA was analysing domestic 
phone calls and emails to ‘discover and track’ connections, and this now turned into 
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political espionage.1037 In a tweet of 4 March 2016 Trump exploded: ‘Terrible! Just found 
out that Obama had my “wires tapped” in Trump Tower just before the victory. Nothing 
found. This is McCarthyism!’ A few minutes later he added, ‘How low has President 
Obama gone to tapp [sic] my phones during the very sacred election process. This is 
Nixon/Watergate. Bad (or sick) guy!’ 1038  Trump may have been ‘half-right’, since 
‘Trump Tower had been wiretapped, not to eavesdrop  on his dealings, but to investigate 
one of the world’s biggest illegal high-stakes gambling rings operating just below his 
own penthouse’.1039  His team was the subject of a counter-intelligence investigation, 
which may have included some monitoring of communications, but there is no evidence 
of systematic tapping. 
Why did Rosenstein appoint a special counsel when there was little evidence that 
the president had committed a crime? Rosenstein was smarting from Trump’s attempt to 
pin the blame for Comey’s dismissal on him, while McCabe and his associates sought to 
institutionalise the Russia probe. Trump was clearly mystified about why meeting with 
Russians was wrong, an indication of how he failed ‘to join the dots’. Trump’s election 
was perceived not only to imperil America’s democratic norms but also the country’s 
national security. An influential analysis in the New Yorker remains one of the most 
unequivocal statements of the philosophy underlying the new cold war and the resistance 
to Trump.1040 The story connected ‘the dots of Russia’s geopolitical mortification, Putin’s 
ambition, the country’s cyber talents, Trump’s own nascent authoritarianism, and the US 
intelligence community’s suspicions about Putin and Russia – codified a narrative as 
coherent and as apocalyptic as the one in the original cold war’.1041 
Twelve days after Comey’s dismissal and with Sessions recused, the way was 
open for his deputy, Rosenstein, on 17 May 2017 to appoint a special counsel. Mueller 
was commissioned to ‘ensure a full and thorough investigation of the Russian 
government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election’ and was ‘authorised to 
conduct’ the investigation that Comey had confirmed on 20 March. The brief was 
remarkably broad: to investigate i) ‘any links and/or coordination between the Russian 
government and individuals associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump, 
and ii) any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation, and iii) any 
other matters’. Mueller was authorised ‘to prosecute federal crimes arising from the 
investigation of these matters’.1042 Trump was furious, tweeting that night ‘This is the 
single greatest witch hunt of a politician in American history’.1043 He stressed that ‘I am 
being investigated for firing the FBI Director by the man [Rosenstein] who told me to fire 
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the FBI Director. Witch Hunt!’.1044 A special counsel has enormous powers to investigate 
any possible crime. Trump had cause to be alarmed: ‘Now I have this person’, he railed, 
‘who has no accountability who can look into anything, however unrelated it is? They’re 
going to spend years digging through my whole life and finances’.1045 
 Trump was right. The Mueller team investigated not only the extent and 
significance of contacts and possible collusion between members of the Trump campaign 
and representatives (real or claimed) of the Russian state, but also campaign contributions 
and the failure to register work conducted on behalf of foreign powers, notably Ukraine 
and Turkey, by those associated with the Trump team. The investigation above all 
examined attempts by individuals and organisations linked to the Russian state to 
interfere in the 2016 presidential election. Members of Trump’s family and associates 
who had dealing with Russia were now vulnerable. Bannon in this respect was beyond 
reproach: ‘I’ve never been to Russia. I don’t know anybody from Russia. I’ve never 
spoken to any Russians. And I’d just as well not speak to anyone who has’.1046 Trump 
denounced Mueller’s ‘team of partisans’ as 17 ‘angry Democrats’.1047 In fact, 13 of the 
17 were Democrats but Mueller and some others were lifelong Republicans, and most put 
professionalism above partisanship – but none could escape a political culture which 
demonised Russia and all its works. On 2 August 2017 Rosenstein’s ‘scope memo’ 
broadened the investigation to cover collateral issues, including Trump campaign 
members Manafort and Page ‘for a crime or crimes by colluding with Russian 
government officials’, allegations that came from the discredited Steele dossier.1048 As 
noted, four warrants were issued against Page from October 2016, but the DoJ in early 
2020 (following the Horowitz review) admitted to the FISA court that the last two of the 
three renewals should never have been filed.1049 We also noted earlier that the memo 
authorised Mueller to investigate the potential ‘crime’ of Flynn ‘engaging in 
conversations with Russian government officials during the period of the Trump 
transition’, a reference to the Logan Act. 
Trump was advised to let the Russiagate investigation take its course, but that did 
not prevent him regularly railing against it. In conversation with his confidant Senator 
Lindsey Graham Trump insisted that ‘I didn’t work with the Russians’, to which Graham 
responded ‘I believe you … because you can’t work with your own government. Why 
should you be working with the Russian government?’.1050 Trump told John Dowd, the 
veteran 76-year-old attorney who represented him, that the Mueller investigation ‘was 
consuming him and his presidency’, and he insisted that he had done nothing wrong: 
‘John, this thing is an enormous burden. It interferes particularly with foreign affairs’. 
Trump stressed that Russia was a nuclear armed state with over a thousand deployed 
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weapons, which changed the strategic calculus of interactions.1051 Trump was outraged 
by the investigation, and he directed much of his anger at Sessions. In a rare interview 
with the New York Times on 19 July 2017 he launched a blistering attack, arguing that he 
would never have appointed him if he had known that he would refuse any involvement 
in Russian matters. Trump was also angry with Rosenstein, who had appointed Mueller 
without any consultation.1052 Worse, Rosenstein’s 17 May order not only authorised ‘a 
Russian investigation but it directed Mueller to investigate “any matters that arose or may 
arise directly from the [Russian] investigation”. Dowd had never seen anyone in Justice 
with such broad authority’.1053 In practice, despite endless fulminations, Trump and his 
team co-operated with the investigation.  
The collusion charge centred on Trump’s visit to Moscow in 2013, what he knew 
about Manafort’s dealings, what business his long-standing attorney Michael Cohen was 
doing with Russia during the campaign, and what he may have known about the 
involvement of his other associates, such as Roger Stone, with Clinton’s hacked emails. 
The enduring fear was that Mueller would frame an obstruction of justice charge, 
including Trump’s three attempts to get Comey to drop the Flynn investigation. 
Nevertheless, Dowd pursued a policy of cooperation, regularly meeting with James 
Quarles, adviser to Mueller’s deputy Aaron Zebley. Dowd provided the requested 
materials, believing that the president had nothing to hide, and hoped thereby that the 
investigation would come to a speedy end. As a veteran of special investigations, he 
knew that ‘The length of these investigations often became the abuse’.1054 As for Trump, 
he accused the investigations of sowing discord: ‘If it was the goal of Russia to create 
discord, disruption and chaos within the US then, with all the Committee Hearings, 
Investigations and Party hatred, they have succeeded beyond their wildest dreams. They 
are laughing their assess off in Moscow. Get smart America!’.1055 
Dowd was particularly concerned about how the Veselnitskaya meeting had been 
blown totally out of proportion, and he told Trump so: ‘Mr. President, it’s horseshit’. 
‘And so what? Getting dirt on people was commonplace in campaigns and the nation’s 
capital. It even had a name – “opposition research” or “investigative reporting”. That’s 
what half of Washington seemed to be paid for’. Dowd considered the media outrage 
‘disgusting’.1056 In his view, the stories were ‘a big nothing burger’.1057 Nevertheless, as 
part of the cooperation strategy, he provided the Mueller enquiry with extensive 
materials, including the testimony of 37 witnesses and 1,400,000 documents (with 
highlights of Trump’s most intimate conversations), on the understanding that the enquiry 
would be expeditiously concluded, thus removing the shadow hanging over the 
administration.1058 This clearly was not enough, and on 20 July 2017 it was revealed that 
Mueller was investigating Trump’s finances, an issue that was likely to be Trump’s 
Achilles Heel. In the event, the financial aspect of the investigation stalled, and thus 
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according to Weissmann the question of financial support from Russia was never 
answered. 1059  Russian purchases of Trump apartments, the 2013 Miss Universe 
tournament in Moscow, and Trump’s sale of the Florida mansion to a Russian oligarch in 
2008 were investigated. There was also the issue of continued attempts by Cohen and 
Sater to develop a Trump Tower in Moscow. 
Dowd increasingly suspected that Mueller was dragging his feet, telling the latter 
on 21 December 2017:  
 
All the records have been produced. … All the witnesses have been interviewed 
except one or two. The entire inquiry appears to be the product of a conspiracy by 
the DNC, Fusion GPS – which oversaw the Steele dossier – and senior FBI 
intelligence officials to undermine the Trump presidency. The failure to 
investigate Comey’s role precipitating the enquiry is a travesty. Comey’s aberrant 
and dishonourable conduct demands scrutiny. 
 
Woodward laconically notes ‘Mueller did not reply’.1060 Mueller and Quarles insisted that 
they wanted to interview the president, and on 8 January 2018 Mueller dictated a list of 
the 16 topics they wanted to talk about, mostly dealing with Flynn, Comey and Sessions. 
Knowing Trump’s prolixity and inability to focus for long on a particular issue, Dowd 
was adamant that Trump should never be allowed to testify on oath. In the course of a 
single answer, Trump would incriminate himself ten times. Dowd recalled the time when 
Trump gave a deposition to a lawyer in Florida: ‘When the lawyer had asked him what he 
did for a living, it had taken Trump about 16 pages to answer the question’.1061 Dowd was 
shocked to discover at a meeting with Mueller on 5 March that the latter contemplated 
issuing a grand jury subpoena to force Trump to testify, despite Dowd having provided 
the enquiry with unprecedented access to White House files. A grand jury subpoena on a 
president, who ultimately was not the target of the investigation but a witness, had never 
been tried before.1062 Dowd was furious, telling Mueller: ‘Talk about reciprocity. You 
guys tell me where the collusion is. And don’t give me that chickenshit meeting in June 
[2016, with Veselnitskaya]. … That’s a nothing. There’s no collusion. And the 
obstruction? It’s a joke’. 
He went on to air the long-standing grievance that Flynn had spoken to the FBI 
not believing he was under jeopardy, since he had been told that the agents had closed his 
file. 1063 As the conversation developed, according to Woodward, ‘Dowd began to think 
that Mueller did not know the facts of the case’. 1064  If true, this is an astonishing 
statement, but it could simply be a matter of Mueller playing his cards close to his 
chest.1065 Dowd believed that the Mueller investigation, lacking substantive evidence, 
repeatedly played the perjury trap to ensnare the president; so he told Mueller: ‘You did it 
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to Flynn, you did it to Gates, you did it to Papadopoulos. … you guys, that’s the games 
you played’.1066 Reporting back to the president shortly afterwards Dowd said ‘You’ve 
never truly respected Mueller. You’ve got really good instincts, but I’ve never bought 
into it. But I’ve got to tell you, I think your instincts might be right. He really wasn’t 
prepared. Why are we coming back here with nothing?’.1067 
 A week later, on 12 March, Mueller’s team provided Dowd with what were now 
49 questions, once again dealing with Trump’s attitude to Flynn, Comey and Sessions, as 
well as the Trump Tower meeting and Trump’s real estate development in Russia. Dowd 
understood that these questions had been repeatedly answered, but ‘the broad range of 
issues suggested that Mueller had nothing and wanted to go on a giant fishing expedition. 
Setting a perjury trap for the volatile Trump would be child’s play’.1068  Dowd now 
understood that the president had been right, telling him ‘I don’t trust him [Mueller]’. 
Woodward goes on: ‘The 49 questions troubled Dowd. Why not just five? Why no 
deference to the president of the United States’, who daily had to deal with major global 
issues. 1069  Nevertheless, the president’s personal lawyer up to May 2018, Ty Cobb, 
recommended that Trump should take the witness stand, and Trump agreed – ‘I’m a good 
witness. I’ll be a real good witness’. 1070 Woodward sums up:  
 
Dowd remained convinced that Mueller never had a Russian case or an 
obstruction case. He was looking for a perjury trap. And in a brutally honest self-
evaluation, he believed that Mueller had played him, and the president, for 
suckers in order to get their cooperation on witnesses and documents. … Dowd 
believed that the president had not colluded with Russia or obstructed justice.1071 
 
Dowd resigned on 22 March when Trump refused to take his advice and continued to 
insist that he would make an excellent witness. The Mueller team received the president’s 
written responses in late November, but already in December the special counsel 
‘informed counsel of the insufficiency of those responses’.1072 The answers about Russian 
links to the campaign were apparently adequate, but not – hardly surprisingly – about the 
obstruction of justice issue.1073 There were also questions about what Trump knew about 
the June 2016 Trump Tower meeting, what he discussed with Stone and Manafort about 
Russia and WikiLeaks, and his ties to Russian oligarchs.1074 
Meanwhile, White House counsel Don McGahn spent 30 hours speaking with the 
Mueller team. The long-time Trump Organization chief financial officer had been 
subpoenaed by Mueller. It was clear that while investigating Cohen the Mueller 
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investigation learnt a lot about the inner workings of the Trump Organization. McGahn 
cooperated fully with the Mueller investigation, to the point even that Trump’s outside 
attorneys ‘were all reportedly surprised by just how candid he was’.1075 This is why 
Trump in late August tweeted that McGahn would be leaving his post, which he did in 
October. There was some substance to Trump’s claim that Mueller had been on a fishing 
expedition, since much of what he discovered had nothing substantively to do with 
Russia, the original purpose of the investigation.1076 As the investigation dragged on from 
months into years, the Mueller probe consumed ‘too much of his [Trump’s] emotional 
energy. It was a real distraction’. 1077 Trump’s fear that there had been wiretaps during the 
campaign induced in him ‘a sense of sort of feeling violated … that there was someone 
that had some power over him where he wasn’t the top dog’. Above all, Trump 
complained about Mueller because ‘I can’t be president’, he said. ‘It’s like I have my 
hands tied behind my back because I can’t do anything that looks like its favourable to 
Russia or to Putin because of Mueller’.1078 With the Mueller investigation hanging over 
him and the constant media coverage that Trump had colluded with the Russians or 
obstructed justice – ‘a real feeding frenzy, vicious, uncivil’ – undermined the capacity ‘of 
the president to be president’.1079 
The White House was concerned that the investigation would move beyond 
Russian election interference into the Trump family finances. Instead, Mueller focused 
narrowly on his brief and did not examine Trump’s history or personal finances, or 
‘examine the roots of his [Trump’s] special affinity for Putin’s Russia’. Critics argue that 
this was the reason ‘the Mueller investigation failed’, although the criteria of success in 
this reading would not be establishing whether the Trump campaign had colluded with 
Russia but Trump’s impeachment.1080 Trump in the end refused to engage in a face-to-
face interview and Mueller did not issue a grand jury subpoena, and instead Trump 
repeatedly gave written answers about his campaign and possible collusion with Russia. 
Rudy Giuliani, Trump’s new personal lawyer, noted that he was ‘disgusted’ with the 




After 22 months of work (674 days), and at the cost of $34 million, on 22 March 2019 
Mueller finally delivered his report to the justice department. Two days later attorney 
general William Barr, in consultation with Rosenstein, sent a four-page letter to Congress 
highlighting the key findings.1082 Barr had been confirmed in post just weeks earlier, on 
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14 February, but he was a veteran of Washington politics, having first served as attorney 
general in the George H. W Bush administration between 1991 and 1993. On 8 June 2018 
Barr submitted an unsolicited 19-page memo to the DoJ arguing that the chief magistrate 
(Trump) had the discretionary power to fire a person who was investigating him and 
supported Trump’s refusal to submit to questioning by Mueller. He argued ‘Mueller’s 
core premise – that the President acts “corruptly” if he attempts to influence a proceeding 
in which his own conduct is being scrutinized – is untenable’.1083 In other words, Barr 
denounced Mueller’s obstruction of justice enquiry as ‘fatally misconceived’.1084 
Barr’s letter was written in this spirit. He noted that the special counsel had 
‘thoroughly investigated allegations that members of the presidential campaign of Donald 
J. Trump, and others associated with it, conspired with the Russian government in its 
efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election, or sought to obstruct the related 
federal investigations’. In completing the investigation, Mueller 
 
employed 19 lawyers who were assisted by a team of approximately 40 FBI 
agents, intelligence analysts, forensic accountants, and other professional staff. 
The Special Counsel issued more than 2,800 subpoenas, executed nearly 500 
search warrants, obtained more than 230 orders for communication records, issued 
almost 50 orders authorizing use of pen registers, made 13 requests to foreign 
governments for evidence, and interviewed approximately 500 witnesses. 
 
The special counsel indicted 34 people – 26 Russian citizens, 7 US and one Dutch 
national. None of the Americans were accused of conspiracy with Russia. Barr stated that 
no conclusive proof of collusion had been found but failed to mention Mueller’s 
argument that Russia and Trump were working towards similar goals. The potential 
incidents of obstruction of justice were noted but the eleven identified by Mueller were 
not enumerated. Neither were the ‘multiple contacts … between Trump campaign 
officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government’, as Mueller put it. It also 
failed to stress that the reason Mueller decided not to make a prosecutorial judgment was 
because of the DoJ’s policy of not charging a sitting president with a federal crime.1085 
Barr’s handling of the report provoked intense controversy.1086  Mueller’s report was 
released in redacted form to the public four weeks later, but by then public perceptions 
had been shaped. 
Mueller clearly failed to answer some fundamental questions. He never found an 
inside witness to describe corrupt and illegal activity, whereas John Dean, Nixon’s White 
House counsel, in 1973 testified to his own and Nixon’s illegal activity. There was not 
even a Monica Lewinsky to demonstrate that the president lied in judicial and public 
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statements. 1087  We noted in Chapter 1 Mueller’s conclusion that ‘The Russian 
government interfered in the 2016 election in sweeping and systematic fashion’ but ‘the 
investigation did not establish that members of the Trump campaign conspired or 
coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities’.1088 This 
was read by Trump as total exoneration, and tweeted endlessly about ‘no collusion’. On 
the crucial issue of obstruction, Mueller writes 
 
Because we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment, we did 
not draw ultimate conclusions about the President’s conduct. … if we had 
confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the President did not 
commit obstruction of justice, we would so state. Based on the facts and the 
applicable legal standards, we are unable to reach that judgment. Accordingly, 
while this report does not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also 
does not exonerate him.1089  
 
This was both inconclusive and confusing. Mueller believed that it was not at the special 
counsel’s discretion to make a finding about obstruction, a view contested by other 
investigators.1090 It was not even clearly stated whether the facts justified an indictment, 
whether served immediately or later.1091 
It was left to the attorney general to determine whether the conduct analysed in 
the report constituted a crime. To help the dissemination of the findings while waiting for 
a review of grand jury material and other issues that should not be made public, the 
Mueller team had prepared a one-page introduction and a ten-page summary of each part 
highlighting the key conclusions and the evidence in both parts of the report. They 
expected that Barr would release these immediately, and his failure to do so was yet 
another matter for recrimination. Barr’s letter was considered a tendentious interpretation, 
much to the fury of the investigators.1092 On Russia, Barr concluded that ‘the evidence 
does not establish that the President was involved in an underlying crime related to 
Russian election interference’, but he failed to quote Mueller’s argument that the Russian 
government ‘perceived that it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to 
secure that outcome’. Critics also condemned Barr for failing to stress adequately that the 
Trump campaign actively solicited Russian help in the ‘hack and dump’ operation and 
were willing to condone the crime as beneficiaries. More than that, Barr’s interpretation 
apparently downplayed the degree to which the Trump campaign solicited support from 
Russia, notably in the June 2016 Trump Tower meeting, and attempted to coordinate the 
dissemination of the damaging emails against Clinton. The investigators also argued that 
Russian interference went far beyond being simply ‘designed to sow social discord, 
eventually with the aim of interfering in the election’, as Barr put it, but in fact sought to 
support Trump and undermine Clinton’s campaign. 
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On obstruction, the presidential threat of dismissing the special counsel cast a 
dark shadow over the investigators’ work, acting as a sword of Damocles over the whole 
process, while the possibility of pardons against potential malefactors inhibited them 
from ‘flipping’. Despite Mueller’s convoluted formulations, the president in the view of 
investigators had undoubtedly obstructed justice. However, Barr argued that ‘while not 
determinative, the absence of such evidence bears upon the President’s intent with 
respect to obstruction’. In short, ‘the evidence developed during the Special Counsel’s 
investigation is not sufficient to establish that the President committed an obstruction-of-
justice offense’, a decision made without regard to the constitutional considerations 
concerning the indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting president. The reference 
here is to the DoJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) ruling of 1973 and reaffirmed in 2000 
barring the indictment of a sitting president.  
The letter was not technically inaccurate, but Barr was accused of having distorted 
the essence of the report. His interpretation of Mueller’s findings allowed Trump to 
declare that they represented a ‘complete and total exoneration’, and to argue ‘It’s a 
shame that our country had to go through this. To be honest, it’s a shame that your 
President had to go through this’.1093 Barr’s summary, in Weissmann’s view, amounted to 
‘deception’ on a grand scale.1094 It represented ‘a concerted refusal to deal with the fact 
that we were attacked by a foreign adversary and will continue to be unless we take 
decisive actions’.1095 Mueller communicated his unhappiness the following morning. On 
27 March he sent a private two-page letter of protest to Barr, which only became public a 
month later. Mueller wrote: 
 
The introductions and executive summaries of our two-volume report 
accurately summarize this Office’s work and conclusions. The summary 
letter the Department sent to Congress and released to the public late in the 
afternoon of March 24 did not fully capture the context, nature, and 
substance of this Office’s work and conclusions. We communicated that 
concern to the Department on the morning of March 25. There is now 
public confusion about critical aspects of the results of our investigation. 
This threatens to undermine a central purpose for which the Department 
appointed the Special Counsel: to assure full public confidence in the 
outcome of the investigations.1096 
 
The summaries were not published, with the DoJ arguing that it made sense to wait for 
the whole report to be cleared for public release. The confusion mentioned by Mueller 
was inherent in his ambiguous conclusion about obstruction. While the collusion 
allegation was largely put to rest, the obstruction of justice issue enjoyed a new lease of 
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life. Mueller described plenty of unbecoming behaviour by the president and could not 
rule out that Trump had committed a crime but conceded that this did not add up to an 
actionable offence, and not just because of the OLC advice. The ambiguities in the 
Mueller report allowed Trump’s opponents and supporters to interpret it in a manner that 
suited their purposes. 
 
Part 1 of the Mueller report 
 
Some of these ambiguities apply to the substance of the report, and some obvious 
investigatory lines appear not to have been pursued. When it comes to the section on 
hacking, it remains unclear how the various servers were attributed back to individuals in 
the GRU. The Netyshko indictment stated that the ‘middle-servers’ were overseas, so it 
was not clear what was the purpose of the US-based server in Arizona. Mueller now 
stated that the GRU obtained the files from the DNC on 22 April (the Netyshko 
indictment states that the files were archived on that date), but this is earlier than the 
compile date of Fancy Bear malware reportedly discovered at the DNC on 25 April. On 
another issue, Assange announced on 12 June that WikiLeaks was working on the release 
of ‘emails related to Hillary Clinton’, two days before the DNC announcement that it had 
been hacked and three days before the appearance of Guccifer 2.0, and a month before 
Mueller reports Guccifer 2.0 sending anything to WikiLeaks. As noted, the Guccifer 2.0 
persona made every effort to be perceived as Russian and claimed to have sent material 
to WikiLeaks before Mueller records any contact between the two parties. Mueller 
rejected the WikiLeaks version of the provenance of its posted DNC material, but the file 
transfer evidence does not conclusively prove that WikiLeaks published anything sent to 
it by Guccifer 2.0 or DCLeaks. They may have been controlled by the GRU, but Mueller 
does not reveal the evidence on which this judgment was based. The report also failed to 
address the question about the lack of independent access to the DNC network and 
reliance on CrowdStrike. Before joining CrowdStrike in 2012, Henry spent 24 years with 
the FBI, retiring as executive assistant director of its cyber crime investigation unit. As 
for the alleged hack of state and local election networks, the DHS itself admitted that 
these attacks were ‘only simple scanning … which occurs all the time’, and there was 
certainly no alteration of results, as admitted by Jeh Johnson on 21 June 2017. 
 In both the IRA and the cyber section, the view that the activities were ordered by 
Putin is asserted rather than demonstrated. Equally, the charges against the troll farm and 
hacking groups do not prove a conspiratorial link to the Trump campaign. They neither 
needed nor wanted American collaborators, some predated Trump’s emergence as 
campaign favourite, and some of the material was even anti-Trump. Putin assumes a 
more active role in Section IV, which describes ‘Russian government links to and 
contacts with the Trump campaign’ and examines ‘whether those contacts constituted a 
third avenue of attempted Russian interference’. The various attempts by the Trump team 
and the Kremlin to contact each other through various intermediaries are chronicled. The 
overall impression is that both sides were groping in the dark. Rather than there being a 
massive conspiracy to subvert American democracy, these efforts were haphazard and 
usually ended in failure. The section reprises what had already become public knowledge, 





project, and the efforts of Trump campaign staffers Papadopoulos and Carter Page to 
establish back-channel links with the Kremlin.  
 In setting up the June 2016 Trump Tower meeting, Goldstone admits that he 
invented ‘publicist puff’ to get the Trump team interested, even though he admits that ‘I 
had no idea what I was talking about’. Mueller is right when he notes that the younger 
Trump’s response ‘showed that the Campaign anticipated receiving information from 
Russia that could assist candidate Trump’s electoral prospects, but the Russian lawyer’s 
presentation did not provide such information’. Mueller recounts (as we have seen) that 
Kushner texted Manafort (at the time campaign chair) that it was a ‘waste of time’ and 
asked an assistant to ‘call him to give him an excuse to leave’. Mueller notes that when 
‘Veselnitskaya made additional efforts to follow up on the meeting’, after the election, 
‘the Trump Transition Team did not engage’.1097 As for Stone, who was indicted in 
January 2019 for lying to Congress about his efforts to contact WikiLeaks, Mueller’s 
indictment in fact showed that he had no contact with WikiLeaks before the election and 
no advance information about its releases. Mueller shows that Trump officials were 
trying to find out about the WikiLeaks releases through Stone, hence demonstrating that 
they had no privileged information. The report adds nothing to this, and although heavily 
redacted because of Stone’s trial, appears only to confirm the earlier findings. 
Equally, in January 2019 Manafort was accused of sharing polling data and 
discussing a peace plan with his Ukrainian-Russian business partner Konstantin 
Kilimnik, who allegedly had ‘links to Russian intelligence services’.1098 Manafort hired 
Kilimnik in 2005 and relied on him for Ukrainian matters.1099 In July 2016 Manafort 
allegedly shared detailed local-level campaign polling data with Kilimnik, which would 
‘provide a boon to someone who wanted to know where key voting blocs were, where 
winning over voters would provide the strongest benefit in the race for Electoral College 
delegates’.1100 In fact, there is no evidence that polling data was given to Kilimnik.1101 
Mueller ‘did not identify evidence of a connection between Manafort’s sharing polling 
data and Russia’s interference in the election’. His report agreed with Rick Gate’s 
judgment that Manafort was trying to prove his financial value to future clients.1102 
Mueller gave credence to FBI assertions that Kilimnik, had ‘ties to Russian intelligence’ 
(the GRU),1103 but were unable to interview him and he denies association with Russian 
intelligence. In fact, Kilimnik may have been a ‘sensitive’ intelligence source for the 
State Department since at least 2013. He worked with the chief political officer at the US 
embassy in Kiev, providing such detailed information about the Opposition Bloc (a 
movement critical of the neo-nationalist anti-Russian Ukrainian government after 2014) 
that it was immediately forwarded to Washington, something well-known to the FBI and 
Mueller. In August 2016 Kilimnik delivered a peace plan to Manafort for the Trump 
team, which Mueller portrayed as suspiciously pro-Russian, when in fact he had 
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delivered a version of the plan to the Obama administration in May, with the explanation 
that Russia wanted ‘a quick settlement’ to get ‘Ukraine out of the way and get rid of 
sanctions and move to economic stuff they are interested in’. The plan was reviewed by 
Nuland in the State Department. What Mueller portrayed as nefarious was in fact a 
serious attempt to bring peace to Europe, and by ignoring all the countervailing evidence 
Mueller was guilty of ‘deception by omission’. Not surprisingly, Kilimnik condemned 
the Mueller report’s ‘made-up narrative’ about him, insisting ‘I have no ties to Russian 
or, for that matter, any intelligence operations’.1104  
 Mueller reports that the Kremlin ‘appeared not to have pre-existing contacts … 
with senior officials around the President-Elect’. In addition, ‘Putin spoke of the 
difficulty faced by the Russian government in getting in touch with the incoming Trump 
Administration … Putin indicated that he did not know with whom formally to speak and 
generally did not know the people around the President-Elect’.1105 The Kremlin also used 
another official, Kirill Dmitriev, the head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, to 
connect with the incoming administration, especially Kushner and Don Jr., but repeatedly 
failed to do so. It was Dmitriev who in the end met the Trump transition team’s informal 
envoy, Erik Prince, in the Seychelles to pass on Putin’s plans for US-Russian 
reconciliation. According to Mueller, Dmitriev was disappointed to be meeting such a 
junior figure, although the message was passed up to Bannon. There is nothing unusual in 
trying to establish such links, but the surprising thing is the absence of established 
channels. This was, after all, the job of the Russian ambassador. The report notes that 
‘while Kislyak was an important person, Kislak did not have a direct line to Putin’, so 
other, more informal, intermediaries were used. 
 One of these was Petr Aven, the head of Alfa Bank. In his testimony to the 
Mueller team, Aven revealed that Putin meets quarterly with some 50 top business 
executives in the Kremlin, and the meetings are prepared by Putin’s chief of staff, Anton 
Vaino. In the meeting held in late 2016 Putin asked Aven to establish a line of 
communication with the incoming administration. Putin informed him that the US 
planned to impose more sanctions on Aven personally and his bank. Russia feared the 
further deterioration of relations and now sought to improve matters. Aven told Mueller 
that Putin admitted having difficulty contacting the new administration and that he did 
not know the people around the president-elect. Aven took Putin’s suggestion as an 
instruction, and shortly afterwards, following another ‘all-hands’ meeting between Putin 
and leading ‘oligarchs’ in December 2016, set out to fulfil Putin’s commission. Aven 
requested Richard Burt, the US ambassador to Germany in the Reagan era, to contact 
Trump’s transition team. Burt in turn asked the president of the Center for the National 
Interest (CNI), Dmitry Simes, to set up a meeting with Jared Kushner to establish a ‘high-
level communications channel between Putin and the incoming administration’. Simes 
rejected the request since he did not want the CNI to be seen as an intermediary between 
Moscow and Washington. Aven dropped the matter after being told by Burt that it was 
‘too explosive to discuss’. When he told Vaino that he had been subpoenaed by the FBI 
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about the request, Vaino ‘showed no emotion in response to this report and did not appear 
to care’.1106 This is not the behaviour of someone with something to hide.  
These incidents, and others in the report (including the use of Putin aide Yuri 
Ushakov and the head of VEB, Sergei Gorkov), reveals a rather less than omniscient 
operation in the Kremlin. Putin in the Mueller report comes over not as the fanatical KGB 
spy bent on revenge of Clintonian myth, but as someone intent on restoring relations with 
the other great nuclear superpower. The change of US leader is always an opportunity to 
reset relations, and Putin sought to take advantage of this. It also reveals the way that 
Putin relies on informal mechanisms to complement official structures. This reflects both 
his natural proclivity to play his hand close to his chest, but it also explodes the myth of 
Putin the master strategist playing three-dimensional chess while his opponents play 
draughts (checkers). Like any leader in a fluid and unpredictable situation, he reacts to 
events while trying to exploit opportunities. Putin does have a grand vision of Russian 
foreign policy – to allow the country a breathing space for economic development while 
enhancing its status in international affairs – but in day-to-day affairs this means 
managing dangerous situations; and there is none more dangerous than nuclear 
confrontation between the two great powers. 
Part 1 of the report comes to two fundamental conclusions. First, the Russian 
government in 2016 tried to influence the election via social media and by obtaining and 
publishing Democratic Party emails. And second, no American colluded, cooperated or 
coordinated that effort. The Trump team’s reaction and even anticipation of the release of 
materials was not criminal – this would have required coordinated actions, and there was 
no evidence of that. The report did not confirm the Steele dossier’s central findings. 
Equally, the Trump Tower meeting, the Trump Tower Moscow project, the polling data, 
the Alfa Bank server, the changed Republican platform on arming Ukraine, Jeff Sessions’ 
meeting with Kislyak, the meeting in the Seychelles, Cohen not visiting Prague, Manafort 
not meeting Assange, and Trump not ordering Cohen to lie to Congress, all turned out not 
to be smoking guns. Mueller did not consider them crimes, but this important conclusion 
(running against a mountain of media commentary) was overshadowed by the obstruction 
of justice issue. 
 
Part 2 of the Mueller report and conclusions 
 
The second part is devoted to obstruction. It deals at great length with events that 
happened because there was investigation into collusion and alleged crimes that did not 
happen. Obstruction is a process crime, and like perjury only exists because an 
investigation is underway. Mueller notes that after the election the president ‘expressed 
concerns to advisors that reports of Russia’s election interference might lead the public to 
question the legitimacy of his election’.1107 This shaped Trump’s response to the various 
investigations. The report examined 11 possible instances of obstruction, but they all ran 
into the inevitable wall. Trump’s actions, and above all his statements, may have been 
provocative, but they were not illegal. The various Russian actions were not coordinated 
with Trump or his team, and thus there was no underlying crime whose investigation 
Trump tried to obstruct. He may have behaved badly, but his actions, the second part of 
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the report concluded, were not intended to cover up an offence, since no crime had been 
committed. Nevertheless, Mueller found evidence of obstruction that was ‘alarming and 
significant’. If there had been sufficient evidence for an obstruction case, he would have 
made it. Mueller dwelt at length on the instances of obstructed justice by Trump and 
hinted that some other body may wish to investigate them – but Mueller was not going to 
take them forwards. Instead, Mueller concluded with the gnomic ‘while this report does 
not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him’.1108 
The major instance of potential obstruction was Comey’s dismissal in May 2017. 
Although Trump muddied the waters, the report is clear that Comey was fired because of 
his mishandling of the Clinton emails. The report stresses that Trump was also angry at 
Comey for telling him privately that he was not under investigation but then refusing to 
say so publicly.1109  Comey’s sacking was not a crime, but it was one of the many 
instances of actions by the president ‘that were capable of exerting undue influence over 
law enforcement investigations, including the Russian-interference and obstruction 
investigations’.1110 The Mueller probe was locked in a logical trap: Trump could not take 
obstructive actions to cover up his Russian crimes because they did not exist to be 
covered up. So, then, why did Trump behave as if he had something to hide? Mueller 
answers the question in this way: 
 
Evidence indicates that the President was angered by both the existence of the 
Russia investigation and the public reporting that he was under investigation, 
which he knew was not true based on Comey’s representations. The President 
complained to advisers that if people thought Russia helped him with the election, 
it would detract from what he had accomplished. Other evidence indicates that the 
President was concerned about the impact of the Russia investigation on his 
ability to govern. The president complained that the perception that he was under 
investigation was hurting his ability to conduct foreign relations, particularly with 
Russia. 1111 
 
Mueller was right in his analysis, but once again unwittingly undermined the rationale for 
his own investigation. All accounts agree that Trump was frustrated that the investigation 
impaired his ability to govern and reduced his foreign policy options. In the end the 
Trump team allowed Mueller to complete an investigation. Trump was exonerated from 
the main charge of collusion, but he was potentially trapped in obstruction offences. 
The report failed to establish evidence of a crime and confirmed the absence of 
any serious and sustained channels of communication between the Trump team and 
Moscow. The attempt by the Kremlin after the election to establish contact with senior 
members of the incoming Trump administration is farcical. Not only was there no 
collusion, neither side had the telephone numbers of the other. The email sent by Cohen 
to Peskov in January 2016 demonstrated not ‘the most direct interaction yet of a top 
Trump aide and a senior member of Putin’s government’, as the Washington Post put it in 
one of its typically lurid accounts in March 2017, but precisely the absence of established 
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communication channels.1112 The report failed to note that at this time Russian operatives 
sent emails to Hope Hicks, Trump’s spokesperson, in an attempt to establish contact, 
about which the Russian embassy in Washington commented later as follows: ‘the 
Russian outreach to Ms Hicks undercuts the idea that the Russian government had 
established deep ties to the Trump campaign before the election. If it had, Russian 
officials might have found a better entrée to the White House than unprompted emails to 
Ms Hicks’.1113 The report confirmed that the exchanges between Sessions and Kislyak at 
the Republican National Convention were ‘brief, public and non-substantive’.1114 The 
report’s effective dismissal of the Steele dossier put paid to the conspiracy narratives 
constructed on its basis.  
 In sum, Mueller demonstrated that every key plank in the collusion narrative was 
unfounded. Russiagate was promoted by the Democrats ‘relentlessly and above all else’, 
as Clinton campaign senior aide Jennifer Palmieri put it, and left them in a quandary. 
They could either accept the verdict and move on, or double down and seek to continue 
the investigation by other means. The latter strategy was pursued by Schiff, but even his 
efforts were deflated by Mueller’s findings. The Democrats had wasted enormous amount 
of effort on a futile quest and failed to address the domestic issues that had led to their 
defeat. Trump’s repeated tweets about ‘no collusion’ had been proved right, and he was 
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Mueller concluded that there was no conspiracy or coordination (he eschewed the term 
‘collusion’) between Trump and the Russians. Glenn Greenwald, a former lawyer who 
worked on the first Snowden story for the Guardian and then established the Intercept 
website, stresses that ‘Robert Mueller did not merely reject the Trump-Russia conspiracy. 
He obliterated it’.1115 Mueller’s investigation led to 34 indictments, including Trump’s 
personal attorney Michael Cohen, campaign chair Paul Manafort, deputy campaign chair 
and long-time Manafort associate Rick Gates, national security adviser Michael Flynn, 
public relations specialist Roger Stone and a clutch of Russians – but not any of Trump’s 
family – Donald Trump Jr. or Jared Kushner. Neither did he charge anyone in the Trump 
team with conspiring with Russia to fix the 2016 election. Despite Trump’s refusal to 
provide evidence in person, Mueller did not issue a subpoena against him. Mueller 
decided not to press charges against Trump for obstruction, a decision prompted not just 
by DoJ policy against indicting a sitting president but based on his own assessment of the 
evidence, although he left the door open for others to do so. On the other side, despite 
endless grumbles, Trump did not fire Mueller or covertly interfere in the investigation. 
Trump’s fulminations against the special counsel were public and frequent. The Mueller 
report is as interesting for what it failed to cover as much as for what it did. Even as 
Mueller put to rest a number of myths, critics insisted that there were still questions to be 
answered.1116 
 
An investigation in search of a crime 
 
In his characteristically pithy way, Putin was scathing about the Mueller report. On 9 
April 2019 he noted that it was  
 
total nonsense targeted exclusively to a domestic audience and used in internal 
political battles … a mountain gave birth to a mouse … It is evidence of a certain 
element of crisis in the American political system … mounting an offensive 
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against the legitimately elected president and trying to annul the outcome … 
putting their party or group interests above the national interest.1117  
 
Later, in his meeting with secretary of state Mike Pompeo on 14 May in Sochi, Putin 
endorsed the sentiment expressed by Trump in a 90-minute call (initiated by the 
American side) on 3 May about the restoration of relations and the resolution of issues of 
mutual interest. Putin declared that ‘we also would like to rebuild fully fledged relations, 
and I hope that right now a conducive environment is being built for that’. He had in 
mind the Mueller report, which he lauded: ‘For all special counsel Mueller’s exotic work, 
he carried out an impartial investigation and confirmed the lack of any trace of any 
collusion between Russia and the acting administration – which we from the very 
beginning characterised as utter nonsense’.1118 The removal of the collusion allegations 
provided some space for manoeuvre, but as Putin noted shortly afterwards, US-Russian 
relations were getting ‘worse and worse’, and he ‘really hoped that common sense will 
prevail in the end’.1119 Trump once again asserted that he hoped the US would have ‘a 
great relationship with Russia’, but pledged to deploy 1,000 US troops in Poland and 
considered sanctions over the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline project, warning 
Germany against becoming dependent on Russia for energy.1120 Conflict between the two 
countries long predated Russiagate, and the structural features of the antagonism would 
not be soon resolved. The interference question, moreover, did not disappear, and 
Pompeo warned that any action by the Russians in the 2020 election ‘would put our 
relationship in an even worse place than it has been’.1121 
Papadopoulos claims to have known nothing about the DNC emails, and probably 
about any emails at all. Papadopoulos certainly made exaggerated claims about his status 
and magnified the significance of his putative Moscow connections. Above all, did 
Mifsud really tell him about Moscow having emails when they met in London on 26 
April 2016? The Mueller report rather craftily implies that Mifsud was a Russian agent, 
but there is no evidence of this – and in fact, if Mifsud had any intelligence connections, 
they were with the British. Mueller phrases the issue in such a way as to obscure the 
weakness of his argument, and instead suggests that Papadopoulos had reason to believe 
that Mifsud was a Russian agent, not that he actually was. Mifsud was interviewed by the 
FBI on 10 February 2017 (an event not confirmed by the FBI) and denied knowing 
anything about or having said anything about Russia’s possession of Clinton-related 
emails.1122 Mueller did not pursue or charge Mifsud, although his testimony is obviously 
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crucial. The point is that before he was interviewed by the FBI in January 2017, 
Papadopoulos did not report anything about Russia having emails to Washington or to 
Downer – with the latter he at most stated that the Russians had damaging information, 
but there was no mention of emails. It was only in his FBI interview that Papadopoulos 
claimed that Mifsud had told him that the Russians had ‘thousands’ of Clinton emails. 
The recording has not been made public, so the accuracy of the reports cannot be 
verified, and we cannot tell if Papadopoulos is telling the truth, or whether nine months 
after the events his memory was distorted. As for the other half of the story, neither 
Mueller nor any other source suggests that Papadopoulos was ever told that Russia 
intended, either directly or through an intermediary, to disseminate damaging information 
about Clinton.  
No less odd is the way that the Mueller remains studiously silent about the 
Papadopoulos-Downer meeting, and there is no statement from Downer. His position is 
stated obliquely, and Mueller quotes not what Papadopoulos said to Downer, but what 
Downer is said to have understood that Papadopoulos had ‘suggested’: 
 
Papadopoulos had suggested to a representative of that foreign government that 
the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that 
it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information 
damaging to Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. That information 
prompted the FBI on July 31, 2016, to open an investigation into whether 
individuals associated with the Trump Campaign were coordinating with the 
Russian government in its interference activities.1123  
 
If we translate Mueller-speak, by the ‘Trump Campaign’ we mean Papadopoulos, and the 
‘Russian government’ is represented by Mifsud. Mueller states that Papadopoulos was 
interviewed in late January 2017 because of his ‘suggestion’ to Downer that Russia 
sought to help Trump by releasing damaging information about Clinton. 1124 
Papadopoulos had ‘suggested’ no such thing, and instead Downer, and Mueller following 
his lead, read backwards to believe that the WikiLeaks material of 22 July 2016 was what 
Papadopoulos had been talking about, when in fact it could not have been. Downer, 
moreover, was not an impartial observer. In addition to his close links with the British 
security establishment, he had earlier supported Clinton’s 2008 presidential bid.1125  
  The Papadopoulos story offset the discredited Steele dossier as the fons et origo 
of Russiagate, yet there is an element of deception involved here. The first memo, it will 
be recalled, asserted that the Trump campaign was conspiring with the Kremlin to 
influence the 2016 election. Gaeta took the memo back to Nuland, who passed it on to the 
FBI, thus starting the Russiagate narrative. Steele shows no prescience about the DNC 
emails published by WikiLeaks, but once they emerged he folded the story into his 
memos.1126 By then the information from British intelligence had already been fed to 
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American agencies, and the highly political CIA director, Brennan, met with GCHQ head 
Hannigan at some unspecified time in the same month, July 2016. The Downer 
information only gave some sort of external legitimacy to an investigation that was 
already getting under way, but what Papadopoulos told Downer created a false 
connection between what Papadopoulos had told Downer and the publication of the 
hacked DNC emails. 
Mueller’s equivocations opened the door to political speculation. Nancy Pelosi, 
who following the November 2018 midterm elections had returned as speaker of the 
Democratic-majority House of Representatives, argued that the attorney general 
committed a ‘crime’ when he told a congressional hearing that he was unaware about 
Mueller’s dissatisfaction with his portrayal of the report. Pelosi characterised Trump’s 
obstructive actions as ‘villainous to the constitution’ but resisted calls for his 
impeachment (a two-thirds Senate majority was lacking), but asserted she would rather 
‘see him in jail’. 1127  The chair of the House Judiciary Committee, Jerry Nadler, 
threatened to hold Barr in contempt of Congress if he failed to explain himself, although 
the underlying gripe was with his failure to provide them with the full unredacted version 
of the report and the underlying evidence, as demanded by the House.1128  Barr was 
accused of acting as ‘Trump’s human shield on capitol hill’.1129 At the same time, six 
separate committees in the House investigated Trump, Kushner, the Trump Tower 
Moscow project and much more. As for Nadler, his attempts to keep the Russiagate 
investigation going met understandable resistance, with former White House counsel 
McGahn in mid-May defying a subpoena to appear before Congress.1130 The investigative 
work by House Democrats indicated their refusal to accept that Mueller had provided the 
answers, and certainly not the answers that they wanted. This was accompanied by a 
public loss of faith in the investigation, with half believing Trump’s contention that he 
was the victim of a ‘witch-hunt’.1131  
Mueller himself kept the obstruction charge alive. In his second book on the 
Trump presidency Michael Wolff added fuel to this by claiming that Mueller considered 
charging the president with three counts of obstruction: disrupting proceedings before a 
federal agency; tampering with witnesses, victim or informant; and retaliation against a 
witness, victim or informant. The indictment according to Wolff sat on Mueller’s desk 
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for a year before being rejected.1132 In the end, Mueller left it to the justice department to 
decide, but in his view the over-riding theme of the Trump presidency was the 
‘extraordinary lengths’ taken ‘to protect himself from legal scrutiny and 
accountability’.1133 The published text was edited to remove references to information 
gained as a result of the grand jury process (in other words, to protect witnesses), and it is 
highly likely that unredacted copies provided to Congress (as demanded) would be leaked 
to the press. On 8 May the HJC voted to hold Barr in contempt of Congress, to which 
Trump responded by invoking the principle of executive privilege, claiming the right to 
prevent members of Congress from reading the full report. Nadler declared that ‘We are 
now in a constitutional crisis’.1134 In the event, the HJC was provided with the underlying 
evidence of the Mueller report.  
The investigation came to focus on investigating obstruction to the investigation. 
Comey weighed in to argue that there was enough evidence in the Mueller report to prove 
that Trump had committed obstruction of justice, and only the fact that he was president 
prevented him being indicted. The key to any obstruction charge is criminal intent by the 
perpetrator, and Comey found this in at least two instances. The first was when Trump 
directed the former White House counsel McGahn to fire Mueller, and the second was 
when Trump tried to limit the scope of the special counsel’s investigation. 1135  The 
Mueller report appears to be less about colluding with Russia than about Trump 
obstructing an investigation into the collusion that did not exist. Trump presciently 
tweeted in June 2017: ‘They made up a phony collusion with the Russians story, found 
zero proof, so now they go for obstruction of justice on the phony story. Nice’.1136 
Mueller’s failure to find evidence of collusion was proof of collusion: like Schrödinger’s 
cat, it was both there and not there. 
After keeping tight-lipped for the duration of his work, in his first press 
conference on 29 May 2019 Mueller reiterated the point that he had not exonerated 
Trump of obstruction charges, immediately prompting calls in Congress for Trump’s 
impeachment. Breaking his two-year silence, Mueller stated ‘I have not exonerated 
Trump’ and went on, ‘If we had confidence that the president clearly did not commit a 
crime, we would have said that’. He noted ‘We did not, however, make a determination 
as to whether the president did commit a crime’, but the decision not to proceed was 
based on the long-standing DoJ policy that ‘A president cannot be charged with a federal 
crime while he is in office’. Trump tweeted in response: ‘Nothing changes from the 
Mueller report. There was insufficient evidence and therefore, in our country, a person is 
innocent. The case is closed! Thank you’. However, Mueller’s intervention was taken as 
a signal to Congress that they were not bound by the incumbency rule, and hence could 
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proceed towards impeachment.1137 In the end they did, but not over Russiagate but its 
complement, ‘Ukrainegate’. 
 The Mueller report implied that there was collusion while providing evidence that 
there was not. The fundamental premise appeared to be that the absence of evidence is 
not proof of the absence of evidence. Mueller reported Russian interference as something 
unprecedented and uniquely effective and which helped Trump gain the presidency. 
Congressional Democrats ignored the substantive findings of the report and argued that 
Barr should resign for ‘misleading the American people about collusion between the 
Trump campaign and Russia’. In other words, the Mueller report failed to nail the charge, 
and partisans of Russiagate continued to issue warnings of further Russian interference as 
the 2020 presidential election approached. 1138  Politicians and journalists who had 
invested in the collusion narrative advanced precisely the sort of conspiracy-laden 
alternative reality that they believed they were resisting. 
 
Crimes in search of investigation 
 
The report does not substantiate allegations of collusion let alone conspiracy (requiring 
substantial evidence), and its central claim that Russia interfered ‘in sweeping and 
systematic fashion’ is deceptive. This becomes clear when we look at what the report 
does not examine. It did not undertake a credible investigation of the source of the 
collusion allegations or the central charge of the whole affair, that Russia not only hacked 
the DNC servers but passed the material to WikiLeaks. Mueller failed to call numerous 
relevant witnesses or to examine alternative narratives. He did not investigate the 
persistent claims, buttressed by considerable evidence, that in various ways the FBI, the 
CIA and British intelligence hyped up the various alleged ‘links’ between the Trump 
campaign and Russia, when in fact most of these links proved spurious. Russia ran 
various operations in the US, but this is what intelligence agencies do. The Soviet Union 
created front companies and published and disseminated propaganda, just as the US did 
in the USSR and continues to do in Russia today. In conditions of the new cold war, this 
is hardly surprising. What is new is that these so-called ‘active measures’ were turned 
against Russia by one of the candidates as a campaign weapon against the other, with the 
active support of parts of the intelligence establishment, the media and non-Russian 
foreign actors.  
 No compelling evidence to start the investigation into the Trump campaign has 
emerged. Instead, ‘the FBI operated on the basis of an overheard conversation of third-
tier campaign aide George Papadopoulos, as well a wild “dossier” financed by the rival 
presidential campaign’. Comey’s gyrations have been described, but the question 
remains: ‘How aware was the FBI that it was being gulled into a dirty-trick operation, 
and if so, how did it justify proceeding?’:  
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If Mr. Mueller [had] done his job properly … His team would have had to look 
into the sources of the allegations as part of determining the documents’ (lack of) 
veracity. A Mueller report that doesn’t mention the dossier and its political 
provenance, or questionable news stories used to justify surveillance warrants, for 
instance, is a report that is playing politics.1139   
 
Mueller identified Mifsud as a ‘London professor with ties to Russia’. This is accurate as 
far as it goes. I met Mifsud when he attended annual meetings of the Valdai Discussion 
Club and twice spoke at his London Academy of Diplomacy, with an extended lunch 
with him on one of these occasions. As befits a former diplomat, Mifsud was highly 
personable and knowledgeable, but his complex past may include, as alleged by 
WikiLeaks and Disobedient Media, that he had links with MI6 and the CIA. Given the 
resources at Mueller’s disposal, the question should at least have been explored further, if 
nothing else to dispel the justified criticism that the special counsel investigators feared to 
go where uncomfortable truths could be found. 
This applies above all to the provenance of the Steele dossier and its outlandish 
claims. The Steele dossier is barely mentioned, which is all the more surprising because 
of the central part that it pays in the whole Russiagate affair. Three of the Russiagate cast 
at one time or another were confidential human sources for the FBI: Felix Sater, since 
December 1998, and he was signed up by none other than Weissmann; Henry Greenberg, 
the mystery man who met Roger Stone in Miami six months before the 2016 election and 
tried to sell dirt on Clinton; and Steele himself. Greenberg (also known as Henry 
Oknyansky) was probably a long-term paid FBI informant.1140 Steele’s status as a paid 
CHS was confirmed by a Judicial Watch Freedom of Information (FOIA) request in 
August 2018, showing that Steele received at least 11 payments during the nine-month 
period that he was signed up as a CHS between 2 February and 1 November 2016. 
Claims that Steele’s relations with the FBI only began on 5 July 2016 have been 
disproved. Why did Mueller not report that Steele met the FBI’s Strzok in July 2016? 
Mueller knew that Steele’s dossier was possibly one of the predicates for opening 
Crossfire Hurricane and certainly for the FISA warrants against Carter Page. Steele was 
interviewed, but the failure to pursue obvious questions exposes the investigation to 
charges of bias and even deception.1141 Mueller notes that ‘Trump would not pay for 
opposition research’ but makes no comment on the Clinton campaign’s enthusiastic 
search for ‘dirt’ on Trump.1142  
Mueller takes at face value the US intelligence reports but fails to address the 
activities of people like Brennan at the head of the CIA in actively fostering the 
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Russiagate narrative. He relies on contemporary media accounts and ignores the 
widespread evidence of journalistic malpractice throughput the whole affair, which some 
(for example Matt Taibbi) have likened to the distorted news reports in the run-up to the 
Iraq war in 2003. Above all, Mueller endorses the Clinton and Democratic version of the 
stolen emails – that Russia was responsible for their dissemination – and pays no 
attention to alternative accounts (for example, the VIPS reports) and did not conduct its 
own analysis. Why did Mueller not question Assange or Craig Murray, let alone look 
more deeply into the role of Mifsud?1143 Mueller accuses Assange of ‘dissembling’ by 
allegedly exploiting the murder of Seth Rich, yet he does not answer why Rich’s 
computers were not subject to forensic examination. Murray could barely contain his 
rage, writing that ‘Robert Mueller is either a fool, or deeply corrupt. I do not think he is a 
fool’. He noted that Mueller ‘omitted key steps which any honest investigator would 
undertake’, including commissioning a forensic examination of the DNC servers or 
interview Binney or Assange. ‘His failure to do any of those obvious things renders his 
report worthless’.1144 
It may have been too much to expect the Mueller report to reflect on its findings, 
but some sort of assessment of how the 13 persons and three organizations charged in 
February 2018 could have affected the electoral process in a nation of 323 million would 
have been useful. Instead, the report endeavoured to inflate its rather meagre findings of 
Russian interference. This obviously had enormous foreign policy implications, and the 
report’s threat inflation can be categorised as an act of dangerous political 
irresponsibility. The indictment of the GRU officers allegedly responsible for the DNC 
hack on the eve of the first Putin-Trump summit in Helsinki sabotaged the meeting. 
Mueller’s attempt to salvage the relevance of his investigation was prioritised over the 
stated goal of the Trump administration to improve relations with Russia. The same 
applies to the notion that 3,000 Russia-linked ads on Facebook costing about $100,000 
could shape the preferences of the electorate. The report was prone to editorial comment, 
but most damaging was the implication that any contact between Trump campaign 
members and Russia was sinister or even criminal. This discredited what even Mueller 
admits was a desire for ‘improved US-Russian relations’, a ‘new beginning with Russia’, 
and attempts to bring about ‘the end of the new cold war’. Mueller concedes that Putin 
sought ‘reconciliation between the United States and Russia’. 1145  The effect was to 
discredit advocates of détente, and those in favour were tainted as holding ‘pro-Russian 
foreign policy positions’.1146 
 
Roger Stone in the barrel 
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There was an air of inevitability about Stone’s arrest by the FBI on 25 January 2019. His 
time ‘in the barrel’ had come.1147 Stone warned in August 2018 that ‘Robert Mueller is 
coming for me’. He was charged with obstruction, lying to Congress and witness 
tampering. The essence of the charge was that Stone acted as a link between the Trump 
campaign and Assange, with WikiLeaks timing the disclosures to inflict maximum 
damage on Clinton. The 24-page indictment filed the previous day alleged that Stone was 
asked by Trump’s campaign to gain inside information about the Democrat emails that 
were passed to WikiLeaks. In June or July 2016 Stone is alleged to have told senior 
Trump campaign officials that he knew that WikiLeaks had damaging information about 
Clinton.1148 Assange first publicly stated on British TV on 12 June that he would be 
releasing information about Clinton, and two days later it was reported that the DNC had 
been hacked. After WikiLeaks started publishing the material on 22 July, Stone 
repeatedly tried to contact WikiLeaks, then ‘told the Trump campaign about potential 
future releases of damaging material’. He asked Jerome Corsi, a former contributor to the 
conspiracy website Infowars and who is best known for propagating the ‘birther’ 
falsehood that Obama was born outside the US, to request that Ted Malloch, a London-
based American academic, visit Assange in the Ecuadorian embassy. Then Stone 
contacted Randy Credico, a spirited radio show host with connections to WikiLeaks, and 
Credico on 1 October told Stone that there would be ‘big news’ that week. As we have 
seen, on 7 October WikiLeaks began publishing the Podesta emails. Stone later took 
credit for passing on inside information to senior Trump staff. 
The prosecutors wanted to know how Stone had correctly predicted that 
WikiLeaks would publish damaging emails about Clinton. To that end they wanted Corsi 
to acknowledge that Stone had asked him during the campaign to contact Assange to find 
out what material they still had to release.1149 The idea that Corsi, who at the time was 
close on 80, had anything significant to do with Assange and the leaked emails is far-
fetched. As for Malloch, in July 2016 he allegedly passed on a request from long-time 
Trump advisor Stone to Assange to provide advance copies of emails stolen from 
Trump’s opponents and later published by WikiLeaks. Malloch was investigated by 
Mueller on the grounds that he may have linked the Trump campaign and the Brexit 
Leave campaign in the UK.1150 The charge for the first time linked the Trump campaign 
to the DNC emails, although White House press secretary Sarah Sanders insisted that the 
case had ‘nothing to do with the president’.1151 To his chagrin, Stone held no official 
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position in the Trump campaign, but he had been a longstanding informal political 
advisor and had been urging Trump to run for the presidency since the 1980s. 
The Stone matter shared the prosecutorial bias of the other Russiagate cases. 
People were convicted not for Trump-Russia collusion but for financial improprieties and 
process crimes. Stone was charged with one count of obstructing a Congressional 
investigation, five counts of lying to Congress and one count of witness tampering. They 
all concerned his alleged communications with WikiLeaks seeking information about its 
publication plans. Any advance knowledge that Stone may have had about WikiLeaks’s 
publishing plans is not a crime. Trump officials may have asked for more information, 
which Stone does not appear to have had. WikiLeaks timed its publication on the eve of 
the Democratic convention to inflict maximum harm on Clinton, but there is no evidence 
that this was coordinated with the Trump campaign. As usual, the charges arise not from 
the original acts but the alleged lies about them. In this case, Stone testified to the HPSCI 
on 26 September 2017 that he had ‘no emails, no texts, no documents whatsoever’ 
concerning hacked documents or conversations about Assange. Stone mocked Mueller in 
an Instagram post a day after his arrest: ‘Here’s what Mueller has on me #nothingburger’, 
with a picture of a platter and an empty bun, and he denounced the pre-dawn raid on his 
home as ‘Gestapo tactics’.1152 Alarmingly, the New Yorker reported the arrest in Stalinist 
terms: ‘Robert Mueller got Roger Stone’.1153  
He was charged with lying to and obstructing Congress about the WikiLeaks 
releases. At the time, there was intense speculation about when Assange would publish 
the next tranche, so Stone’s interest was not surprising. There is no evidence that his 
communications with Credico, Corsi or Malloch established a secret ‘back channel’ to 
WikiLeaks, and the messages between Stone and the official WikiLeaks account (leaked 
to the press by the HPSCI) are far from incriminating. Stone was charged with witness 
tampering and intimidation, but in a letter to presiding judge Amy Berman Jackson 
Credico stressed that ‘I never in any way felt that Stone himself posed a direct physical 
threat to me or my dog [the latter had allegedly been threatened]’, although he noted that 
Stone ‘shamelessly invents and promotes outlandish and invidious conspiracy tales’.1154 
The prosecutors recommended a sentence of between seven and nine years. Trump 
described the recommendation as ‘horrible’ and a ‘miscarriage of justice’, and the DoJ on 
11 February revised the sentencing recommendation to no more than three or four years. 
All four federal prosecutors resigned from the case in protest.1155  
In November 2019 Stone was convicted on the charges arising from the Mueller 
investigation. Trial judge Jackson refused to allow Stone to call Binney and McGovern to 
testify. On 20 February Stone was sentence to 40 months in jail. Jackson accused Stone 
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of covering up for Trump and argued ‘The truth still exists. The truth still matters’.1156 At 
68 and with serious medical conditions, Stone asked for the sentence to be deferred 
beyond the 14 July date when he was due to report since the designated correctional 
facility suffered an outbreak of Covid-19. Given the pandemic, he feared that his prison 
term would become a ‘death sentence’. Jackson refused, contrary to the guidelines of the 
US Bureau of Prisons, which advised that non-violent offenders were to be released into 
home confinement until the coronavirus pandemic was under control. However, on 10 
July Trump commuted the sentence, with the White House stating ‘Roger Stone has 
already suffered greatly. He was treated very unfairly, as were many others in this 
case’.1157  
The decision prompted widespread outrage, with Mueller issuing a rare statement: 
‘I feel compelled to respond both to broad claims that our investigation was illegitimate 
and our motives were improper, and to specific claims that Roger Stone was a victim of 
our office’.1158 In an op-ed in the Washington Post on 11 July, Mueller asserted that 
Stone ‘lied about the identity of his intermediary to WikiLeaks’, as well as about the 
existence of written communications with his intermediary’. 1159  However, his own 
investigation had failed to establish that Stone had an intermediary with WikiLeaks. 
Stone publicly claimed such links, but Mueller found that they were Credico and Corsi, 
and they never made contact with WikiLeaks. Credico did interview Assange on his radio 
show in August 2016, but there is no evidence of further contact. In fact, WikiLeaks sent 
Stone a Twitter message before the election asking him to cease making ‘false claims of 
association’, an exchange that for some reason was excluded from Stone’s indictment and 
the Mueller report. Stone claimed that he had advance knowledge of WikiLeak’s 
publication of stolen DNC emails, but the Mueller report never argued that he had such 
knowledge. As demonstrated earlier, ‘Stone’s contact with Guccifer 2.0 was minimal and 
inconsequential’. 1160  In late 2020 unredacted additional pages of the Mueller report 
finally revealed that investigators found ‘insufficient evidence … to establish beyond 
reasonable doubt that Stone or any other persons associated with the Campaign 
coordinated with WikiLeaks on the release of the emails’.1161 
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The accused fight back 
 
Weissmann wanted to indict the president, but Mueller was more cautious. However, for 
lesser figures caught up in Russiagate he was less merciful. Unreported lobbying by 
Flynn was leveraged to get him to plead guilty to lying to the FBI. Cohen was charged 
with numerous financial crimes, but his guilty plea was for campaign finance violations 
that could well be considered personal expenses. As for the Moscow Tower, while efforts 
did continue after January 2016, these were at most desultory. It was a sign of 
desperation for Cohen to try to enlist Peskov to help. Papadopoulos was forced to plead 
guilty about lying about the timing of his contacts. The best-selling author Jerome Corsi 
was threatened about lying about his contacts with his friend Roger Stone, although there 
was nothing illegal about his activities. Roger Stone suggested in a tweet that the email of 
John Podesta would be the next to be revealed, and in an email to Corsi asked him to get 
the rest of the emails. He appeared to want to know what was going on, and there was 
nothing illegal about what he did or that he was party to the deep secrets about Clinton 
team emails. Carter Page In November 2020 filed an eight-count complaint against the 
DoJ, the FBI and its former director Comey, seeking at least $75 million in damages 
over, among other things, obtaining what were claimed to be the four illegal FISA 
warrants against him.1162 Manafort’s tax misdemeanours were levered to get him to work 
with Mueller, but he was one of the few to resist the pressure – and as a result was jailed 
(although he was released in May 2020 because of Covid-19). A special prosecutor 
vested with such wide powers as Mueller could not return empty-handed. Even more 
disturbing, the whole exercise appeared designed to undermine Trump and possibly even 
to destroy his presidency. America was at war with itself in a struggle in which there 
could be no winners. 
Mueller anticipated the GRU hackers would accept trials in absentia, but he was 
shocked when they commissioned representatives to fight the case on their behalf. 
Mueller was forced to backtrack and asked for an immediate adjournment when the case 
opened and fought to limit disclosure, individual by individual. A conviction was sought 
without the defendants seeing the evidence against them.1163 On the other side, the DNC 
brought a lawsuit against Russia, WikiLeaks, Assange and key members of Trump’s 
team, including Trump himself, Kushner, Manafort, the Agalarovs, Roger Stone and 
Joseph Mifsud. The collusion charges would finally be tested in a court of law. In the 
event the judge, John Koeltl of the Federal District of New York, ruled that the 
Russiagate claims were insufficient even to merit a hearing. He argued that even if 
everything that the DNC alleged did indeed happen, there was no basis for a case. The 
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materials, the first amendment rights defended WikiLeaks as the publisher, as long as it 
was not directly involved in illegal activities to gain the material (a ruling with 
implications for the Assange extradition hearing in London).1164 Above all, he stated that 
the DNC offered no evidence of collusion between WikiLeaks and the other named 
parties to hack the DNC’s computers, or of a relationship between Russia and WikiLeaks. 
No evidence had been produced of collusion between WikiLeaks, the Trump campaign 
and Russia. Even if the facts at the heart of the Russiagate allegations were true, they did 
not add up to a plausible case in a court of law.1165  
Mueller charged 13 IRA employees and three companies owned by Prigozhin 
with interfering in the 2016 election, but he was surprised that they turned up in court to 
fight their case. As the conservative commentator Rush Limbaugh put it, Mueller planned 
to use the indictments for public relations ‘to convince people that the Russians did 
infiltrate and somehow meddle in the election’.1166 In May 2018 Concord Management 
and Concord Consulting pleaded not guilty and argued that special counsel Mueller was 
unlawfully appointed and lacked the legal authority to advance the case. Concord 
Management hired a leading US legal company to defend itself against the allegations 
and called for the Mueller team to disclose how they obtained the detailed information 
about the Russian activities, including internal emails, travel itineraries, and personal 
details about the 13 Russians. The defence team argued that it was impossible to charge 
Concord with interfering in US elections, because there is no specific law against that. 
Not revealing identities at political rallies or on social media would confuse voters, but it 
is not evidence of intent to interfere with a US government function. As so often, the 
Mueller team looked unprepared as they scrambled to find evidence of a crime, even 
though they had filed the indictment. The prosecutors also tried to limit Concord’s access 
to the 3.2 million pieces of evidence on the grounds that they were too ‘sensitive’ for 
Russians to see. According to the federal judge in Washington presiding over the 
Concord Management case, Dabney Friedrich, the prosecution faced a ‘heavy burden’ in 
demonstrating that the trolls acted criminally and ordered Mueller’s team to explain why 
they had indicted Concord for election meddling. The defence argued ‘Mueller’s office 
concocted a crime and that there’s no law against interfering in elections’.1167 
There was no clear evidence that Concord sought to undermine Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) rules, hence the difficulty of proving the charge of a conspiracy to 
defraud the government. There are FEC rules prohibiting the use of foreign money to 
fund political candidates and restrictions on how foreigners can participate in elections, 
but it was a matter of free speech for someone to pretend to be someone else, and to say 
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whatever they wanted within the law. While the indictment alleged that Concord 
defrauded the government by hiding the activity of trolls on a server within the US and 
concealed that the trolls were operating from Russia, the defence asserted that was not 
illegal. They went further to argue that Mueller’s ‘prosecutorial adventure’ was part of an 
Orwellian plot to use the Russian trolls as a way of constraining free speech on the 
internet. That was why the special counsel allegedly made up a crime to fit the facts: 
‘And that’s the fundamental danger with the entire special counsel concept: that they 
operate outside the parameters of the Department of Justice in a way that is absolutely 
inconsistent with the behaviour of the Department of Justice in these cases for the past 30 
years’.1168  
Mueller’s claim of ‘sweeping and systematic’ Russian meddling was further 
challenged on 25 April 2019 when Concord filed an instant motion claiming that Mueller 
violated the law by releasing information to the public that was not contained in the 
original indictment. Concord argued that the special counsel’s report ‘improperly 
suggested a link between the defendants and the Russian government and expressed an 
opinion about the defendant’s guilt and the evidence against them’ and the Court ordered 
the government ‘to refrain from making or authorising any public statement that links the 
alleged conspiracy in the indictment to the Russian government or its agencies’.1169 On 
28 May Friedrich famously ruled that Mueller’s indictment of the ‘troll farm’ was not 
actually proof of it. 1170  Mueller’s implied link between the IRA and the Russian 
government was an assertion based on no stated evidence. A month before trial, on 16 
March 2020 the Mueller charges against Concord were abruptly ‘dismissed with 
prejudice’ (meaning that it was permanently closed and could not be brought back to 
court). Prosecutors argued that the company had ‘no exposure to meaningful 
punishment’, and that the prosecution risked exposing investigative sources and methods. 
The next day Prigozhin went on the offensive, arguing that the US government ‘feared 
publicity and just court proceedings’, and claimed that it proved that charges of Russian 
interference were ‘mendacious and false’, and that he would sue the US government for 
$50bn over ‘wrongful persecution’.1171 The latter claim would go nowhere, but the case 
suggested that the indictment had been intended as a piece of political theatre rather than 
a serious criminal prosecution. 
The only known individual to be charged with foreign interference in the 
November 2018 midterms is Elena Khusyainova, an employee of the IRA. A criminal 
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complaint was filed against her by the DoJ on 19 October 2018. She was one of the 13 
previously indicted by Mueller for using fake accounts to spread divisive content on 
social media. She was charged with conspiring with others to ‘spread misinformation 
about US political issues including immigration, gun control, the Confederate flag, and 
protests by NFL players. It [the IRA] also used events, including the Las Vegas mass 
shooting and the far-right rally in Charlottesville, to spread discord’. She had not 
personally engaged in such activity, but was the chief accountant overseeing Project 
Lakhta, responsible for ‘meticulous record-keeping and management’ of IRA accounts. 
She had apparently overseen the disbursement of $60,000 over the first six months of 
2018 for advertisements on Facebook and $6,000 on Instagram, with both conservative 
and liberal messages. Most of the material was trivial, although some was racist and anti-
Muslim. As Aaron Maté notes, ‘All are so juvenile or inconsequential that it is difficult to 
see how they could have vastly greater influence than the millions of other pieces of 
political clickbait littering the Internet’. As with the rest of Russia’s alleged 
misinformation, ‘its most significant impact appears to be as fodder for ongoing efforts 
intent on convincing Americans that unsophisticated social-media trolling could 
somehow divide and weaken society’.1172 As for Khusyainova, she declared that ‘my 
heart filled with pride’ at the news that she had been accused of a covert media campaign 
in both the 2016 and 2018 elections. Speaking on Russian TV, she added ‘It turns out that 
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FRUIT OF A POISONED TREE 
 
 
Mueller’s indictments focused less on the central charge of a Trump-Russia conspiracy 
than on process crimes. The justice department took the lead in examining the origins of 
Russiagate, which developed into a criminal investigation. Some fundamental questions 
were raised.1174 First, why did the FBI launch an investigation into Trump’s presidential 
campaign based on tenuous and partisan predicates? How far did the FBI rely on the 
Steele dossier case to launch Crossfire Hurricane and, later, the FISA warrants against 
Carter Page? Second, Barr and Durham focused on the part played by the CIA in 
mobilising other security agencies in driving forward the Russia-Trump collusion 
narrative. The FBI investigations had a political agenda, and then the same team was 
assigned to work with Mueller: ‘And if Crossfire was politically motivated, then its 
culmination, the appointment of a special counsel, inherited the taint. All special counsel 
activities – investigations, plea deals, subpoenas, reports, indictments and convictions – 
are fruit of a poisonous tree, byproducts of a violation of due process’. 1175  These 
conclusions flow inescapably from the Horowitz report. At the same time, the media was 
caught up in the frenzy. The evening newscasts on the main TV channels (ABC, CBS and 
NBC) between 21 January 2017 and 10 February 2019 devoted 2,202 minutes to the 
Trump-Russia collusion allegations but gave almost no coverage to their refutation. 1176 
 
Why it all started 
 
In summer 2016 Brennan delivered a top-secret letter to the White House with the claim 
by a Russian mole that Putin had personally ordered an interference operation to install 
Trump. The ‘mole’ turned out to be a mid-level Kremlin official named Oleg Smolenkov, 
well outside of Putin’s inner circle and who had been fired some years earlier. He 
rebuffed early attempts by the CIA to exfiltrate him, but following American media 
reports he finally defected during a trip to Montenegro in June 2017. Smolenkov was 
later found living under his own name in Stafford, a Virginia suburb. Brennan worked 
with the FBI to investigate and then took the lead in producing the inadequate ICA of 6 
January 2017.1177 Despite the claims, Mueller did not find a single case where the Trump 
campaign team initiated contact with Russians to gain damaging information on his rival 
or to boost their campaign. 
 
1174 Maté provides a list of relevant questions, ‘It’s Trump’s Last Chance to Declassify These 
Secrets’. 
1175 Rivkin and Foley, ‘Mueller’s Fruit of the Poisonous Tree’. 
1176 Christoforou, ‘Corrupt Rosenstein’. 
1177 Aaron Maté, ‘Uncovering Russiagate’s Origins Could Prevent Future Scandals’, The Nation, 





 The Republican-controlled HPSCI in September 2018 voted unanimously to 
release the 57 witness transcripts of its January 2017 to March 2018 Russiagate inquiry 
and sent them to the ODNI for declassification review. However, when Schiff took over 
as Democratic chair in January 2019 he ordered that the material be withheld from White 
House lawyers seeking to review them for executive privilege. It was only when acting 
ODNI director Richard Grenell in May 2020 threatened to release them himself that 
Schiff revealed the transcripts. In stark contrast to public assertions of confidence in the 
collusion allegations, many witnesses under oath were less sure. Former DNI Clapper 
testified on 17 July 2017 that ‘I never saw any direct empirical evidence that the Trump 
campaign or someone in it was plotting/conspiring with the Russians to meddle with the 
elections’.1178 Other Obama administration officials, including Susan Rice, testified to the 
same effect.1179 This once again raises the question whether there was ever an adequate 
predicate to open a counter-intelligence investigation into an opposition party’s 
presidential campaign. Even more revealing, CrowdStrike, the company contracted to 
investigate the central Russiagate charge of hacking, admitted to Congress that it had no 
concrete evidence that Russian hackers stole the emails from the DNC server. 
CrowdStrike president Shawn Henry, who personally led the forensic and 
remediation analysis, admitted that while material had been prepared, there was no 
confirmation that files had actually been exfiltrated. CrowdStrike installed its monitoring 
devices on 1 or 2 May, but when asked to specify the date when the Russian hackers stole 
the data from the DNC server, Henry responded that Crowdstrike was not sure whether 
the theft had taken place: ‘We did not have concrete evidence that the data was exflitrated 
from the DNC, but we have indicators that it was exfiltrated’. The material had been ‘set 
up to be exfiltrated, but we just don’t have the evidence that says it actually left’. Henry 
noted that ‘There are other nation-states that collect this type of intelligence for sure, but 
the – what we would call the tactics and techniques were consistent with what we’d seen 
associated with the Russian state’.1180 Mueller’s conclusion that Russian intelligence on 
or about 25 May and 1 June (over three weeks after CrowdStrike was monitoring the 
servers) ‘appears to have compressed and exfiltrated over 70 gigabytes of data from the 
file server’, unless he drew on another unknown analysis of the server (as noted, the 
grand jury material was redacted), becomes more questionable.1181 This does not mean 
that the GRU did not do so, but the uncertainty was hidden from the public. The result 
was intensified animosity towards Russia, amplifying the divisions of the new cold war. 
These were among the issues examined by the various probes. Department of 
Justice inspector general Horowitz launched his investigation in March 2018 and on 19 
December 2019 released his review of the four FISA applications and other aspects of the 
Crossfire Hurricane investigation. The report examined the FBI decision to start the 
investigation in July and to open cases on four current and former members of the 
campaign in August 2016: Papadopoulos, Page, Manafort and Flynn. It also examined the 
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FBI’s relationship with Steele; the use the FBI made of his memos, and its decision to 
close Steele as a confidential human source; the four FBI applications filed with FISC in 
2016 and 2017 to conduct FISA surveillance of Page; the interactions of DoJ attorney 
Bruce Ohr with Steele; whether Nellie Ohr’s work for Fusion GPS breached ethical rules 
applicable to her spouse; and whether any undercover operations were conducted against 
the Trump campaign.1182 The report is one of the most comprehensive analyses of the 
Russiagate affair. Its basic finding is that the FBI committed serious violations of its own 
procedures, with 17 instances of improper behaviour identified, most associated with the 
investigative warrants issued against Page (above all withholding exculpatory evidence). 
However, the report concluded that the FBI had sufficient reason to open the 
investigation into purported links between the Trump campaign and Russia.  
The immediate predicate was the receipt of information from what the report calls 
a Friendly Foreign Government (FFG), that is, Britain, as well as reasons to believe that 
WikiLeaks’ publication of the DNC emails was coordinated with Russia. 1183  Most 
controversially, the report argued that the FBI only became aware of Steele’s memos 
weeks later, and therefore they played no part in triggering the investigation. The report 
also dismissed claims of political bias or improper motivation in opening the 
investigation, arguing that while both Lisa Page and Peter Strzok were part of the 
process, the decision after detailed consultation was ultimately taken by Bill Priestap, 
assistant director of the Counterintelligence Division. The use of CHS’s against Page and 
Papadopoulos was criticised, but the operations were permitted under DoJ guidelines. 
The initial FISA surveillance application against Page in October 2016, a month after he 
had stepped down from the campaign, was approved at the highest levels, including 
deputy attorney general Sally Yates, but the Crossfire Hurricane team failed to inform the 
DoJ of significant information that was known at that time and the three subsequent 
renewals. When it comes to Steele, the report noted that as early as 2013 the FBI had 
completed the paperwork to appoint him a CHS, but the relationship was based on 
fundamentally different understandings of the role. The FBI considered Steele a former 
security agent with obligations to the FBI; whereas Steele considered the contractual ties 
were with his company and not himself, and that his obligations were to his paying 
clients, not the FBI. This misunderstanding ‘affected the FBI’s control over Steele during 
the Crossfire Hurricane investigation [and] led to divergent expectations about Steele’s 
conduct in connection with his election reporting’, provoking his termination as a CHS in 
November 2016, although the FBI continued its relationship with him through Ohr.1184  
Receipt of Steele’s memos on 19 September prompted the FBI to seek the FISA 
application against Page.1185 The FBI is excoriated for failing to corroborate Steele’s 
reports, although it did provide a gnomic footnote in its FISA application about the 
potential political bias of Steele’s work. On this aspect, the report noted seven significant 
inaccuracies and omissions including that Page between 2008 and 2013 provided 
information to the CIA about his prior contacts with Russian officials (this came as a 
revelation), overstating the reliability of Steele’s earlier reporting and relied on four 
dubious claims from the dossier, omitting Page’s monitored statement that he had 
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‘literally never met’ Manafort and his denial that he had met Sechin or Divyekin.1186 The 
FISA renewals failed to mention negative assessments of Steele’s work, above all that he 
was ‘prone to rash judgments’ and demonstrated a ‘lack of self-awareness’1187 More 
damningly, one of Steele’s sources noted that they never expected Steele to present their 
material as ‘facts’ since there was ‘no proof’ but ‘hearsay’, the kind of ‘conversation that 
[he/she] had with friends over beers’. The source stressed that Steele in any case 
‘misstated or exaggerated’ statements and the source’s access to Russian officials. The 
source noted that Trump’s alleged romp in the Ritz Carlton in 2013 was no more than 
‘rumor and speculation’.1188 The FISA applications also omitted Mifsud’s denial to the 
FBI that he supplied Papadopoulos with the information that he allegedly passed on to 
Downer. 1189  In short, the report listed 17 errors or omissions in the Page FISA 
applications. It also concluded that Bruce Ohr had committed ‘consequential errors’ in 
failing to inform his superiors that he was communicating with Steele and Simpson or to 
pass on the information that Steele was ‘desperate that Donald Trump not get elected and 
was passionate about him not being the US President’.1190 
The report basically confirmed the findings of Devin Nunes’s 18 January 2018 
memo and dismissed the rival summary by Schiff and the Democrats. The report was 
condemned by Barr for not going far enough, arguing that ‘the FBI launched an intrusive 
investigation of a US presidential campaign on the thinnest of suspicions’. Horowitz 
conceded that the bar for opening an investigation had been low, and FBI director Wray 
ordered 40 corrective steps to address the report’s recommendations. Durham, whose 
own investigation had now become a criminal enquiry, ‘advised the inspector general that 
we do not agree with some of the report’s conclusions to predication and how the FBI 
case was opened’. 1191  Having noted numerous threats to ‘constitutionally protected 
activity, notably the First Amendment’, Horowitz limited himself to the rather mild 
assessment that ‘We did not receive satisfactory explanations for the errors or problems 
we identified’.1192 There may well have been a reasonable case for opening the Russia 
investigation in July 2016, but what Horowitz failed to explain is why it was pursued so 
doggedly as each of its predicates proved biased, insubstantial or not corroborated. 
Brennan and Clapper repeatedly used the media to advance collusion allegations, but the 
FBI later told Horowitz that it never received anything of substance from the CIA. 
Later Republican congressional investigations focused on what precisely the CIA 
told the FBI in 2016, in the period before the ICA was published in January 2017. As 
noted, in April 2020 acting DNI Richard Grenell and Barr authorised the publication of 
the previously redacted Horowitz review footnotes. They reveal that Russian intelligence 
knew as early as July 2016 that Steele was preparing a dossier on Trump, and hence US 
intelligence believed that the dossier was susceptible to false information planted by 
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Moscow.1193 Already in January 2017 the Crossfire Hurricane team received information 
that Steele’s reporting on the activities of Cohen were inaccurate and possibly ‘part of a 
Russian disinformation campaign to denigrate US foreign relations’, and on 27 February 
2017 a different source ‘claimed that the public reporting about the details of Trump’s 
sexual activities in Moscow during a trip in 2013 were false, and that they were the 
product of RIS [Russian intelligence services] “infiltrate[ing] a source into the network”’ 
of the person who compiled the dossier.1194  
That is why the CIA’s station chief in Moscow, Daniel Hoffman, believed that the 
Obama administration’s intelligence assessment was wrong, and that ‘The question of 
whether Russia favoured Clinton or Trump is superfluous’. Instead, Moscow was 
concerned, in his view, with undermining American democracy more broadly. In 2016 
the CIA knew that the main target of the FBI investigation, Page, was a CIA asset and not 
a Russian spy, and that the meeting between Page and Sechin did not take place. In other 
words, Russia was feeding false information to Steele. As so often in Russiagate, the exit 
from one wormhole only leads to another. This part of the labyrinth is powerfully 
described by Hoffman, and is worth quoting at length: 
 
Putin hoodwinked everyone who believed the most ‘salacious and unverified’ 
portions of the Steele dossier. Putin would have purposefully included this 
information because he knew the Trump campaign would vociferously reject the 
claims. Steele’s reporting was so extreme, it would spark investigation, and if 
there is one thing Putin knows about our democracy it is that we eventually 
discover the truth … Once Steele’s shoddy dossier was exposed for what it was, 
Trump and his supporters rightfully had a bone to pick with the Democrats. So 
Putin got what he wanted. The Steele dossier was used as fodder in or partisan, 
political meat grinder. Putin’s goal is to exacerbate the already high level of 
animosity between Democrats and Republicans, with an eye towards degrading 
our democracy.1195  
 
As another commentary put it, if this is true Comey’s Russia investigation ranks ‘as one 
of the agency’s greatest blunders’, with the added paradox that ‘the people who did the 
most to whip up this hysteria were the same ones who professed to be most alarmed at 
Russia meddling’.1196 This is why Barr called the FBI investigation one of the greatest 
‘travesties’ in the FBI’s 112-year history, and that is why he called on Durham not just to 
deliver a ‘report’ but expected him to focus on possible criminal violations: ‘And if 
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people broke the law, and we can establish that with the evidence, they will be 
prosecuted’.1197 
 
The investigators investigated 
 
The Mueller report disappointed those who had been ‘counting on Mueller to rescue them 
from the waking nightmare of Trump’s presidency’. 1198  However, all was not lost 
because the report left open the door to an obstruction charge, possibly even leading to 
Trump’s impeachment. By historical standards, Mueller ran an efficient and tight 
investigation, and even before the final report a slew of indictments had been issued. The 
plea agreements with senior officials, including Rick Gates and Michael Flynn, sought to 
find something incriminating against more senior Trump associates. This in turn 
generated the argument that ‘the abuse of power that the special counsel embodied is a 
deadly cancer on American democracy. Two years of investigations have left families in 
ruins, stripping them of their savings, their homes, threatening their liberty, and dragging 
their names through the mud’.1199 Three dozen indictments were issued against Russian 
citizens, although Mueller hardly expected to see them in court. Six Trump insiders were 
accused of ‘process crimes’, like perjury, or on matters that had nothing to do with the 
2016 election, Russia or even politics. The perjury cases were prompted by various lies or 
misspeaking to investigators. With no underlying crime, these cases become particularly 
disturbing, only taking place because of the existence of the investigation. Flynn, 
Manafort and Papadopoulos were pressured by Mueller to ‘flip’ and provide evidence 
against top Trump officials; but with no collusion, there was no incriminating evidence to 
give. If there was no crime, then what was the point of the investigation? The special 
counsel had had to find the evidence to justify the investigation. 
Not surprisingly, there have been calls for the investigators to be investigated. On 
13 May 2019 Barr opened an enquiry into whether the Trump-Russia investigation had 
been ‘lawful and appropriate’. It was led by John Durham, the US attorney in 
Connecticut, a respected career prosecutor nominated to his post by Trump and who had 
been unanimously confirmed by the Senate in February 2018. In one of his final acts 
before he resigned in December 2020, Barr on 19 October secretly appointed Durham a 
special counsel to ensure that the probe into the origins of Russiagate would continue 
after the end of the Trump administration. Biden confirmed the continuation of the 
investigation, although Durham along with 55 others resigned as US attorney at his 
request in February 2021. The original appointment in 2019 came a month after Barr on 
10 April informed Congress that he believed ‘spying did occur’ on the Trump campaign 
in 2016, finally turning attention on the FBI’s behaviour. ‘I think’, he warned, ‘spying on 
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a political campaign is a big deal’.1200 Durham’s enquiry focused on FBI surveillance of 
the Trump presidential campaign. The FISA warrants on Carter Page started in October 
2016 and the last 90-day one was issued in June 2017 – which Mueller did not renew 
when it ended in September. The FBI’s use of informants when it was investigating 
Papadopoulos was also examined, as well as the provenance of the Steele dossier. In sum, 
Durham’s enquiry focused on whether the methods used to gather intelligence on the 
Trump campaign were indeed ‘lawful and appropriate’. The Durham investigation 
worked separately but in parallel with Horowitz’s examination of political bias and the 
origins of the Russia probe. This investigated why the counter-intelligence investigation 
was formally opened by the FBI on 31 July 2016, an issue also part of Durham’s 
purview.  
Durham examined the role of the FBI in Russiagate as well as the activities of 
other agencies. In particular, he explored whether Brennan’s CIA withheld information 
from other agencies to steer the Russiagate investigation in a particular direction. He 
focused on the January 2017 ICA, which concluded that Putin ordered an influence 
campaign that ‘aspired to help’ Trump. It was now revealed that analysts working on the 
document disagreed over whether Putin really wanted to help Trump or just to ‘sow 
chaos’, and the weight to be attached to the Democrat-funded Steele dossier. As we have 
seen, the CIA and FBI reported ‘high confidence’ and the NSA, which conducts 
electronic intelligence, only a moderate degree of confidence in the assertion that Putin 
ordered intervention on Trump’s behalf. Discussing Durham’s work, Barr argued that 
‘The president bore the burden of probably one of the greatest conspiracy theories – 
baseless conspiracy theories – in American political history’. Durham examined the 
thinking that led to the inclusion of Steele’s allegations as an appendix to the 
assessment. 1201  Brennan denied that the CIA relied on the dossier in drafting the 
assessment, and Clapper made the same claim on behalf of the intelligence agencies more 
broadly. The FBI pushed hard for the unverified dossier to be included, and as 
Horowitz’s report made clear, McCabe accused other intelligence chiefs of trying to 
minimise Steele’s information. Comey insisted that Steele was reliable, but Clapper 
ignored Comey, according to Horowitz, while the CIA viewed the dossier as an ‘internet 
rumor’.1202 
The list of investigations became absurdly long. Congressional Republicans also 
launched their own enquiry, focusing on whether there were any legal concerns.1203 
Steele declared that he would not cooperate with the Durham enquiry but might work 
with Horowitz’s. Steele had been interviewed twice by the Mueller team in September 
2017 and gave written testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee in August 
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2018.1204 Meanwhile, Sessions asked US district attorney for Utah, John W. Huber, to 
investigate not only surveillance abuses by the DoJ and the FBI, but also their handling of 
the probe into the Clinton Foundation and other matters. Even former NSA head, Michael 
Rogers, was reportedly cooperating with investigators.1205 The January 2017 ICA became 
the subject of an investigative referral in October 2020 when DNI Ratcliffe requested 
examination of potential wrongdoing.1206  
All investigations were prompted by a single glaring fact. If Mueller was right and 
there was no collusion or even substantive communication between the Trump campaign 
and Russia, then the behaviour of Obama administration officials and the mainstream 
media who insisted to the contrary is all the more disturbing. The Clinton campaign 
understandably sought to blame some outside force for its woes, but seasoned political 
and intelligence professionals were caught up in the scheme to blame Russia. They 
played up an alleged conspiracy that Mueller dismissed as a fiction. These officials 
‘collectively suffered from one of the most historically monumental cases of poor 
judgment in US intelligence history’. 1207  The pressure was now on to declassify 
information about the origins of the Trump-Russia investigation. Not surprisingly, 
Brennan led the opposition to transparency on this issue: ‘The concern is that very, very 
precious source and methods of the United States intelligence community as well as our 
partners and allies abroad – those who share this sensitive information with us’. Just as 
the Democrats called for the ‘underlying evidence’ of the Mueller report to be made 
public, so ‘transparency has to cut all ways for this three-year national fiasco to be 
resolved in any way that makes sense’.1208 
The damaging Russiagate investigation and the failure of the Mueller report to 
answer the most pressing questions left many issues to be examined. The FBI counter-
intelligence investigation was opened by Strzok in July 2016, but in closed door 
Congressional testimony Lisa Page admitted that the FBI at that point ‘knew so little’ 
about whether the collusion allegation were ‘true or not true’. She insisted that it was not 
unusual to start an investigation when there was just a ‘small amount of evidence’.1209 
The Trump investigation began with a false premise: that Trump must have known that 
Russia possessed emails concerning Clinton; and that Moscow planned to disseminate 
these emails, with the help of a third party, at a time that would do maximum damage to 
the Clinton campaign. The idea of some sort of link between Trump and the Kremlin was 
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encouraged by the communication from Downer about his conversation with 
Papadapolous, which in turn was based on a conversation with Mifsud, who denied that 
he had ever said such a thing. Thrumming in the background were the explosive Steele 
dossier allegations, which purported to expose a conspiracy of mind-numbing 
proportions. The narrative was fed by contacts with British security officials, who remain 
typically tight-lipped about what they communicated. This is a remarkably thin thread on 
which to hang such weighty matters. Any investigation would have to examine the role of 
Britain and Australian officials in setting the Russiagate story going. 
 Democrats fought back against the various investigations by claiming that critics 
were essentially working on behalf of the Kremlin. Senate minority leader Chuck 
Schumer argued that Homeland Security chair Ron Johnson’s investigation into the 
Biden family’s dealings with Ukraine was a ‘disgrace’, claiming his committee was 
echoing ‘Russian disinformation’. Democrats had long argued that foreign interference in 
elections was the greatest risk to American democracy, so Republicans argued that the 
links of the presidential nominee and his family with Ukraine should also be 
investigated.1210 Mueller’s failure to provide clarity allowed these claims to fester and 
poison the American body politic. None of the eight cases of alleged Trump campaign 
interactions with Russian officials investigated by Mueller originated with Trump 
officials but came from FBI informants, MI6 assets or were paid for by Fusion GPS. 
Mueller provided no evidence that at any point the Trump team initiated contact with 
Moscow to gain derogatory information about Clinton or to boost Trump. This is why the 
Russiagate affair has been called a ‘hoax’, which the dictionary defines as ‘an act 
intended to deceive or trick’ or ‘something that has been established or accepted by 
fraudulent means’.1211 Both definitions apply in this case. The Trump-Russia collusion 
allegation turned out to be false. Russia was at most a bit player in a drama that was 
played out elsewhere. We are left with a ‘Russiagate without Russia’.1212 
 
Further investigations  
 
On 6 February 2020 the Senate Intelligence Committee released the third volume of its 
investigation into Russian election interference, focusing on the responses of the Obama 
administration. The report did not question the base assumptions of the ICA, and 
therefore had little meaningful to add to the Russiagate affair. Despite significant 
redactions, a footnote confirms that it was Brennan at the head of the CIA who first 
raised the alarm about ‘Russian meddling’, and that it was his briefings of the ‘gang of 
eight’ that set the Russiagate ball rolling. 1213  The report notes that the Obama 
administration was torn between those officials who ‘viewed WikiLeaks as a legitimate 
 
1210  Kimberley A. Strassel, ‘From Russia (to Biden) With Love’, Wall Street Journal, 18 
September 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/from-russia-to-biden-with-love-11600383717. 
1211 Roger Kimball, ‘Let’s Call the Russian Collusion “Hoax” What it Really is’, Spectator USA, 
27 May 2019, https://spectator.us/call-russian-collusion-hoax/. 
1212 It is not clear who coined the term, but Nation writer James Carden may have been the first, 
and it was used by Stephen F. Cohen, ‘Media Malpractices is Criminalizing Better Relations with 
Russia’, The Nation, 13 December 2017,  https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/media-
malpractice-is-criminalizing-better-relations-with-russia/. 





news outlet’, and those who saw it ‘as a hostile organization acting intentionally and 
deliberately to undermine US or allies’ interests’.1214  
The fifth and final Senate Intelligence Committee report was published in August 
2020 and focused on ‘counterintelligence threats and vulnerabilities’. 1215  Despite 
weighing in at nearly 1,000 pages, the report contained almost nothing new and was 
already outdated by the time it was published, with many of its assertions questioned 
(above all its treatment of the Steele dossier) or outright debunked (as in its endorsement 
of the FBI’s decision to investigate Page). By then attention focused on Clinton’s 
supporters assumption that she would be the next president and hence did little to cover 
their tracks when they played fast and loose with the Constitution and the law, matters 
that were by then being investigated by Barr, Durham and others.1216 Yet, published just 
months ahead of the November presidential election, it revived the Russian interference 
allegations. The key finding was that Manafort had shared polling data with Russians 
who may have been intelligence officers – a rehash of the Kilimnik story. Nearly two 
years earlier the New York Times had been forced to correct its coverage to explain that 
the data was intended not for Russian but Ukrainian oligarchs.1217 Manafort’s work in 
Ukraine was once again examined to suggest that in fact Manafort had been working on 
behalf of the Russian state through ‘pro-Russia’ Ukrainian oligarchs as well as 
Deripaska, who all had agendas of their own and cannot be simply lumped together as 
‘pro-Russian’ elements of ‘Russia’s own influence efforts’. As we have seen, Manafort 
took anything but a pro-Russian position and worked hard to get Ukraine to sign the 
Association Agreement with the EU, and a cache of emails released at this time 
demonstrates that Kilimnik also worked to achieve that goal.1218  
The Senate report alleges that Kilimnik was a Russian intelligence officer when in 
fact he worked closely with the US embassy in Kiev, and was an important source of 
information about Yanukovych.1219 Kilimnik had been a ‘sensitive’ intelligence source 
for the US State Department since at least 2013 and in May 2016 delivered a Russian 
peace plan to settle the Donbas conflict to the Obama administration, although the 
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Mueller report omitted mention of that and instead focused on his delivery of the peace 
plan to the Trump team in August, an egregious case of ‘deception by omission’.1220 
Veselnitskaya and Akhmetshin were accused of having ‘significant connections to the 
Russian government, including the Russian intelligence services’, but no attempt was 
made to investigate whether the June 2016 Trump Tower meeting was part of a Russian 
intelligence operation (discounted by the Mueller report), and instead guilt by association 
and assertion remained the operative code. The obsession with RT continued, which can 
be traced back to Clinton’s assertion in March 2011 that the US was ‘losing … the 
information war’. In short, the Senate report was egregiously wrong in its coverage of the 
story, avoiding known facts and relying on innuendo and assertion. Above all, the Senate 
report repeated discredited claims about WikiLeaks, and once again there had been no 
attempt to speak with Assange. It appears that the outgoing Intelligence Committee chair 
Richard Barr, who resigned in May 2020 but who had largely overseen work on the 
report, had been keen to establish its bipartisan character and had thus allowed the 
ranking Democrat Mark Warner to shape the narrative.1221 
The Senate Judiciary Committee conducted its own Russia investigation. Its chair, 
Lindsey Graham, noted that he had initially been in favour of Mueller’s appointment but 
came to believe that the special counsel investigation was strewn with errors and driven 
by an anti-Trump animus. He warned ‘We’re going to be talking about how it got off the 
rails, who’s responsible for it getting off the rails, and making sure that they are 
punished’. One of the first witnesses on 3 June 2020 was Rod Rosenstein, who had left 
the DoJ in May 2019 and remained tight-lipped about his part in these historic events. In 
response to Graham’s question whether he would agree that by August 2017 it was clear 
that there was ‘no there there’ to support the ‘concept that the campaign was colluding 
with the Russians’, Rosenstein offered a rather limp defence of the Mueller investigation, 
and admitted that by then no evidence of collusion had emerged.1222 Nevertheless, he 
believed that it made sense to let the investigation be completed.1223 This does not explain 
why his ‘scope memo’ of 2 August broadened Mueller’s remit, unless it was to ensure 
that the whole process did not come up empty. To find the answers, the Committee 
threatened to issue 53 subpoenas to relevant witnesses.  
 The question for the Judiciary Committee and other investigations was not so 
much to explain how contrary evidence was suppressed but why the Russiagate charges 
gained so much traction in the first place. The Steele dossier was clearly a deceptive 
foundation on which to build so much. On 17 July 2020, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
issued an annotated version of the New York Times article of 14 February 2017, published 
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just hours after Flynn’s ouster, claiming that ‘Trump campaign aides had repeated 
contacts with Russian intelligence’. 1224  Strzok wrote an internal FBI analysis of the 
article highlighting the story’s inaccuracies. The first comment was ‘misleading and 
inaccurate … we are unaware of any Trump advisors engaging in conversations with 
Russian intelligence officials’ and questioned the assertion that Manafort had contact 
with Russian security officers, noting ‘We are unaware of any calls with any Russian 
govt officials in which Manafort was a party’. He dismissed the NYT assertion that Stone 
was part of the FBI’s enquiry, curtly stating ‘We have not investigated Roger Stone’. 
Strzok also noted that ‘recent interviews’ ‘reveal ‘Steele may not be in a position to judge 
the reliability of his subsource network’.1225 By this point it was clear to the FBI that 
Steele was not a reliable source but failed to make this public and even continued to use 
him in the FISA warrants. As an editorial puts it, ‘The more evidence that is made public, 
the clearer it becomes that the Steele dossier and collusion narrative were dirty political 
tricks that became abuses of power’. 1226  The fundamental question is why the FBI 
continued the fan the flames of Russian collusion when it knew that the charges were 
‘unfounded, false and baseless’.1227 Trump was ridiculed for his response to the article 
when he said in a press conference, called to address the growing Russian collusion 
narrative on 16 February, that ‘The leaks are real, the news is fake’, but in fact leaks from 
anonymous intelligence officials and the faulty NYT story caused his administration real 
damage. McCabe privately told Priebus, according to reporting in Howard Kurtz’s book 
Media Madness, that ‘everything’ in the story was ‘bulls-t’, but when Priebus asked him 
to state this publicly, he refused to do so.1228 Instead, the FBI leaked to CNN that the ‘FBI 
refused White House request to knock down recent Trump-Russia stories’, making it look 
as if the White House was trying to obstruct a legitimate investigation.1229 In June Comey 
admitted under oath that the reporting was ‘false’, but by then the narrative had become 
institutionalised in the form of the Mueller inquiry. 
In August 2020 the Senate Homeland Security and Finance committees issued an 
87-page joint report on Hunter Biden’s business dealings with foreign nationals while his 
father served as vice president. 1230  The committees reviewed over 45,000 pages of 
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Obama administration material and most of the eight witnesses were current or former 
government officials. The report detailed transactions between Hunter Biden, his family 
and associates with Ukrainian, Russian, Kazakh and Chinese nationals, and noted ‘these 
documents show that Hunter Biden received millions of dollars from foreign sources as a 
result of business relationships that he built during the period when his father was vice 
president of the United States and after’. Hunter apparently gained some $4 million in 
‘questionable financial transactions’, partnering with Chinese businesspeople associated 
with the Communist Party of China and the People’s Liberation Army, as well taking 
$3.5 million from Elena Baturina, the wife of the former Moscow mayor, Yuri 
Luzhkov. 1231  The report detailed how Telizhenko had repeated contact with Obama 
administration officials in 2016, yet Democrats later claimed that he was involved in a 
Russian disinformation campaign. 1232  The acting deputy head of mission at the US 
embassy in Kiev, George Kent, repeatedly warned that Hunter’s work with Burisma 
undermined the credibility of the administration’s anti-corruption efforts, since the 
company’s owner, Zlochevsky, in Kent’s estimation was an ‘odious oligarch’.1233 The 
report detailed how ‘officials within the Obama administration ignored the glaring 
warning signs when the vice president’s son joined the board of a company owned by a 
corrupt Ukrainian oligarch’. 1234 Despite secretary of state John Kerry’s later claim that he 
was not aware that Hunter served on the Burisma board, the report found evidence to the 
contrary. 1235 Hunter’s own account dismisses his place on the board as an ‘epic banality’ 
and a way of confronting Russia.1236 He was well-paid for his efforts, which appear to 
have consisted of attending two board meetings annually in such exotic locations as 
Monaco or a hunting lodge in northern Norway. 
Continuing his series of exposures, on 7 October 2020 DNI Ratcliffe released 
more than 1,000 pages of documents to the DoJ concerning the origins of the Trump-
Russia collusion allegations. A day earlier, he released a redacted hand-written note by 
then-CIA director Brennan shortly after he briefed Obama on Russian intelligence about 
Clinton. Trump asserted that he had authorised ‘the total declassification of any and all 
documents’ pertaining to what he called ‘the single greatest political crime in American 
history, the Russia hoax’, but his detractors argued that the ‘selective declassification of 
information’ was designed to advance Trump’s and Republicans aligned with him’.1237 
One of the memos released by Ratcliffe made the explosive claim that Russian 
intelligence assessed that Clinton approved the campaign in July 2016 to link Trump to 
Russia’s alleged hacking of the DNC to shift attention away from her own email scandal. 
We have noted that Mook at the time of the Democratic National Convention condemned 
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Russia for the hacking, in part at least to divert attention from the scandalous revelations 
about DNC bias against Sanders. Brennan’s note stated: ‘We’re getting additional insight 
into Russian activities from [redacted] … allegedly approved by Hillary Clinton a 
proposal from one of her foreign policy advisers to vilify Donald Trump by stirring up a 
scandal claiming interference by the Russian security service’. 1238  According to 
Brennan’s notes, Clinton approved the plan on 26 July, the day of her presidential 
nomination.1239 Brennan admitted that he briefed Obama and his national security team 
(with Comey possibly in attendance) ‘about what the Russians were up to and I was 
giving examples of the type of access that the US intelligence community to Russian 
information and what the Russians were talking about and alleging’. Ratcliffe also 
declassified a secret CIA memo of 7 September 2016 ‘per FBI verbal request’ addressed 
to Comey and Strzok, which also talked of ‘Clinton’s approval of a plan concerning US 
presidential candidate Donald Trump and Russian hackers hampering US elections as a 
means of distracting the public from her use of a private email server’. The case could 
hardly be less ambiguous. Wikileaks began publishing the DNC material on 22 July, 
Mook appeared on CNN on 24 July to make the first public claim that Russia hacked the 
DNC to support Trump, on 26 July Obama stated ‘What we do know is that the Russians 
hack our systems, not just government systems but private systems’, and the Crossfire 
Hurricane investigation was opened on 31 July.1240 
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 WORSE THAN WATERGATE 
 
 
The Mueller investigation has been accused of ‘antecedent political bias’; in other words, 
partisanship. Carl Bernstein argues that ‘This is worse than Watergate in the sense the 
system worked in Watergate and it’s not apparent yet the system is working in the current 
situation’.1241 Bernstein is half of the legendary duo, who along with Bob Woodward 
doggedly investigated the break-in of the DNC in 1972, ultimately precipitating Richard 
Nixon’s resignation. Woodward describes the chaotic decision-making and personnel 
choices in Trump’s first 18 months in power.1242 He explains that he chose the title Fear 
after an interview in which Trump remarked: ‘Real power is through respect. I don’t even 
want to use the word, fear’. Bernstein added that ‘I think that this is a dangerous time for 
America, that we have a president with no regard for the rule of law or for the truth … I 
think that’s what so extraordinary’.1243 No less extraordinary were the flaws in those who 
set themselves up as the ‘resistance’ to the administration. Neither accepted the 
legitimacy of the other, and both sought to exploit temporary control of institutions to 
press home their advantage. The ‘norms of toleration and restraint [that] served as the 
soft guardrails of American democracy’ were being eroded.1244 
 
Russiagate and resistance 
 
In 1964 Barry Goldwater had been perceived as a threat to the established conduct of US 
politics, and he endured unprecedented vilification. This was accompanied by CIA 
surveillance ordered by President Lyndon Johnson led by none other than E. Howard 
Hunt, who later organised the notorious break-in to the DNC, at the time located in the 
Watergate building. In 2016 Trump was also considered an abnormal presidential 
candidate and elements of the establishment apparently conspired against him. The 
Horowitz report exonerated Comey of trying to influence the election, but the charge of 
making decisions based on political considerations remains. Comey told Horowitz that he 
decided to reopen the Clinton email investigation because he wanted to protect the 
legitimacy of her assumed presidency. Crossfire broke with the long-standing convention 
not to investigate campaigns in an election year. Clinton’s use of a private email server 
prompted a criminal investigation and began a year before the campaign, whereas 
Crossfire was not a criminal investigation (there was no crime to investigate), but a 
counter-intelligence operation, governed by a very different investigative logic. It was 
prompted by fears of Trump-Russia collusion, although when Crossfire was launched 
there was minimal evidence.  
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Despite straining mightily, Mueller was not able to find evidence of collusion. 
The hacking of the DNC and other Clinton team data breaches certainly deserved 
investigation, but Stone’s queries are far from proving that Trump colluded with the 
perpetrators. The case then reverts to the generic assumption that Russia tried to help 
Trump get elected, and Trump reciprocated by embracing pro-Russian policies – but 
neither proposition has been proven. Hence we come to the fundamental question: ‘Given 
the paucity of evidence, it’s staggering that the FBI would initiate a counterintelligence 
investigation, led by politically biased staff, amid a presidential campaign’. 1245  In 
September 2020 it was revealed that only a small minority in US intelligence considered 
that Russia had tried to influence the outcome of the 2016 election, with several senior 
analysts arguing that the Kremlin had in fact anticipated a Clinton victory and considered 
Trump a ‘wild card’. However, CIA director Brennan moved aggressively to exclude 
dissenting voices from the ICA and to include the Steele dossier in the January 2017 
Assessment. On his last morning in office, 20 January 2021, Trump ordered the 
declassification of a binder of material on the origins of the Crossfire Hurricane probe. 
The full ‘FD-302’ interview summary of Steele’s meeting with the FBI in London’s 
Grosvenor Hotel in September 2017 now demonstrated that Steele refused to name 
Danchenko as his main source, even though the FBI had interviewed him eight months 
earlier and had by then pieced together the provenance of the dossier. Danchenko by now 
had disappeared, not because he was scared (as suggested by Steele) but probably to 
avoid being drawn further into the web of deceit. 1246  Steele doubled down on his 
assertion that Cohen visited Prague and other claims that have since been demonstrated to 
be false. He admitted that he leaked his dossier at the height of the 2016 campaign to 
divert attention from Clinton’s renewed email scandal and to damage Trump, whose 
election he believed would be damaging for US-UK relations.1247 
The progenitors of Russiagate went on to become the heart of the ‘resistance’ to 
the president. Brennan was unsparing in his attacks on Trump, accusing him of ‘venality, 
moral turpitude and political corruption’, and condemned Republican Party investigation 
of the FBI. He claimed on Twitter that Trump’s performance at the July 2018 press 
conference in Helsinki ‘rises to and exceeds the threshold of high crimes and 
misdemeanours. It was nothing short of treasonous. Not only were Trump’s comments 
imbecilic, he is wholly in the pocket of Putin’.1248 His own behaviour, however, came 
under scrutiny. As a columnist with the Wall Street Journal put it,  
 
That’s what Mr. Brennan is – a partisan – and it is why his role in the 2016 
scandal is in some ways more concerning than the FBI’s. Mr. Comey stands 
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accused of flouting the rules, breaking the chain of command, abusing 
investigatory powers. Yet it seems far likelier that the FBI’s Trump investigation 
was a function of arrogance and overconfidence than some partisan plot. No such 
case can be made for Mr. Brennan.  
 
Brennan was a close Obama adviser, and he went on to use his position at the head of the 
world’s most powerful spy agency to assist Clinton’s campaign – and ‘to keep his job’. 
According to the article, Brennan took credit for launching the Trump investigation. At 
the HPSCI hearing in May 2017, he explained how he became ‘aware of intelligence and 
information about contacts between Russian officials and US persons’. Since the CIA is 
prohibited from investigating US citizens, he shared ‘every information and bit of 
intelligence’ with the FBI. This information in turn ‘served as the basis for the FBI 
investigation’. Brennan may well have been over-stating his early role, but he certainly 
played a key part in getting the investigation started. More importantly, Brennan helped 
shape ‘the narrative that Russia was interfering in the election specifically to help Mr. 
Trump – which quickly evolved into the Trump-collusion narrative’. The Clinton team 
obviously supported the claim, especially in light of the embarrassing revelation of DNC 
bias against Sanders. There are solid reports that this was the line that Brennan 
aggressively pushed internally. 1249  In other words, while there may have been no 
sustained ‘conspiracy’ to use Russiagate allegations to discredit the Trump and then to 
hobble his administration, there certainly was a new cold war disposition to move in that 
direction. 
Mueller’s failure to investigate the Steele dossier opens yet another avenue for 
speculation. The dossier justified Page’s wiretapping and influenced the decision to open 
a counter-intelligence investigation into Trump himself, heralding the chain of events that 
led to Comey’s dismissal, which in turn contributed to the establishment of a special 
counsel. The damaging consequences stimulated a major counter-conspiracy theory: the 
view that the devious Russians had started the whole thing. As a commentary in the New 
York Times puts it: ‘Was any of the Steele dossier’s bad intel deliberately drafted by the 
Russians’.1250 The question is logical, since why should the Kremlin provide damaging 
material against someone they ostensibly supported. The journalist David Satter has no 
doubts about it. In his view the Mueller report ‘shows that Donald Trump and his 
campaign did not collude with Russia but Russian intelligence used disinformation to 
create the impression that he did’. This is certainly a dastardly plan – to get the 
Americans to believe that Russia was meddling in the election with the connivance of the 
Trump team. The goal was not only to exacerbate partisan divisions in the country but 
also to paralyse the Trump presidency as it drowned in the subsequent investigation. 
From this perspective, Papadopoulos told Downer on 10 May 2016 that Moscow had 
compromising information on Clinton to set off a false lead that in the end helped trigger 
the destructive counter-intelligence investigation into the Trump campaign. Equally, the 
June 2016 Trump Tower meeting ‘was part of the effort to inflame US politics by 
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creating the impression that candidate Trump was a Russian pawn’.1251 If Satter is right, 
then the Russians were playing a masterful hand of double-bluff – three-dimensional 
chess barely describes it. If he is mistaken, then his argument typifies everything that is 
wrong with neo-journalistic coverage of the Russiagate affair: distortion of the facts, 
fanciful and evidence-free assertions, and irresponsible speculation damaging to US 
domestic and foreign policy. 
The deception goes even deeper. Critics argue that the whole Mueller 
investigation was ‘itself its own version of a hoax, precisely because there isn’t a crime to 
investigate, and there never has been a crime to investigate’.1252 Stephen Cohen dismisses 
the exaggerated claims that ‘Russia attacked American democracy during the 2016 
presidential election’, likened to Japan’s nefarious attack on Pearl Harbour in December 
1941. Instead, he argues, there was no ‘attack’ in 2016, only ‘ritualistic “meddling” of the 
kind that both Russia and America have undertaken in the other’s elections for 
decades’.1253 The Russiagate allegations became part of domestic political struggle. The 
heads of the intelligence agencies, notably Brennan and DNI Clapper, exaggerated the 
threat and played up charges of Trump’s collusion, an operation that Cohen calls 
‘Intelgate’. The mainstream media also split along partisan lines, and not only failed to 
expose abuses of power but also amplified those abuses. Comey’s FBI, wittingly or 
unwittingly, became a political player, leading to the appointment of the special counsel.  
Here again comparisons are drawn with earlier cases of prosecutorial misconduct, 
arguably in the Enron case in which the Supreme Court overturned four of the five 
Anderson convictions. Weissmann himself was unrepentant, arguing in his memoir 
Where Law Ends that investigation of Russian election interference and links between 
Trump and Moscow did not go far enough and had been cowed by the power of the 
presidency, failing to go after the financial records or subpoena Trump family members, 
a charge rejected by Mueller.1254 Corruption and security threats must be investigated, but 
Mueller’s special counsel investigation, like the destabilising mani pulite (clean hands) 
anti-corruption campaign in Italy in the early 1990s and the equivalent lava jato (car 
wash) exposures in Brazil in the 2010s, damaged the American polity by deepening 
polarisation and the politicisation of the judiciary, the security services and the media. 
The enduring consequences were evident in the 2020 election. 
 
Russia and the 2020 election 
 
After a lull following the publication of the Mueller report, the long shadow of 
Russiagate returned to cast a pall over the 2020 presidential election. When asked if 
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Russian activity in 2016 was a one-off or a long-term proposition, Comey responded: 
‘Oh, it’s a long-term practice of theirs. It’s stepped up a notch in a significant way in ’16. 
They’ll be back’, and later in his testimony he added ‘we remain that shining city on the 
hill. And they don’t like it’.1255 DNI Coats was convinced that ‘Putin had something on 
Trump. How else to explain the president’s behaviour?’.1256 Mueller himself fed anxiety 
about continued Russian meddling when he testified to Congress on 24 July 2019: ‘It 
wasn’t a single attempt. They’re doing it as we sit here. … And they expect to do it 
during the next campaign’.1257  In the 25 February 2020 Democratic primary debate, 
Biden said Russians are ‘engaged now, as I speak, in interfering in our election’, while 
former New York mayor Mike Bloomberg charged that Russia was backing Bernie 
Sanders to ensure a Trump victory – another example of dastardly double-bluff. The 
intelligence community at that time assessed that the Kremlin was backing Trump, while 
other reports suggested that Moscow backed Sanders. A major study in The Atlantic 
warned that ‘Putin is well on his way to stealing the next election’.1258 Clinton for good 
measure added that ‘Russians are back in our cyber systems’, and that ‘anyone who tries 
to deny it’ is living in a ‘sad dreamworld’.1259 
Democrats clearly thought that the American public still had the appetite for 
another bout of Russiagate. The logic of the new cold war generated the perception of 
heightened external threat to American values, democratic procedures and security, and 
domestic polarisation reinforced the search for external enemies. Russia inevitably re-
emerged as the main adversary because in certain respects the original cold war had never 
ended. NATO expansion and the ideology of the ‘end of history’ precluded the possibility 
of a serious institutional or ideological alternative, and thus Russia’s great power 
ambitions and normative challenge simply did not fit into the logic of cold war victory. 
Those who questioned the character of that victory, like Trump, were cast as sympathetic 
or even collusive with Russia. The mainstream media continued to feed the public with 
unproven stories of Russian election meddling and malign activity. The story was bigger 
than the facts, reproducing in new forms the ‘red scare’ practices of earlier years. 
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Five intelligence officials headed by Shelby Pierson (an aide to acting DNI Joseph 
Maguire) in a closed-door meeting on 13 February 2020 informed Schiff’s HPSCI that 
Russia was trying to get Trump re-elected. This provoked the usual storm of outrage 
when the New York Times revealed the meeting. 1260 Brennan tweeted to his 766,000 
followers that ‘we are now in a full-blown national security crisis’ and ‘Trump is abetting 
a Russian covert operation to keep him in office for Moscow’s interests’.1261 However, a 
few days later an official revealed that there was no evidence for the ‘misleading’ 
supposition that ‘Russia’s interference in this cycle is aimed at re-electing Trump … The 
intelligence doesn’t say that’. At most, Russia may have preferred Trump as a ‘deal-
maker’. 1262  Trump was furious that Maguire had allowed the briefing, and he was 
summarily replaced by the US ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell. The incident 
rekindled the struggle between the White House and the intelligence community. Schiff 
insisted that Russia had ‘never really stopped being at it [interfering in elections], in 
terms of their social media campaign’ and warned that ‘the US intelligence community 
under Trump, cannot be relied upon to highlight and combat this threat’.1263 By now there 
was even less evidence than earlier that the Kremlin sought a Trump victory, hence the 
view that its goal was to ‘sow chaos’, a narrative based on little more than ‘intuition than 
dispositive evidence’.1264 The weaponisation of an inflated Russian threat by Schiff and 
others damaged normal statecraft and pushed the US towards actions (such as withdrawal 
from strategic arms control agreements) that may in the end cause the country 
incalculable damage. Long-term US interests suffered as the ‘Russia factor’ was 
instrumentalised for partisan ends. The Democrats also prepared to fight the election on 
the grounds that Trump was ‘soft on China’ as he tried to get a trade deal, with the effect 
of toughening an already hard stance.  
It is not clear why Moscow would prefer Trump in 2020. Some in Moscow had 
welcomed Trump’s election in 2016 since it was thought that ‘this very unusual guy 
might bring something completely new to the relationship. And he actually tried, but he 
failed’. Positive expectations about Trump soon waned, and by 2020 had largely 
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disappeared.1265  Although Trump professed respect for Putin (as he did for Chinese 
leader Xi Jinping), his policies towards the respective countries were as hard, if not 
harder, than during the cold war. As his allies pointed out at the 13 February briefing, 
Trump had ‘aggressively confronted Moscow’ and strengthened ‘the NATO alliance with 
new resources’.1266 Appeasement was an integral part of the Russia collusion narrative, 
with CNN insisting that Trump had been ‘soft on Russia’ no less than 37 times.1267 In 
fact, Trump ended up ‘embracing the worst features of liberal hegemony – overreliance 
on military force, disinterest in diplomacy, and a tendency towards unilateralism’.1268 
This sentiment comes over strongly in Bolton’s memoir of his time in Trump world: the 
slightest concession was taken as defeat, and in a hostile world only the compete and 
utter capitulation of adversaries enemies would do. 1269  This hostility to diplomacy 
reinforced the mechanism whereby the Russia scandal ‘swallowed’ possible foreign 
policy initiatives vis-à-vis Moscow. 1270  Trump’s legitimacy was undermined by the 
allegations of collusion, and his presidency was swallowed as Trump himself put it by 
‘Russia, Russia, Russia’. 
Trump’s approach was significantly more uncompromising and confrontational 
than Obama’s, especially when it came to Ukraine.1271 He not only maintained Obama-
era sanctions but imposed a slew of new ones; his December 2017 National Security 
Strategy condemned Russia as an aggressive revisionist power; he repeatedly expelled 
Russian diplomats and closed diplomatic facilities; time and again he deployed the 
Magnitsky Act against Russian officials and businesspeople; sent lethal arms to Ukraine 
including Javelin man-portable anti-tank missiles; sold Patriot missiles to Poland; 
increased funds for the $4.5 billion European Deterrence Initiative and intensified 
military exercises on Russia’s borders; doggedly imposed sanctions on companies 
building, insuring and regulating Nord Stream 2; undercut Russian gas sales to Europe by 
encouraging the building of LNG facilities; accelerated strategic nuclear modernisation, 
including the deployment of low-yield weapons that were explicitly directed against 
Moscow; withdrew from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and the Open Skies 
treaties; refused to renew New Start; withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), 
brokered with Russia’s help; confronted Russia in Syria and Libya; and turned the 
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Helsinki summit in June 2018 into a fiasco. Sanctions were no longer a discretionary 
instrument of statecraft but became a blunderbuss response for all occasions. Although 
Congress took the lead on Nord Stream 2, it suited Trump’s mercantilist inclinations. The 
Democrats accused Trump of pandering to Putin in Afghanistan and Syria, but the 
planned US pullouts hardly benefited Russia.  
Moscow looked for a US president who could establish a new détente, and Trump 
did not deliver. Dmitry Medvedev, the former president and prime minister who in 
January 2020 was appointed deputy chair of the Russian Security Council, argued that in 
2016 ‘it seemed that relations between the two countries could not be any worse’ than 
under Obama, but ‘the following years have dispelled this illusion. The Trump 
administration consistently strengthened the systemic confrontation between Washington 
and Moscow’.1272 There was certainly no reason for Putin to help Trump in 2020.1273 
Polls showed that Russian citizens had also given up on Trump, with 37 per cent holding 
him responsible for the deterioration in relations, while 33 per cent conceded that he had 
avoided conflicts but failed to achieve the desired rapprochement.1274 Nevertheless, part 
of the Washington elite still considered Trump Putin’s catspaw. Discussing his 
tumultuous 18 months as national security adviser, Bolton argued that Putin learned that 
he could play Trump ‘like a fiddle’. The report which quotes Bolton notes that while 
some in Putin’s administration may have been disappointed,  
 
Yet consider the gifts Trump has given Putin in the past 3½ years. Trump has all 
but wrecked Putin’s nemesis, the NATO alliance; this month [June 2020] he 
abruptly decided to withdraw more than a quarter of US troops from Germany. He 
opened the door for Russian meddling in the Middle East, and to greater influence 
over Turkey, Egypt and even Israel. He has poisoned the once-close relations 
between Washington and Ukraine; President Volodymyr Zelensky has still not 
been invited to Washington.1275  
 
Russian intervention in Syria was at the invitation of the constitutionally legitimate 
government in Damascus (however odious) to prevent Islamic State and other jihadist 
forces over-running the country, so why it should be considered ‘meddling’ is not clear. 
But the report was right to the degree that Trump lobbied for Russia’s restored 
membership of the Group of Seven (G7) nations, and that Trump was destructive of the 
US system of multilateral security and other ties built up in the post-war years. 
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In 2020 the Democrats resurrected the Russiagate playbook, although Republicans 
did not shrink from using Russia when it suited their purposes. The Russian government 
as we have seen allegedly tried to help Sanders’s campaign and he was accused of being 
a ‘Russian asset’.1276 Sanders was excoriated for visiting the Soviet Union in 1988, at a 
time when Gorbachev’s reforms were gathering pace, and made some positive comments 
about universal health care and other social achievements.1277 It was thereby implied that 
Sanders was a closet communist, if not an outright traitor. 1278  Reagan also visited 
Moscow that year and announced that he no longer considered the USSR an ‘evil 
empire’. However, as Matlock (who was the US ambassador at the time) stressed in a 
letter to the New York Times, the view of Sanders as some sort of fellow traveller was ‘a 
distortion of history’, since Sanders (who was then mayor of Burlington, Vermont) had 
established a sister-city relationship with Yaroslavl in 1988 ‘with the encouragement and 
strong support of the United States government’.1279 Now Sanders placed himself at the 
head of ‘the resistance’ and was sharply critical of Russia. 1280  Just before the New 
Hampshire primary in February 2020 he accused Trump of ‘cozying up to Putin’, 
whatever that means, and in the Democratic primary debate in South Carolina on 25 
February, instead of rebutting Bloomberg’s assertion that Russia was helping get him 
elected, Sanders rather lamely addressed Moscow: ‘Mr Putin’, he declared, ‘if I’m 
president of the United States, trust me, you’re not going to interfere in any more 
American elections’. Sanders fell into the ‘absurd paradox where he was coerced into 
accepting the premise of an attack specially designed to destroy him’. 1281  If he 
condemned Russiagate as a hoax, he would alienate Democrats who had made it an 
article of faith for years; but if he accepted it, he joined the camp of mainstream Russia-
baiting cold war hawks. Tulsi Gabbard, a Representative from Hawaii and a Democratic 
candidate for president, faced a similar dilemma but handled it more adroitly. She warned 
that ‘the Democrats’ hyper-partisan impeachment process has increased the likelihood 
that he [Trump] will be re-elected’.1282 Gabbard was one of the few Democrats who 
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challenged the normalisation of war as America’s post-cold war default setting. In 
response, Clinton suggested that Gabbard was ‘the favourite of the Russians’, implying 
that she was a ‘Russian asset’.1283 Gabbard responded by suing Clinton for defamation.  
 The 2016 DNC hack made its way back into the campaign. The secret US 
indictment against Assange was revealed in November 2018, and on 11 April 2019 his 
asylum was revoked. Assange was unceremoniously dragged out of the Ecuadorian 
embassy and incarcerated in Belmarsh high security prison.1284 He was not released at the 
end of the custody period associated with absconding bail and instead remained in jail 
pending the US extradition hearing. In May the US authorities revealed an expanded 
indictment in which all bar one of the 18 counts were based on the 1917 Espionage Act. 
This treated him not as a publisher but as a ‘hacker’ and focused not on the 2016 election 
but the 2010 Pentagon disclosures.1285 Assange faced one charge of computer hacking 
and 17 counts of espionage, threatening a 175-year prison sentence. The extradition 
hearing started in Westminster Magistrates Court in February 2020, and almost 
immediately was embroiled in controversy. Assange’s lawyers talked of US 
Congressman Dana Rohrabacher ‘going to see Mr Assange and saying, on instructions 
from the president, he was offering a pardon or some other way out, if Mr Assange … 
said Russia had nothing to do with the DNC’. It was assumed that Trump was trying to 
deny or cover up what was assumed to be an established fact, that Russia had hacked the 
DNC and passed the material to WikiLeaks. Rohrbacher did visit Assange in the 
Ecuadorian embassy in London, who gave him ‘definitive proof that Russia was not the 
source’ for the DNC emails. However, when Rohrabacher tried to brief Trump about this, 
he was blocked on the grounds that with Mueller’s investigation in full flood, such a 
meeting could put the president in legal jeopardy.1286  Trump’s team feared that any 
discussion about Russia could be used by Mueller as evidence of collusion. In turn, 
Assange has not released the information so as not to compromise his source and 
methods.  
The story does not make sense, since Assange had long proclaimed that Moscow 
was not the guilty party, so did not need the inducement of a pardon to say so. Assange in 
February 2017 tried to provide ‘technical evidence ruling out certain parties [Russia]’ in 
the handling of the DNC emails in 2016 but was blocked by Comey and Democratic 
Senator Mark Warner. The deal would have given Assange ‘limited immunity’ to allow 
him to leave the Ecuadorian embassy, and in exchange Assange would have redacted the 
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published CIA materials. 1287  When the deal was blocked, WikiLeaks launched a 
publication broadside, including the Vault 7 releases on 31 March, which included 
material on the Marble Framework tool that allows the CIA to mask its hacks. Marble 
had been deployed in 2016, and this may explain why Washington was so keen to keep 
Assange incommunicado in the embassy. It is not clear why Comey blocked the deal, 
although evidence demonstrating that Russia was not the WikiLeaks source would have 
embarrassed the FBI and its inept investigation (or more accurately, non-investigation, 
outsourcing the investigation to Crowdstrike). McGovern notes that if that was the 
reason, Comey and Warner ‘put US intelligence agents and highly sophisticated 
cybertools at risk, rather than allow Assange to at least attempt to prove that Russia was 
not behind the DNC hack’.1288 Immediately prior to the extradition hearing in September 
2020 the US added a raft of new charges to the indictment. Assange was accused of 
recruiting hackers to steal military secrets, stealing data from banks, obtaining 
information on tracking police vehicles, and supposedly helping the whistleblower 
Edward Snowden in Hong Kong. Pleas by the defence team for time to review the new 
charges were denied by the Old Bailey judge. In January 2021 the US extradition request 
was refused on the grounds that his life could be under threat in one of the American 
supermax prisons. However, he was considered a flight risk and so was refused bail and 
remained in jail, despite his poor health. 
The coronavirus pandemic put the 2020 presidential campaign on hold, but 
politicking did not stop. In late June the New York Times reported that ‘Russia secretly 
offered Afghan militants bounties to kill US troops’, based on anonymous intelligence 
sources. 1289  Like so much in the Russiagate affair, the story lacked independent 
confirmation and was based on anonymous sources and was clearly designed to 
embarrass Trump. He had allegedly been briefed on the issue as early as February but had 
not responded. If true, the Russian actions would indeed represent an escalation of 
hostilities to the verge of war, and Trump’s failure to react would represent an egregious 
failure to protect American lives. However, the claims were denied by a named Taliban 
spokesperson, and DNI Ratcliffe confirmed that neither the president nor the vice 
president had been briefed about the story. The NYT admitted that ‘The intelligence 
assessment is said to be based at least in part on interrogations of captured Afghan 
militants and criminals’; in other words, it probably came from the Afghan government, 
keen to keep US forces in the country, and by US intelligence officials sympathetic to 
that view and opposed to Trump’s attempts to normalise relations with Russia. 1290 
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Worryingly, Trump’s electoral rival Biden swallowed the story and demanded 
retribution:  
 
Not only has he [Trump] failed to sanction or impose any kind of consequences 
on Russia for this egregious violation of international law, Donald Trump has 
continued his embarrassing campaign of deference and debasing himself before 
Vladimir Putin ... His entire presidency has been a gift to Putin, but this is beyond 
the pale. It’s a betrayal of the most sacred duty we bear as a nation, to protect and 
equip our troops when we send them into harm’s way.1291  
 
The problem is that none of it was true, but the new cold war had conditioned Biden to 
believe uncritically in Russia’s malevolent hand. As Fred Weir, one of the most 
perceptive reporters in the field noted, ‘even the Kremlin’s critics in the expert 
community now complain that US intelligence about Russia has become completely 
detached from reality’.1292 
This was reflected in House Speaker Pelosi’s argument that ‘The American 
people need to know what the Russians are doing in this case and the American people 
believe that they should decide who the next president is, not Vladimir Putin’.1293 In early 
August she complained about the lack of detail in intelligence briefings on ‘Russia’s 
continued interference in the 2020 election campaign’. This refers in particular to the 
ODNI official statement on election security, which allegedly ‘played down the threat 
from Russia by listing it along with China and Iran, as well as other nation states and 
nonstate actors [who] could also do harm to our electoral process’.1294 This tempering of 
the Russian threat was also alleged to be at work in a National Intelligence Estimate, 
which asserted that Russia favoured Trump but was later (and correctly) modified. This 
was taken to signal continuing White House softness on Russia, making ‘no distinction 
between Russia’s sophisticated election-disrupting capabilities and the less insidious 
influence campaigns of the two supposedly anti-Trump countries’.1295 David Ignatius in 
the Washington Post once again weighed in, arguing that ‘The United States is Putin’s 
main target in this “anything goes” campaign to revive his country’s reputation as a 
superpower’. He quoted William Evanina, director of the National Counterintelligence 
and Security Centre, who on 7 August stated ‘We assess that Russia is using a range of 
measures to primarily denigrate former Vice President [Joe] Biden and what it sees as an 
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anti-Russian “establishment”’.1296 He added that ‘some Kremlin-linked actors are also 
seeking to boost Trump’s candidacy’.1297 In fact, there was no consensus among the 
Russian elite about which of the candidates would suit Moscow’s interests – neither was 
particularly positive.1298  An open letter to Pelosi from VIPS tried to educate her by 
reprising their argument that the DNC emails were leaked and not hacked, a view 
reinforced by Shawn Henry’s testimony of 5 December 2017, which was made public on 
7 May 2020. They stated the obvious point that ‘the lack of desired detail may simply 
betoken the absence of credible specifics on significant Russian interference, and the 
absence of Clapperesque officials to conjure it up. In a word, today’s intelligence 
managers – unlike their predecessors – are not likely to find Russia-indicting evidence 
that “wasn’t really there”’.1299 
 Allegations of Russian meddling and attempts to ‘manipulate public discourse’ 
have become a tradition in American elections. However, ‘A botched rollout [of 
meddling allegations] in the middle of the campaign season could become its own form 
of election interference’.1300 If in 2016 the emphasis was on hacking and social media 
disinformation, the concern focused now on attacks on election infrastructure and the 
hacking of voter databases. Russian reports revealed data on 7.6 million Michigan voters 
on the dark web Forum known as Gorka9, along with voter information from swing states 
like Florida and North Carolina. The allegation that the material was the result of a hack 
was rebutted by both the DHS and FBI, who stressed that most of the material was freely 
available.1301 Criminal hackers have long used more extensive versions of citizen data 
(with email addresses and other information, and not just names) from voter registration 
databases but also from driver licence, health care and other sources. Above all, it was 
not clear what benefit Russia would derive from hacking US election data points, but 
speculation was assumed to become fact through endless repetition.1302 There were also 
claims the IRA sponsored a website called PeaceData (peacedata.net) that recruited 
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leftwing American journalists to contribute, designed to depress the progressive vote and 
thus help Trump.1303 The site ran articles critiquing Biden and other Democrats, but some 
also criticised Trump, both main parties and the flaws of American democracy. 
Following a tip-off by a software and analytical company called Graphika (with links to 
the US government), the media and intelligence agencies became involved. Graphika 
accused PeaceData of ‘information laundering’, a rather chilling term to describe political 
debates.1304  
On 7 August Evanina issued a carefully worded statement that Russia was once 
again meddling using a ‘range of measures’ to ‘undermine former Vice President Biden’s 
candidacy and the Democratic Party’. The failure to provide details elicited outrage in the 
Washington Post and New York Times, with Ratcliffe coming in for particular criticism 
because of his plan to curtail briefings in the run-up to the election.1305 Wray, eager to 
restore the FBI’s reputation after Russiagate, briefed on 17 September that Russia had 
engaged in ‘very active efforts’ to interfere in the election by damaging Biden primarily 
though social media proxies.1306 In September the CIA warned that Putin was probably 
still directing interference operations designed to improve Trump’s chances of re-
election, but the CIA itself had only ‘moderate confidence’ in its own analysis.1307 The 
CIA’s World Intelligence Review of 31 August claimed that Andriy Derkach, who had 
provided information to the joint Senate report on Hunter Biden, was in fact working for 
the Russians as part of ‘Russia’s influence operations aimed at denigrating the former US 
vice president, supporting the US President, and fuelling public discord ahead of the US 
election in November’.1308 Given Trump’s sensitivity over charges of Russian meddling, 
the CIA was accused of limiting the flow of Russian intelligence to the White House. 
When FBI director Wray testified to a Congressional hearing about Russia’s attempts to 
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undermine Biden, Trump launched a Twitter storm arguing that ‘China is a FAR greater 
threat than China’.1309  
 Clinton failed to build bridges with the Sanders campaign in 2016 after her 
nomination, and as a result about a quarter of Sanders’ primary supporters did not vote 
for her in the general election.1310 In 2020 Biden avoided making the same mistake and 
‘reached out’ to the left wing of the Democratic Party, although his ‘centrist’ positions on 
fracking, healthcare, mass incarceration, policing and the environment alienated 
progressive voters. 1311  As for Trump, his cruel mishandling of Covid-19 and the 
accompanying economic crisis undermined the foundations of his appeal, namely his 
successful handling of the economy. On 15 July Trump, smarting from the 
embarrassment of a poorly attended campaign rally in Tulsa on 20 June, ditched his long-
time campaign manager Brad Parscale, demoting him to senior adviser (Parscale then 
quit following health issues). Trump played down the significance of the pandemic 
‘because I didn’t want to create a panic’, an approach that was of little comfort to the 
families of 300,000 Americans who had died of Covid-19 by the time of the ballot.1312 
The New York Times in late September published 18 years of Trump’s tax returns and 
exposed how in 11 of the 18 years he paid no taxes at all, and in the campaign year of 
2016 his tax bill came to just $750 and the same amount in his first year in office. 
Exposure of his chronic indebtedness undermined his credibility as a successful 
businessman and once again raised questions about who had lent him the money. Trump 
was ‘more successful playing a business mogul than being one in real life’. His reputation 
and finances were salvaged by his role in The Apprentice and associated licensing and 
endorsement deals, which earned him $427.4 million. The Times noted that ‘As president, 
he has received more money from foreign sources and US interest groups than previously 
known’, but examination of Trump’s assets and wealth did not ‘reveal any previously 
unreported connections to Russia’.1313 He had over $300 million of debt due in the next 
four years, most of which was owed to Deutsche Bank, prompting concern that Russia 
may ultimately have been the guarantor. In fact, the collateral was on Trump’s personal 
assets, hence the loans were issued on normal commercial terms.1314 
Trump’s personal finances, his harsh and intolerant approach to Black Lives 
Matter protests following the police killing of George Floyd in Minnesota on 25 May 
2020 and his mishandling of the coronavirus pandemic became key themes in the 
presidential debates. Soon after the ill-tempered first debate on 29 September Trump 
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contracted the disease himself, disrupting his campaign activities as polling suggested a 
widening lead in favour of Biden. Observers feared that Biden’s victory and the 
Democratic takeover of the Senate would mean an end to the various investigations into 
the origins and conduct of Russiagate. The investigation conducted by the Senate 
Judiciary Committee under Lindsey Graham questioned Comey on 30 September about 
the FISA warrants taken out against Page. Comey claimed to have little memory of what 
was going on when, as in the words of one commentator, ‘the FBI deceived the [FISA] 
Court into approving four warrants for surveillance of Trump campaign aide Carter 
Page’.1315 Ukraine also came back into the spotlight, with a New York Post report in 
October alleging that Hunter Biden traded access to his father with Ukrainian energy 
tycoons, sought deals for his family in China, and shared some of his foreign profits with 
his father. The newspaper had received a hard drive containing the emails from Trump’s 
attorney, Giuliani, who in turn claimed that he was given the drive by a computer shop in 
Delaware, after a laptop was left there by Hunter in 2019. Although few disputed the 
authenticity of the emails, Schiff immediately claimed that the story was part of a 
‘Russian disinformation campaign’, which DNI Ratcliffe immediately refuted, saying 
that there was no evidence to make such a claim.1316 Despite this, Twitter suspended the 
New York Post’s account on the grounds that it was spreading Russian disinformation by 
reporting on the laptop’s contents. In the final presidential debate on 22 October Biden 
dismissed the laptop scandal as a Russian plot to sabotage his campaign, and he referred 
to a letter to Politico signed by over 50 former intelligence officials asserting that the 
Hunter email scandal ‘has all the classic earmarks of a Russian information operation’, 
although they admitted that they had no evidence. 1317  Biden once again condemned 
Trump for not taking action against Russia over the Afghanistan bounty scandal.1318 
Ratcliffe at this time asserted that Russia and Iran had obtained US voting registration 
data and were attempting to sow disinformation in the forthcoming election, a threat that 
FBI director Wray said would be met by imposing costs.1319 Putin noted that Hunter 
Biden had made ‘good money’ in Ukraine, but Russia saw nothing criminal in it’, and in 
any case ‘It doesn’t concern us’.1320  
Putin repeated his offer of cyber security cooperation with the US, but the 
proposal was ignored. Putin noted that ‘there are ongoing complaints about Russia’s 
 
1315 Ray McGovern, ‘Comey’s Amnesia Makes Senate Session an Unforgettable Hop, Skip & 
Jump to Fraud’, Consortium News, 5 October 2020, https://consortiumnews.com/2020/10/05/ray-
mcgovern-comeys-amnesia-makes-senate-session-an-unforgettable-hop-skip-jump-to-fraud/. 
1316 Jake Gibson and Brooke Singman, ‘FBI in Possession of Hunter Biden’s Purported Laptop, 
Sources Say’, Foxnews.com, 21 October 2020, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/fbi-purported-
hunter-biden-laptop-sources. 
1317  Holman W. Jenkins, ‘The US Has an “Intelligence” Problem’, Wall Street Journal, 24 
October 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-u-s-has-an-intelligence-problem-11603489696. 
1318 Mark Episkopos, ‘Joe Biden Keeps the Fictions about Trump and Russia Alive’, The National 
Interest, 24 October 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/2020-election/joe-biden-keeps-
fictions-about-trump-and-russia-alive-171366. 
1319  Maanvi Singh, ‘Russia and Iran Obtained US Voter Data in Bid to Sow Unrest Before 
Election, Says FBI’, Guardian, 23 October 2020, p. 33. 
1320 Vladimir Putin, interview with Rossiya-1, 25 October, RT.com, ‘Putin Says Hunter Biden 






hyperactivity, alleged hyperactivity, in the information sphere, interference in US 
elections, and other allegations, which are completely unfounded’. As for the election 
itself, in the first debate Biden called Trump ‘Putin’s puppy’. Putin denied any Russian 
interference and noted that ‘Everything that is happening in the United States is the result 
of the country’s internal political processes and problems’, although references to 
Russia’s head of state in fact ‘enhances our prestige, because they are talking about our 
incredible influence and power’. As for preferences, Putin observed that Trump had 
‘repeatedly expressed interest in the improvement of Russian-American relations. And 
we certainly appreciate that very much … we certainly heard him’. However, ‘we must 
look objectively at what has been happening in recent years’, and although there were 
some achievements, the aspirations had ‘not been fully realised’. Putin attributed this to 
‘a certain bipartisan consensus on the need to contain Russia, to curb our country’s 
development’. This represented containment ‘on all tracks’, with ‘the greatest number of 
various kinds of restrictions and sanctions introduced during the Trump presidency. 
Decisions on imposing new sanctions or expanding previous ones were made 46 times’. 
Putin lamented the US withdrawal from the INF treaty, and announced withdrawal from 
the Open Skies Treaty. As for Biden, Putin noted that the Democrat came from the 
social-democrat tradition, from which the Communist Party, of whom Putin noted he had 
been a rank-and-file member for 18 years, so there was a certain ideological commonality 
– a rather far-fetched and mischievous argument, although technically correct.1321 
On an exceptionally high turnout of 66.7 per cent, Biden won by an impressive 
7.1 million votes, the highest margin since 1908. Biden gained 81.3 million votes 
(51.4%), giving him 306 to Trump’s 232 electoral college delegates (the same margin by 
which Trump beat Clinton in 2016), comfortably exceeding the 270 required for victory. 
However, Trump’s vote also held up, and the 74.2 million ballots (46.9%) cast in his 
favour exceeded his 2016 tally. Trump increased his vote in Florida and Texas, and 
gained more white working-class support than in 2016, while also increasing his support 
among Latinos. This confirmed that his 2016 result was no mere fluke or the result of 
Putin’s machinations, Comey’s gyrations or Clinton’s failings but represented a solid 
base of popular support. This helps explain why Trump obdurately refused to concede, 
making baseless claims about voter fraud. In part this was revenge against those in the 
Democratic Party who never recognised the legitimacy of his earlier victory. As late as 
September 2019, nearly three years after her defeat, Clinton was still asserting that ‘He 
[Trump] knows that he is an illegitimate president. I believe he understands that the many 
varying tactics they used, from voter suppression and voter purging to hacking to false 
stories, he knows that there were just a bunch of different reasons why the election turned 
out as it did’. Former President Jimmy Carter in June of that year went even further to 
argue ‘There’s no doubt that the Russians did interfere in the election. And I think the 
interference, although not yet quantified, if fully investigated would show that Trump 
didn’t actually win the election in 2016. He lost the election and he was put into office 
because the Russians interfered on his behalf’.1322 Trump’s refusal to concede prepared 
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the ground for the Republicans to contest the legitimacy of Biden’s election.1323 Trump 
sought to consolidate his base with an eye to a possible comeback in 2024, but his 
inflammatory appeals provoked the storming of the Capitol on 6 January, prompting his 
second impeachment on 13 January by a 232-197 vote on the charge of ‘incitement of 
insurrection’. 
The 2020 election was considered ‘the most secure in history’ by the 
administration’s own officials. Christopher Krebs, the director of the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the federal office responsible for election 
security, dismissed Trump’s claims of widespread voter fraud but for his pains was 
sacked on 18 November. 1324  This did not prevent a US Intelligence Community 
Assessment prepared by seven of the 17 agencies in March 2021 asserting ‘with high 
confidence’ that Putin authorised ‘influence operations aimed at denigrating President 
Biden’s candidacy and the Democratic Party, supporting former President Trump, 
undermining public confidence in the electoral process, and exacerbating sociopolitical 
divisions in the US’. This was to be achieved by proxies including ‘Ukraine-linked 
individuals with ties to Russian intelligence and their networks’ who would spread the 
narrative ‘alleging corrupt ties between President Biden, his family, and other US 
officials and Ukraine’.1325 The Ukrainian legislator Andriy Derkach, one of Giuliani’s 
prime sources, was accused of having ties with Russian intelligence. Above all, Kilimnik 
was once again accused of being a ‘Russian influence agent’ who meddled in the 2020 
campaign to help Trump’s re-election. A month earlier the FBI offered a $250,000 
reward for his arrest in connection with a 2018 witness tampering charge in Manafort’s 
Ukraine lobbying case. No new evidence was revealed, and Kilimnik repeated that ‘I 
have no relationship whatsoever to any intelligence services, be they Russian or 
Ukrainian or American, or anyone else’. 1326  The substantive Russiagate charge of 
collusion by then had been discredited, but the Biden administration continued to 
investigate some of its many strands, including Devin Nunes’s 2018 memo about FBI 
FISA surveillance abuses and Rudy Giuliani’s actions in Ukraine. As for the 2020 
election, Nakashima argues that Russia failed to mount any major hacking or 
disinformation operations because of the changed political environment as well as the 
robust cyber-operations mounted by the US Cyber Command, but above all because 
‘Americans themselves were the largest purveyors of disinformation, dwarfing Moscow’s 
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efforts to influence the campaign through social media and its propaganda channels’.1327 
Claims of Russian interference suddenly disappeared, and one can assume the same 
would have happened if Clinton had won in 2016 – and the world would have been 
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DECEPTION AND THE NEW COLD WAR 
 
 
Trump promised to be the great disruptor, and on this he delivered. However, when it 
came to fulfilling a positive agenda of economic transformation and the modernisation of 
strategic foreign policy thinking, his presidency turned into a grand deception. Trump’s 
defenders point to the shadow cast by Russiagate to explain the failure to deliver on his 
promises, but the Trumpian deception is deeper than that. Nevertheless, the endless 
investigations and aspersions did constrain his presidency. In the end, though, despite the 
best endeavours of investigators, they were unable to locate a ‘smocking gun’, as Trump 
put it in a tweet on 10 December 2018: ‘No collusion. That’s because there was no 
collusion’. The US intelligence agencies found that the Russian government ran a 
campaign to damage Hillary Clinton’s presidential bid, to undermine the American 
democratic process and to sow discord in society. The two main strategies were the ‘hack 
and leak’ operation against the Democratic Party, and an online disinformation campaign. 
In turn, the Russiagate allegations became a way of pushing back against Trump, 
preventing the rapprochement with Russia that he had so loudly declared as his goal in 
2016 while tying him down with endless investigations at home. Collusion charges 
became a routine part of American elections, accompanied by accusations of being ‘soft’ 
on Russia when the new orthodoxy was questioned. The Russiagate allegations prompted 
social media regulation that at times veered towards censorship, as well as hardening new 
cold war policies that further soured an already fractious relationship between Russia and 
America.  
 
Causes and consequences 
 
A report in the New York Times on 25 August 2018 suggested that the US intelligence 
agencies had multiple ‘informants close to … Putin in the Kremlin who provided crucial 
details’ about Russiagate for two years.1328 Stephen Cohen noted that an earlier version of 
the sensational story appeared in the Washington Post on 15 December 2017, and he asks 
the fundamental question: if the US intelligence community had such a priceless asset in 
the heart of Russian government, why reveal it in such an irresponsible way? The reason 
was the failure to find any real evidence to support the fundamental allegation that Putin 
ordered Russian operatives to put Trump in the White House. Instead, the Russiagate 
allegations delegitimized a presidential election and a presidency. The ‘attack on 
American democracy’ came not from Putin or Trump, but ‘by whoever godfathered and 
repeatedly inflated Russiagate’. In Cohen’s opinion, the intelligence agencies were the 
main sponsors of the narrative; less so the FBI, although Comey’s antics pointed the 
finger of blame in that direction, than Brennan and Clapper. The intelligence agencies 
were central to the whole saga, suggesting that it could be better described as ‘intelgate’ 
rather than Russiagate. In Cohen’s view, ‘Russiagate has brought us to the worst 
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American political crisis since the Civil War and the most dangerous relations with 
Russia in history’.1329 
Russia was involved in the 2016 election, with unwarranted social media activity 
and disputed claims about hacking the DNC and senior Democrat officials and 
coordinating release through WikiLeaks. However, the crucial charge of collusion 
between the Trump campaign and Moscow has been disproved. Russia was involved in a 
covert influence operation of the sort that was typical of the US during and after the cold 
war, but there is no evidence of an actual attempt to rig the vote. Republicans naturally 
were sceptical of the Russiagate allegations from the start, and as the insubstantiality of 
some of the exaggerated charges were revealed they hitched their wagons ever closer to 
Trump. This helps explain why the party failed to challenge Trump’s repeated allegations 
of fraud in the November 2020 election, and then became mired in the fall-out of the 
attack on the Capitol of 6 January 2021. In the subsequent second attempt to impeach 
Trump the Democratic House brought two charges against him: abuse of power and 
obstruction of Congress. Just one Republican, Mitt Romney, voted to support the first 
charge, and once again Trump escaped.  
The Democrats, too, became tainted by the Russiagate saga. Their opposition to 
Trump became aligned with the Washington policy elite that was pushing for conflict 
with Russia, to the point that Schiff’s dangerous claim that the Ukrainians ‘are fighting 
our fight against Russia’ went unchallenged. Democrats and liberals sought to build their 
opposition to Trump on the back of stoking a new cold war. Anti-Soviet sentiment from 
the 1950s rallied the right, and now anti-Russian sentiment mobilised the liberal left.1330 
Democrats were guilty of condemning Trump for Russian connections without adequate 
evidence, and then pinning their hopes on the Mueller report exposing malfeasance and 
treachery on an epic scale. When that failed, they resorted to impeachment. The political 
mainstream and the two main parties were tainted by the whole story. Not surprisingly 
the Democrats were only too pleased to put the whole ghastly episode behind them once 
Biden entered the White House. Russiagate had been the province of those seeking to 
explain Clinton’s defeat and the meritocratic elite defending old-style globalism, groups 
that largely overlapped.1331 Biden had never personally invested much political capital in 
the story, so was ready to return to a more pragmatic realist relationship with Russia. 
However, the taint of Russiagate would not be expunged so easily. 
The lessons of history are notoriously poorly learned but getting the history right 
is always important. History is always a matter of interpretation, but it also about 
establishing the facts. In our case some issues stand out. First, in Russiagate the 
judgments of the security services were presented as canonical, with those questioning 
their assessments at risk of being investigated themselves. On 3 January 2017 Chuck 
Schumer, Senate minority leader, told MSNBC’s Rachel Maddow, that Trump was 
‘being really dumb’ by taking on the intelligence community and challenging its 
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assessments on Russian cyber-activities: ‘Let me tell you, [if] you take on the intelligence 
community, they have six ways from Sunday at getting at you’. In other words, the US 
president should be intimidated by his intelligence officials.1332 Jared Kushner soon after 
was also warned by a senior Republican figure not to ‘piss off the intel community’, and 
he presciently outlined how things would develop: ‘If you f*** with the intel community 
they will figure out a way to get back at you and you’ll have two or three years of a 
Russian investigation, and every day something else will leak out’.1333 Trump condemned 
American intelligence failures on the eve of the Iraq war as well as a ‘litany of Obama 
Afghanistan-Iraq-Syria-Libya and other war-related intelligence failures’, and now the 
‘intelligence leaks regarding his purported Russian relationships and subterfuges’ 
appeared payback time. 1334  
The concept of the deep state as an organised conspiracy by some sort of cabal is 
mistaken and misleading, but as a disposition and defined set of policy preferences it 
helps explain the genesis of Russiagate. There was nothing ‘deep’ about the hostility of 
parts of the security apparatus to Trump and Russia. Brennan’s characterisation of 
Trump’s behaviour at the Helsinki press conference as ‘nothing short of treasonous’ 
implied that Trump’s removal from office by any means would be justified. There was no 
organised ‘deep state’ collusion, let alone an organised resistance movement, but the 
myriad of uncoordinated actions, prompted mostly by genuine concerns about an external 
threat and the erosion of executive accountability, were rooted in the structural power of 
the Trumanite state and the ideological context of the new cold war. This explains why 
some marginal figures in Trump’s entourage gained such exaggerated prominence, and 
why Flynn’s actions were seen in the worst possible light.1335 The foreign policy logic 
that underlay Trump rhetoric in favour of improved relations with Russia was not only 
suppressed but considered a ‘highly suspicious’ security threat.1336 He was suspected of 
being the Manchurian candidate propelled by Moscow to the White House.1337 
This in effect criminalised diplomacy and categorised challenges to the bipartisan 
new cold war consensus as appeasement if not treachery. This is not to suggest that there 
were no grounds for concern. Intelligence and security officers were genuinely worried 
that Trump acted criminally and that he represented a national security threat. 1338 
Americans, like Russians, abhor foreign interference in their domestic affairs. The 
‘resistance’ came to see itself as ‘guardian of the republic’, one of the central features of 
the dual state model in which a force sets itself up to defend the constitution by flouting 
its principles. As McFarland puts it,  
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there is some evidence that highly placed Hillary Clinton supporters in the 
intelligence community had an anti-Trump ‘insurance plan’ in place before the 
election. If Hillary won, no one would be any the wiser. But if the unthinkable 
happened and Trump won, they could activate the plan and claim he won unfairly 
with the help of America’s arch enemy.1339 
 
She notes that American ‘conservatives believe that there is a Deep State, a conspiracy 
within government that continues to rule, regardless of who’s elected to office’, and 
while there may not have been a ‘Deep State plot against Trump’, she certainly believes 
that there is a Democrat-leaning administrative state. 1340  As for Russiagate, Russian 
interference became ‘a mantra, accepted as fact by otherwise thoughtful Americans’, and 
thus fed into ‘conspiracism’, the belief that major political and historical events are the 
result of manipulation and conspiracy between interested parties.1341  
 A Yahoo analysis argues that the collusion investigation in 2017 was part of ‘a 
broader effort by people within the national security bureaucracy to box Trump in on 
Ukraine’. Graham Fuller, a former Reagan official and a veteran CIA officer, argues that 
anti-Trump ex-intelligence officials like Clapper and Brennan were ‘dismayed at any 
prospect that the official narrative against Russia could start falling apart under Trump, 
and want to maintain the image of a constant and dangerous Russian intervention into 
affairs of state’. Trump claimed as much in late 2017 when he argued ‘This artificial 
Democratic hit job gets in the way [of improved relations with Russia]’, and warned 
‘people will die because of it’.1342 The Yahoo report also demonstrated one of Trump’s 
persistent contradictions: while proclaiming his desire for improved relations, he gave the 
security agencies dangerous new powers, including in 2018 lifting previous restrictions 
on CIA cyber operations.1343 These were repeatedly used against ‘adversary countries’ 
such as Iran, China, North Korea and Russia. The Democratic narrative that Trump 
colluded with Russia encouraged demonstrative measures to prove that this was not the 
case, driving an escalation cycle that intensified the new cold war.1344 On the other side, 
Russia’s neo-revisionist foreign policy stance after 2012 encouraged resistance to liberal 
hegemony and a more assertive stance all-round. ‘Fortress Russia’ felt itself under siege, 
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accompanied by paranoia about the outside world.1345 This encouraged a greater appetite 
for risk-taking, including arguably in US elections.1346  
After the fall of communism in 1989-91, the usual categories of ‘left’ and ‘right’ 
in domestic politics were inverted, and in Russiagate something similar occurred in 
foreign policy. The left, in the form of the Democratic Party and its allies not only 
defended hawkish policies abroad (that was nothing new) but also high-handed and 
possibly abusive actions by the security state at home. Russiagate represented less a 
‘righteous campaign for truth and justice’ than the unleashing of a security state 
accompanied by ‘prosecutorial overreach, entrapment, and the criminalization of foreign 
policy dissent’.1347 The mainstream ‘liberal establishment’ was not only complicit but 
allied with the security services, raising the fundamental question: ‘How could it be so 
blasé about what are clear abuses of power by law enforcement and intelligence officials 
in the now-infamous Russiagate collusion probe?’.1348 Glenn Greenwald argues that ‘The 
ability to distinguish between ideological questions from evidentiary questions is vital for 
rational discourse to be possible, yet has been all but eliminated at the altar of tribal 
fealty’ [italics in original]. Russiagate conspiracy theories became a matter of partisan 
affiliation for the left (broadly defined), even when evidence was lacking. Tribal loyalty 
substituted for ‘substantive political debates’, and as a result ‘US politics has been 
depoliticized, stripped of any meaningful ideological debates in lieu of mindless team 
loyalty oaths on non-ideological questions’. 1349  Trump was entitled to seek a 
rapprochement with Russia, but this policy choice in the end became the subject of a 
criminal enquiry. The fundamental paradox is that ‘The deep state, once an object of 
suspicion among liberal Americans, has turned into an object of longing under 
Trump’.1350 
This takes us to the fundamental question asked by Glennon: ‘Why does national 
security policy remain constant even when one President is replaced by another [in this 
case Obama], who as a candidate repeatedly, forcefully, and eloquently promised 
fundamental changes in that policy?.1351 The issue was posed by Trump, although less 
eloquently. The Trumanite security state naturally inflates threats; 1352 but what remains a 
mystery is why defenders of Madisonian constitutionalism do so little to push back 
against ballooning military budgets and ‘forever’ wars. Interventionist Democrats if 
anything are more militaristic than traditional Republicans and in Russiagate allied with 
‘America’s most powerful agencies’ and ‘weaponized against President Donald 
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Trump’.1353 Brennan assisted by Clapper gathered foreign intelligence and fed it to the 
domestic intelligence community; the FBI handled Brennan’s intelligence and conducted 
the requisite surveillance; the DoJ facilitated the FBI investigation while the State 
Department disseminated information through formal channels and leaks; Clinton’s 
campaign and the DNC ‘provided funding, support, and media collusion’; ‘Obama 
officials were complicit, and engaged in unmasking and intelligence gathering and 
dissemination’; and ‘the media was the most corrosive element in many respects. None of 
these events could have transpired without their willing participation. Stories were 
pushed, facts were ignored, and narratives were promoted’.1354 Brennan was instrumental 
in setting the ball rolling, and once the counter-intelligence investigation was launched in 
July 2016 he convinced the elite and the public of the gravity of the danger. First, in 
August and September he briefed the ‘Gang of Eight’, the Congressional leaders, but did 
so separately and the transcripts have not yet been released. Second, he issued the 7 
October joint statement from the ODNI and DHS, but notably not the NSA or FBI. Third, 
this culminated with the January 2017 ICA buttressing the Russigate narrative. Selective 
leaking to a complaisant media ‘weaponised’ the media and exacerbated the problem of 
neo-journalism.1355 Many of the journalists who propagated the Trump-Russia theory 
were also responsible for the Iraq weapons of mass destruction fiasco.1356 
Russiagate achieved the ‘magical transformation of intelligence agency heads into 
paragons of truth-telling’.1357 Anonymous intelligence officials fed information to the 
media, escalating to the point that unverified reports were taken as fact. This included the 
New York Times report during the 2020 presidential campaign that Russia paid the 
Taliban to kill American forces in Afghanistan, followed by an op-ed in the same paper 
by Obama’s former national security advisor Susan Rice condemning Trump’s failure to 
respond to ‘Russian efforts to slaughter American troops in cold blood’, confirming that 
the president was ‘actively advancing our arch adversary’s nefarious interests’. David 
Foglesong notes that  
 
Such reckless jingoism reflects the cumulative impact of a long campaign by 
American media. The demonization of Russia is driven by the desire to deflect 
attention from misconduct by the United States, to affirm American moral 
superiority in contrast to Russian depravity, and to smear domestic political 
opponents’ comments by associating them with Russia.  
 
He notes that the executive editor Dean Baquet admitted that when the Mueller report 
failed to confirm the collusion story the New York Times was left ‘a little tiny bit flat 
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footed’. 1358  The response was as damaging as Russia’s putative actions. Genuine 
concerns were amplified by the intelligence community, creating an echo chamber picked 
up by the media. The effect was rather like that of the former head of the CIA counter-
intelligence (1954-75), James Angleton, whose search for an imagined high-ranking mole 
destabilised the agency for decades. In this case the entire American polity was 
destabilised. A parade of anonymous leaks endowed unverified information with the 
patina of credibility.  
In a last gasp attempt to revive the fading Russiagate story, the New York Times 
magazine on 11 January 2021 published a major review of the Obama-Trump transition 
and the three major episodes – the DNC emails, the Steele dossier, and the fall of Michael 
Flynn – but added little critical analysis and even managed to mock the legitimate 
grievances of those who had fallen foul of the Russiagate juggernaut.1359 Adrian Chen, 
whom we have met before in relation to his work on the IRA, outlined the dilemma. After 
Mueller’s February 2018 indictment of the trolls, he was called on to speak about the 
effect of social media campaigns on American public opinion, but he found himself on 
the horns of a dilemma. He could either stay silent, and ‘allow the conversation to be 
dominated by those pumping up the Russian threat, or I could risk giving fodder to 
Trump and his allies’. He cited the case of Facebook advertising executive Robert 
Goldman, who was forced to apologise to the entire company after having revealed that 
‘the majority of the [IRA’s] Facebook ads were purchased after the election’. The choice 
was to join the ‘resistance’ to Trump or to be portrayed, as Chen puts, as a ‘Trumpkin’, 
which is no choice at all. 1360 
 The implications are disturbing. The Trumanite state appeared out of control, 
lending credence to Trump’s claims that he was the target of a slow-motion coup. As 
Schuessler notes, ‘Liberal institutionalists argue that democracy should serve as a 
deterrent to deception. This book makes the opposite case – that deception is a natural 
outgrowth of the democratic process’. 1361  More than that, as Joshua Rovner notes, 
‘democracy actually promotes the politicisation of the intelligence services because 
elected leaders ‘have strong incentives to use intelligence as a promotional vehicle for 
their policy decisions’.1362 The Trumanite national security state would not accept the 
Trumpian disruption without a fight and cloaked that struggle as a defence of the 
Madisonian state. Collusion charges provided ‘cover for US intelligence and law 
enforcement bureaucracies to break the law, with what’s left of the press gleefully going 
along for the ride’. Whereas Watergate defined an entire generation’s opposition to 
politicians and the country’s elite, Russiagate ‘proved itself to be the reverse: It is a 
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device that the American elite is using to define itself against its enemies – the rest of the 
country’.1363 And, we may add, major countries in the rest of the world. 
 
Patterns of the new cold war 
 
The charges and counter-charges roiled the American elite, but poll after poll showed that 
Russiagate did not resonate as a major concern with the American people.1364 However, 
when it came to viewing Russia as an adversary, fear mongering and the associated 
intensification of cold war sentiments shifted views. If in 2004 only 18 per cent 
considered Russian military power a ‘critical threat’, by 2019 52 per cent of those polled 
thought that it was, with the figure higher among Democrats (65%) than among 
Republicans (46%) By that time Russia had displaced North Korea as America’s greatest 
adversary, while China now came in second.1365  
Kislayk returned to Russia in July 2017, and he shared the common Russian elite 
view that ‘all the talk about us getting the president elected, that we helped him in the 
US, it’s such nonsense that it’s hard to take with a straight face’.1366 In his view, Russia 
was keeping the door open to normalisation, but relations were being destroyed because 
of ‘political infighting inside the United States, where relations between Russia and the 
United States have become a bargaining chip, if not an instrument in the domestic 
political struggle’. 1367  He forthrightly dismissed the idea of collusion, the knowing 
cooperation with an adversary, in 2016. By the time the next election came round in 2020 
Russian deputy foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov condemned the ‘media’s mindless 
reiteration of allegations of Russia’s purported meddling in US presidential elections’. He 
accepted ‘that endless chatter about the meddling issue will rage on … and will be used as 
a tool in the political fight in the US’. There was no way out of the impasse, but ‘the 
collateral damage is Russian-American relations plunging into this horrible trap, where 
those who speak in favour of improving ties are bound to be branded a Kremlin agent’.1368  
He warned that ‘we have no trust, no confidence whatsover’ in America.1369 Clinton’s 
defeat turned Russia into a hostage of partisan domestic political conflicts.  
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On the other side, if Russia consciously and deliberately tried to shape the 
American political environment, then the endeavour backfired spectacularly. Russian 
meddling and its purported effects lowered trust, hardened American policy and reduced 
Washington’s readiness to engage constructively with Moscow. Russo-American relations 
since the end of the cold war have been on a roller-coaster of ups and downs, but the 
overall downward trend was accelerated by Russiagate. This period of confrontation is 
one of the longest on record. Large majorities of Russians (85%) and Americans (78%) 
see the two countries as ‘more rivals than partners’. Two-thirds of Americans believed 
that the Russian government tried to influence the 2016 election, but there was a strong 
partisan split to these sentiments. Some 90 per cent of Democrats but only 35 per cent of 
Republicans believed there was Russian interference. The deepening hostility with the 
US shifted Russian perceptions of China. A Levada poll in 2016 found that 34 per cent of 
Russians viewed China favourably, but by 2019 84 per cent viewed China as ‘more a 
partner than a rival’, while at the same time 85 per cent viewed the US as more a rival 
than a partner.1370 The escalating rivalry in conditions of the weakening of the nuclear 
arms control regime and numerous regional conflicts increased the danger of a slide into 
uncontrolled confrontation. 
There is a deeper meaning to the idea of collusion, namely that Trump worked with 
Russia to undermine the US-led liberal international order created at the end of the Second 
World War. Trump repeatedly criticised NATO and he was no fan of the EU, a stance that 
aligned with Moscow’s alleged ambitions to undermine both organisations. From this 
perspective, Trump’s refusal to condemn Russia’s interference was a symptom of his larger 
betrayal of traditionally defined US interests. In this second sense there is the suggestion 
that Putin and Trump in some way coordinated their policies, hence the febrile reaction 
every time they met. The three substantive meetings – Hamburg, Da Nang and Helsinki – 
repeated the deteriorating pattern of US-Russian relations of the post-cold war years, to the 
point that both sides recognised the futility of summits. With the Mueller report published, 
Trump initiated a call to Putin on 3 May 2019 in which they discussed a wide range of 
pressing global and regional issues. They met at the Osaka G20 summit in June, but there 
was no talk of a broader summit. In spring 2020 there were numerous calls between the two 
men to discuss plunging oil prices, the Covid-19 pandemic and other issues. On 25 April 
they issued the ‘Elbe Declaration’ to mark the 75th anniversary of the meeting of the two 
Allied armies towards the end of the Second World War, but even this symbolic gesture of 
reconciliation alarmed Russia’s critics.1371 The US announced that it would leave the 1992 
Open Skies Treaty, allowing aerial inspections of military facilities of the 34 signatory 
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states, and the chief arms control negotiator Marshall Billingsea warned that the US knew 
how to spend other countries ‘into oblivion’.1372 
Trump and Putin were both critical of the post-war international order, and hence 
the coincidence of interests prompted the charge of collusion. However, although both 
Moscow and Trump’s Washington disparaged the old order, this was for very different 
reasons. Trump came to the question from a narrow nationalist-mercantilist perspective, 
focused on whether America received its money’s worth from the old alliance system – a 
view that he had held since at least the 1980s. Putin, however, as a conservative 
internationalist and realist, sought to enhance Russia’s status in the international system 
while defending Russia’s national interests as a great power. Both were aware that 
international politics were changing because of the West’s relative decline, the shift of 
economic power to the Asia-Pacific region, and the re-emergence of China, but had very 
different responses. Moscow considered the changes an opportunity, but Washington 
increasingly perceived the shift in the correlation of forces as a threat. Divergent foreign 
policy orientations were exacerbated by domestic polarisation. Tsygankov argues that 
Russia became so prominent in domestic polarisation because it reflected not only political 
partisanship but also the growing cultural divide between the values of Trump supporters 
and those of the liberal establishment.1373 
In an interview with the Financial Times in June 2019, Putin once again 
dismissed charges of Russian interference. He insisted that Trump won by his own efforts 
by tapping into the anti-establishment mood and the backlash against globalisation: 
‘Russia has been accused, and, strange as it may seem, it is still being accused … of 
alleged interference in the US election. What happened in reality? Mr Trump looked into 
his opponents’ attitude to him and saw changes in American society’.1374 Moscow saw 
Trump’s election as an opportunity genuinely to reset relations, but these expectations were 
not only disappointed, but relations deteriorated even further. As Putin’s spokesperson 
Peskov lamented, ‘The meaning of “getting along with Russia” has yet to be explained; we 
do not know what it stands for, considering that the reality of bilateral relations is in stark 
contrast with Trump’s statements, to our deep regret’.1375  Russiagate prevented a new 
détente. Indeed, the authors of the Steele dossier took pride in what they had achieved:  
 
The dossier appears to have derailed a plan by the incoming Trump team to re-order 
the post-World War II Western alliance through a rapprochement with Russia that 
would transform US relationships with Europe, the Middle East, China and beyond. 
Domestically, it helped fuel an investigation that landed several of Trump’s closest 
allies in jail and tied his administration in knots.1376 
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There was to be no rapprochement and instead Trump ramped up pressure. Lavrov 
lamented Washington’s failure to take up Russia’s repeated offer to discuss ‘the absolutely 
baseless accusations’ of US election interference, including cybersecurity consultations and 
‘a bilateral political statement by Russia and the US in which we both categorically 
undertake not to meddle in each other’s domestic affairs’, and he noted the law in support 
of Ukraine that allocated $200 million annually to the State Department to finance Russian 
NGOs and civil society. He noted a survey of US politicians on whether Russia or China 
meddled most in US elections, and he was disappointed to see that China had displaced 
Russia from the number one spot.1377 
 This raises the fundamental question of how ‘interference’ should be defined. All 
great powers – the US, Russia and China – routinely interfere in the internal affairs of other 
states. Sometimes this goes under the heading of ‘democracy assistance’, and at other times 
through support for foreign political parties, leaders and policies. Obama came perilously 
close to direct intervention when he made clear his support for the Remain camp in the 
UK’s Brexit vote. Earlier, the US made no secret of its support for the insurgents who 
overthrew Yanukovych in Kiev and installed a neo-nationalist ‘pro-Western’ government. 
It was this geopolitical shock that provoked the Russian intervention in Crimea. Even 
earlier, US advisors helped re-elect President Boris Yeltsin in 1996, and thus averted the 
threat of a Communist entering the Kremlin again. On the other side, Moscow supported 
sympathetic leaders from across the political spectrum in Europe and stood accused of 
having tilted the scales in the 2016 US election. In this confused environment there have 
been calls for some sort of international convention or conference, under the aegis of a 
leading international body such as the UN, to define the problem and to establish some 
ground rules. Putin himself returned to the idea of a non-interference pact on the eve of the 
2020 presidential election. 1378  Given the intensity of geopolitical contestation and 
ideational polarisation in the new cold war, the offer was ignored. By the time of the 
Geneva summit between Biden and Putin in June 2021, a leading Russian commentator 
notes that the relationship between Russia and the US after 2016 ‘was not just bad. It was 
absolutely abnormal and irrational’. Russia became the subject of US domestic politics as 
domestic and foreign affairs merged, and ‘the specificity of the Trump administration 
contributed very much to make this elationship absolutely destructive’. Early expectations 
about Trump had turned into deep disappointment’.1379 Trump reversed virtually all of the 
Obama-era accommodations to Moscow, including sending lethal arms to Ukraine. The 
task of the Geneva summit was to find ways of managing confrontation to stop further 
decline, and this Biden achieved by establishing working parties with Russia on strategic 
stability and cyber conflict. The toxic atmosphere fostered by Russiagate had somewhat 
dissipated and US elites were no longer so viscerally opposed to an improvement in US-
Russian relations – especially as China loomed ever-larger on the horizon.  
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The new cold war emerges out of the intersection of five processes. The first 
concerns Russia, whose motivations are often misunderstood. Russia is a conservative 
power, but since at least 2012 it has also become increasingly alienated from the practices 
of liberal hegemony. As far as Moscow is concerned, the ‘rules-based order’ stopped at its 
borders, turning Russia into an outsider. How else to understand the expansion of NATO 
without finding an adequate mode of integration for Russia in the changing European 
security order? The rules appeared to be suspended when it came to bombing Yugoslavia in 
1999, invading Iraq in 2003, recognising Kosovo in 2008, overthrowing the Libyan regime 
in 2011 and trying to do the same in Syria from 2011, and above all, displacing a legitimate 
and democratically elected (although corrupt) president in Ukraine in February 2014. This 
is what turned Russia into a neo-revisionist power: opposed to the practices of the US-led 
liberal power system but committed to the institutions of international society (the 
conservative institutionalist position). This does not mean that Russia is out to subvert 
Western democracy, a charge first formulated in the Steele dossier, repeated almost 
verbatim in the ICA of 6 January 2017, and then echoed ad nauseam in endless 
commentary thereafter. The charge simply does not make sense in any intelligible 
framework of Russian foreign policy. This is not to say that there are no ‘active measures’ 
by Russian agents, affiliated bodies and even civic activists. However, Russia is not the 
quasi-totalitarian authoritarian body portrayed by radical liberals, although it is far from the 
open and democratic society portrayed by much of the Russian mass media.  
Second, domestic partisanship reinforced the deep cultural roots of the portrayal 
of Russia as America’s ‘dark double’. The renewed emergence of a challenger in the 
international system prompted the mobilisation of values as well as cultural stereotypes in 
the struggle.1380 As diplomacy and dialogue failed, sanctions become a permanent fixture 
in Russo-US relations. The punitive actions against Russia far exceed anything imposed 
by Trump’s predecessors even at the height of the cold war and are potentially 
comparable to the sanctions imposed on Japan in the months leading up to Tokyo’s Pearl 
Harbour attack in December 1941. The Trump administration and Congress imposed no 
fewer than 46 sanctions packages on Russia. The CAATSA measures adopted in August 
2017 constrained Trump’s room for manoeuvre and rendered it impossible for him to 
fulfil his ambition to ‘get on’ with Russia. The sanctions legislation is based on the view 
that they would split the Russian elite and encourage the ‘oligarchs’ to turn against Putin. 
Tony Wood rejects this premise, arguing that Russian political economy as it developed 
in the Yeltsin era simply does not work that way and intra-elite splits are unlikely to be 
provoked by external actions. In addition, when faced by outside pressure, the stoicism 
and powers of endurance inherited from the history of repeated invasions only tighten the 
bond between the elite and the people.1381 They also reinforce the alignment between 
Russia and China. A commentary in China Daily notes that ‘When US political elites 
cannot solve the country’s domestic problems, they tend to divert American’s people’s 
attention to external issues’.1382 
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Third, the reaction to Russia’s intervention in 2016 became part of the larger 
response to Trump’s election. Gessen notes that ‘Russia has served as a crutch for the 
American imagination. It is used to explain how Trump could have happened to us, and it 
is also called upon to give us hope. When the Russian conspiracy behind Trump is finally 
exposed, our national nightmare will be over’. She notes that the ‘most troublesome aspect’ 
of the Trump-Putin story was ‘leaks from intelligence agencies’: ‘Virtually none of the 
information can be independently corroborated. The context, sequence, and timing of the 
leaks is determined by people unknown to the public, which is expected to accept 
anonymous stories on faith; nor have we yet been given any hard evidence of active 
collusion by Trump officials’.1383 The special counsel investigation became a weapon to 
devitalise incumbents, but it is pertinent to ask: ‘Do we really want the special-counsel 
investigation to become a staple of presidential life?’.1384 The methods of the ‘resistance’ 
exacerbated the problems which they sought to address. Trump turned ‘the country, and to 
some extent even the world, upside down’, but his opponents, ‘to get rid of their hated 
enemy, are ready to tear down their own house’.1385  
This brings us to the fourth point. This is where truth itself becomes the subject of 
contestation and subordinated to partisan goals. Gessen puts this well: ‘The dream 
fuelling the Russia frenzy is that it will eventually create a dark enough cloud of 
suspicion around Trump that Congress will find the will and the grounds to impeach him. 
If that happens, it will have resulted largely from a media campaign orchestrated by 
members of the intelligence community – setting a dangerous political precedent that will 
have corrupted the public sphere and promoted paranoia’. 1386 Trump is famous for his 
cavalier disregard for facts and the abusive use of the term ‘fake news’ to dismiss 
criticism, but there could be no automatic assumption that Trump’s opponents, by mere 
dint of countering his falsehoods, were themselves the upholders of truth. Instead, too 
often the ‘resistance’ and others critical of Trump simply pursued axiological politics, 
only with an opposite polarity. This also applies to condemnation of Russian 
‘disinformation’. Russia’s official agencies and media have a distinctive and often self-
serving view of the world. There are well-documented cases when they have acted in 
concert to assert falsehoods or distorted material to fit the official narrative. Mostly, 
though, the Russian media advances positions that while often critical of the West, are 
based on a legitimate different viewpoint, and thus add to the pluralism of information 
that is essential for healthy democratic societies. Attempts to muzzle the Russian 
international media undermine the principles that liberal democracies proclaim to uphold, 
while neo-containment policies against Russia destabilise global order. 
The fifth point follows directly from this. Russia became the scapegoat not only 
for the failure of the Clinton campaign in 2016, but also for the larger crisis of the 
American polity. Russia was accused of exacerbating the polarisation of American 
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politics by ‘sowing discord’. However, the best way of dealing with domestic problems is 
to resolve them, rather than blaming some external force for talking about them. This also 
applies to Russia spreading ‘fake news’ and misinformation. As Trenin notes, ‘The only 
meaningful way of dealing with adversarial (dis)information attacks is fixing the 
vulnerabilities of one’s own system that invite such attacks’.1387 However, dealing with 
domestic problems, as the Black Lives Matter protests demonstrated, is much harder than 
simply blaming them on some external cause. Equally, in matters of international politics, 
it is too easy to dismiss Russian concerns as ‘disinformation’ when in fact they often 
represent policy differences that in the past were respected and addressed through 
diplomatic means. In the new cold war the legitimacy of policy differences is rejected, 
and complex questions are presented in starkly binary moralistic terms. 
 Trump condemned America’s crumbling infrastructure, as well as the 
marginalisation of communities by ill-managed globalisation and poorly considered 
military globalism, but he had no real solutions to offer. His advocacy of economic 
nationalism represented a beggar-my-neighbour approach to international affairs, in 
which America’s global power dominance could be levered to its benefit. His liberal 
critics rightly stressed the importance of the rule of law and civility, but the norms of 
constitutionalism and impartial state institutions were undermined in the wake of the 
2016 shock. Democrats believed that the election had been ‘stolen’, but it was lost in the 
most profound sense. The conditions that gave rise to Trump remain, and only when they 
are addressed will the crisis be resolved. Overcoming the Russiagate syndrome is no easy 
task, but the greater challenge is to address its causes. For that new politics is required 
that breaks out of cold war thinking at home and abroad. Trump is the destructive 
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